





# HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

IN A NEW EDITION.

WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

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from her Mother 13<sup>th</sup> February 18  
THE

# HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

A NEW EDITION,

WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED

A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,

BY HIS BROTHER,

LORD REDESDALE.

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# HISTORY OF GREECE



A NEW EDITION

WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION AND CORRECTIONS

TO THE SECOND EDITION

A NEW EDITION OF THE HISTORY

OF GREECE

BY H. N. SPENCER

IN FOUR VOLUMES

VOL. VI

LONDON

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# CONTENTS

OF

VOL. VI.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

*Affairs of the Grecian settlements of Sicily and Italy  
from the death of the first Dionysius to the restora-  
tion of the second Dionysius.*

SECT. I. *Election of the second Dionysius to the dignity of general-  
autocrator. Peace of eleven years. Parties in opposition under  
Dion and Heraclides. Banishment of Heraclides* . . . Page 1

SECT. II. *Measures of Dion for war against Dionysius. New  
settlement of Nazus under Andromachus. Return of Dion to  
Sicily in arms. Return of Heraclides in arms. Dionysius be-  
sieged in the citadel. Death of Philistus* . . . 9

SECT. III. *Declining popularity of Dion; advancing influence of  
Heraclides. Retreat of Dion from Syracuse. Ill success of  
Heraclides. Recall of Dion, and failure again of popularity.  
Interference of the Lacedæmonians. Surrender of the citadel to  
Dion* . . . . . 17

SECT. IV. *Power of Dion. Measures for reforming the consti-  
tution. Assassination of Heraclides. Tyranny and assassination  
of Dion* . . . . . 26

SECT. V. *The Athenian Callippus general-autocrator of Syracuse.  
Hipparinus general-autocrator. Ill condition of the Grecian cities  
of Sicily. Quiet of the Italian cities. Restoration of Dionysius  
in Syracuse* . . . . . 32

VOL. VI.

b



## CHAPTER XXXIII.

*Affairs of the Grecian settlements in Sicily and Italy from the restoration of the younger Dionysius to the death of Timoleon.*

SECT. I. Expedition of the Carthaginians into Sicily under Hanno. Grecian cities in Sicily under the government of single chiefs. Death of the widows of Dion and of the elder Dionysius. Application for interference of Corinth in the affairs of Sicily. Circumstances of Corinth. Timoleon appointed to manage the Corinthian interest in Sicily . . . . . Page 37

SECT. II. Expedition of Timoleon to Sicily. Opposition of Greeks and Carthaginians to the interference of Corinth in Sicily. First and second campaigns of Timoleon. Final retreat of Dionysius 45

SECT. III. Desolation of Syracuse. Difficulty of Timoleon to reward his conquering troops. Provocation to Carthage. New invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians. Mutiny in Timoleon's army. Battle of the Crimesus. New measures of the Carthaginians. Measures of Timoleon. Peace with Carthage . . . . . 53

SECT. IV. Measures of Timoleon to reduce the independent Grecian chiefs of Sicily. Successes and cruelties. Measures to repopulate the country; to restore law and order. Singular magistracy. Despotic character of Timoleon's administration. Extent of the revolution. Prosperity of the new people. Fate of Dionysius and his family . . . . . 64

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

*Affairs of Macedonia from the reign of Perdiccas son of Alexander to the establishment of Philip son of Amyntas.*

SECT. I. Macedonian constitution. Macedonian territory. State of Macedonia under Perdiccas son of Alexander. Splendid and beneficent reign of Archelaus son of Perdiccas . . . . . 81

SECT. II. Disputed succession and civil war. Acquisition of the throne by Amyntas son of Philip. Bardylis prince of Illyria.



*Hereditary interest of the Macedonian royal family in Thessaly. Revival of the Olynthian confederacy. Ancient connexion of Macedonia with Athens revived and improved. Grecian princes of Lyncestis* . . . . . Page 95

SECT. III. *Reign of Alexander son of Amyntas. Macedonian interest in Thessaly maintained. Accession of Perdiccas son of Amyntas. The family of Amyntas supported by the Athenian general Iphicrates. Breach of alliance with Athens and connexion with Thebes. Illyrian invasion, and death of Perdiccas* . . . . . 106

SECT. IV. *Accession of Philip son of Amyntas. Pretenders to the throne. War and negotiations with Illyrians, Pæonians, Thracians, and Athenians. Renewed alliance of Macedonia with Athens* . . . . . 117

## CHAPTER XXXV.

*Affairs of Athens from the general peace following the battle of Mantinea, and of Macedonia, from the establishment of Philip son of Amyntas, to the renewal of war between Macedonia and Athens.*

SECT. I. *Revived political eminence of Athens. Increasing defect in the restored constitution. Uneasy situation of eminent men. Opportunity for political adventurers. Unsteadiness of government. Decay of patriotism. Subserviency of administration to popular passion. Decay of military virtue. Tyranny of popular sovereignty over subject states* . . . . . 131

SECT. II. *Projects for improving the Athenian revenue. Affairs of the Athenian colony of Amphipolis. Produce of the Thracian gold-mines. Summary of affairs of the Olynthian confederacy. Opposition of Olynthian and Athenian interest. Alliance of Olynthus with Amphipolis* . . . . . 148

SECT. III. *Armament under Timotheus. Expedition proposed to Asia; diverted to Samos. Measures of Timotheus against Olynthus. Co-operation of the king of Macedonia. Injurious conduct of Athens towards Macedonia* . . . . . 154

SECT. IV. *Expedition under Iphicrates against Amphipolis. Supercession of Iphicrates by Timotheus. State of the Thracian Chersonese. Acquisition of Amphipolis to the Athenian empire. Honors to Charidemus of Eubœa* . . . . . 158

- SECT. V. *Restored extent of the Athenian empire. Mal-administration of Athens. Growing oppression of the allies. Revolt of Rhodes, Cos, Chios, and Byzantium, and war ensuing, commonly called the Social or Confederate war. Revolt of Eubæa: summary history of Eubæa; interference of Thebes in Eubæa. Expedition under Timotheus, and liberal composition of the affairs of Eubæa. War impending from Macedonia* . . . Page 168

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

*Affairs of Athens and Macedonia from the renewal of hostility between them to the end of the war between the Athenians and their allies, called the Confederate or Social war.*

- SECT. I. *Historical memorials from the orators. Alliance of Macedonia with Olynthus against Athens. Negotiation between Athens, Macedonia, and Olynthus. Hostilities prosecuted. Successes of the allies* . . . . . 181
- SECT. II. *Cotys, king of Thrace. Expedition of Philip into Thrace. Acquisition and improved management of the Thracian gold-mines. Affairs of Thessaly. Liberal conduct of Philip in Thessaly, and advantages ensuing* . . . . . 192
- SECT. III. *Affairs of Thrace. Different views of parties in Athens concerning foreign interests. Measures for recovering the dominion of the Thracian Chersonese. Charidemus of Eubæa, citizen of Athens, and son-in-law of the king of Thrace. Assassination of the king of Thrace, approved and rewarded by the Athenian people* . . . . . 200
- SECT. IV. *Cephisodotus Athenian commander in Thrace. Political principles of the Athenian administration. Rebellion encouraged in Thrace. Admirable moral principle of the Thracians. Athenodorus Athenian commander. Pressure upon the young king of Thrace. Mission of Chabrias to Thrace, and liberal composition of differences* . . . . . 207
- SECT. V. *Slowness of the Athenians in the Confederate war. Expedition under Chares; death of Chabrias. Characters of Chares and of the Athenian people. Offensive operations of the allies. Exertion of the Athenians. Relief of Samos. Trial of Timotheus and Iphicrates* . . . . . 215



SECT. VI. <i>Deficient supply to the armament under Chares. Irregular measure of the armament. Oration of Isocrates on peace. Peace with the confederates</i>	Page 223
---	----------

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

*Affairs of Greece during the first period of the contest for possession of the temple and treasury of Delphi, called the Phocian or the Sacred war.*

SECT. I. <i>Persevering ambition of the leading Grecian republics. Circumstances of the council of Amphictyons. Summary history of Phocis. Ancient sacred wars. Regulation of the council of Amphictyons by Solon: treasure deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia. Subjection of Delphi to Lacedæmon, and depression of the Amphictyonic authority</i>	234
SECT. II. <i>State of Thebes after the death of Epaminondas. Prosecution of Lacedæmon by the Thebans in the court of Amphictyons. Prosecution of Phocis</i>	252
SECT. III. <i>Decrees of the Amphictyons against Lacedæmon and Phocis. Alarm of the Phocians. Philomelus general of the Phocians. Support from Lacedæmon to Phocis. Expulsion of the Amphictyons from Delphi</i>	260
SECT. IV. <i>Measures of Philomelus for defence of Delphi and Phocis: difficulties of the Phocians: violence of their enemies: oracle: manifesto of Philomelus: disposition of Athens: disposition of other states: allies of Thebes: barbarity of Thebans: retaliation: death of Philomelus</i>	267
SECT. V. <i>Negotiation for peace between Thebes and Phocis unsuccessful. Assistance from Thebes to the satrap of Phrygia, otherwise Bithynia, against the king of Persia. War of invective among the Greeks. Onomarchus successor of Philomelus. Invasion of Doris and Bæotia by Onomarchus</i>	280
SECT. VI. <i>Politics of Athens. Circumstances of Macedonia: marriage of Philip: circumstances of the kingdom of Epirus. Disposition to peace thwarted by a party in Athens: confederacy against Macedonia: accumulated successes of Philip</i>	288
SECT. VII. <i>Politics of Athens. Orators. Measures for acquiring dominion in Thrace. Areopagitic oration of Isocrates</i>	296

SECT. VIII. <i>Purpose of the war-party to carry war into Asia. Opposition of Demosthenes. Circumstances of Methone and of Thrace. Chares general-autocrator in Thrace. Massacre of the Sestians. Conquest of the Thracian Chersonese; and partition of the Thracian monarchy</i>	Page 304
---	----------

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

### *Affairs of Greece during the second period of the Sacred war, when Macedonia was implicated.*

SECT. I. <i>New views of the war-party in Athens. Trespass on the Delphian treasury. Methone taken by Philip. Invasion of Thesaly by the Phocians, assisted by Athens, opposed by Macedonia: victory of Onomarchus and distress of Philip: death of Onomarchus, and liberal use of victory by Philip</i>	311
SECT. II. <i>Phajllus successor to Onomarchus: large assistance to Phocis: Bæotia invaded, and Epicnemidian Locris conquered: Phalæcus successor to Phajllus</i>	325
SECT. III. <i>State of parties in Athens: Isocrates; Phocion; Æschines; Demosthenes: Grecian settlements in Scythia. Politics of Demosthenes before he acquired a share in the administration</i>	329
SECT. IV. <i>Project of the Lacedæmonian government for an extensive arrangement of interests in Greece: tract of Isocrates, entitled Archidamus: constitution of the new Arcadian city of Megalopolis: oration of Demosthenes against the project: war in Peloponnesus: imperfect accommodation: continuation of the Sacred war between Phocis and Thebes</i>	346
SECT. V. <i>Sedition at Rhodes: speech of Demosthenes for the Rhodians. Troubles of Eubæa: Phocian commander of the Athenian forces in Eubæa: battle of Tamynæ. Embassy from Thebes to the court of Persia. Treaties of subsidy between the Persian court and the Grecian republics</i>	358

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

### *Affairs of Greece during the third period of the Sacred war, when Athens and Macedonia became principal parties.*

SECT. I. <i>Chronology of the times. Naval successes of Macedonia against Athens: opening for negotiation alarming to the war-party</i>
---



<i>at Athens: Philip's popularity alarming: measures of the war-party: Olynthus gained from the Macedonian to the Athenian alliance: embassy of Æschines to Peloponnesus: Philippics of Demosthenes</i>	Page 374
SECT. II. <i>Olynthian war: Macedonian Olympic festival: apology for the conduct of Chares: Macedonian bribes</i>	390
SECT. III. <i>New measures of the Athenian war-party: revolution in Phocis: licentiousness of Chares in military command: uneasiness of the public mind at Athens: disposition of the war-party to treat for peace: mission of the player Aristodemus to Macedonia: counter-revolution in Phocis: coalition of parties at Athens: embassy of Ten from Athens to Macedonia</i>	404
SECT. IV. <i>Progress of the embassy to Pella: audience: return and report to the council and people. Policy of the war-party: condition of Synedrian or subject-allies. Embassy of Three from Macedonia to Athens. Decree for peace and alliance with Macedonia. Treatment of the king of Thrace. Departure of the Macedonian ministers from Athens</i>	416
SECT. V. <i>Judicial inquiry into dilapidation of the Delphian treasury. Continuation of war between Phocis and Thebes. Distress of Thebes, and solicitation for support from Macedonia: alarm of Phocis and Lacedæmon: alarm of the war-party in Athens</i>	427
SECT. VI. <i>Congress of Grecian embassies at the Macedonian court. Proceedings of the Athenian embassy. Report to the council and people</i>	436
SECT. VII. <i>New measures of the war-party in Athens hostile to Macedonia. Oration of Isocrates to Philip</i>	446
SECT. VIII. <i>Effect of the oration of Isocrates. Measures of the king of Macedonia. Measures of the Phocians. Negotiation of all parties with Macedonia. End of the Sacred war. Judgment on the Phocians committed to the Amphictyons. Credit acquired by the king of Macedonia</i>	459



THE  
HISTORY OF GREECE.

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CHAPTER XXXII.

*Affairs of the Grecian settlements of Sicily and Italy from the death of the first Dionysius to the restoration of the second Dionysius.*

SECTION I.

*Election of the second Dionysius to the dignity of general-autocrat. Peace of eleven years. Parties in opposition under Dion and Heraclides. Banishment of Dion and Heraclides.*

THE discussion of the character of the elder Dionysius and of his government, longer perhaps and more particular than would generally become historical composition, seemed warranted, and even required, by the importance of the portion of history, and by the obscurity and contradictions in which that portion of history hath been enwrapped; nor may it be less necessary toward exhibiting in just light an important sequel.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

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On the death of a man who had presided over the government so many years, with uncommon ability, and perhaps yet more uncommon success, it was matter of most serious consideration for all the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, but especially the Syracusans, and most especially those who had been his

CHAP.  
XXXII.

principal supporters, how and by whom the administration should in future be directed. To preserve peace and union, and means for common exertion against a threatening common enemy, among so many portions of the little empire, long habituated to discord within each and among all, it seems to have been extensively felt that one chief, with some permanence of power, was necessary, and that, for such a chief, eminence of birth was an important qualification. With these views the family of the late general-autocrator would stand among the foremost for public notice. Dionysius had left by Doris, daughter of Xenetus of Locri, a son also named Dionysius, already advanced in manhood; and by Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, his late colleague in the office of general-autocrator, two sons, Hipparinus and Narsæus, yet under age. But the elder Hipparinus had also left a son, Dion; and the family of Hipparinus was the first, or among the first, of Syracuse. Dion then was some years older than the younger Dionysius: with considerable talents, cultivated under the first philosophers of the age, and especially Plato, he had the farther advantage, derived from his late brother-in-law's favor, of having been versed in high employments military and civil; and to these he added that of possessing the largest patrimonial fortune of the Sicilian Greeks. Thus eminent he aspired to the first eminence, and before the death of the elder Dionysius he had begun the secret practices to prepare the way for stepping into his place.

Diodor.  
Plut. vit.  
Dion.

Corn. Nep.  
v. Dion.

The younger Dionysius was not his equal either in ability or in ambition. But Dion had made himself obnoxious by a morose and haughty temper. Dionysius was more popular among the many through his father's popularity, and more agreeable to the



principal men for his pleasanter manners. Philistus especially supported him.<sup>1</sup> But the important election was to be made, as in a democracy, by the voice of the sovereign people. The general assembly was convened. Young Dionysius, addressing the multitude, solicited that good will which he said he hoped, little as he had yet had opportunity to earn it, would attach to him for his father's merits, and pass to him as an inheritance. Of any opposition on the occasion we have no account.

SECT.  
I.

B. C. 364.  
Ol. 182. 1.  
Diod. l. 15.  
c. 74.  
[B. C. 367.  
Cl. Sec  
c. 31. s. 8.]

The silence of the adverse writers concerning transactions in Sicily, during eleven years after the accession of the younger Dionysius to the supreme power in Syracuse, forms no small eulogy of his administration, and reflects very great credit on that of his predecessor, who had established the advantageous order of things which gave means for such a phenomenon in Grecian history. While the mild temper of the government provoked no enemies, the naval and military force, ready at its command, deterred aggression. Respected abroad and cherished at home, the only murmurs, noticed even by adverse writers,

<sup>1</sup> The story told by Plutarch of Dionysius having given the tyranny of Syracuse and Sicily by a testamentary devise is so little consonant with what was either usual among the Greeks, or likely to have happened in his particular circumstances, that the clear testimony of Diodorus to a more probable and ordinary course of things is hardly necessary for its refutation. Plutarch's idea seems to have been drawn from Roman times, or Greek after the conquest of the Persian empire. For the age of Dionysius, he should still have attended to the tragic poet's information of what tyranny was, and how to be acquired, with which the account of Diodorus perfectly accords. The phrase *πρῶτον τὰ πλήθη συναγαγών*, and indeed the whole account of Diodorus, shows that not only the form, but the reality, of popular sovereignty remained.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

were of restless spirits, who reprobated that want of energy, as they called it, which allowed the Carthaginians to hold their Sicilian possessions; while sober men could not but consider the maintenance of peace with that preponderant power, unsullied by any degrading concession, as indicating political conduct the most beneficial and praiseworthy. In the uncommon peace thus enjoyed, the Sicilian towns, and especially Syracuse, flourished beyond example; and the benefits appear to have been in no small degree extended to the Italian cities, which acquiesced under the superintending authority of the younger, as before of the elder, Dionysius. The many self-governed little states, thus united under one executive administration, in the manner nearly of the Athenian confederacy under Pericles, formed one state altogether the most powerful at that time existing in Europe.<sup>2</sup> The peace of Sicily appears to have remained wholly undisturbed. In Italy hostilities occurred only with the Lucanians. The Syracusan government undertook the conduct of the war, and the younger Dionysius has the credit of having commanded in some successful actions which brought the enemy to submission. The moderation and generosity which restrained ambition and rapacity, and gave easy terms to the conquered, were taken by the ill-affected as ground, apparently in the scarcity of other ground, for invective against the administration. Except in this little war, the growth of piracy in the Adriatic alone gave occasion for any use of arms. That evil was repressed by the Syracusan fleets; and, to prevent

<sup>2</sup> Μεγίστη τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην δυνατειῶν ἀρχή. Diod. l. 16. c. 5. Τυραννίδι τῇ πασῶν ἐπιφανεστάτῃ καὶ μεγίστῃ. Plut. vit. Timol. p. 242.

more effectually the renewal of maritime depredation in those seas, two towns were founded, in places commodious for naval stations, on the coast of Apulia. SECT.  
I.

The advantages however of the administration of the younger Dionysius appear to have been little owing to his own character, but much to the able men who had been his father's friends and assistants, and especially the venerable Philistus. If Dionysius had himself talents for business, he appears to have had little disposition to use them. All his father's passion for literature indeed he seems to have had, but with an excessive propensity, which, if his father ever had, his great mind overbore it,<sup>3</sup> for pleasure and dissipation. That he had some quickness of judgment as well as of wit, much good humor, and a temper not easily ruffled, appears from anecdotes of his later life, preserved with a purpose very wide of flattery. Easiness and generosity are also marked in him in the course of the narrative of Diodorus, and remain attested even by his contemporary enemy Timæus. But his dissipation, and especially his drunkenness, made him contemptible. Arist. Polit.  
I. 5. c. 10.

With such a character at the head of a government, whether tyranny, aristocracy, or democracy, (and the government of Syracuse seems clearly to have been compounded of the three, with the addition, from the Sicilian and Italian cities, of a large portion of what has been called federalism,) it may well be wondered that quiet could be maintained so long, but not that troubles should at length arise. Philistus, who seems chiefly to have directed things, would be sometimes ill-supported, and always envied. Two

<sup>3</sup> 'Minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus.' Corn. Nep. de reg.



CHAP.  
XXXII.

Plut. v.  
Dion.

principal men opposed him, Dion and Heraclides. The former, maternal uncle of Dionysius, was in character the reverse of his nephew, ambitious, active, austere, singularly austere, and haughty. He had some popular virtues; and, for the sake of power, he cultivated popularity; but his political principles were aristocratical, and his temper, perhaps yet more than his political principles, was adverse to the acquisition of any extensive and dangerous popularity. Heraclides was more of the courtier. With much ambition, much courage, much activity, he had a temper that could accommodate itself to acquire the favor equally of prince and people. Through the favor of the general-autocrator he was next in military command under him: through the favor of the people he was the most dangerous man in Syracuse to his government.

Of Heraclides we have very little account; and of Dion in some respects too little, in other more than enough; for much from Plutarch is evidently fable. Nevertheless in comparing Plutarch with the honest though prejudiced Diodorus, and both, as opportunity offers, with other writers, means are found for appreciating, in considerable amount, what is related by all. It seems probable that the elder Dionysius had taken measures for securing to his son the succession to the high rank which himself held, by the favor both of the principal men and of the multitude. We owe to the Roman biographer, less a party writer than either Diodorus or Plutarch, the information that Dion, even before his brother-in-law's death, engaged in secret measures for supplanting his nephew. This was discovered, yet the easy liberality of the younger Dionysius forgave it, and Dion was not only still admitted to his society and counsels,

Corn. Nep.  
v. Dion.



but was among the most respected and favored in both. It was at the instance of Dion, it is said, that Plato was invited to revisit Syracuse, and assist in improving the laws and constitution. However doubtful may be the accounts of Plato's voyages to Sicily, and of the circumstances of his residence there, yet this may deserve notice concerning them. If they are true, it follows that the government of Syracuse remained in a great degree popular under each Dionysius; for the very purpose for which the philosopher is said to have been invited was to arrange a free government. But if the accounts are fictitious, they show that the author of the fiction, which has obtained so much credit, either was aware that the government of Syracuse was free, or considered it as general opinion, which, to make his fiction popular, it would be necessary to respect.

It is likely nevertheless that Dion had reason to be dissatisfied with his nephew's conduct, as it tended to weaken and expose to ruin the well-combined system of government under which Sicily had so long flourished; and it is moreover likely that his haughty and austere manner in remonstrance might make his counsels daily less acceptable to the general-autocrator. Philistus then enjoying the greatest favor with the first magistrate, and Heraclides with the people, Dion with much uneasiness found himself in an inferior situation, where he reckoned he ought to have held the first. Thus disappointed and soured, he was led to a line of conduct which nothing could justify, engaging in secret correspondence with the governor of the Carthaginian settlements in Sicily. Some of his letters were intercepted and delivered to Dionysius. From these it was discovered that while, for a blind, formal communication was carried on by

Plut. v.  
Dion.  
p. 963.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

Plut. &  
Corn. Nep.  
v. Dion.  
Diod. 1. 16.

the Carthaginian governor with the Syracusan administration, secret negotiation was going forward with Dion. Of its tenor information from ancient writers fails, but that the purpose was the advancement of Dion's power in Syracuse, to the overthrow of that of Dionysius and his immediate friends, is clearly implied. Dionysius, before aware, as the Roman biographer says, that Dion excelled him in talents, and was gaining upon him in popularity, now saw that it was no longer possible for both to live in Sicily.

Occasion has occurred heretofore to observe that it was too much the way of writers of the ages of Diodorus and Plutarch, deficient in their accounts of public affairs, to relate secret transactions and private conversation, the most unlikely to become known, with as much confidence as if they had been present. Plutarch has undertaken to say what passed between Dion and Philistus concerning the intercepted letters, and he has reported, in still more detail, a conversation between Dion and Dionysius on the same occasion. What concurrent testimonies speak to is, that Dion was detected in a conspiracy for overthrowing the existing administration of Syracuse, and establishing himself in the chief authority; that he was in consequence banished, and that Heraclides was banished about the same time. It seems probable that the sentence against both was given, with all constitutional formality, by a decree of the people; the interest of the administration, directed more by the able and active Philistus than by the dissipated general-autocrator, overbearing the divided causes of the leaders of opposing parties.

The generosity of Dionysius, on this occasion, remains authenticated by the unsuspecting testimony

Aristot. Pol.  
lit. 1. 5. c. 10.  
Diod. 1. 16.  
Corn. Nep.  
& Plut.  
vit. Dion.  
Justin.  
B. C. 359.  
Ol. 105.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .  
[See p. 11]

of a contemporary historian of the adverse party. To soften the fate of his uncle, consistently as far as might be with his own safety, he ordered a trireme for his accommodation to carry him to Corinth, the mother-city of Syracuse, the place he chose for his residence. Thither his large income was regularly remitted to him, and he is said to have lived in a style of princely splendor, new in Peloponnesus. Meanwhile his wife and children, remaining in Syracuse, were taken by Dionysius into his own house, and treated with the kindness and respect becoming such near relations.

Timæus,  
ap. Plut.  
vit. Dion.  
p. 963. 964.  
965.

## SECTION II.

*Measures of Dion for war against Dionysius. New settlement of Naxos under Andromachus. Return of Dion to Sicily in arms. Return of Heraclides in arms. Dionysius besieged in the citadel. Death of Philistus.*

The gratitude of Dion, even according to his panyrist, did not at all correspond with the liberal generosity of Dionysius. Proposing to use the means which he owed to it for raising troops to make war against his benefactor, it is said he consulted Plato on the subject, whose scholar and friend it was his boast to have been. Plato strongly dissuaded, but Dion nevertheless persevered. At this time more than a thousand Sicilian exiles were living in Greece. It seems probable that the greater number, or perhaps all, were a relic of the party in the several cities, which we have seen so virulent and inflexible in animosity against the elder Dionysius. Scarcely thirty could be engaged to follow Dion, who had been so many years a principal person of the opposite party. Many seem to have been of those expelled from Naxos;

Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 967.



CHAP.  
XXXII.

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and these, holding together under an eminent man of their own city, Andromachus, whom wealth enabled and talents qualified to be a chief in adventure, drew many others with them. The colony, established in the Naxian territory after the expulsion of the rebellious Sicels, in the neglect of the Syracusan government, distracted through the dissipated character of the general-autocrator, seems to have been at this time in decay. Andromachus, using a favorable opportunity, and being well seconded by the zeal of his followers, possessed himself of the height of Taurus, where the Sicels had so long resisted the elder Dionysius; and from that commanding situation he vindicated for his followers in a great degree the possession and enjoyment of the whole Naxian territory. His circumstances made the lofty fastness preferable to the otherwise far more convenient situation of the old town of Naxus below it; and under his able direction his settlement, retaining the name of Tauromenium, quickly became a flourishing republic. Timæus, whose Sicilian history is now unfortunately known only by quotations of other writers, was a son of the founder of the republic of Tauromenium.

Meanwhile both Dion and Heraclides had been levying forces in Peloponnesus, for the purpose of re-establishing themselves in Syracuse; and as the deranged state of the government there had afforded encouragement and opportunity for Andromachus, so his success would afford encouragement and promote opportunity for the Syracusan exiles. Intelligence of their preparations, and of the actual seizure of Tauromenium by Andromachus, alarmed the Syracusan administration. The direct passage from Peloponnesus across the Ionian sea to Sicily was

rarely ventured by the ancient ships of war: they commonly, as occasion has occurred formerly to observe, ranged the coast of Epirus till opposite the Iapygian promontory, and then proceeded by the Italian headlands to the Sicilian shore. The occupation of Tauromenium, if its occupiers, as might reasonably be apprehended, were in concert with Dion and Heraclides, would give facility to invasion on that side, and perhaps might afford opportunity also to detach some of the Italian cities from the Syracusan alliance. The danger appeared so threatening that Dionysius and Philistus went together to Italy to provide against it.

SECT.  
II.

Meanwhile Dion, far less successful than Heraclides in engaging Sicilian refugees, yet having collected some mercenary troops, and holding intelligence in Sicily, resolved upon a measure which has been celebrated for its novelty and boldness. The direct passage, very hazardous for the ancient ships of war, was far from being equally so for the ships of burthen. Dion therefore embarked his troops in merchant-vessels, and steered to the south of Sicily; but, avoiding the Grecian towns, he held on his course to Africa; forced thither, as his friends gave out, by the wind. Thence however he proceeded, not to any Grecian settlement, but to Minoa, a Carthaginian garrison in the Agrigentine territory. There he was received as a friend by the Carthaginian governor, who gave him important assistance for the prosecution of his purpose. Dion hastened his march with his small force toward Syracuse, and the Carthaginian governor meanwhile managed for him conveyance of arms, which he brought to distribute among his partizans in the island. The friendship of Carthage moreover would procure him the friendly aid of all

B. C. 358.  
Ol. 105. 3.  
[B. C. 357.  
Cl.]

Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 9.

Plut. vit.  
Dion.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

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the Sicans, and probably some of the Sicels, and perhaps even some Greeks; for few of the Grecian towns, especially of the west of the island, were without a Carthaginian party.<sup>4</sup> But everywhere all who were adverse to the ruling party, and all who apprehended that the administration of Dionysius was tottering, would be half prepared to join him. In a proclamation adapted to the general temper, or to the temper of a large part of the Sicilian Greeks, Dion declared that his purpose was to give liberty to all; and before he reached Syracuse he had collected an army, it is said, of twenty thousand men.

Probable as it is that, with all the advantage which Dionysius had in the able advice of Philistus, there would be considerable errors in his administration, it is remarkable enough that none regarding public measures are specified by the adverse historians. They pry into his house and his family for accusation against him. They say that, when Dion's purpose of bringing war against his country was ascertained by open preparation, Dionysius, in revenge for his ingratitude and perfidy, compelled his sister, Dion's wife, to repudiate her husband and take another. The credit due to such an account from an adverse faction, whether for the manner and circumstances, or for the fact itself, is hardly to be estimated. But the administration, in the absence of Dionysius and Philistus, remained certainly in hands either weak

<sup>4</sup> It seems probable that, if the history of Philistus had remained to us, we should have seen that the Carthaginian connexion was the popular topic, urged by the party of Dionysius, that pressed most against Dion; and it seems to have been to counterwork this that the accusation was retorted, evidently enough without foundation, and yet ingeniously enough to have perhaps some effect upon the popular mind at the time, as applicable to the elder Dionysius.



or faithless. Dion became master of the city without a blow, the island only excepted. The numerous population, some part always disposed to Dion, a greater part indisposed to the existing administration, and expecting the desired arrival of Heraclides, some swayed by the alarm and some by the encouragement of the moment, all flocked out to meet and earn the favor or allay the resentment of the rising power. Dion, in a sort of royal, or as it would be called by an adverse party, tyrannical state, conspicuous for his fine armour, and surrounded by a body-guard of foreigners, addressed the obsequious multitude, and recommended the immediate election of commanders, fit, he said, in the style commonly used for alluring the multitude, to lead them to the overthrow of tyranny and the establishment of freedom. The choice, under the existing circumstances, could not be doubtful; universal acclamation raised Dion and his brother Megacles to the high office of autocrator-generals, and a body-guard was allowed them, as appurtenant to that dignity. No symptom of opposition appearing, they led the way, in a kind of triumph, through Achradina to the Agora. Sacrifices, thanksgivings, festivals, whatever might encourage among the people the hope and imagination of great advantages in the revolution, followed; and, while the informed and serious looked with anxious apprehension to the future, the thoughtless multitude enjoyed for the moment a real happiness, for which they paid Dion with the grossest flattery, equalling him with the gods.

SECT.  
II.Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 10.Plut. vit.  
Dion.Ibid.  
p. 972. E.Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 11.

But that government which had made Syracuse the greatest city of the Greek nation, the capital of the flourishing settlements of Sicily and Italy, and had been able to maintain it so many years in so un-

CHAP.  
XXXII.

common a tranquillity, though thus violently interrupted and put in imminent danger, was not so to be in a moment overthrown and annihilated. Dionysius and Philistus, returning not till seven days after Dion had been in possession of the city, found themselves nevertheless, by the command of the strong fortress of the island, by the attachment of the fleet, and by an interest yet among those who had submitted to Dion, in circumstances to propose an accommodation by which civil war might have been avoided. But Dion, haughty and unbending, for so much even his panegyrists allow, would accede to no equal terms, and yet feared the unpopularity likely to be incurred by the refusal of them. To obviate this his partizans imputed insincerity to their adversaries in proposing negotiation. Arms then being resorted to, and Dion, while his troops were roughly handled, being himself severely wounded, his partizans reproached Dionysius for breach of faith, as if a treaty had been going forward or even concluded. Nevertheless Dionysius again invited negotiation, which Dion persevered in avoiding, while he diligently prosecuted works for blockading the fortress. Composition, even his encomiasts avow, was not his purpose; he would compel Dionysius either to surrender at discretion or quit Sicily.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 12.

c. 13.

The rapidity and the amount of Dion's first success had brought unexpected credit to his cause; but when the extent of his design became more manifest, and men had leisure to reflect upon the probable and even necessary consequences of a revolution, his progress was presently checked, and it appeared that an adverse party, or even more than one adverse party, remained, capable of contending with him for superiority. The fleet continued faithful to the old

c. 16.

government; and Philistus, passing again to Italy, where also its interest was yet good, procured from Rhegium alone, flourishing under the party established in power by the elder Dionysius, five hundred horse. He did not fear then to return to Syracuse by land; and Leontini having declared for Dion, he made a vigorous assault upon it. He was repelled, but he proceeded without any check to his march, and joined Dionysius in the citadel.

Meanwhile in the city things had taken a new face. Dion had quickly ceased to be the god who could command the minds of all men. Already symptoms of dissatisfaction had appeared among the multitude, when Heraclides arrived from Peloponnesus, and was received with extensive satisfaction. He pretended the same zeal with Dion for what they called the popular cause, against Dionysius; but with little disposition to coalesce with Dion, and none to act under his orders. He had found among the Sicilian exiles, and in the Peloponnesian states, a favor which Dion could not obtain. He brought a force with him considerably greater; and the popularity of his character seems to have produced shortly some desertion in the Syracusan fleet, which Dion had vainly tempted. Nor was Heraclides supported only by the multitude. Those of higher rank, either disgusted with the haughty manner, or fearing the imperious temper of Dion, concurred in the policy of supporting a rival. Dion was compelled to concede, so far that, the command in chief of the land force remaining to him, Heraclides was appointed, by a popular decree, to the independent command of the fleet. Dion had assumed a guard for his person, and a similar guard, by a vote of the people, was allowed to Heraclides. Jointly they seem to have

SECT.  
II.

Corn. Nep.  
vit. Dion.  
Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 972.

Corn. Nep.  
vit. Dion.



CHAP.  
XXXII.

been deficient in nothing that might give them, equally at least with either Dionysius, a claim to the title of tyrants of Syracuse.

Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 975. 976.

Heraclides soon collected a fleet such that he could offer battle, and he gained a decisive victory. The veteran Philistus, who commanded against him, fell. Plutarch has related his fate as reported by Timonides, an associate in arms of Dion, to his friend the philosopher Speusippus in Italy. According to his account, Philistus was made prisoner in the ship in which, now in his eightieth year,\* he had bravely fought. Neither his age, nor the courage which at that age he had demonstrated, nor the universally acknowledged merit of fidelity to principle and steadiness in friendship through so long and active a life, moved any spark of generosity in his illiberal victors, the friends of the reporter. Stript naked, his body, shrunk and shrivelled with years, while his mind remained so vigorous, was exhibited to the derision of the thoughtless multitude, and, not till they were sated with the abominable joke, he was deliberately put to death. Boys were then encouraged to drag the corpse about the city, and the odious scene was concluded by tumbling it, denied the rites of burial, into the stone-quarries. It marks a strong stain in the character of the times, perhaps even more than of the man, that such a person as Timæus, son of the respectable chief of Naxus, giving a similar account of this base revenge, testified a malignant satisfaction in it which has drawn censure even from Plutarch. The historian Ephorus, also a contemporary, seems to have been unwilling to allow that Philistus, whose

Plut. ut  
ant.

[\* ‘Mr. Mitford, quoting Plutarch, describes Philistus as *‘now in his eightieth year.’* But this is not to be found in ‘Plutarch.’ Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 127.]

character he admired, and whose fate he lamented, would submit to be taken alive. Diodorus, apparently following his account, says that Philistus, seeing resistance useless, and escape impossible, to avoid the indignities expected from such rancorous enemies, destroyed himself. Concerning the scandalous insults to the dead body, avowed as matter of triumph by the victorious party, all have agreed. The superiority of character of the venerable sufferer seems to have been hardly less generally acknowledged. The cause indeed, in which his talents were exerted, would of course bring on him reprobation from its opponents; yet his high merit with the party with which through a long life he acted has been admitted by all.<sup>5</sup> The loss therefore of his history of Sicilian affairs, which Cicero esteemed highly for style and manner as well as for the matter, will be esteemed among the greatest suffered from the barbarism of the middle ages.<sup>6</sup>

## SECTION III.

*Declining popularity of Dion; advancing influence of Heraclides. Retreat of Dion from Syracuse. Ill success of Heraclides. Recall of Dion, and failure again of popularity. Interference of the Lacedæmonians. Surrender of the citadel to Dion.*

By the defeat of the fleet, and the loss of the man who, equally for politics and war, was his ablest and most faithful adviser, Dionysius was reduced to a

<sup>5</sup> Πλείστας μὲν καὶ μεγίστας χρείας παρεσχημένος τοῖς τυράννοις, πιστότατος δὲ τῶν φίλων τοῖς δυνάσαις γεγονώς. Diod. l. 16. c. 16.

<sup>6</sup> 'Philistum, doctum hominem et diligentem.' De Divin. l. 1. c. 20. 'Catonem cum Philisto & Thucydide comparares? —Quos enim ne e Græcis quisquam imitari potest.' De Clar. or. c. 85.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 16.  
Plut. vit.  
Dion.

Ibid.  
p. 972.

situation of extreme peril and difficulty. Immediately he again tried negotiation; founding some hope perhaps in the knowledge of dissension among his enemies. Dion, pressed by the popularity of Heraclides, was now disposed to moderation toward Dionysius. Claiming to be the deliverer of Syracuse, he had demanded public pay for more than three thousand mercenaries engaged in his service; but, thwarted by the influence of Heraclides, he could not obtain the necessary sanction of a popular vote. His situation in consequence, pledged as he was to the troops, became highly distressing. In this state of things Dionysius offered a sum equal to five months' pay, for the mercenaries, and to surrender the island and citadel upon condition of being allowed to pass to Italy, and enjoy there, under security of the Syracusan government, the revenue of his lands in Sicily. Dion exerted his influence to have the proposal accepted; but, in the debate on the question in the general assembly, free vent was given to the harshest invective against him and his foreign troops; and to this the people so listened that he was unable to carry his proposal. The tricks to which democratical government is peculiarly liable, if his panegyrist may be trusted, were resorted to for bringing farther discredit upon him. A man named Sosis, in the course of a bitter harangue, accused him of aiming at the tyranny. The next day the same man came bloody into the agora, asserting that he had been wounded by Dion's foreign soldiers, and hardly escaped assassination. Freedom of speech, he said, and all freedom would shortly be banished from Syracuse, if such crimes went unpunished. Inquiry being immediately instituted the falsehood of the story was fully proved, and Sosis, in due course of law, condemned to death



for the attempted imposture, was executed. Whether however Sosis were false or Plutarch misguided, the story assists to mark the state of Syracuse. Its happy days were gone by; and the time was come for citizens to be liable to insult and violence from foreign troops, and for the sovereign assembly to be misled by impostors.

But popular suspicion of Dion, and dislike of his foreign troops, did not die with Sosis. While he was in vain endeavouring to obtain an allowance from the public that might enable him to discharge his engagements, a measure was proposed which might straiten his private means. Citizens, it was said in the general assembly, who had deserved well and were in want, should be provided with the necessary before foreign mercenaries were rewarded. A division of lands was accordingly decreed; how far to the injury of legal property, and how far to the particular injury of Dion, who seems to have been the greatest landed proprietor among the Syracusans, we want information. A measure however followed which deprived Dion of all official authority: it was decreed that there should be a new election of generals, and that instead of one, or two, there should be no less than twenty-five. Heraclides was chosen of this numerous board, and Dion omitted.

Dion's situation was now highly critical. Fortunately for him, while the favor of the Syracusan citizens so failed, the conduct of his adversaries rendered it the more necessary for his mercenary army to make common cause with him. Confident in the superiority which discipline and practice in war would give to their small number over the Syracusan multitude, which had been habituated to a relaxed military system in an uncommon length of peace, they pro-

SECT.  
III.

Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 973. F.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 17.  
Plut. ut sup.

CHAP  
XXXII.

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posed to right themselves and their commander by force. Dion however would not, with a band of foreigners, begin hostilities against his country, whose deliverer it had been his boast to be. He persuaded his little army to abstain from violence, and march under his orders to Leontini, where he could ensure it a favorable reception. Probably Heraclides was unable to keep equal order among the Syracusans; taught by himself to believe that they had a right to exercise sovereign authority under no rule but their fancy. Under no regular command accordingly they pursued Dion; and, treating with scorn his admonition to forbear violence, they made it necessary for his troops to chastise their injurious aggression. He interfered with politic humanity to check the slaughter while they directed their precipitate flight to Syracuse, and he pursued his march to Leontini.

The dissension among those who claimed to be assertors of the liberties of Syracuse had afforded some relief to Dionysius and his friends in the island.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 17.

The blockade indeed was continued, so that a failure of provisions threatened; but, notwithstanding the enemy's decided naval superiority since the battle in which Philistus fell, opportunity was found for Dionysius himself to go in quest of supplies to Italy, where his interest was yet good. The command of the garrison meanwhile was committed to his son Apollocrates; and its numbers and fidelity, with the natural and artificial strength of the place, sufficed to make assault vain. Want however became pressing, and a negotiation for its surrender was going forward when a convoy from Locri came in sight. The Syracusans launched and manned their triremes, and proceeded against it as to a sure prey. But Nysius, a man of approved valor and talent, who commanded,

conducted the contest so ably against a very superior force that, though with the loss of four triremes, he carried in his whole convoy. SECT.  
III.

Heraclides is said to have been supported by a considerable number of principal men,<sup>7</sup> but all accounts indicate that the power, which enabled him at the same time to contend with Dionysius and drive Dion from Syracuse, was acquired principally by excessive indulgence and flattery to the multitude. The people, in consequence, became utterly unruly; they would consider the destruction or capture of four triremes, in the late action, as a victory important enough to be celebrated by a public festival; and their generals, whether accommodating themselves to the popular fancy, or following their own inclination, are said to have joined in the dissolution of moral order and military discipline, so as to have disabled themselves by inebriety. Nypsius, watchful, and supplied with intelligence, sallying in a critical moment with his whole garrison, became master of the two quarters of the city adjoining the harbour.<sup>8</sup>

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 18. 19.  
Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 974. 5. 6.

The friends of Dion who had remained in Syracuse, encouraged by this misfortune to the government of Heraclides, now ventured again, in conversation and in debate, to push the interest of their party through that of its chief. ‘It was become evident,’ they said,

<sup>7</sup> ‘Neque is minus valebat apud optimates, quorum consensu præerat classi.’ Corn. Nep. v. Dion.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch, who commonly paints with a broad brush, regardless of nice distinctions, and often indulges in a very indiscriminate use of hard names and foul language, calls Nypsius’s troops altogether barbarians. But Diodorus’s narrative, and the tenor even of Plutarch’s account, marks them to have been mostly Sicilian and Italian Greeks; though possibly, with the Locrian troops, there may have been some Lucanians, and possibly a few Gauls or Spaniards.



CHAP.  
XXXII.

‘ that there was but one man capable of averting from  
 ‘ Syracuse the horror of returning under the odious  
 ‘ tyranny of Dionysius. Another indeed in his cir-  
 ‘ cumstances might think only of revenge for the  
 ‘ gross ill-usage he had received; but Dion’s magna-  
 ‘ nimity and patriotism, it need not be doubted, would  
 ‘ forgive the offence of the Syracusan people, and  
 ‘ receive them as repentant children.’ The defect  
 of the policy of Heraclides, just before experienced  
 in prosperity, now equally showed itself in adversity.  
 He was obliged to concur in an invitation, in the  
 name of the people, for Dion to return to Syracuse.  
 There could indeed be no reasonable doubt of Dion’s  
 readiness to grant the request, which was, with the re-  
 storation of his property, to raise him again to the first  
 situation in the commonwealth.<sup>9</sup> To obtain such  
 advantages his proud mind did not disdain a com-  
 promise with Heraclides. The board of twenty-five  
 generals was dissolved of course; Dion was elected  
 general-autocrator, with Heraclides, as the elder  
 Dionysius had been formerly with Hipparinus, and  
 it was settled that the land force should be under  
 Dion’s orders, the independent command of the fleet  
 remaining to Heraclides, still the popular character,  
 especially with the seamen. Dion immediately pro-  
 ceeded to use the well-disciplined troops which had  
 returned with him against Dionysius, and with such  
 effect that Nysius was soon compelled to abandon  
 his conquest, and withdraw again within the island.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Plutarch describes much good acting on the occasion, with considerable stage effect; but the story is not fit for serious history.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch pretends that Dion’s return was opposed by Heraclides, who was made prisoner by him, and owed life and liberty to his generosity. His own account of transactions,

SECT.  
III.

The zeal of Dion's friends, on his return, but still more on this success, broke out in gross extravagancies. They paid him divine honors; Diodorus says as a hero, or demigod: Plutarch, to whom, under the Roman empire, the absurd profaneness was familiar, says they called him a god. Such extravagance could not but maintain and increase jealousy among the friends of Heraclides. It was indeed an ill-fated city whose internal peace depended upon the agreement of rival chiefs, supported by parties old in mutual animosity. Dion was still bent upon that scheme of an improved constitution, said to have been concerted with Plato. For whatever cause this was disapproved by the first Dionysius, under whom it seems to have been conceived, or by the second, to whom Dion, according to his panegyrist, would allow no rest for his urgency to carry it into execution, it was not a plan for increasing, but for checking the popular power. After his master Plato, Dion called democracy not a government, but a market for governors; or, if a phrase, the only apposite one our language affords, might be allowed, a job-market. But the power, and of course the safety, of Heraclides and his principal supporters depended upon

Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 981. D.

Plut. *ibid.*

confused and sometimes contradictory as it is, shows this very little likely; and from Diodorus and Nepos it appears clearly untrue. But Plutarch, without such improvement of the genuine accounts of Dion's life, would have wanted ground for some fine declamation which he has introduced on clemency and magnanimity. Yet however admirable such declamation may be, to found it on the demolition of the truth and even probability of history, is a practice surely not without inconvenience; and the invective against Heraclides as a popular leader on one hand, and against each Dionysius as tyrants, on the other, is so marked with malignity, and, as not only Diodorus and Nepos, but also those more respectable writers Isocrates and Polybius, show, so unsupported by fact, that even the moral tendency of the tale seems at best very questionable.

CHAP.  
XXXII.Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 979. C.

their influence among the great body of the people. Any check therefore upon the authority of the general assembly they were led by the most pressing interest to oppose. Dion, supported by his mercenary army, resisted the execution of the decree, which had actually passed, for the partition of lands and distribution of houses. Perhaps his end was just and patriotic, but his measure appears to have been violent and tyrannical. He could not conceal his dissatisfaction with the appointment of Heraclides to the independent command of the fleet. A phrase of Homer, much noticed in ancient and in modern times, was frequently in his mouth, which Pope has well, though strongly turned, ‘That worst of tyrants, ‘an usurping crowd:’ and this, with the comment which ingenious opponents could add, did him great injury in popular estimation.

Corn. Nep.  
vit. Dion.

Syracuse thus, with two parties only not at open war within the city, and a third against which both carried arms in the citadel, could not be the flourishing and commanding state which it had been under either Dionysius; and yet among the Sicilian cities Syracuse remained powerful. Among all those cities also was yet a relic of the party of Dionysius. This, the party which, from of old, had principally maintained the connexion of Syracuse with Lacedæmon, seems, in its existing distress, to have engaged the attention of the Lacedæmonian government, to which it had occasionally afforded assistance. Pharax, a Lacedæmonian, charged with the interests of Lacedæmon in Sicily, was in the Agrigentine territory with some troops under his command.<sup>11</sup> This was considered by the Syracusan government as highly

Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 979. E.

<sup>11</sup> We are here reduced to depend upon Plutarch, all notice of Sicilian affairs failing, in extant copies of Diodorus, for nearly four years.



threatening to their interest. Plutarch, commonly careless of coherency, and here more than commonly defective and confused, assigns no cause for their alarm, but proceeds to relate that, ceasing to press the siege of the island, they sent the greatest part of their force, the army under Dion, the fleet under Heraclides, to oppose Pharax. Between such rivals as Dion and Heraclides just co-operation could hardly be. Dion then, compelled by the impatience of his licentious army to fight at disadvantage, was defeated. Heraclides, presently after, without communicating his purpose to the commander of the land force, sailed eastward. Dion, apprehending he was gone for Syracuse, in extreme jealousy so hastened thither with his cavalry that, though it was night before he moved, he arrived by a march reckoned of eighty miles at the third hour of the next day.

This appears to have been esteemed by Dion's partizans a very meritorious exploit. Whether it was on any fair ground to be justified means to judge fail, but clearly it was a great party stroke for Heraclides; and his principal friends were excluded from the city. Nevertheless it was far from placing Dion and his party in any easy circumstances there; deprived of all co-operation from the fleet, which remained strongly attached to Heraclides. But the fleet felt the want of the city not less than the city of the fleet. The inducements to accommodation thus being mutual, and a Lacedæmonian, Gæsylyus, becoming mediator, a reconciliation, for the present, between the rival chiefs was effected.

What was the policy of the Lacedæmonian government at this time in regard to Sicilian affairs, or what the views of either Pharax or Gæsylyus, its officers and ministers, does not appear. No consequences of

CHAP.  
XXXII.

the victory obtained by Pharax against Dion are mentioned. The reported conduct of Gæsylus however shows that the old connexion of Lacedæmon with the party of Dionysius no longer subsisted, and that on the contrary its weight was rather given to the opposite scale. Pressed then by sea and land, former friends having become adverse, and means no longer occurring to avert threatened famine, Apollocrates negotiated for a capitulation with Dion in preference to Heraclides. Surrendering then the island and citadel, he was allowed to withdraw with his followers to his father in Italy.

#### SECTION IV.

*Power of Dion. Measures for reforming the constitution. Assassination of Heraclides. Tyranny and assassination of Dion.*

The reconciliation of Dion and Heraclides having been produced merely by political necessity, when that necessity ceased their contest for superiority was renewed. Dion represented to the people that the expense of the fleet, which pressed heavily upon them, might now be spared. The fleet accordingly was laid up, and Heraclides its commander reduced to a private station; Dion remaining general-autocrat, without any other in a situation to balance his authority.<sup>12</sup>

Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 980. A.

<sup>12</sup> In Plutarch's account the reduction of the fleet is stated first, and the surrender of the island afterward; but he is always careless of any other order in his narrative than what may set a particular fact in a striking point of view. He wanted to pass at once from the surrender of the island to a display of Dion's greatness and glory, and for this advantage he would dispense with any explanation to his reader on what ground his

Dion was now, as far as may be gathered from ancient writers, not less than either Dionysius had been, king or tyrant of Syracuse; differing principally in the want of that popularity through which the first Dionysius had executed such great things in peace and in war, at home and abroad, and extended the supremacy of Syracuse over the whole Grecian interest in Sicily and in Italy, to the great advantage of all; a popularity which, passing as a kind of inheritance to his son, and adhering to him even under great deficiencies of conduct, maintained him so long, and long so peacefully, in his high situation. Plutarch, amid the most extravagant panegyric of Dion, has avowed, in plain terms, that the Syracusans hated him.<sup>13</sup> Dion was aware of his own unpopularity, and yet, what can be well done only through the highest popularity, he would persevere in a reformation of the constitution. So bent he was upon his project that, seeing his party weak, he endeavoured to strengthen himself by foreign aid, seeking assistance from Corinth, where the title of parent-city might soften the prejudice that would attach against any other foreign power.

Vit. Dion.  
p. 975. A.  
p. 980. F.

What has been really the merit or demerit of his plan we have no information. It may be however not unreasonable to believe that a man, as he was, of acknowledged talents, who had studied under one of the greatest philosophers, and acted many years

hero could pretend to the people, or even with a view to his own interest desire them, to believe that the fleet was no longer wanted, while the close blockade of the island was so great an object for all, and without the fleet impossible.

<sup>13</sup> Ἐμίσουν τὸν Δίωνα, p. 975. A. On other occasions Plutarch is generally a preacher of democratical doctrine, but here, to revenge his hero, he is severe upon democracy.



CHAP.  
XXXII.

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Corn. Nep.  
vit. Dion.

Ibid.  
Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 981. D.

under one of the greatest politicians of his own or any age, would, in altering, considerably improve a constitution such as was then the Syracusan, sunk as it was through interested flattery and indulgence to the multitude, to a state apparently not better than that in which it was on the first rise of Hermocrates, at the time of the Athenian invasion. But in carrying this plan into execution he was evidently indiscreet; highly indiscreet and highly arbitrary. He seems clearly not to have profited from that admonition of the tragic poet to which we have already more than once adverted. When alarm and indignation at his conduct were manifested among the people, instead of endeavouring to appease he would overbear. Heraclides, reduced as he was to a private situation, found means to profit from Dion's indiscretion so as to be still formidable by his popularity, which increased as Dion's waned. Whatever the general-autocrator proposed in the assembly was thwarted by the favorite of the people. Dion's proud spirit could ill brook this revived opposition from a fallen rival, and his philosophy was weak against the alluring proposal to still the annoyance by the base crime of assassination. Haraclides was murdered in his own house, by persons commissioned by Dion for the purpose.

This atrocious deed, as even Plutarch has been fair enough to acknowledge, excited great and general indignation in Syracuse. Yet in the existing lawlessness, unless it should be rather called the existing tyranny, no judicial inquiry seems to have followed. Dion, known as he was for the murderer, proposed to allay the popular anger by a show of respect for the dead body. It was buried with great pomp under his direction, himself attending. But his panegyrist, to whom we owe this curious particular, has been

true enough to a better morality to avow that conscience of the wickedness embittered all Dion's following days.<sup>14</sup>

It has been apparently in tenderness for his hero's reputation that Plutarch has omitted all account of transactions in Syracuse from the death of Heraclides to the completion of the tragedy by the death of Dion; a short but interesting period, reported succinctly by the more impartial Roman biographer thus:

'No man any longer now thought himself safe in Syracuse, when Dion, after the removal of his opponent, in a still more arbitrary manner than before, seized and divided among his soldiers the property of any whom he supposed his adversaries. Nevertheless, with all the confiscations, the expenses of this arbitrary government so exceeded the income that he was driven to press upon the purses of his friends; and thus dissatisfaction was extended among the wealthy and powerful.' Information, much to be desired, fails us, what was become of the revenue with which the first Dionysius had done such mighty things. 'But Dion,' continues the biographer, 'irritated more than admonished by the appearance of ill humor among all ranks, inveighed most impatiently against the unsteadiness of men, now thwart-

Corn. Nep.  
vit. Dion.

<sup>14</sup> Barthelemy, in his learned romance of Anacharsis, has taken Dion as a favorite hero, and even outstripped Plutarch in extravagance of panegyric, concealing many of the disadvantageous truths which Plutarch has revealed. Thus far, were romance only his purpose and not history, he might be excused. But he admits the consent of Dion to the assassination of Heraclides for the purpose of justifying it. His unfortunate nephew has probably seen and felt enough not to be so fond of those principles which the uncle, and his great patron the duke of Choiseul, contributed to spread in France.—(This note was written when Barthelemy, the nephew, was exiled to Cayenne.)

CHAP.  
XXXII.

‘ing his best purposes, who a little before were promising him every support, and equalling him with the gods. Such reproaches gained him no party; and, when the dissatisfaction of the most powerful men became generally known, while the discontent of the military was made public by petulant clamors for pay long in arrear, the body of the people freely vented their sentiments, calling Dion a tyrant no longer to be borne.’

Plutarch, desirous of softening the tyrannical character of his hero, which he knew not how entirely to conceal, says that, mistrusting and scorning his fellow-citizens, he sent for Corinthians to be his associates in council and in authority.<sup>15</sup> The reality and the character of his tyranny are thus largely shown. Yet the association of Dorians, in the government of a Dorian state, would be less generally offensive than the administration of Ionians; and a Corinthian, as of the mother-city of Syracuse, would be more acceptable than any other Dorian. But Dion’s most confidential assistant in civil and in military business, (so far Plutarch and Nepos agree,) was Callippus an Athenian. His popularity was so completely gone, and his mistrust of his fellow-citizens such, that he employed Callippus as a spy among them, to discover and report their sentiments and their purposes. To enable a foreigner, and one so known to have been in his confidence, to execute effectually such an office, a plan of dissimulation was agreed upon between them: Callippus was to pretend concurrence with those most dissatisfied with Dion, who was equally to profess dissatisfaction with him. But in the course of this employment Callippus found

Corn. Nep.  
vit. Dion.  
Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 982.

<sup>15</sup> Μεταπέμπεται δ' ἐκ Κορίνθου συμβούλους καὶ συνάρχοντας, ἀπαξιῶν τοὺς πολίτας. Plut. v. Dion. p. 981. C.



that, if he remained faithful to Dion, he must probably fall with him, whereas by betraying him he might rise on his ruin. Daring, cunning, and unprincipled, (if we may trust the panegyrist of Dion, from whom alone report of his character and actions hath reached us,) he resolved upon the latter. Example for assassination, a crime to which the Syracusans were perhaps before but too prone, had been given by Dion himself. A plot was formed against him, and there seems to have been a very large number of persons so far engaged as to give it their approbation. Rumor of it got abroad, and reached Dion's family. Confiding in his supposed friend, or at a loss for another in whom he might confide, he would himself take no measures of prevention: but his wife and sister, it is said, communicated their suspicions to Callippus, nor would be satisfied with his assurances of fidelity till he had sworn it before them in the temple of Proserpine, with every ceremony supposed to give firmest sanction to an oath, covered with the goddess's purple robe, and bearing a flaming torch in his hand.

But Callippus having advanced too far to retreat with any safety, the discovery that he was suspected was admonition to hasten the execution of the plot. A day of public festivity was chosen, when the people would be collected where it was known Dion would avoid attending. For security against commotion, commanding points in the city were occupied by troops in the confidence of the conspirators, and a trireme was prepared in the harbour for ready flight, should it become desirable. Matters being thus arranged, some Zacynthian soldiers went without arms to Dion's house, and pretending an errand to speak with him on business of the mercenary troops, pushed

CHAP.  
XXXII.

into the room where he was, and immediately shut the door. His very guards, according to Nepos, had they had any disposition to it, might easily have saved him; for tumult was heard while Dion for some time resisted his unarmed assailants; yet none moved to his relief. The business of murder was at length completed with a sword which Lycon, a Syracusan, handed to the foreign assassins through a window. Thus with his life ended the administration of Dion, about four years after his return from Peloponnesus, and about the fifty-fifth of his age; a man whose eulogy among ancient writers has far exceeded what any remaining account of his actions can justify.

B. C. 352.  
Ol. 106.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .  
[B. C. 353.  
Cl.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 31.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Dion.

## SECTION V.

*The Athenian Callippus general-autocrator of Syracuse. Hipparinus general-autocrator. Ill condition of the Grecian cities of Sicily. Quiet of the Italian cities. Restoration of Dionysius in Syracuse.*

Still in proceeding with Sicilian history, much as such guidance as that of Thucydides or Xenophon fails, yet for facts of a public nature accounts remain; ill connected indeed, and often defective, but consistent and probable, with little important variation from one another. Secret history, in which the writers on Sicilian affairs are more ample, of course should be received with caution, and their panegyric and their invective those who seek truth will equally disregard. The Syracusan constitution, as it existed under either the elder Dionysius, or Dion, is very defectively reported; but the character of the administration under each may be in a great degree gathered from the circumstances of the death of

each, and what immediately followed. The elder Dionysius, as we have seen, died in peace, at a mature age, surrounded by his friends, respected by his enemies, leaving his family flourishing, and his country by far the most flourishing of Grecian states. The first following public measure was to assemble the people, and commit to them the choice of a first magistrate. The accounts come only from the enemies of the family, and yet no violence upon the public voice is pretended: the general favor, which had attached so many years to the father, passed as an inheritance to the son; so that a youth of uncertain merit was, for the father's sake, raised to the first situation in the commonwealth, and with circumstances so advantageous as to retain it peaceably, notwithstanding great disadvantages of character and conduct, during eleven years. When, on the contrary, Dion, after having held the administration four years, was cut off by sedition, the circumstances of the state were far from flourishing; empire gone, revenue gone, population diminished, faction raging. Instead then of an assembly of citizens, an army of mercenaries decided the succession to the first magistracy; and Callippus, a foreigner of Ionian race, an Athenian, of character stained with imputation of the murder of Dion, ruled with sovereign power during thirteen months.<sup>16</sup> Callippus was, no doubt, a man of talents, which he is said to have improved in the school of Plato; and what was his real guilt seems ill ascertained. The family of Dion continued under his government to live in Syracuse, and apparently might have lived secure, had they avoided plots against it. But the relics of the party moving sedition, they,

Athen. I. 11.  
c. 15. p. 250.  
vel 508.

<sup>16</sup> Λαμπρὸς ἦν καὶ κατεῖχε τὰς Συρακούσας. Plut. v. Dion. p. 983. Ἦρξε μῆνας τρεῖςκαίδεκα. Diod. l. 16. c. 31.



CHAP.  
XXXII.

as implicated in the measures for disturbing the existing order of things, were compelled to fly to Leontini.

That interest then, which Dion during four years at the head of affairs in Syracuse had failed to acquire, the family of Dionysius yet retained. Hipparinus, son of the elder Dionysius by Aristomache, sister of Dion, arriving in a critical moment when Callippus was absent on some expedition, a revolution was effected in his favor, and he held the chief power two years. Callippus, driven to wander with his mercenaries in quest of new fortune, after an unsuccessful attempt upon Messena, made himself master of Rhegium, but soon perished there by assassination.

B. C. 351.  
Ol. 106.  $\frac{3}{4}$ .  
[B. C. 352.\*  
Cl.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 36.  
Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 983.

Of the government of Hipparinus in Syracuse we learn no more than that it was neither flourishing nor lasting. Nor was it succeeded by a government either flourishing or lasting. Syracuse, so long the superintending state, being too much distracted to hold its superintendency, lawlessness and confusion pervaded the Sicilian Greek cities. During five or six years of this confusion history of Sicilian affairs fails. At length, in the third year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, the three hundred and forty-fourth before the Christian era, eight years after the death of Dion, the state of Sicily, the result of his celebrated expedition for its deliverance, is described by his panegyrist Plutarch thus: ‘Syracuse, under no settled government, but among many competitors for the sovereignty passing from tyrant to tyrant, became through excess of misery almost a desert. Of the rest of

B. C. 344.  
Ol. 108  $\frac{2}{3}$ .

Plut. vit.  
Tim. init.

[\* ‘Callippus governed Syracuse thirteen months: ἦρξε μῆνας τρεῖςκαίδεκα’ Diod. xvi. 31. and was driven from the city,—ἡπτηθείς ἐξέπεσε τῆς πόλεως, in the archonship of Eudemus B. C. 35 $\frac{3}{4}$ . Diod. xvi. 36. The thirteen months bring down his expulsion to the year B. C. 352. near midsummer. He was still living in the year of *Thessalus* B. C. 35 $\frac{1}{2}$ . Diod. xvi. 45. and is mentioned by Demosthenes in B. C. 350.’ Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 267. note t.]

‘ Grecian Sicily, through unceasing hostilities, part  
‘ was absolutely depopulated and waste. The popu-  
‘ lation of almost every town, which had a remaining  
‘ people, was contaminated by a mixture of barbarians  
‘ and mercenary soldiers, who, for want of regular  
‘ pay, were driven to any venture for subsistence.’  
In the coloring of this picture Plutarch has had in  
view to prepare his readers for panegyric of a new  
hero; and yet that it is little if at all overcharged  
appears from other accounts and from the result,  
which seems not ill summed up in these words of  
Diodorus: ‘ The Syracusans, divided into factions,  
‘ and compelled to submit to many, and great and  
‘ various tyrannies, at length came to the resolution  
‘ of sending to their mother-city Corinth for a ge-  
‘ neral, who might command respect from all parties,  
‘ and repress the overweening ambition of individuals.’

SECT.  
V.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 65.

While Syracuse and most of the Grecian part of  
Sicily were in this wretched situation, the Italian  
towns seem to have remained nearly in the state of  
regular government and prosperity in which the elder  
Dionysius left them. We hear of neither tyrants  
nor civil war among them, except in the occupation  
of Rhegium by Callippus, nor of any popular dis-  
content. There, on his expulsion from Syracuse,  
the younger Dionysius had found an advantageous  
asylum. Locri, his mother’s native city, was mostly  
his residence. Little disposed to activity, and little  
troubled by ambition, he would perhaps there have  
passed the remainder of his days in as much ease as  
was commonly enjoyed under Grecian governments,  
if the importunity of friends and partizans, suffering  
under the actual state of things in Sicily, and ex-  
pecting only increased oppression from any new pre-  
valence of the Corinthian party, had not again brought

CHAP.  
XXXII.

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him into action. It was not however on any light ground that he engaged in a new expedition to Syracuse. His party there was so strong, and things had been so prepared, that Nesæus, who had acquired the lead in the government, was obliged to retire before him. He was again elected general-autocrator; and, in consequence of the confusion of all the regular powers of government in the course of the long troubles, became a much more absolute sovereign, though within a much narrowed dominion, than when he first succeeded his father.



## CHAPTER XXXIII.

*Affairs of the Grecian settlements in Sicily and Italy from the restoration of the younger Dionysius to the death of Timoleon.*

## SECTION I.

*Expedition of the Carthaginians into Sicily under Hanno. Grecian cities in Sicily under the government of single chiefs. Death of the widows of Dion and of the elder Dionysius. Application for interference of Corinth in the affairs of Sicily. Circumstances of Corinth. Timoleon appointed to manage the Corinthian interest in Sicily.*

FORTUNATELY for the Grecian interest in Sicily the Carthaginian government, whether prevented by domestic troubles or engaged by greater views elsewhere, made no use of those opportunities which the weakness incident to the administration of a man of the character of the younger Dionysius, and the distractions which followed the expedition of Dion, afforded for prosecuting by arms any views of ambition there. Its policy meanwhile, or at least the conduct of its officers, was liberal and able. The attachment even of the Grecian towns in the western parts was conciliated; and it appears from Diodorus that those towns shared little in the ruin which Plutarch has represented as so universally sweeping over the island. After the decay of the great naval force which the first Dionysius raised, the Carthaginians had held complete command of the sea; and this, in the di-

SECT.  
I.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 67.

Plut. vit.  
Timol. init.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

vided state of the Greeks produced by Dion's expedition, would be perhaps more advantageous to a commercial people than any extension of territorial command. The first warlike measures of the Carthaginian government were professed, and apparently intended, not against the Greeks, but merely to repress the rapine of the Campanians, who, with such faithless violence, had settled themselves in Entella, and retained, to the annoyance of their peaceful neighbours, their habit of war and appetite for plunder.

Among the Grecian cities unconnected with Carthage there seems to have been at this time no regularity of government or security for individuals, but where some one powerful man could hold sovereign sway. With his own party that powerful man had the title of governor, prince, or potentate:<sup>1</sup> by an opposite party he would of course be called tyrant. His power indeed could be little defined by law; he must necessarily act according to emergencies; and the character of his administration would be decided by his character, and his sense of his own interest. His situation nearly resembled that of the feudal barons of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Of those who thus held sovereign sway in the Sicilian Greek cities Dionysius perhaps was the most powerful: for, though Syracuse was lamentably fallen, and in Syracuse itself his authority, though little regularly limited, was ill settled, yet his interest in Italy gave him weight. Next, and perhaps for power within Sicily hardly second, were Icetes of Leontini and Andromachus of Tauromenium. Andromachus stood as head of that party throughout the Sicilian and Italian cities which had always been adverse to

<sup>1</sup> Ἀρχων, δυνάστης.

the family of Dionysius; and by his success at Tauro-menium he had acquired the consideration of restorer, or, in the ancient phrase, second founder of the interest of that party in Sicily.

SECT.  
I.

Iceles had been a confidential friend of Dion, on whose death, accompanied by the mercenary force which served under him, and those citizens who desired to avoid the new power in Syracuse, he had withdrawn to Leontini. That place, more than any other in Sicily, had been always well disposed to Dion. Thither therefore his widow and his sister, widow of the elder Dionysius, had retired from the government of Callippus. At first they were treated with apparent tenderness and respect; but, after no long time, under pretence of placing them in better security, they were embarked for Peloponnesus, and, in pursuance of orders, it is said, from Iceles, murdered in the passage. Among infelicities likely to attend haughty and morose tempers, like Dion's, may be reckoned failure in the choice of friends. But though this tale of horror comes from Plutarch, the panegyrist of Dion, it seems liable to some reasonable doubt. The manner of the murder the biographer mentions to have been variously reported. If then Iceles directed it, he did not intend it should be known that he directed it; and how that became known we are not informed. What temptation would lead Iceles to the crime does not appear. That the unfortunate women perished in the passage was probably of public notoriety. If it was by accident, party calumny may thence have gathered opportunity to asperse Iceles. But they may have been destroyed by the pirates who infested those seas; or, in the opportunity among the Greek republics for the worst criminals to escape, the crew, to whose charge they

Plut. vit.  
Dion.  
p. 983.

Ibid. & vit.  
Timol.  
p. 252.



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

were committed, may have been tempted to murder them for the small riches they might carry. In the want of means to ascertain the fact, where such tales of secret crimes want both authentication and probability, they can rarely deserve regard in history; and accordingly many such, some of celebrity, have been unnoticed here.

Plut. vit.  
Timol. init.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 68.

But though this shocking tale, related by the philosophical biographer, the panegyrist of Dion, is of very doubtful appearance, yet the character of Icetes seems not to have been altogether creditable to Dion's choice of a friend. When the return of Dionysius to Syracuse made the residence of the more violent of those in opposition to him unsafe or uneasy there, those most obnoxious for past violence resorted to Leontini. Men of quieter and more respectable character generally, and especially those of higher rank, preferred the refuge of Tauromenium, under the government of Andromachus. Other chiefs held an independent or almost independent authority in some of the smaller towns. Dionysius, Icetes and Andromachus stood as chiefs of three principal parties, each in a state of war with both the others; and with such a spirit of animosity pervading all, so inflamed and maintained by opposition of interest, that composition between them was hardly possible.

In circumstances so distressing for all who held property, or desired settled life, among the Grecian possessions in Sicily, the rumor of preparation at Carthage for a new expedition, though the Campanians of Entella, who had given sufficient occasion for it, were alone its avowed object, excited great and reasonable alarm. Union, under the lead of any man, or any city of Sicily, appeared beyond hope. These circumstances being taken into consideration by the

refugees in Tauromenium, the proposition was made to solicit the interference of Corinth, the mother-city of Syracuse and of a large proportion of the Dorian Greeks of Sicily, as what alone could have authority to conciliate the adverse spirits enough to bring them to a coalition necessary for the safety of all. Precedents of such a measure were numerous. Among the Greeks it was generally held reputable, and pleasing to the gods, for colonies, on important occasions, to desire a leader from the mother-country. The Syracusans themselves, no longer ago than the Athenian war, had admitted Corinthians to chief commands in their forces. From Tauromenium therefore communication being managed in Syracuse and other towns, numbers were found to approve the proposal.<sup>2</sup>

But Corinth itself was at this time distracted by contest of factions. To resist aggression from Argos the government had been driven to the resource, which we have seen it formerly using, of employing an army of those adventurers, or they might perhaps be called traders, in military business, commonly distinguished, after the Latin phrase, by the name of mercenaries. Under the able and spirited conduct of Timophanes, of one of the most illustrious families of Corinth, success rather beyond hope had attended the Corinthian arms. His popularity, before extensive, was thus greatly increased; and thus, with his power

SECT.  
I.

Ch. 28. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 65.  
Plut. vit.  
Timol.

<sup>2</sup> Both Diodorus and Plutarch mention this measure as the act of the Syracusans. They do not however say, and it cannot be supposed, it was a regular act of the Syracusan people, under the newly restored administration of Dionysius. But every party of Syracusans, every knot of Syracusans, in and out of Syracuse, would call themselves, and be called by their friends, the Syracusans. It is in the sequel specified by Diodorus that the communication with Corinth was conducted by the refugees in Tauromenium.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

accruing from command of the mercenaries, gave him great means for purposes of ambition. What the real merit of the contest of parties was, accounts remaining not only are too defective, but too contradictory, to enable us satisfactorily to gather. The historian's expressions however imply that the party was that through which Timophanes was formidable. What remains assured is that the contention in Corinth was at this time, as formerly according to the authentic account of Xenophon, violent; and that the party in which Timophanes had been bred considered him as not only betraying their cause, which alone they would allow to be the cause of their country, but, by the combined powers of popularity, and of his influence over a standing army, aiming at sovereign command, or in the Grecian phrase, the tyranny of Corinth.<sup>3</sup>

Timoleon, younger brother of Timophanes, disapproved his conduct and purposes. Failing in remonstrance and dissuasion, and seeing the constitutional powers, or the powers of his party, unequal to contest with the extensive popularity of Timophanes, he engaged in conspiracy against him. Whether better means really became desperate, or the familiarity of the age with assassination so lessened its horror that it was adopted merely as the readiest and surest, assassination was resolved upon. For the manner of the crime, as would be likely for a fact of the kind, accounts differ, agreeing about the result. Diodorus says that Timoleon killed his brother with his own

<sup>3</sup> The phrases, *πονηροτάτους ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ*, and *κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν περιήει οὐ προσποιούμενος ὅτι τύραννός ἐστι*, (Diod. l. 16. c. 65.) clearly indicate a man raising himself by popular favor. On the contrary Aristotle, in cursory mention of Timophanes, attributes his acquisition of the tyranny to his command of mercenaries. Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c. 6.



hand, publicly, in the agora. For a different report SECT.  
I.  
Plutarch has quoted three authors, Timæus, Ephorus, and Theopompus, all contemporary with the event. According to them Timoleon introduced the assassins into his brother's house, under pretence of desiring a friendly conference; but though he considered the murder as a patriotic duty, yet he yielded so far to nature as to turn his back while the deed was done. The Roman biographer, contrary to both these accounts, relates that Timoleon acted indeed in concert with the assassins, but was not present at the assassination, being employed elsewhere in preventing opposition to their purpose.<sup>4</sup>

Corn. Nep.  
vit. Timol.

Corinth was still in the ferment which this atrocious act produced when the Syracusan deputies arrived.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, in his usual way, has undertaken to describe the dark scene in Timophanes's apartment as if it had been acted before him. The difference of writers about this assassination, the circumstances of which, as it was gloried in by the perpetrators and their whole party, were as likely to be ascertained as those of such deeds commonly can be, may add to the lessons already gained in the course of the history, to be cautious of giving credit to the pretence of exact reports of any of them.

<sup>5</sup> This is the account of Diodorus, who seems always to have meant to be accurate, especially in dates. Plutarch, on the contrary, ever straining to make the best story, unsolicitous about the consistency or connexion of history, reports that Timoleon had been living twenty years in solitude and repentance when he was called upon to undertake the deliverance of Sicily from tyrants. But though we find Diodorus often detected by the learned and sagacious Dodwell in confounding the chronology of a year or two, yet, for these times, when historians and annalists abounded, he would hardly err, concerning so public a fact, so widely as twenty years. If Diodorus however could want support against Plutarch, we gain for him what is pretty satisfactory from the omission of all mention of these remarkable matters by Xenophon. According to Dodwell's exposition of Xenophon's chronology, it was in the twentieth year

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

One party was extolling Timoleon as a virtuous tyrannicide, whose magnanimous patriotism was above all praise: the other execrated his deed as a parricidal murder, for which the laws of gods and men demanded expiation by his just punishment. The petition of the Syracusans afforded opportunity for a compromise, in which, with a wisdom and temper oftener found perhaps in Corinth than in other Grecian cities, both parties agreed. Timoleon's birth and rank were eminent; his great talents had been proved in politics and in war; and, according to one party, he had shown himself peculiarly fit for the honorable office of delivering Sicily by the very act which, according to the other, made him unfit to live in his own country. His friends and his enemies therefore concurred in his appointment; with the condition, according to Diodorus, required by the latter, that, provided his conduct in Sicily corresponded with his pretensions to political virtue, he should be forgiven the offence to the laws of the city and of humanity; but otherwise, if ever he returned to Syracuse, he should suffer the just punishment for parricide. Plutarch has censured it as weakness in Timoleon, the only weakness of his great mind, that he felt contrition for his brother's murder. The Roman biographer has less affected a philosophy like that of the modern French; and, relating apparently nothing without authority from elder writers, he says the persevering refusal of Timoleon's mother to see

before the mission of the Sicilian Greeks to Corinth that the Corinthians, with the approbation of the Lacedæmonian government, made their separate peace with Thebes. Xenophon's history, continued some years after, has not a word about Timophanes or Timoleon, or any circumstances of Corinthian affairs suited to their story.

him after the fact, and her invective and imprecations against him, of which he was informed, made a most severe impression on his mind. Thus he was prepared for such a proposal as that from the Sicilians; in which he seems to have rejoiced, however offering a field only for almost hopeless adventure among abounding dangers and difficulties, with a resolution never to return to Corinth.

## SECTION II.

*Expedition of Timoleon to Sicily. Opposition of Greeks and Carthaginians to the interference of Corinth in Sicily. First and second campaigns of Timoleon. Final retreat of Dionysius.*

The fulsomeness of panegyric ordinary among the later Grecian writers, especially Plutarch, is perhaps not less injurious to a great character than the malevolence of invective which abounded among those of the age we are engaged with, and which Plutarch, for the advantage apparently of contrast in his pictures, frequently adopted. It may not be less disadvantageous to Timoleon's fame, among sober inquirers, that we know him only from writers ever straining for eulogy, than to that of the elder Dionysius, that all detailed accounts of him come from his traducers. Timoleon's history altogether bears the character more of a tale of a hero of the times of the Seven before Thebes than of the authentic narrative of the actions of a contemporary of Xenophon, Isocrates, and Aristotle. Nevertheless, involving a very interesting portion of the history of the Grecian republics, curiosity cannot but be awake to it; and, in the circumstances of Timoleon and of Sicily, the real



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

character of adventures, sentiments, and conduct might have some tinge of the romantic. On careful examination however, those principal matters of fact, which might be of some public notoriety, are generally found not unsatisfactorily unfolded.

To the outfit of Timoleon's adventurous expedition the Corinthian government would contribute little or nothing beyond the credit of its name; and what could reach Corinth from Sicilians friendly to the cause was probably very small. His own credit would assist, and possibly his private fortune. But the force with which he left the Grecian shores, professing the purpose of delivering the Sicilian cities from tyranny, and avenging the Grecian cause against the Carthaginians, consisted of only ten ships of war and seven hundred soldiers. In failure of transport ships, he put his land force into four of his triremes; an incumbrance so disabling them for naval action that his effective fighting ships were only six.<sup>6</sup>

To infuse then into his little armament an inspiration likely to be wanted, he had recourse to that superstition of which the ablest commanders of Greece and Rome are found most to have availed themselves. The priestesses of Ceres and Proserpine in Corinth gave him their valuable assistance in a declaration

<sup>6</sup> Diodorus alone has given this detail of Timoleon's naval force. Plutarch agrees with him in stating it at ten triremes. Wesseling has supposed that Aristotle, in his epistle to Alexander, on rhetoric, has had Timoleon's fleet in view, where he says that the Corinthians sent nine triremes to Syracuse against the Carthaginians. Apparently the learned commentator has not sufficiently followed up the historian's narrative, or he would have seen, I think, that Aristotle has rather referred to the fleet stated by him to have been afterward sent by the Corinthian government, as we shall see in the sequel, for the immediate purpose of opposing the Carthaginians.

B. C. 343.  
Ol. 108. 4.  
[B. C. 344.  
Cl. See p.  
53.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 66.  
Plut. vit.  
Timol.  
p. 239.

that those goddesses, appearing to them in dreams, gave assurance that they would accompany Timoleon to that great and fruitful island which was peculiarly sacred to them. Timoleon hence took occasion to consecrate his best ship to the goddesses, and call it by their name. A meteor, more brilliant and lasting than common, was seen in the sky during his voyage. He termed it a lamp, held out by the gods to guide him; and the story afterward passed that this celestial lamp directed his course across the Ionian sea and up the Tarentine gulf to his proposed port Metapontium. Probably he desired to pass unseen from the land, and for such advantage must give up that other, so important for ancient navigation, and especially for the ancient ships of war, of seeing and being near the land; and thence encouragement from confidence in divine protection might be more wanted for his people.

Intelligence reaching Leontini of the negotiation put forward from Tauromenium, and of preparation at Corinth for interfering with arms in the affairs of Sicily, Icetes, who had interest with one party among the Corinthians, sent ministers to counterwork the measure. Meanwhile the Carthaginian army under Hanno had crossed from Africa, and began operations with the siege of Entella. Conquest, such as Hannibal and Imilcon formerly sought, seems not to have been the purpose of Hanno's expedition; yet, in securing the Carthaginian command or influence, to extend them would probably be in his view. Icetes held friendly connexion with Carthage, which we have seen not uncommon among the Sicilian Greeks. The interference of the Corinthians in Sicily, highly obnoxious to Icetes, was likely to be an object of jealousy to the Carthaginian government. In con-

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 66.  
Plut. vit.  
Timol.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 67.

c. 66.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

sequence therefore of concert between Icetes and Hanno, a Carthaginian squadron was sent to watch the movements from Peloponnesus. It seems however not to have been Hanno's purpose to provoke hostilities. A single trireme, sent to Metapontium, met Timoleon there. The Carthaginian remonstrated against the purpose of the Corinthians to interfere with an armed force in the affairs of Sicily, where they had no possessions. Timoleon, little regarding argument, resolved to use the opportunity yet left open by the moderation of the Carthaginian commander for reaching a friendly Sicilian port, and hastened to proceed on his way. Nevertheless an invitation from Rhegium to assist in putting the government of that city into the hands of the party friendly to him appeared of too much importance to be neglected. He went thither, and the object was gained; but he had not time to sail again before a Carthaginian squadron, of twice his force, entered the harbour. The conduct of the Carthaginian commander was that of one instructed to promote peace and respect the rights of others. No way using the power in his hands, he went ashore to meet the Rhegian people in assembly, and argue, in their constitutional method, the matters in question between his own government and the various parties of the Greeks. This respect, from a Carthaginian commander, for Grecian laws and customs, Timoleon regarded only as it afforded opportunity to profit from disingenuous artifice. As soon as the debates had begun to engage all attention, nine of his ships proceeded to sea; and then, slipping away himself unobserved, he followed in the remaining one. The Carthaginian, indignant as soon as the deceit was made known to him, hastened in pursuit; but night

Died, l. 16.  
c. 68.



was already advancing, and Timoleon reached Tauromenium without obstruction. Andromachus and the Syracusan refugees, the first promoters of his expedition, greeted his arrival.

SECT.  
II.

It seems to have been late in the summer for beginning military enterprise; but things had been singularly prepared by war between those against whom Timoleon meant to direct his arms. Icetes had besieged Dionysius in Syracuse, but, making no progress, withdrew. Dionysius pursued. Icetes, turning, defeated him, entered the city with his flying troops, and became master of all except the island. Against the extraordinary strength of that fortress he would not waste his exertions; but he proceeded to besiege Adranum, the colony of the elder Dionysius, now holding connexion with the refugees in Tauromenium.

B. C. 343.  
Ol. 108. 4.  
[See  
p. 53.]

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 68.  
Plut. vit.  
Timol.  
p. 241.

Information of these circumstances decided the measures of Timoleon. Marching to relieve the Adranites, he attacked Icetes with such well-planned surprise that, with very inferior force, he put him presently to flight. In the instant of victory then he decided his next measure. Proceeding immediately for Syracuse, he marched with such speed, it is said, as to outstrip the retreating enemy; and, arriving wholly unexpected, he became master of the two quarters which he first approached, Tyche and Epipolæ. The strong separate fortifications of Neapolis and Achradina made farther attempt unavailing; but he retained what he had acquired; and thus the unfortunate city was divided between three powers at war with each other.

[B. C. 344.  
CL]

Winter now put that stop to farther military operations which, divided as the Greeks were among small republics, scantiness of revenue made for them, it

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

may be said, fortunately unavoidable. The season of leisure for arms then seems to have been diligently and ably employed in negotiation. The numerous garrisons of small fortresses, scattered over the Syracusan territory, began in the existing circumstances to despair of the cause of Dionysius, to which they were attached. Vehemently averse to Icetes, they were little inclined to Andromachus; but to a general from the parent-city Corinth, unversed in Sicilian quarrels, if he might be able to protect them, they had no particular objection. Timoleon was ready with fair promises, and most of them made terms with him.

This success prepared matters for a greater acquisition. Mamercus, chief of Catana, bears among ancient writers the title of tyrant. But Timoleon, it appears, never disdained friendly connexion with a tyrant, if it might be useful; and Mamercus, beside that he was a brave and able soldier, holding a well-trained little army under his orders, was, in the biographer's phrase, powerfully wealthy.<sup>7</sup> The accession therefore of this chief to the Corinthian interest was altogether considered as a highly fortunate event.<sup>8</sup>

But in the following spring, while Syracuse was yet divided between the three contending parties, Dionysius holding the island, Icetes Achradina and Neapolis, and Timoleon Tyche and Epipolæ, a Carthaginian fleet under Hanno entered the harbour, and landed an army, stated at fifty thousand men. It was expected that Hanno would have the co-operation of Icetes, and their united strength seemed far too great for either of their opponents to with-

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 69.  
Plut. vit.  
Timol.  
p. 241.

B. C. 342.  
Ol. 108. 4.  
[See  
p. 53.]

Aristot. ep.  
ad Alex. de  
Rhet. c. 9.  
Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 69.

<sup>7</sup> Πολεμιστῆς ἀνὴρ, καὶ χορήμασιν ἐρρόωμένος. Plut. v. Tim. p. 241.

<sup>8</sup> Ἀνέλπιστον εὐτυχίαν. Plut. v. Timol. p. 242.

stand. Energy, for whatever it might effect, was not wanting to the Corinthian party; and Mamercus, and the Syracusans of the country garrisons, showed all zeal in their new engagements. The party in Corinth which supported Timoleon had been also prospering, or report of his first successes had extended his interest there; for in the existing crisis nine Corinthian triremes, filled with soldiers, arrived to act under his orders. Still in extreme anxiety he was looking around for opportunities of attack and means of defence, when he was relieved by the sudden and unaccountable retreat of the Carthaginian armament. Whether news from Carthage, or intriguingly managed by Timoleon, or dissatisfaction with Icetes, (which following circumstances indicate as probable,) or what else may have influenced Hanno, historians have not undertaken to say. The Greeks, on all sides, observed the departing fleet with astonishment, and Timoleon's troops, from expressions of growing despondency, passed to joyful scoffing and ridicule.

SECT.  
II.

Aristot. ut  
sup.  
Diod. ut  
sup.

This inexplicable conduct of the Carthaginian general produced advantages for Timoleon which might not have accrued, had no Carthaginian force appeared. The Messenians, who had refused any intimacy of connexion with Icetes, and nevertheless had formed alliance with the Carthaginians, now, conceiving themselves deserted, listened to proposals from Timoleon, and joined that which appeared the prospering cause. Icetes, pressed by an enemy on each side, hopeless of assistance from Carthage, and fearing blockade from the increased and still growing strength of Timoleon, abandoning Syracuse with his adherents, no small portion of the remaining population of the city withdrew to Leontini.

[B. C. 343.  
Timoleon  
completes  
conquest of  
Syracuse.  
Cl.]

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 72.



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Meanwhile Dionysius, no longer, as formerly, possessing a fleet commanding the sea, but shut within his island fortress, had been losing interest in Italy while, with apparently ill-planned and ill-conducted effort, he was endeavouring to serve his friends and recover his property and influence in Sicily. Ease and pleasure, according to all but the most evidently malignant reports, far more than power and pomp, were the objects of his prevailing passions. A knowledge of his disposition, as well as of his circumstances, seems to have been the foundation of a negotiation, into which Timoleon entered with him in the course of the winter after the departure of Icetes. Corinth itself was proposed for the place of his retreat. The Corinthian state had obligations both to his father and to himself. Some among the principal citizens were likely to be well affected toward him; and that city, whose graver society had engaged the preference of Xenophon's elderhood, might still more, by its gaieties, invite the yet vigorous age of Dionysius. In the following spring the island and its citadel were surrendered to Timoleon; two thousand mercenaries of its garrison engaged in service under him; and Dionysius, with his immediate friends, passed to Corinth.<sup>9</sup>

B. C. 341.  
Ol. 109.  $\frac{3}{4}$ .  
[B. C. 343.  
after mid-  
sum. Cl.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 70.  
Plut. &  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Timol.

<sup>9</sup> However, in collating Diodorus with Thucydides or Xenophon, we may be disgusted with his deficiencies, yet, compared with the wildness of Plutarch, we find reason often to be gratified with his sobriety, clearness, and consistency. From Diodorus we have a coherent account of the transactions of two summers and two winters after the arrival of Timoleon in Sicily, before he became master of the citadel of Syracuse; which he says was managed by capitulation with Dionysius, without mentioning any assault upon it. Plutarch, a hundred and fifty years after Diodorus, and near five hundred after Dionysius, without either vouching any authority or impeaching any, boldly says

## SECTION III.

*Desolation of Syracuse. Difficulty of Timoleon to reward his conquering troops. Provocation to Carthage. New invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians. Mutiny in Timoleon's army. Battle of the Crimesus. New measures of the Carthaginians. Measures of Timoleon. Peace with Carthage.*

Syracuse, thus brought completely under the authority of Timoleon, was still in buildings the largest SECT.  
III.

that Timoleon, within fifty days after his arrival in Sicily,\* took the citadel of Syracuse by assault, with Dionysius in it. Timoleon's first success after his victory at Adranum, against a part of the vast city held by Icetes, without approaching the island held by Dionysius, seems to have served as foundation for this romance.

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[\* Mr. Clinton considers Mr. Mitford justly dissatisfied with the *fifty days* of Plutarch, but denies that in Diodorus there is any vestige of *two winters*. 'Three archons indeed,' he says, 'are specified: in the year of the first Timoleon sailed; in the year of the second he landed; and in the year of the third he took the citadel. But, as the archons commenced at midsummer, the operations of one campaign, comprehending a spring and autumn, would be distributed into two years by the annalist. Every campaign of the Peloponnesian war belonged to two Attic years. This we may trace in the narrative of Diodorus (XVI. 66—69.) upon this occasion: 'Επ' ἄρχοντος Εὐβούλου—Τιμολέων ἐξέπλευσεν ἐκ Κορίνθου.—καταπλεύσας δὲ τοῦ στόλου εἰς τὸ Μεταπόντιον—ἐξέπλευσεν εὐθέως ἐκ τοῦ Μεταποντίου.—οὗτος μὲν οὖν κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐτέλει τὸν εἰς Ῥήγιον πλοῦν—καὶ καθωρμίσθη πλησίον τῆς πόλεως. ἐπικαταπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων—ἔλαθε διαδρᾶς—καὶ ταχέως ἐξέπλευσεν—εἰς τὸ Ταυρομένιον.—ἀναζεύξας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Ταυρομένιου—ἀνελπίστως ἐπέθετο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἰκέταν—καὶ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἐκράτησε.—παραχρῆμα (δὲ) ἐπὶ τὰς Συρακούσας ἀφάρμυσεν.—'Επ' ἄρχοντος Λυκισκου—Τιμολέων μὲν Ἀδρανίτας καὶ Τυνδαρίτας εἰς συμμαχίαν προσλαβόμενος στρατιώτας οὐκ ὀλίγους παρ' αὐτῶν παρέλαβεν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς Συρακούσαις πολλὴ ταραχὴ κατεῖχε τὴν πόλιν, κ. τ. λ. At this point we discern a winter: the winter of the archon Lyciscus B. C. 34½. But we are at a loss to discover a second. The operations of Timoleon are continued in the following spring [B. C. 343.]; still within the year of Lyciscus. And Dionysius retired to Corinth in the summer; which brings the annalist to the year of Pythodotus. The actual interval from the setting forth of Timoleon might be little more than a year: from the last month of Eubulus [May, B. C. 344.] to the first month of Pythodotus [July, B. C.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

V. Timol.  
p. 246. 247.

city of the Greek nation, but in population, compared with extent of buildings, appeared a desert. With this great unpeopled town, and what territory he could vindicate with it, at his disposal, it was incumbent on Timoleon to reward the services of his now large force of mercenary troops, and to provide for those Syracusans of the Corinthian party who did not prefer a residence under the approved good government of Andromachus in Tauromenium. To this then, if to any period, would apply Plutarch's description of desolation in Syracuse; such, he says, that the cavalry actually grazed in the agora while the grooms, probably slaves, indulgently slept upon the luxuriant swarth. The biographer and the Sicilian historian concurrently ascribe to this period Timoleon's legislation for the Syracusans. But by their concurrent account also, beyond the troops to whom he issued his orders as a military commander, there were few for whom to legislate. His employment for the winter seems to have been the assignment of deserted houses and lands to his followers; to his mercenaries instead of pay, which he had not to give, and to the Syracusans of the Corinthian party in proportion to their zeal in the cause. With this some civil arrangement would be necessary, and it seems every way probable that he adapted it ably to the circumstances.

But it was beyond his ability to convert at once

‘343.]. In the whole period of Timoleon in Sicily Diodorus agrees with Plutarch. The death of Timoleon in the year of Phrynichus, towards the close of ‘B. C. 337. would be accurately described as ‘not quite eight years’ from his ‘landing in the year of Lyciscus B. C. 344. The real space of time might be ‘seven years and a half.’ Fasti Hellen. p. 269. In his account of Sicilian affairs Mr. Mitford has sometimes appended dates to events not noticed by Mr. Clinton; but dates of the latter will be found introduced at certain distances, which will enable the reader to form a better judgment of the correctness of the intermediate ones of Mr. Mitford.]



soldiers by trade, and men habituated to revolutions, into sober citizens. Good houses for the winter would of course be gratifying; but the lands he gave were little valuable without slaves and cattle to cultivate them. With spring therefore it became necessary for him again to seek war. Nor was this difficult to find; for between his followers and those whose lands and houses they had seized, though there might be cessation of hostilities, peace could not easily be established. He led his restless people first against Icetes in Leontini; but, finding little hope of ready success there, he quickly turned against Leptines of Engynne, another of those tyrants or chiefs to whose rise Dion's expedition had given occasion. Leptines, less able to resist than Icetes, came to terms similar to those made with Dionysius; surrendering his town, he passed to Peloponnesus. Meanwhile Icetes had confidence enough in his strength, or hope enough in a remaining party, to make an attempt upon Syracuse, but was repelled with loss.

SECT.  
III.

B. C. 340.  
Ol. 109.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 72.  
Plut. vit.  
Timol.

The expedition against Leontini having been unprofitable, and Engynne not affording enough for the existing need, it was necessary for Timoleon still to seek a war. Among the Grecian settlements no advantageous opportunity offered; those which had not claim for his protection being able to resist his power. To provoke the might of Carthage seems to have been rash, yet might be popular; and so, want pressing, he sent his mercenaries to find among the people of the western end of the island the large arrears which he owed them. Faction among the Campanians of Entella perhaps invited to the measure, and seems certainly to have afforded the means for bringing under the power of Timoleon a place whose

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 73.  
Plut. vit.  
Timol.  
p. 248. A.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

strength had baffled the arms of the first Dionysius. The manner in which he then arranged its affairs was thus: he caused fifteen principal men to be put to death for having been faithful to those engagements in which, whether from necessity of circumstances or choice as a free people, the Campanians had bound themselves and their state to Carthage. With this admonition how the gift should be used, he presented the Entellite people, in the historian's phrase, with liberty. Nevertheless, in a country where the failure of civil government had been so severely felt as in great part of Sicily, where the expedition of Dion, in Strabo's strong phrase, had caused universal disturbance by setting all against all,<sup>10</sup> the order which Timoleon's energetic and steady command established, and the degree of security which it gave, would be extensively beneficial and satisfactory. As soon therefore as it became recommended by the appearance of power to maintain it, not only many of the Grecian towns looked to him for patronage, but, according to his panegyrist, several of the Sicel tribes, and some even of the Sican, solicited his alliance.

Whether Timoleon had foreseen a storm approaching from Carthage, or his aggression drew it, is not to be gathered from the very deficient historians of his transactions. In the next year however a very powerful armament passed from Africa to Sicily. The land force, Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians, Balearians, together with the troops before in the island, is said to have amounted to seventy thousand foot and ten thousand horse; the fleet to two hundred ships of war. If the land force has been ex-

B. C. 338.  
Ol. 119. 4.  
[See p. 61.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 73.  
c. 77.

<sup>10</sup> Ἐτάραξεν ἅπαντας πρὸς ἅπαντας. Strab. l. 6. p. 255.

aggerated, Timoleon's means were yet very unequal to meet it. In the flourishing state of Syracuse under the first Dionysius, when hands were wanted for works of peace or deeds of war, sixty thousand Syracusan citizens, at the call of that popular leader, with forward zeal took either spade and mattock, or spear and helmet. The voice of all Grecian Sicily, and it is not from his friends that we have the account, called and almost compelled him to take the command for war with Carthage. But now, when danger so threatened from that enemy, represented continually by the later Grecian and all the Roman writers in such odious colors, Timoleon, as his most zealous panegyrist acknowledges, could persuade no more than three thousand Syracusans to follow his standard.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, of whatever activity and courage and policy might do in his immediate circumstances, Timoleon seems to have failed in nothing. Not scrupling to try negotiation with Icetes, now no longer connected with Carthage, he engaged that

Plut. vit.  
Timol.  
p. 248. C.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 77.

chief to co-operate against the Carthaginians. But with all his exertions, some of them successful thus beyond reasonable hope, adding to his force of mercenaries every Syracusan citizen that he could persuade or compel, he was unable to collect, includ-

c. 78.

<sup>11</sup> We have here a curious instance of Plutarch's carelessness of consistency or arrangement or explanation. He had just before given an account of sixty thousand new citizens added to Syracuse by Timoleon. It is probable that this making of Syracusan citizens took place mostly at a later period. But from the two circumstances, the smallness of the numbers that would follow Timoleon's standard, and the making of Syracusan citizens in great numbers, may be gathered the value of the terms the GREEKS, and the SYRACUSANS, as often used by Diodorus and Plutarch to distinguish the partizans of Dion and Timoleon from those of Dionysius.



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

ing the auxiliaries from Icetes, more than twelve thousand men. Nevertheless with this very inferior force he resolved to seek the enemy rather than await attack. Indeed a choice only of great difficulties appears to have been before him. His marauding expedition among the Carthaginian settlements and dependencies, notwithstanding the acquisition of Entella, had not enabled him to pay the due to his mercenaries. The promise of great and ready plunder allured them to march; but, in proceeding by the road of the southern coast, as they passed the Grecian towns, every new report made the Carthaginian force more formidable, the prospect of hard fighting consequently greater, and the hope of ready plunder less. Irritation being thus added to irritation, in approaching the Agrigentine territory they broke out into complete mutiny. 'They found it was intended,' they said, 'that instead of plunder they were to be paid with wounds, or a final settlement was to be made by their destruction: they would return to Syracuse; and, when it was known the Carthaginians were following, they did not fear but there they should obtain their just demands.'

Fortunately the rest of the army had no common interest with the mercenaries. Even toward these however Timoleon wisely avoided harshness. In addressing persuasion and promises to them he could little point out any clear prospect of the future, but he managed to interest them by talking of their past successful fellowship in arms. At length he prevailed upon three-fourths to proceed under his orders. About a thousand persevered in mutiny with Thrasius, the leader of it, and returned directly to Syracuse. Timoleon made light of the loss. 'They had foolishly,' he said, 'deserted glory and large reward, to which

‘ he should, in great confidence, hasten to lead the  
 ‘ army. It was nothing impossible, or improbable,  
 ‘ or unexperienced, that he promised to them and  
 ‘ himself. Why should the victory of Gelon, over  
 ‘ the same enemy, be the only instance of the kind ?<sup>12</sup>

SECT.  
III.

A drove of mules, laden with parsley, the abundant wild growth of the country, commonly used for the soldier to sleep on, was entering the camp. Everything among the Greeks was an omen of good or evil; and the same thing, according to circumstances or fancy, might portend either. Parsley was the material of chaplets usually hung at funerals over the graves. Timoleon was alarmed. The lading might make an impression on the soldier's mind of the most fatal tendency. But parsley was also the material of the chaplet that distinguished the conquerors in the Isthmian games. With ready recollection therefore he cried, ‘ Omen of Victory, I accept you!’ and causing a chaplet of parsley to be immediately woven, which he put on his own head, animation pervaded the army while all followed the example.<sup>13</sup>

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 79.  
Plut. vit.  
Timol.  
p. 248.

<sup>12</sup> To the vehemence of Plutarch's zeal for his hero's military fame we are indebted for most unsuspecting testimony to the tyrannical character of his administration, which was supported by four thousand mercenaries, when his popularity was so deficient that he could obtain no more than three thousand citizens for his expedition. The strained panegyric afterward degenerates into puerile absurdity. The reply which Shakspeare attributes to Henry the fifth, before the battle of Agincourt, when a wish for re-enforcement was expressed, admirably paints the real hero, infusing confidence by showing confidence, and using perhaps the most powerful argument in his circumstance to prevent desertion. But Plutarch represents Timoleon absolutely delighted with the desertion of a thousand men; exhibiting thus rather a fool than a hero, and doing injustice to a character which, though very far from faultless, appears to have had much of the truly heroic.

<sup>13</sup> It was not till four centuries after, near Plutarch's time, that pine-leaves were made the material of the Isthmian crown, parsley remaining still that of the Nemean.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

The confidence of the Carthaginian general in his very superior numbers led him to seek that quick decision which Timoleon's circumstances especially required. While the Greeks occupied a brow overlooking the valley through which the river Crimesus flowed, supposing they would await attack in their advantageous post, he did not scruple to cross the stream in their sight. Timoleon seized a critical moment, when the Carthaginian army was divided by the river, to attack the advanced body; and, though he met with strong resistance, he broke it at length, and put it to flight. But in the mean time the rest of the army made the passage, and advanced in good order against his flank. In danger of being surrounded, his utmost ability might have failed against well-conducted numbers, when a violent thunder-storm came on. Amid repeated flashes of lightning, hail of uncommon size beat full in the faces of the Carthaginians. Unable to meet the storm, they were pressed by the weapons of the Greeks, not equally impeded by it. Confusion arising, and resistance to the assault of the elements and of the enemy together appearing impossible, all became anxious to repass the river. Numbers hastening in one direction, while the noise of thunder overbore the voice of command, and the alternacy of gloom and vivid flashes disturbed the sight, and the hail and the wind impeded action against an enemy pressing on in a manner as the associate of the storm, among the various nations composing the Carthaginian army an uncommon kind of tumult arose. Unable to turn or even to look around against the enemy, some by mistake, and some perhaps in anger, fought one another. Still all pushed for the glen, anxious to pass the river. But the foremost, contending with the swollen current, and afterward with the opposite



steep, could no longer advance with sufficient speed to make way for those who, pressed by the pursuing Greeks, were still descending. The crowd in the bottom became in consequence intense. Many were overthrown, trampled on, and drowned, and many suffocated by the mere pressure. To restore order was no longer possible: the rout was complete, and the slaughter very great. Report made more than ten thousand of the Carthaginian army killed, and fifteen thousand prisoners. The extravagance of this however is indicated by another report, recorded by the same writers, that only one thousand horsemen's cuirasses, and ten thousand shields from slain and prisoners together, could be collected. The roundness of the numbers, even here, might excite suspicion of exaggeration; though it was said that the larger part of the shields of the slain were carried away by the torrent. It is however far likelier that many more shields were found than bodies; for, in flight, to throw away the shield was common,<sup>14</sup> and in the authentic account of Xenophon we have seen a Grecian army compelled by the mere violence of a storm, where no enemy pressed, to abandon the incumbrance. The victory however was complete; the Carthaginian camp was taken, and the booty was rich enough to afford gratifying reward for the conquerors.

Ch. 26. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

[June, B.C.  
339. Cl.]

The consequences of the victory of the Crimesus were very great. However in the divided state of the Sicilian Greeks Timoleon's force might be feared, his credit had hitherto been very doubtful and little extensive. A small party, long considered as outcasts, lately indeed receiving accession through the dis-

<sup>14</sup> ——— ‘relictâ non bene parmâ,’ is Horace's well-known confession.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

fractions of the country, but still apparently a small party, acknowledged him as the representative of the parent-city of Syracuse, commissioned to liberate Sicily. Among far the greater part, even of the Syracusans, and even of those yet residing in Syracuse, he was regarded either with horror, as the patron of their worst adversaries, or with suspicion and fear, as the leader of a band of mercenaries and adventurers. But by the victory of the Crimesus he acquired a solid foundation for the claim to be the protector of the Greeks against barbarians; and the zeal of his partizans would appear not wholly unreasonable in extolling him as a patriotic conqueror, rivalling in merit and in glory the first Dionysius, or even Gelon. Trophies, taken in the battle or found in the camp, were sent to all the principal Greek cities of Sicily; and the ostentatious compliment to Corinth of transmitting a selection of them thither appears to have assisted the promotion of Timoleon's interest there.

Nevertheless the accession to his party, whether from gratitude for his benefits or fear of his power, was not such as to enable him to prosecute conquest against the might of Carthage. On the contrary, to hold his footing in Syracuse required the most diligent exertion of his abilities, and, as his measures show, the utmost stretch of his authority. The crime of the mutineers demanded his first attention. On their secession from the army, with ready prudence he had provided for the quiet of the city by forwarding directions to pay their arrears, and to avoid whatever might exasperate them. He had now no longer to fear what they alone could do; but it behoved him still to consider the interest that his more faithful mercenaries might take in their fate. His severity

against them therefore went no farther than to re-quire their immediate departure from Sicily. Not that this was, in effect, a light punishment. For the business of service in arms for hire, now become almost as regular a trade among the Greeks as any other, required, like all others, character to support it. A body which had earned the reputation of fidelity, as well as of valor and skill in arms, would of course be preferred. Untried men would be the next choice. Those who had once proved false to their engagements would be avoided. Thus arose some security to the employers of mercenaries from the interest such troops had in character. The simple dismissal of the mutineers by Timoleon, with loss of character, involved their ruin. Unable to find a reputable service, and little inclined to peaceful industry, they turned to piracy. Going to Italy, they possessed themselves of a town on the coast of Bruttium. But, quickly blockaded in it by the collected Brutians, they were overpowered, and to a man destroyed.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians were preparing to revenge their defeat by measures founded apparently upon just information of the state of things in Syracuse, and throughout the Grecian cities of Sicily. Instead of sending for troops, as formerly, from the distance of Gaul or Spain, they resolved to use the opportunity which the long and violent distractions of the Grecian interest furnished, for extending the policy, not wholly new to them, of employing Greeks against Greeks. For means to oppose this policy Timoleon's interest in Sicily, notwithstanding the glory of the victory of the Crimæsus, seems clearly to have failed. Either mistrusting the Sicilians, or unable to induce them to trust him, he imported

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 82.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 81.



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 82.

five thousand colonists from Peloponnesus;<sup>15</sup> among whom he distributed the lands and houses of those Syracusans who had fled or been expelled. This was an effectual addition of that number to his mercenary army: the lands and houses were instead of pay. Thus strengthened he entered into treaty with the Carthaginians, and apparently conducted it ably; for he obtained terms not unworthy of the fame of the conqueror of the Crimesus. The country westward of the Lycus (apparently the same as the Halycus, the boundary prescribed in the first treaty with the elder Dionysius) being ceded to the Carthaginians, they engaged not to interfere to the eastward of that river. This advantageous treaty confirmed the power of Timoleon in Syracuse, and added greatly to his weight throughout the Grecian part of Sicily.

#### SECTION IV.

*Measures of Timoleon to reduce the independent Grecian chiefs of Sicily. Successes, and cruelties. Measures to repeople the country; to restore law and order. Singular magistracy. Despotic character of Timoleon's administration. Extent of the revolution. Prosperity of the new people. Fate of Dionysius and his family.*

As in making war against the Carthaginians Timoleon claimed to be the assertor of Grecian freedom, the protector of the Grecian interest in Sicily, so in making peace he claimed equally to be the patron of all the Greeks of the island. The Grecian interest however, though divided so that it would have been

<sup>15</sup> Plutarch mentions an ancient writer, Athanis, who made the number fifty thousand. He was contented himself to state it at ten thousand. The still more moderate report of Diodorus has been preferred for the text.

weak against the power of Carthage, was yet no longer in that state of utter confusion which Dion's expedition had produced. Almost every town, still under the direction of some one powerful man, who bore regularly the title of archon, ruler or chief, had under such superintendency a government of some regularity: but, as everywhere were two parties, the party adverse to the chief would, in the common way of Grecian party-language, call him tyrant, and be ready to concur in any measures for a revolution. Among such governments, though each seems to have had its sovereign assembly, some would be corruptly and some tyrannically administered. Information however fails of any particular demerits, either of the governments, or of those who presided in them, when Timoleon resolved to abolish all.

SECT.  
IV.

No effectual confederacy existing among those governments, he had little difficulty with the smaller. Nicodemus, chief of Centoripa, fled at his approach, and the people received their law from Timoleon. A message sufficed to make Apolloniades resign the supreme authority in Agyrium. The Campanians of Ætna, obeying no tyrant, governing themselves under a popular constitution, but presuming to resist the exterminator of tyrants, (as Timoleon is called by his panegyrist,) and being overpowered by him, were utterly destroyed.<sup>16</sup>

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 82.

With Icetes, chief of Leontini, Timoleon had friendly connexion, as formerly noticed, and, in pressing need, had received from him important assistance. The pretence for hostility with that chief, according to Plutarch, was a report that he had entered into new engagements with the Carthaginians. Diodorus has mentioned no pretence. In tenderness apparently

Plut. vit.  
Timol.  
p. 251.  
Diod.  
ut sup.  
Plut.  
ut sup.

<sup>16</sup> Καμπανοὺς ἐκπολιορκήσας διέφθειρε. Diod. l. 16. c. 82.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

for a favorite hero, he has hurried over the abominable tale in these remarkable words: ‘Timoleon conquered Icetes, and buried him.’ Plutarch’s garrulity, notwithstanding his partiality, has afforded more information; and, however doubtful the character of the conquered chief, the atrocity of the conqueror seems not doubtful. Icetes, and his son Eupolemus, and the principal military commander under them, Euthymus, were made prisoners. Euthymus was a man of such excellent character, so generally esteemed and respected, that many of the zealous partizans of Timoleon interested themselves for him. But it was objected that he had once used a sarcastical expression in derision of the Corinthians, and this sufficed to make all interference in his favor vain: Icetes and his son, and their general, were all put to death. Nor did the tragedy end so. The fate of the wives and daughters of these unfortunate men was submitted, nominally, to the decision of that multitude, collected mostly from beyond sea, which was now called the Syracusan people; and the miserable women and girls perished by the executioner. Unable to excuse, and unwilling to condemn, Plutarch says coldly, ‘This was the most ungracious of Timoleon’s actions.’<sup>17</sup>

Leontini being thus secured, it was resolved next to have Catana. The pretence against Mamercus, as against Icetes, unless it were only apology afterward, was connexion with Carthage. It seems indeed difficult to estimate the value of such an accusation, so loosely stated as it is by Plutarch. Timoleon himself had just made peace with the Carthaginians;

<sup>17</sup> The expression, as coming from a celebrated moralist, is curious enough to deserve observation in its original language: Δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο τῶν Τιμολέοντος ἔργων ἀχαριστότατον εἶναι.



and it seems very unlikely that Mamercus, who had joined interest with him against the Carthaginians when his circumstances were almost desperate, would of choice abandon him, now become the arbiter of the Grecian interest in Sicily, to connect himself with the Carthaginians. But if he saw it no longer possible to hold Timoleon's favor or avoid his oppression; if he found himself, as in the account of Timoleon's panegyrist he seems to have been, devoted to destruction, then indeed he would probably seek support from Carthage, or wherever it might be found. With crime thus problematical, or rather with imputation undeserving of credit, his merits are acknowledged. Amid the desolation of Sicily, when multitudes were wanting security for private life, he collected a considerable population in the deserted town of Catana, and made it a flourishing little state. Of any discontent of the people with his government we have no information; and Timoleon himself seems not to have owed so much to any one man, excepting perhaps Andromachus of Tauromenium, as to Mamercus. Nevertheless Mamercus was driven from Catana. He found hospitality with Hippon, chief of Messena. But Timoleon, claiming to give liberty to all, would allow none to enjoy any liberty but what he gave. Possibly there had been a party in Catana desirous of rising to power and wealth on the ruin of the existing government. There was such in Messena. Timoleon undertook its patronage and laid siege to the town. Hippon, pressed at the same time by sedition within, and by an enemy of overbearing power without, attempted flight by sea, but was taken. It is not from an adverse pen, but from the panegyrist of Timoleon, that we have the account. The unfortunate Hippon, like the elder Dionysius, had been moderate enough

Plut. vit.  
Timol.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

in the use of power to avoid extensive banishment against the party adverse to him. He was now delivered by Timoleon to that party. A kind of democratical law was thus put in execution against him, which must have had, in some degree, Timoleon's approbation, and is not marked with any reprehension by the moral biographer. Hippon was carried to the great theatre of Messena, and all the boys from all the schools were sent for to take the lesson of atrocity, while, with the most studied indignities, he was tormented to death.

Meanwhile Mamercus, in some confidence apparently of merit, both with Timoleon and with that multitude which, not without important assistance from him, was become the Syracusan people, had surrendered himself; stipulating only for allowance to plead his own cause freely before the general assembly of Syracuse, with the condition annexed, that Timoleon should not appear as his accuser. Timoleon's accusation however was unnecessary: his interference to preserve some decency of proceeding might have been creditable to him. So was the assembly composed, and so regulated, that Mamercus could not obtain a hearing. Shouts and scoffing drowned his voice. In a mixture of indignation and despair, throwing off his cloak, he ran violently across the theatre, the place of trial, with the purpose of destroying himself by dashing his head against the wall. He was however taken up alive, but being considered as sufficiently tried and condemned, he was put to death in the usual way of execution for those convicted of theft. Not an evil deed has Plutarch found to impute either to Mamercus or Hippon. Nevertheless that admired moralist relates the shocking tales of their fate as if creditable to his hero, and

concludes exultingly, 'Thus Timoleon abolished tyrannies, and destroyed his enemies.'

Yet it seems probable that Timoleon never wholly wasted cruelty: his atrocity, of which he was on occasion not sparing, was always subservient to his policy. As he repressed an adverse party by his executions at Entella, so he riveted an associated party by conceding Icetes, Hippon, and Mamercus to its vengeance; not merely thus gaining its uncertain good will, but increasing its dependency on him for protection against exalted animosity and hatred, and making any union of the Sicilian Greeks against him more impracticable. The final reward of the party, as likely in such circumstances, was more proportioned to their desert than to their hope. The mercenary soldiers and adventurers from Corinth and various parts of Greece, who had no interest in Sicily but what they owed to Timoleon, were his principal care. Paid for their services with forfeited lands and houses, the Syracusans were obliged to admit them to all the rights of citizens. Heart-burnings and disagreements arose between the new citizens and the old, such that arms were taken and civil war ensued. Of this contest no particulars remain; but that the new-comers prevailed, and that the lot of the remnant of Syracusans, resting on the mercy which Timoleon's policy would allow, was more than before uneasy and degrading, is sufficiently indicated.

Aristot.  
Polit.  
l. 5. c. 3.

Henceforward Timoleon treated Sicily as a conquered country; for so it appears even in the accounts of those who extol him as the deliverer of the Sicilian Greeks. It is remarkable that not a single Sicilian is mentioned by them in either civil or military situation under him. Corinthians and other foreigners are named; and Plutarch, the most extravagant of his

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 82.

Plut. vit.  
Timol.



CHAP.  
XXXIII.B. C. 337.  
Ol. 110.  $\frac{1}{2}$ .Diod.  
ut ant.

panegyrist, goes so far as to say that he could not trust the Syracusans.<sup>18</sup> How much of the large population which flourished under each Dionysius was extirpated or exterminated in the troubles preceding Timoleon's expedition, and what he himself destroyed or expelled, history remaining only from his partizans, extant accounts fail to show; but the void altogether was very great. This he determined to repair; and it appears that he was great in the business of repatriation not less than of destruction. His first measure was to invite adventurers, by proclamation over Greece, with the promise of lands and houses and the rights of citizens. Exiles from different republics abounding in Greece, some always from every state, and from some states sometimes half the people, to collect numbers opportunity would be ready. On the immediate territory of Syracuse, it is said, he established at once four thousand families, and, in an adjoining plain, called the Agyrinæan, of great extent and extraordinary fertility, no less than ten thousand.

The arduous business remained to establish civil order among a mixed multitude, thus new in the country, and to blend his mercenary soldiers with the fresh adventurers, and both with the remnant of

<sup>18</sup> Perhaps Plutarch, professing not to write history, would claim indulgence for omitting historical facts at pleasure: carelessness and misjudgment have occasioned the numerous important omissions in the narrative of Diodorus. Neither has noticed the war between Timoleon's mercenaries and the Syracusan people, whose support was the original pretence for Timoleon's expedition. Indeed to make any account of it accord with their panegyric of him as the deliverer of the Sicilian Greeks must have been difficult. Yet what Plutarch has acknowledged, of the denial of confidence to Syracusans, and admission of strangers only to power, possibly among the causes, would however be a ready and perhaps necessary consequence of the war of which we get information from Aristotle.

Syracusans, if any might be, into one mass of citizens. Nor was this wanting for Syracuse only, but for almost every Grecian town of Sicily; all now brought under his power, through revolutions more or less violent and sweeping. In this very difficult business his principal assistants are said to have been two Corinthians, Dionysius and Cephalus. On a revisal of the old laws, those relating to property and the rights of individuals which had obtained under the autocrator Dionysius were found so unexceptionable that in them little alteration was found expedient. But the political constitution, which seems to have stood under the two tyrants of that name nearly as it had been established by the demagogue Diocles, is said to have been almost wholly altered. Ground however occurs for doubting the justness of this general assertion, unattended with any account of particulars. For, had there not been merit in the institutions of Diocles, the first Dionysius, who seems clearly to have had the power, surely would have altered them; and the alteration would have been matter for charge against him among the adverse writers. That under Dionysius the constitution was good, the flourishing state of the country under him, and for some years after him, in regard to which all remaining evidence concurs, will at least afford large presumption. But under the constitution of Timoleon also the country flourished. Diocles and Timoleon equally pretended the warmest zeal for democratical sway; though, provident no doubt of those temporary enjoyments for the multitude which were necessary for engaging its favor, they profited from circumstances to rule with severity; a severity for which Diocles was famed, and for which Timoleon appears to have deserved fame, however his superior manage-

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

ment or good fortune may have averted the imputation from his party and from posterity. But it seems not probable that two governments of democratical form, under each of which the country flourished, could be upon the whole very dissimilar. Timoleon however made an addition to the constitution of Syracuse well deserving notice. Though his policy led him to avow himself always the champion of democracy, yet, in settling the government of the country, aware of the necessity for a balance to the sovereign power of the people, and of the impossibility of giving sufficient weight to any civil authority for the purpose, he had recourse to the superstition of the age. The magistrate, to whom he committed the salutary power of controlling popular despotism, he called the Minister of Olympian Jupiter. What were the particular functions of this ministry we are not informed; but its permanence through many succeeding revolutions, and the continuance of its high estimation, as we are assured by Diodorus till his own time, near three hundred years after Timoleon, when its authority was in a great degree superseded and its dignity in a manner overshadowed by the extension of the privileges of Roman citizens to all the Sicilians, satisfactorily indicate the wisdom with which it was adapted to the temper and circumstances of the people; that new or mixed people which was thenceforward to be called Syracusan.

But Timoleon's care was not confined to Syracuse. Diod. 1. 16. c. 32. Diodorus says, 'that he restored liberty to all the Sicilian Greek cities, rooting out tyrants, and receiving the people into alliance.' We learn from much higher authority in the course of Lacedæmonian, Athenian, and Theban history, what such liberty and such alliance were. But Timoleon evidently exceeded



the ordinary despotism of Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes. The accounts remaining from his panegyrist of his introduction of new citizens afford the best ground for estimating the amount of his destruction or expulsion of the old. Scarcely in any city does the chief power seem to have been trusted with natives. In Syracuse, as already observed, not a Syracusan is found in any authority. Agrigentum, under his patronage, was occupied by a colony of mixed people, among whom were many Agrigentine refugees: but the leaders, those to whom he committed the commanding authority, were two Eleans, Megellus and Pheristus. A similar colony, led by Gorgus of the island of Ceos, took possession of Gela. The Camarinæans appear to have been more favored; being only compelled to admit a number of strangers to share with them the rights of citizens of Camarina. Those Leontines, who neither suffered death with their chief, nor banishment for their fidelity to the cause in which they had been engaged with him, probably not numerous, were removed to Syracuse. The first Dionysius, and Gelon before him, had made many such removals; but a revolution so extensive and so complete, in governments, in property, in population, as that effected by Timoleon in Sicily, had not occurred among the settlements of the Greek nation since the return of the Heraclidæ.

That the government of Timoleon, even in Syracuse, was highly despotic, is evident from all accounts. Nepos calls him king, and his command a kingdom.<sup>19</sup> Plutarch says, 'he was believed and venerated every-

Plut. vit.  
Timol.  
p. 253. A.

<sup>19</sup> 'Cum tantis esset opibus ut etiam invitis imperare posset, tantum haberet amorem *omnium Siculorum* ut nullo recusante *regnum* obtineret. Quod ceteri *reges* imperio vix potuerunt, hic benevolentia tenuit.' Corn. Nep. v. Timol. Those whom the biographer calls *all the Sicilians* were, for

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

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‘where as a founder;’ and then follows the proof; ‘neither war nor peace was made, law enacted, colony established, or constitution settled, that was thought rightly done unless he approved.’ The same authors furnish anecdotes, indicating the character of the administration of this king and founder. We have seen in Athens, where something nearer to pure democracy than perhaps ever anywhere else had practical effect as a lasting government, what licentiousness of invective was used in the general assembly, and what libellous representation in the theatres, against the truly great Pericles, in the fulness of his power. Many anecdotes, mostly preserved with a view to defame the elder Dionysius, show that, under his administration in Syracuse, public debate was generally very free. But under that celebrated destroyer of tyrants, Timoleon, it was considered as an extravagance for any one to think of opposing the executive power, either in the general assembly or in the courts of law. Demænetus is named as a remarkable instance of a person venturing, in the general assembly, to impeach any part of Timoleon’s conduct, whose well-imagined reply shows how little he had to fear opposition. Not deigning to enter into any refutation of the charges, he said, ‘he thanked the gods who had been propitious to his constant prayer for freedom of speech to the Syracusans.’ Laphytius was presumptuous enough to institute a suit at law against him, and to require surety, in regular form, that he would stand the trial. Timoleon’s warm partizans were so indignant that they excited tumult and

the most part, according even to the panegyrists of Timoleon, foreigners, brought into Sicily in the room of Sicilians, either destroyed or made outcasts; and the *love* was of those who owed to him, and under him only had hope of holding, property taken by violence from the owners.

began violence. The wiser Timoleon restrained them: 'His very purpose,' he said, 'in all the toil and danger he had undergone for the Syracusan people, was that the law should be equal to all.'

But that Timoleon, pretending to give universal freedom, really governed all with despotic authority, should perhaps less be attributed as blame to him, than considered as, in some degree, a necessity imposed by the general deficiency, among the Greeks, of any conception of principles on which that civil freedom might rest, for which they were so generally zealous. The following anecdote, in which, even in Trajan's time, Plutarch seems to have seen nothing but wise decision, marks a deficiency of jurisprudential principle which, even of Timoleon's age, might appear now hardly credible. Timoleon was engaged with the ceremony of a public sacrifice when, in the crowd about him, one man suddenly stabbed another, and fled. A third, hitherto a quiet bystander, instantly sprang to the altar, and, claiming asylum, declared himself ready to confess all. Being told to speak out, and no harm should befall him, he said, 'he had been sent by Icetes, together with the man just killed, to assassinate Timoleon; and they were going to execute their commission when his comrade was stabbed; by whom he knew not.' Meanwhile the effectual assassin had been overtaken and was brought back, insisting 'that he had committed no crime; having only taken just revenge for his father, who had been killed in Leontini by him whom he had now put to death.' It happened that some persons present, recognizing him, bore testimony to the truth of his account; upon which he was not only set at liberty without reprehension, but rewarded with a sum equal to thirty pounds



CHAP.  
XXXIII.

sterling, for having been, in committing one murder, so accidentally the means of preventing another. Whether this story were in all points true, or the confession was the invention of the partizans of Timoleon to palliate the cruelties used toward Icetes and his unfortunate family, whose partizans could now little raise their voices for themselves, yet as transmitted from Timoleon's age, and reported in Trajan's, it must deserve attention among indications of the characters of government and jurisprudence in both. Not only the principle of allowing private revenge to supersede public justice is admitted, but encouragement is held out for murder, by showing that as, in the chance of things, benefit might result to the public, so instead of punishment, profit and honor might follow to the perpetrator.

Nevertheless the result, for which we have satisfactory testimony, shows the policy of Timoleon to have been very ably adapted to the temper and circumstances of the mixed people for whom he was to legislate. The first evidence we have from history consists indeed in its silence. That historians were not wanting we are well assured. That they had nothing to report therefore of Sicilian affairs, during nineteen

Diod. 1. 19.  
c. 3.

years after the establishment of Timoleon's power, excepting some inconsiderable hostilities between Syracuse and Agrigentum, and that at the end of that period, when new and great troubles called their attention, the Sicilian Greek towns were flourishing, nearly as under the first Dionysius, seems unquestionably to mark extraordinary wisdom in the institutions of Timoleon. Diodorus, if our copies give the number rightly, says that he lived only eight years\*

[\* See bracketed note, p. 53.]

after his first arrival in Sicily, and only two after his victory of the Crimesus. Plutarch is less explicit on this subject. They agree in asserting that he became completely blind for some time before his death; and accounts altogether appear to imply that the period in which he was active in administration, and the period in which he lived honored in the blindness that in a great degree incapacitated him, must together have been considerably longer than the historian has reported.

If however the many who were indebted to Timoleon for fair possessions in Sicily, some instigated by gratitude, and all by interest, would extol the living founder of their fortune, amplify his merit, and extenuate his failings, yet more would his premature death, or even that blindness which would render him in a manner dead to military and civil business, call forth the voice of panegyric from the zeal or regret of both friendship and party. Had a revolution quickly followed, Timoleon's fame, turbid even in the accounts of his panegyrists, might have been still more blackened than that of Dionysius or of Phalaris. But the long peaceful prevalence of that party to which he gave possessions and power provided security for his reputation. Andromachus, chief of Tauro-menium, though how his authority was more constitutional in itself, or less exceptionably exercised, than that of Mamercus, Hippon, or Icetes, nowhere appears, preserving Timoleon's friendship, retained his own power. From the pen of his son Timæus therefore, one of the principal historians of Sicily, only eulogy of Timoleon could be expected. Either gratitude, or hope, or fear, or all together, might prompt his exclamation, in the words of the great tragic poet, 'O ye divinities, what Cyprian goddess,

Sophocl. ap. ' what god of desire, presides over all his actions!' But  
 Plut. vit. recollecting the treatment of Mamercus, of Hippon,  
 Timol. of Icetes, and, beyond all, of the women of the family  
 p. 253. of Icetes, as reported by the moral biographer Timoleon's zealous panegyrist, we shall hardly agree with that moralist of four or five centuries after, in his unqualified admiration and praise.

Plut. vit.  
 Timol.  
 p. 242.

While Timoleon's adventure was attended with such extraordinary success in Sicily, the party with which he was connected in Corinth prospered so that opposition was overborne, and the powers of government rested in their hands. The liberal treatment therefore which Dionysius found, on first taking his residence there, may reflect some credit on Timoleon himself. By the Corinthians, and by others resorting to that central city, the great emporium of the nation, the seat of the Isthmian games, Dionysius was treated with such consideration that he appears to have been the most distinguished person of Corinth and of Greece. But this excited a jealousy that threatened his safety: he found it prudent to avoid the attentions of considerable men; and, whether led more by considerations of expediency, or by his natural disposition, he is said to have affected low company and frivolous or dissolute amusement, with a carelessness about serious concerns. But Plutarch has had the candor to avow that many anecdotes preserved in his time marked in Dionysius a manly firmness under misfortune. He has even reported several, which show very illiberal behaviour toward him, and much good temper, good sense, and ready wit in his manner of meeting it. But all did not suffice for obtaining justice from the Syracusan government, or permanence of protection from the Corinthian. Whether still under Timoleon, or more probably not till after his death, the stipulated

Ibid.



remittances to Dionysius ceased, and his consequent distress is said to have driven him to seek his livelihood by the occupation of a schoolmaster; for which his literary acquirements and superior manners might give him advantages. At one time he was compelled to fly from Corinth. By birth a citizen of Athens, the privilege having been given to his father, for himself and all his posterity, the state of the Athenian government however was not inviting for him, and he preferred retiring to the less polished regions of Epirus.

Cic. Tusc.  
l. 3.

Ep. Philipp.  
ap. Demost.  
p. 161.  
ed. Reiske.

It is difficult to judge what credit may be due to Plutarch's mention of the fate of the women of the family. It was in the way of democratical party-spirit among the Greeks to glory in the most diabolical revenge against an adverse faction; and this spirit was cherished among philosophers under the Roman empire, apparently with the same view with which it has been adopted by the French philosophers of the present age, who have, in truth, been in almost everything copiers, though in atrocity they have at least equalled or perhaps outdone their masters.<sup>20</sup> It has been in this spirit that Plutarch has held out ostentatiously the punishment which the younger Dio-

<sup>20</sup> This spirit seems, on the revival of letters, to have been early caught by some of those learned men, far more on the continent than in our island, who undertook the translation of the Greek authors; and it has led them often to outgo their originals in violence of expression, and to prefer the most injurious sense of every doubtful phrase. Thus Plutarch's "Α δ' ἔπραξε τυραννῶν (ὁ Διονύσιος) οἷς ἔπαθεν ὑπερβαλόμενος, is rendered by Rhodoman and Wesseling, *Hic scelera sua superavit calamitatibus*. Those translators cannot but have known that *τυραννῶν* does not necessarily imply any *scelera*, and the context would rather imply reference to the splendor of the first years of the second Dionysius's reign or administration.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

Plut. vit.  
Timol.  
p. 242.

Aristot. Pol.  
l. 5. c. 7.

nysius suffered in the calamities of his family, living to see the death of his wife and all his children. The manner in which his sons perished is not said. The treatment of his wife and daughters, mercifully concluded by drowning them, appears to have resembled that which the unfortunate daughter of Hermocrates had suffered many years before, from the same party. The story is related with so much complacency by the moral philosopher that we are left only to hope his favorite hero, Timoleon, was not implicated in the atrocious wickedness. It was probably when the family of Dionysius were obliged to fly from Locri that the destruction fell upon that city which we find obscurely mentioned by Aristotle.

Timoleon's history has assuredly deserved to be better known; and the account of such a contemporary as Timæus, however partial, could not but have been of high value. Of Dion, who, in the geographer's phrase, set all at variance with all, we should perhaps little desire to know more; nor indeed of Timoleon for his works of destruction, which have been so much the subject of panegyric. But we want information how, through a revolution so violent and so complete, he produced a prosperity and lasting quiet, of which examples, in all history rare, occur among the Grecian republics almost only under the administration of Sicilian chiefs, and those mostly described by the title of tyrants.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

*Affairs of Macedonia from the reign of Perdiccas son of Alexander to the establishment of Philip son of Amyntas.*

## SECTION I.

*Macedonian constitution. Macedonian territory. State of Macedonia under Perdiccas son of Alexander. Splendid and beneficial reign of Archelaus son of Perdiccas.*

WHILE among the numerous states of Greece, and their extensive colonies, security for civil freedom had been vainly sought in various forms of republics, and permanence of public strength had equally failed in experiment of various systems of confederacy, there remained on the northern border a people of Grecian race who held yet their hereditary monarchy, transmitted from the heroic ages. This, as we have seen formerly in treating of the times described by Homer, was a limited monarchy, bearing a striking resemblance to the ancient constitution of England, and in his age prevailing throughout Greece. Of the countries which preserved this constitution, the principal in extent and power, and the most known to us, was the kingdom of Macedonia; whose affairs, for their implication with those of the leading republics, have already required frequent mention.<sup>1</sup> According to

SECT.  
I.

Ch. 2. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

<sup>1</sup> The principal passages, in the foregoing history, relating to Macedonia, occur in ch. 1. s. 1. and 2. ch. 6. s. 3. ch. 7. s. 3. ch. 8. s. 2. and 5. ch. 9. s. 1. ch. 13. s. 4. ch. 14. s. 2. ch. 15. s. 2. ch. 16. s. 2. 4. 5. 6. ch. 26. s. 2. 3. 4.



Polyb. l. 5. the concurring testimony of ancient writers who have  
 p. 375.  
 Arr. de treated of Macedonia, the king was supreme, but not  
 exp. Alex. despotic. The chief object of his office, as in the  
 l. 4. c. 11. English constitution, was to be conservator of the  
 Q. Curt. l. 6. peace of his kingdom; for which great purpose he  
 c. 8. s. 25. was vested with the first military and the first judicial  
 Luc. dial. authority; as in the governments described by Homer,  
 Alex. & he commanded the army, and presided over the ad-  
 Phil. ministration of justice. But he was to command and  
 to judge according to established laws. He had no  
 legislative authority but in concurrence with the as-  
 sembled people; and condemnation, and the decision  
 of all more important causes, rested with popular  
 tribunals; in which, as among our forefathers, in  
 what thence bears yet the title of the King's Bench,  
 the king presided in person, but the court gave  
 judgment. Even in military jurisdiction his authority  
 continued to be limited, even to the latest times of  
 the monarchy.<sup>2</sup> Thus far our information is positive  
 and clear. What we want farther to know is, what  
 was the composition of the Macedonian people;  
 whether there was any distinction between one part  
 and another in the enjoyment of rights and partici-  
 pation of power; and, what is not a little important  
 in the estimate of any constitution of those times,  
 what proportion the number of those who had civil  
 rights bore to that of those who had none, or  
 next to none, the slaves. The silence however of

<sup>2</sup> 'De capitalibus rebus, vetusto Macedonum modo, inquit, rebat exercitus: in pace erat vulgi. Nihil potestas regum valebat, nisi prius valuisset auctoritas.' Q. Curt. l. 6. c. 8. s. 25. Εξ Ἀργουε εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἦλθον, οὐδὲ βίᾳ ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων ἄρχοντες διετέλεσαν. Arr. de Exp. Alex. l. 4. p. 86. D. A very remarkable instance of the restriction upon the military jurisdiction of the Macedonian kings is related by Polybius, b. 5. p. 375. ed. Casaub.

authors concerning these matters, especially in accounts of civil wars in Macedonia, indicates that the Macedonian government was little disturbed with those pretensions to oligarchal privilege on one side, and to democratical despotism on the other, of which we have been observing the evils among the republics; in some of which, as Lacedæmon and some of the Thessalian cities, honor and office were arrogated exclusively to a few families; in others, as Athens and Argos, the poor oppressed the wealthy; and in all a division of interests subsisted, frequently interrupting the public peace, and always threatening the public safety. How the gradation of rank, necessary in numerous societies, was arranged, we are not informed; but equal law for all freemen appears to have been, as in our common law, our Anglosaxon constitution, the first principle of the Macedonian government;<sup>3</sup> whence it has been observed that the Macedonians were freer in their kingdom than the Greeks in their republics.<sup>4</sup> Time then, not merely a destroyer, but often an improver of human institutions, brought them an advantage which seems hardly yet in Homer's age to have gained steady footing anywhere. Popular attachment to the constitution and to the reigning family, the firmest support of political arrangement, the most discouraging check to adventure in revolution, was established among the

<sup>3</sup> Ælc man ꝥý Folcnuhter ꝥýnð, ge earne ge eadig. This has been noticed in note 6 of the first section of the fourth chapter of this History.

<sup>4</sup> By the authors of Ancient Universal History, v. 8. p. 398. quoting Arrian, l. 4. and Curtius, l. 6. I think the observation just, but not exactly Arrian's, who, though superior to most of the Grecian writers under the Roman empire, was not entirely free from their common prejudice in favor of that licentiousness of the republics, whence there was more power to do ill than security in doing well.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

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Macedonians. The rules of succession to the throne indeed unfortunately remained so far defective, as in England before the wars of the Roses, that within the reigning family competition would often arise, and produce civil war. Yet civil war, calamitous everywhere and always, appears to have been of a less atrocious temper among the Macedonians in the struggle for a crown, than among the republican Greeks in the contest for democratical, oligarchal, or tyrannical sway. Half a people banished or massacred are circumstances at least not reported in Macedonian as in republican Greek history. Against the constitution, and against the rights of the royal family, as the key-stone of the constitution, the salutary prejudices of the people, the growth of ages, would allow no competition.

Nor was this steadier form of free government the only advantage of the Macedonians over their southern neighbours. In extent of territory the Macedonian kingdom far exceeded any of the republican states, and it exceeded most of them in proportional extent of level country and valuable soil. Its frontier indeed, except where verging toward the sea, was of lofty and rugged mountains, but the interior was mostly champaign. As then the natural division of Greece by highlands and gulfs into small portions of difficult access had contributed much to its political division into very small states, so the freedom from such hindrance of communication in Macedonia had produced, and gave facility for maintaining, the union of such an extent of fruitful territory under one government.

These advantages however were not unattended with balancing evils. The Macedonians were unfortunate in their continental situation, nearly sur-



rounded by powerful hordes of the fiercest and most incorrigible barbarians. If actual warfare was sometimes intermitted, yet the danger of it was unceasing. Nearly excluded then from the sea, their communication with the more polished parts of the world was limited and precarious. Nevertheless the Macedonians appear to have been not ruder than many of the republican Greeks, the Dorians, the Locrians, perhaps the Arcadians; and no account shows them so barbarous as Thucydides has described the Ætolians. Under the first Amyntas, when Darius invaded Europe, the Macedonian kingdom, though unable to withstand the vast force of the Persian empire, appears to have attracted consideration from the Persian commanders as a civilized country, of some importance among the powers of the age; and this was increased under his son, the first Alexander, after the great defeat of the Persian army near Platæa. In the Peloponnesian war, the second Perdiccas, son of Alexander, seems to have maintained its former consequence. Afterward, in the heat of party contest among the republics, the foul language of democratical debate would sometimes stigmatize the Macedonians with the name of barbarians. But this is not found from any others. Among the Greek historians their Grecian blood has been universally acknowledged. Their speech was certainly Grecian, their manners were Grecian, their religion was Grecian; with differences, as far as they are reported to us, not greater than existed among the different republics.<sup>5</sup>

SECT.  
I.

Thucyd.  
l. 3.

Ch. 15. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

Herod. l. 5.  
6. & 7.

<sup>5</sup> We find Isocrates putting the Macedonian name in marked opposition to the barbarian, and the title of king of Macedonia in equally marked opposition to the titles of tyrant and despot: Ἀμύντα τῷ Μακεδόνων βασιλεῖ, καὶ Διονυσίῳ τῷ Σικελίας τυράννῳ, καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῆς Ἀσίας κρατοῦντι. Panegyr. p. 250. t. 1. ed.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

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Ch. 15. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

But a practice, apparently originating in the purpose of obviating an immediate difficulty, contributed much to disturb and weaken the Macedonian kingdom. It was usual to provide for the younger sons of the reigning family by committing frontier provinces to their government; where their situation resembled that of the lords marchers of the feudal times in western Europe. The revenue of the province supported the dignity of the honorable but troublesome and dangerous office. The employment was worthy of the high rank of those employed, and suited the temper of a martial age. Nor was it probably without its advantages to the state; the frontier territory being so defended, the interior rested in peace. But, in progress of ages, the multiplication of these appanages, which seem to have been generally hereditary, might reduce the kingdom to weakness and insignificance; so that it would be no longer able either to resist foreign enemies or control its own vassals. Accordingly we find from this source jarring interests arising, which not only produced troubles within the kingdom, but afforded opportunity and even invitation for the interference of foreign powers. We have seen one of the subordinate princes, Amyntas son of Philip, becoming an instrument in the hands of the great monarch of Thrace, Sitalces, for overthrowing the supreme government of Macedonia; and we have seen the leading Grecian republics, Athens and Lacedæmon, by turns forming connexion with those princes for nearly the same purpose. It seems therefore to have been a wise policy of Perdiccas son of

Auger. And this was when the king of Macedonia was allied with the enemies of Athens to oppose purposes which the orator desired to promote.

Alexander, after having baffled the violence of the Thracian monarch, to re-unite those severed principalities with the kingdom, or bring them under a just subordination. In the prosecution of this reasonable purpose he is said indeed not to have been duly scrupulous of foul means. The measures by which he acquired the territory which had been the appanage of his brother Alcetas, if we should believe the story told by Plato, were highly nefarious. But in Plato's time, books being rare, and authentic history little extensively known, if a statement of facts was wanted for illustration of moral or political argument among philosophers, any report was taken, and whether considered as true or supposed, it equally served the purpose. It is therefore necessary to be careful of assuming reports, so stated, as intended by the authors themselves to be taken for historical truths. The character of Perdicas however, as represented by Thucydides, is not pure. But reasonable in his thwarted purpose of re-uniting the severed principalities by the ready interference, sometimes of Lacedæmon, sometimes of Athens, sometimes of Thrace, his success appears to have been incomplete. Nevertheless his administration was evidently altogether able; and though of various fortune as of doubtful character, yet, at his death, which happened about the time of the defeat and destruction of the Athenian fleet and army under Nicias and Demosthenes in

Plat. Gorgias.

B. C. 414. <sup>6</sup>  
Ol. 91. 3.  
[B. C. 413.  
CL. •]

<sup>6</sup> The authority on which this date is assigned for the accession of Archelaus will be mentioned in a following note.

[\* 'Perdicas king of Macedon was still living as late as the end of summer ' B. C. 414. Thucyd. vii. 9. *ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τελευτῶντι καὶ Εὐερτίων, στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων, μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας, κ.τ.λ.* The accession 'therefore of Archelaus could hardly be in this year, but at the soonest perhaps 'in the beginning of B. C. 413.' Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 74. See Mr. Mitford's note, and the additions to it, below, p. 95.]



CHAP. Sicily, he seems to have left his kingdom altogether  
XXXIV. improved to his son Archelaus.

Thucyd.  
1. 2. c. 100.

It appears very uncertain what credit, or whether any, may be due to report, which apparently had currency many years after in Athens, of the illegitimacy of this prince's birth, and of the crimes by which he acquired or secured the throne. Thucydides, his contemporary, likely beyond others among the Greeks to know Macedonia, calls him son of Perdiccas without mentioning illegitimacy, and speaks of him as the immediate successor, without any intimation of interfering pretensions. In a short summary then of his actions he ranks him effectually with the most illustrious princes. Archelaus son of Perdiccas, he says, raised most of the present fortifications of the kingdom: he formed straight roads, and he improved the military establishment, providing horses, heavy armour, and whatever else military use might require, more than all the eight kings his predecessors.<sup>7</sup>

In the actual circumstances of Macedonia an improved military was perhaps the first thing necessary

<sup>7</sup> In Plato's dialogue, entitled *Gorgias*, one of the interlocutors mentions Archelaus king of Macedonia as the illegitimate son of Perdiccas, and as having acquired the crown by the murder of the proper heir, the legitimate son of their common father. Athenæus has considered this as scandal, to which he says Plato was addicted. It is however likely enough that a story of this kind was current in Athens, and Plato appears to have introduced it in his dialogue merely for illustration of moral argument by supposed facts, which, whether true or feigned, would equally answer the purpose of illustration. What credit therefore Plato himself gave to the story, which has a mixture of the ridiculous with the shocking, does not appear; but, on the other hand, in the same dialogue, it is clearly indicated that Archelaus left behind him the reputation of a powerful, fortunate, rich, and liberal prince.

toward all other improvement. The Macedonians, like the republican Greeks, were all soldiers; for so the ever-threatening pressure of hostilities around required: but they did not live like the republicans, especially the democratical republicans, crowded in towns, leaving the country to their predial slaves. Confident in unanimity, all ranks having an interest in the maintenance of the constitution as well as in the defence of the country, they resided on their estates; and, having little commerce, their towns were small and mostly unfortified. But the irruption of the overbearing force under Sitalces during the reign of Perdiccas had made them feel their error, or rather the misfortune of their continental situation. Unable either to withstand his numbers in the field or to defend their unwall'd towns, they had been compelled, as we have seen, to abandon their less moveable property, and seek shelter in their woods and marshes.

SECT.  
I.

Ch. 13. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

The measures of Archelaus, possibly not unproductive of following evil, seem to have been at the time in extraordinary amount effectual for their important object, the security and quiet of the country. In a turbulent age he found means to obviate war so as to maintain peace with dignity. With the Athenian democracy indeed, the common disturber of states, as it is called by the great Athenian historian, he could not avoid hostilities. The Athenians excited the people of Pydna, a Macedonian seaport, to rebellion, and supported them in it. Archelaus did not then hesitate to use the force he had prepared, and he was successful: he vindicated his kingdom's rights, and he seems to have prosecuted the purpose of arms no farther.

Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 70.

B. C. 410.  
Ol. 92. 3.  
Diod. l. 13.  
c. 49.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

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The policy then, by which he proposed to secure to Macedonia the valuable possession of an only sea-port, will deserve notice. Occasion has occurred formerly to observe how very commonly, in early times, the dangers of maritime situation drove habitation to some distance from the sea-shore. But spots, which the peaceful tillers of the soil would avoid, sea-faring adventurers would often in preference covet. Hence the Macedonian and Thracian shores became occupied by Grecian colonies; established, perhaps many, with little violence, and some, though not quite in the spirit of Penn's settlement in America, yet possibly without any violence. Peninsulas especially, hazardous possessions for the husbandmen, unless protected by a government possessing a powerful navy, were peculiarly convenient for men addicted to commerce or piracy. Thus the Thracian Chersonese and the Chalcidic peninsulas became early Grecian land. The settlers who emigrated with Perdiccas from Argos to Macedonia would probably carry with them some sea-faring disposition, which would however be likely to be lost among their progeny, led by the circumstances of their new country to establish themselves within land. So late as the beginning of the Peloponnesian war such was the superfluity of fruitful soil within the Macedonian dominion that the prince then reigning, Perdiccas son of Alexander, could furnish settlements for the whole population of several Grecian towns of the Chalcidic peninsulas, emigrating at once to avoid the oppression of the imperial democracy of Athens. The Macedonians therefore, invited by the ample opportunities and better security of inland situation, appear to have neglected the coast and become almost entirely a nation of husbandmen and hunters. The

Ch. 13. s. 4.  
of this Hist.



widely differing pursuits and mode of life then of the inlanders and the coastmen led to a difference in habits, in character, and in personal interests, which produced a disposition to separation and even opposition in political concerns. The inlanders lived scattered in villages, subsisting from the produce of their fields, warmly attached to their homes, to their country, to its constitution of government, which ensured their private property and their public strength, and for the sake of these, if for nothing else, to one another. The coasters, on the contrary, traders and navigators, assembled in towns, anxious for fortifications that might afford security for collected stores, careless otherwise of territory, even for subsistence looking to commerce or piracy, averse to connexion with any controlling government, ready for communication with all the world, were little attached to any country.

Such a people, so differing from the rest of the Macedonians, the Pydnæans appear to have been. When therefore, after their rebellion, Archelaus had reduced them to submission, he was aware of the difficulty of assuring their loyalty to the Macedonian government. The policy of the Athenian republic, to obviate revolt, often denied its subject towns the fortifications requisite for defence against the ordinary dangers of maritime or any limitary situation. The resource of Archelaus, violent it might appear now, but for his age mild and liberal, was to remove the town to the distance of two miles from the shore. There it might be controlled in rebellious purposes by loyal armies, and not readily assisted by foreign fleets. Its conveniences for trade would be somewhat lessened; but they might still at least equal

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

those of Athens, Megara, Corinth, Argos, and most of the old maritime towns of Greece, placed, originally for security, at a greater distance from the shore, and yet finding means to flourish by commerce.<sup>8</sup>

But with talents for war, and a mind capable of the necessary exertion, the delight of Archelaus, fortunately for his people, was in the arts of peace. He had the just discernment to be aware that his kingdom wanted internal improvement far more than increase of territory. Nor is it little that is implied in the contemporary historian's concise information, 'that he formed straight roads.' Till assured of ability to defy invasion through a military force prepared with attachment to the government and country as well as with discipline, no prudent ruler of a country, situated like Macedonia, would make roads. But security being provided and roads formed, improvements in agriculture, in commerce, in civiliza-

Thucyd.  
1. 2. c. 100.

<sup>8</sup> The urgency, formerly, to avoid maritime situation on account of piracy, is strongly marked even in the circumstances of the English shores. All the existing towns on the coast of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight are, comparatively, of recent origin. Not one contains the mother-church, or gives name to the parish. Portsmouth is in the parish of Kingston in the middle of Portsea island, where remains the church deserted by its town. With circumstances nearly similar Gosport is the parish of Alverstoke, Lymington of Bolder, Yarmouth of Freshwater, Newtown of Calborn, and Cowes of Northwood, or rather of Carisbrook, the mother-church of Northwood. The Cinque Ports may seem some exception: their maritime strength indeed would assist for their security; but old Winchelsea alone of them seems to have trusted in its strength of hands: Hastings and Dover depended on the protection of their castles. At Plymouth the very superior situation of the present Docktown, now called Devonport, and the harbour of the Tamar were neglected for the sake of better safety some way up the narrower water of the Plym.

tion, in provincial administration, and in the general comforts of the people, would readily follow. Silent however about these, ancient writers have nevertheless reported what yet largely implies them. Archelaus was sedulous to dispel ignorance and rudeness, and promote science and the fine arts among his people. He was the greatest patron in his age of the learned and ingenious, whom he invited from all parts of Greece. It cannot but be creditable to him to have invited Socrates, though the philosopher's refusal, recorded by Aristotle, has been taken by declamatory writers under the Roman empire as ground of sarcasm against him. The invitation however which Socrates, for the sake of his fellow-citizens, whose instruction he had undertaken as a sacred duty, not without foresight of their ingratitude, refused, Euripides, the friend whom he is said most to have esteemed, thought not unfit to accept. Euripides lived long at the Macedonian court; which, by the assemblage of talents there, as well as by the security enjoyed under a well-administered free government, seems to have been the most desirable residence, for men of leisure, any where to be found in that age.

In the great deficiency of history concerning this interesting reign Ælian's anecdotes will have value; and the more, because his purpose has not been the eulogy which they effectually involve. He informs us that the celebrated painter Zeuxis was among the artists entertained at the Macedonian court; and that his works, adorning the royal residence, formed an inducement contributing not a little to occasion a great resort of strangers, in the reign of Archelaus, to the capital of Macedonia. It appears to have been in the same spirit with which he entertained Euripides

SECT.  
I.

Arist. Rhet.  
l. 2. c. 23.

Ælian: var.  
hist. l. 14,  
c. 17.



CHAP. and Zeuxis in his court that Archelaus instituted  
 XXXIV. games in imitation of those of southern Greece; the  
 Diod. 1. 17. Pythian rather than the Olympian, but apparently  
 c. 16. an improvement on both. Dedicating them to the  
 Muses, he chose for their celebration the town of  
 Dium in Pieria, that province of Macedonia to which  
 the old Grecian mythology assigned the birth and  
 principal residence of the Muses. These games were  
 called Olympian; perhaps from the neighbouring  
 mountains of Olympus, held equally the seat of the  
 Muses and of Jupiter. The administration must  
 have been able that, in such a kingdom as Mace-  
 donia, could provide funds for all that Archelaus,  
 within a short reign, accomplished; fortifying towns;  
 greatly improving the military; repelling, when oc-  
 casion required, but mostly deterring hostilities, and  
 thus maintaining peace with advantage and dignity;  
 forming roads; promoting literature, science, and  
 arts; and all so as to give eminence and celebrity to  
 Macedonia, among the Greeks of the time of Thu-  
 cydides and Socrates.

But, endowed as he was with great and valuable  
 qualities, Archelaus remains accused, on high autho-  
 rity, of giving way to strong and vicious passions,  
 which brought him to an untimely end. Report  
 indeed was transmitted, which Diodorus adopted,  
 that he died of a wound accidentally received in  
 hunting. But Aristotle, to whom the best oppor-  
 tunities which the next generation could furnish must  
 have been open, speaks of a conspiracy as undoubted,  
 though the occasion and manner were so variously  
 related, as usual of that dark kind of transaction,  
 that he was unable to fix his belief of them. All  
 that remains ascertained is that Archelaus, after a

Aristot.  
 Polit.  
 1. 5. c. 10.

Diod. 1. 1.  
 c. 37.

short but most beneficial reign, was cut off in the vigor of his age by a violent death.

B. C. 400.<sup>9</sup>  
Ol. 95. 1.  
[B. C. 399.\*  
CL.]

## SECTION II.

*Disputed succession and civil war. Acquisition of the throne by Amyntas son of Philip. Bardylis prince of Illyria. Hereditary interest of the Macedonian royal family in Thessaly. Revival of the Olynthian confederacy. Ancient connexion of Macedonia with Athens revived and improved. Grecian princes of Lyncestis.*

The Macedonian kingdom, under the administration of four successive able princes, had acquired a consistency, and under the last of them, with great increase of internal strength, a polish that might have given it splendor in the leading situation to which it

<sup>9</sup> Our copies of Diodorus, as it has been well observed by the critics, are evidently corrupted in regard to the number of years, only seven, assigned to the reign of Archelaus; for the historian mentions Archelaus as king when engaged in war with the Pydnæans supported by the Athenians, in the tenth year before that of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, to which he ascribes his death. Prideaux and Dodwell have agreed in fixing upon the term of fourteen years as probably about the extent of the reign; and Wesseling assents to this conjecture, which, unable to mend, I have adopted.

[\* ‘Archelaus, the ninth in descent from Perdiccas I., began to reign in the archonship of Pisander, the beginning of B. C. 413. He reigned 14 years: μετὰ Περδίκκᾱν Ἀρχέλαος ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἐβασίλευσεν ἔτη ιδʹ. πρὸς δὲ καὶ Εὐριπίδης τραγωδιοῦν παραγενθὲς πάντα τὸν χρόνον διῆξε τιμώμενος παρʼ αὐτῷ. Dextr. ap. Syncell. p. 263. A. Archelaus therefore was assassinated B. C. 399. in the archonship of Laches; where Diodorus (xiv. 35. 37.) rightly places his death, although there is an error in the number of the years assigned to him: Ἀθήνησι μὲν ἦρχε Λάχης—κατὰ τὴν Μακεδονίαν Ἀρχέλαος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔν τινι κυνηγίῳ πληγὴν ἀκουσίως ὑπὸ Κρατεροῦ τοῦ ἐρωμένου τὸν βίον μετέλλαξε, βασιλεύσας ἔτη ἑπτὰ. The error of seven years is sufficiently refuted by Diodorus himself, (xiii. 43. 49.) who mentions Archelaus as king ten years before, in the year of Glaucippus B. C. 433. The Parian marble, as is well known, has committed an opposite error, placing the accession of Archelaus in B. C. 420., seven years too high.’ Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 223.]

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

was rising in the civilized world. Archelaus seems to have prepared it for producing its own historians when his death gave occasion for troubles and confusion in which all history of the country was nearly overwhelmed, his own reputation, and even his birth thrown into doubt and obscurity, and the succession itself of princes after him, when the restored and increased splendor of the monarchy excited new curiosity about it, no longer to be exactly ascertained.

Aristot. &  
Diod.  
ut ant.

Plat.  
Alcib. 2.  
p. 141. t. 2.  
Diod. l. 14.  
c. 37.

B. C. 395.  
Ol. 96. 2.

Orestes, son of Archelaus, was an infant when his father perished. The confusion on the occasion was however was not such as immediately to disturb the succession. But while Aeropus, one of the royal family, claimed the regency, Craterus, favorite of the late king, and author, whether by design or accident, of his death, assumed it. Within four days Craterus was killed, and the unfortunate boy Orestes did not long survive. Aeropus, by report accused of his murder, ascended the throne, but little to enjoy it. During four years who really held the sovereignty remains unascertained; and indeed it seems probable that the country was rather divided between several competitors than entirely governed during any part of that time by any one prince. In the fifth year Pausanias, of another branch of the royal family, had so far overborne the rest as to be generally acknowledged sovereign.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The curious reader may find in Wesseling's Diodorus two good notes, and in Bayle, art. Archelaus, a third, on the uncertainties of this part of Macedonian history.

[ ' After the assassin Craterus was removed, *Orestes*, son of Archelaus, was made king under the guardianship of *Aeropus* :  
' τὴν ἀρχὴν διεδέξατο Ὀρέστης παῖς ὦν, ὃν ἀνελὼν Ἀέροπος ἐπί-  
' τροπος ὦν κατέσχε τὴν βασιλείαν ἔτη ἕξ. Diod. xiv. 37. Ἀρ-  
' χελάου δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος, διεδέξατο τὴν βασιλείαν Ὀρέστης υἱὸς  
' αὐτοῦ ἔτη δ' . ὃν ἀνεῖλεν Ἀεροπᾶς ἐπίτροπος, καὶ ἐβασίλευσε μετ' ]



During these troubles of the Macedonian kingdom the Upper Macedonian principalities, under the government of Derdas and Amyntas, though probably in some degree affected, seem to have been preserved from any violent convulsion. Amyntas, after having been dispossessed by the king Perdiccas his uncle, had, under the patronage of Sitalces king of Thrace, not only recovered his principality, but contended with his uncle for the kingdom. With fairer pretensions now he asserted his claim against Pausanias. That prince, after a precarious reign of scarcely a year, was assassinated. Report of the party adverse to Amyntas would of course impute to him participation in the crime. All that seems ascertained is, that in consequence of that crime he became king of Macedonia; and for the connexion of Macedonian with republican Greek history it may be convenient to observe that it was nearly about the time of the successes of Agesilaus king of Lacedæmon in Asia.

SECT.  
II.Ch. 13. s. 4.  
of this Hist.B. C. 394.  
Ol. 96. 3.  
Diod. l. 14.  
c. 89.[B. C. 394.  
Cl.]

Would Amyntas have been contented to have held his mountain-principality in secure peace, it was probably little in his power; and yet the change to the

‘ αὐτὸν ἔτη δ’. Dexipp. ap. Syncel. p. 263. A. Diodorus, xiv. 84.  
 ‘ —περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον [in the year of Diophantus B. C. 394.]  
 ‘ Ἀέροπος ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς ἐτελεύτησε νύσφ, βασιλεύσας  
 ‘ ἔτη ἑξ. Aeropos reigned four years of this period jointly with  
 ‘ Orestes, and the remainder alone. Diodorus ascribes the whole  
 ‘ period to Aeropos; Dexippus specifies the distinct portions of  
 ‘ each. But the two reigns were not *eight* years collectively,  
 ‘ because Pausanias succeeded in the sixth year from the death  
 ‘ of Archelaus. We may therefore assign, with Dexippus, *four*  
 ‘ years to Orestes the minor, and *two* to the sole reign of Aero-  
 ‘ pus. But the six years were not complete; for between Laches,  
 ‘ in whose year Archelaus died, and Diophantus, in whose year  
 ‘ Pausanias succeeded, are only four archons.’ Clinton, *Fasti*  
*Hellen.* p. 224.]

CHAP.  
XXXIV.Diod. l. 14.  
c. 92.Cic. de off.  
l. 2.B. C. 393.  
Ol. 96. 4.  
Diod. l. 14.  
c. 92.Ch. 26. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

more splendid situation at the head of the Macedonian kingdom was only from smaller to greater troubles. Pretenders to the crown remained, holding, in parts of the country, considerable interest among the people. None indeed was able by himself to assert his own cause, but there were neighbouring powers, whose ambition or rapacity were ready to profit from the distractions of Macedonia. On its western border the Illyrians, in manners and character much resembling the Thracians, though apparently of different race and language, had been brought more than formerly to union under one dominion by the power and popularity of a chief named Bardylis. Venerated for his courage, activity, and military talents, Bardylis is said to have extended his power and influence yet more by his discovery of the value of a maxim, before little known among the Illyrians, and not always duly estimated among the Greeks, that honesty is the best policy: he was famous for his equitable division of plunder taken by his armies of robbers. By his military force and his fair reputation together he had united under his authority all the Illyrian clans, so that he was become a very formidable potentate. While this new power thus grew on the west of Macedonia, the Olynthian confederacy, of which we have seen formerly the rise and the fall, by its alluring policy, still more than its military force, pressed the eastern. On that side, the richest of the Macedonian territory, and the readiest for maritime communication, were all its principal towns. Whether the policy of Archelaus, in fortifying these, led to the dismemberment of Macedonia which followed, the defective relics of its history will not enable us to say, farther than that it seems probable. While then Bardylis, avowing

himself the protector of Argæus, one of the pretending princes, invaded and ravaged the country on the western side, many principal towns on the eastern renounced their connexion with the Macedonian kingdom to become members of the Olynthian confederacy. According to Diodorus indeed, this was not wholly without the consent of Amyntas; who rather chose that his people should owe protection to the Olynthians than become subjects to his rival, or to the Illyrian prince. Unable however, under all the circumstances pressing on him, to maintain himself in Macedonia, he withdrew into Thessaly.

SECT.  
II.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 11.

Diod. l. 14.  
c. 92.

[B. C. 392.  
Cl.]

Between the wealthy aristocracy, which mostly governed that fruitful country, and the Macedonian kings, connexion old and hereditary has been formerly noticed. One numerous and powerful family, the Alevads, a name said to be derived from a king of the country their reputed ancestor, was bound to the Macedonian royal family through the prejudice of connexion by blood, claiming the honor of a common descent from Hercules. The frequent exercise of hospitality, to which the right on both sides was also esteemed hereditary and sacred, upheld this prejudice of kindred, real or imaginary. The Thessalian nobles were frequently entertained at the Macedonian court, not without some claim of right to be entertained there; and they esteemed it equally a duty and a privilege to entertain the Macedonian kings whenever they might visit Thessaly. Under these circumstances no struggle of faction in Thessaly could be indifferent to the Macedonian princes, nor any contention for the Macedonian throne to the principal families of Thessaly. Teeming with inconvenience as such connexion might be to governments, by their own consistency and the force of the country under

Ch. 16. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

Herod. l. 7.  
c. 6.  
Diod. l. 16.



CHAP.  
XXXIV.

them, capable of maintaining complete independency, yet for narrow territories, with defective constitutions, divisions of one people under different governments rather than distinct nations, such might be the need of the advantages that they might overbalance the evil.

Whether Amyntas was considered by the Thesalian nobility as the truer representative of the Macedonian branch of the family of their common great ancestor Hercules, or, in his mountain-principality, he had better cultivated the connexion, he found favor among them such as to encourage him to attempt the recovery of his kingdom. Probably he relied also upon assistance from his kinsman Derdas prince of Elymia; a brave and active soldier, always upon friendly terms with him. The difficulty seems to have been to obviate opposition from the Illyrian prince; but his acquiescence was purchased. Argæus then, deserted by the protector to whom he owed his throne, was compelled to fly, and Amyntas became again sovereign of Macedonia.

But the richest and most populous part of his kingdom, the eastern towns and their cultivated territories, far more valuable than many times the extent of ill-inhabited lands of the interior, was yet held by the Olynthian confederacy. He demanded its

1. 14. c. 92. restitution, the historian says, according to compact.

Ch. 26. s. 2. But the Olympians, already risen to that power of this Hist. which Xenophon has described as alarming to all southern Greece, far from disposed to restore acquisitions, were bent only upon aggrandizement. Not

only refusing therefore to surrender anything, but prosecuting still zealously their plan of association, and supporting everywhere political intrigue with military force, they gained Pella, the largest town of

Macedonia; and Amyntas, as Xenophon intimates, was again in danger of losing his kingdom. SECT.  
II.

It was an unfortunate combination of circumstances that made the overthrow of the most liberal and advantageous system of republican government hitherto seen in Greece necessary to the preservation of the last relic of the patriarchal constitution, the balanced monarchy of the heroic ages. The Lacedæmonians, for so much Xenophon indicates, would hardly have undertaken the war against Olynthus without assurance of co-operation from the Macedonian princes; and, without that co-operation, would have been little likely to have succeeded in it. The Macedonian forces, joining them, were commanded by the prince of Elymia, Derdas; who, at the head of the cavalry, as formerly has been noticed, did important service. On the ensuing dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy the Macedonian kingdom recovered all its towns. Whether then better to assure the control of the general government of the country over them, or merely for a more advantageous situation, readier for communication with the sea, and through it with all the more polished countries of the age, Amyntas moved the seat of government from Edessa, otherwise called *Ægæ*, where it had subsisted from the foundation of the monarchy, to Pella, which was thenceforward the capital of Macedonia. Ch. 26. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

It is almost only when, as in the Olynthian war, the affairs of Macedonia and of Olynthus have been implicated with those of the leading Grecian republics, that we gain any information about them. From the dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy therefore, till some time after the battle of Leuctra, which so changed the circumstances of Greece itself, we have no particulars of their history. But after

Excerpt.  
ex Strab.  
p. 330.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

that battle, Lacedæmon being no longer able to control Olynthus, and Thebes of course disposed to support everywhere a party adverse to the Lacedæmonian interest, the Olynthian confederacy was restored, and quickly so prospered as to become again formidable to Macedonia.

Intercourse has been observed formerly, sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, between the Macedonian kings and the Athenian commonwealth. The event of the Peloponnesian war, depriving Athens of the dominion both of the Ægean sea and of the towns on the Macedonian and Thracian shores, removed almost all ground for farther political connexion between them. But, with the restoration of the Athenian marine by Conon, the pretensions of the Athenian people to their former sovereignty over so many towns around the Ægean, and to hold control over all the commerce of that sea, being revived, Athens and Macedonia became again interested in each other's affairs; and Olynthus, formerly subject to the imperial sway of the Athenian people, and recently threatening the overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom, would, in its new independent power, be looked upon with jealousy by both. The peace of Antalcidas however, which soon followed, controlling the Athenian naval empire without establishing the Lacedæmonian, relieved Olynthus from immediate danger, and diffused indeed over all the various members of the Greek nation, severed by seas from those called imperial republics, a more real independency than they had for ages known.

In the denial of dominion, to which the Athenian people were thus obliged to submit, no portion of their former empire seems to have been so much and so constantly regretted as Amphipolis on the



Strymon; a conquest, inasmuch as the territory was usurped by force of arms, but otherwise a colony, settled under the protection and at the expense of the Athenian government. The Lacedæmonians however, after it had yielded to their arms directed by Brasidas, had added to its population a large body of settlers from the Grecian town of Cyrene in Africa; and the congress of Grecian states held at Lacedæmon, a little before the battle of Leuctra, had confirmed the independency given to it by the treaty of Antalcidas. Athens was a party both to that treaty and to the decrees of the congress. But through the event of the battle of Leuctra, and the consequent depression of Lacedæmon, the comparative importance of the Athenian commonwealth among the Grecian powers was considerably augmented. Another general congress was soon after held at Athens. Representatives of almost all the Grecian states attended, and, among them, a minister from Macedonia, as a Grecian state.<sup>11</sup> The professed purpose of this congress, like that of the former, was to obviate the pretensions of any that might aspire to be imperial people and hold command over other Grecian people, such as Lacedæmon and Athens had alternately held; a revival of which both Lacedæmon and Athens now dreaded in Thebes. With this view it was proposed to enforce the strictest execution of the provisions of the treaty of Antalcidas, confirmed by the congress of Lacedæmon, which denied to every Grecian state the sovereignty over any other Grecian state. The Athenian representative asserted the claim of the Athenian people to hold the

SECT.  
II.

Isocr. Or.  
ad Philip.  
t. 1. p. 316.

Ch. 27. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Æschin. de  
legat.

<sup>11</sup> Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης, εἰς ᾧν τούτων Ἀμύντας, ὁ Φιλίππου πατήρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον.—Æschin. de legat. p. 216. ed. Reiske.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

people of Amphipolis, their colony, as their subjects; he said it was a distinct case, and imputed injustice to the denial of it. On the contrary it was contended that the Amphipolitans, not Athenian colonists only but Lacedæmonian, Grecian people from various parts, had the common right of all Greeks to be free.

Æschin. de  
legat.

It seems probable that the political connexion was already begun, which became afterward close, between Amphipolis and Olynthus, and that the king of Macedonia found reason again to be apprehensive of the growing power of Olynthus. His deputy in the congress contended strenuously in favor of the Athenian claim; and this was at length allowed by a majority of votes, principally obtained through his arguments and the Macedonian interest. The advantage resulting to Macedonia, not perhaps at the time generally obvious, appears to have been very considerable. The acquisition of Amphipolis to the Athenian dominion, except as a loss to the Olynthian, could not indeed be desirable for Macedonia. But the Amphipolitans, regardless of the vote of the congress, continued to assert their independency successfully, yet Amyntas gained credit among the Athenian people as a valuable and beneficial ally. Communication with the commanders of the Athenian fleet, generally maintained on some part of the Thracian coast, was of course ready for him; and he formed a particular intimacy with that eminent and highly respectable officer Iphicrates. These circumstances would be favorable to the maritime commerce of Macedonia; and the constant hostility of Athens toward Olynthus would make both the arms and the policy of Olynthus less formidable and less troublesome to Macedonia.

Ibid.

The power acquired by that extraordinary man Jason, tagus of Thessaly, his military force and his avowed ambition, could not but demand the attention of a neighbouring prince, and especially one so connected as Amyntas with the principal Thessalian families. It seems probable that Jason's interest was connected with that of those families. For this great purpose then, the restoration to Thessaly of its ancient superiority among the southern republics, usurped, as the Thessalians might term it, successively by Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, peace on his northern border would be necessary, and accordingly not only peace but alliance was maintained between Macedonia under Amyntas and Thessaly under Jason.

SECT.  
II.

Diod. l. 15.  
c. 57. & 60.

The practice subsisted in Macedonia, which in the times described by Homer prevailed throughout Greece, and, as far as Homer's history extends, through Asia, for princes generally to choose their wives without their own dominions, among the daughters of other princely families. Nor were princely families, boasting high Grecian blood, yet wholly wanting, among whom the Macedonian royal house might choose. Others, beside the Temenidæ of Argos, driven to seek among the northern wilds a repose which the spreading republican system of the southern parts denied, had been fortunate enough to find, how far repose we know not, but honor there. The princes of Lyncus or Lyncestis, a country bordering on Macedonia and Epirus, generally acknowledging some subordination to the Macedonian kings, claimed their origin from the illustrious house of the Bacchiadæ of Corinth. Of these princes we have seen Arrhibæus oppressed by the late king of Macedonia, Perdicas, and relieved by the generous policy of the Lacedæmonian general Brasidas. Amyntas,

Ch. 16. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 4. s. 2.

Ch. 16. s. 4.



Strab. 1. 7. in a milder way, succeeded better in the purpose of strengthening the Macedonian interest in Lyncestis, marrying Eurydice granddaughter of Arrhibæus by his daughter Irra.  
p. 327.

B. C. 370.  
Ol. 102. 3.  
[B. C. 370  
Cl.]

Farther of the reign of Amyntas, said to have been of twenty-four years, we gather only its general reputation of having been wise, vigorous, and beneficial. Dying in advanced age he left, by his queen Eurydice, three sons, Alexander, who succeeded him, scarcely arrived at manhood, and Perdiccas and Philip, still boys.

### SECTION III.

*Reign of Alexander, son of Amyntas. Macedonian interest in Thessaly maintained. Accession of Perdiccas, son of Amyntas. The family of Amyntas supported by the Athenian general Iphicrates. Breach of alliance with Athens, and connexion with Thebes. Illyrian invasion, and death of Perdiccas.*

When the youthful Alexander was called to the Macedonian throne, circumstances, produced by the recent assassination of the great tagus of Thessaly, Jason, pressed for the attention of the Macedonian government, and especially interested the royal family. In the administration itself perhaps of Jason, but very eminently in the events following his death, was manifested the danger of preponderant standing armies to free governments. Jason had ruled Thessaly with the constitutional title of tagus, and, possibly, for history tells nothing to the contrary, with the constitutional authority. His successors also, even those for whom crimes opened the way, were raised to the same constitutional title and power, as far as history tells, in all constitutional form. Wanting however possibly Jason's inclination, and certainly his talents, to make their administration smooth through

Ch. 27. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

popular esteem and respect, they soon recurred to the use of the means of violence which he had left to their hands. The worthy Polydamas of Larissa, whom even as an opponent Jason had always respected, was murdered, with eight of his principal friends: numbers fled; and the tyranny ensuing seems to have been among the most really cruel of the many, among the various states of Greece, execrated by Grecian writers.

SECT.  
III.

But these Thessalian tyrants did not overlook the ordinary and necessary policy of those who affected sovereignty in the Grecian republics; they courted the rabble of the towns; and their army, which served equally by sea and land, was held at their devotion through the profits of a general piracy which they encouraged. The government of Pheræ, and its chiefs, appears then to have resembled those of the northern states of Africa in modern times. The nobility, and in general the landholders, suffered under their administration. These therefore, looking round for succour, applied to their hereditary ally and host the young king of Macedonia.

Alexander was not deaf to the calls of their interest and his own. His measures were so well concerted and so rapid that, though the tagus, apprised of his purpose, was prepared to give battle on the borders, the Macedonian army, evading him, reached Larissa, the principal seat of the friendly party, without opposition. The tagus followed, but found the united strength of his opponents such that, avoiding action, he withdrew again to Pheræ. The king, thus left at leisure to arrange matters with his friends, placed a part of his force in Larissa, and a part in Cranon, and, having fulfilled the purpose of his expedition without bloodshed, he returned into Macedonia.

Diod. l. 15.  
c. 61.  
B. C. 369.  
Ol. 102. 4.  
[B. C. 368.  
CL.]

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

Pretence for invective nevertheless was found by those who were disappointed by his success. They exclaimed against what they termed the garrisoning of the cities; not only as a measure of tyranny, but a direct breach of faith, plighted to the Thessalians for their freedom. Diodorus, from whom alone we have the account, has given credit to the historians of their party. But we have seen enough of Grecian politics to be aware, and the course of events even in the account of Diodorus shows, that another party would not only approve, but earnestly desire the measure, as that without which their liberty, property, and life itself would be utterly insecure.

Meanwhile in Macedonia the good government and tranquillity of a few years, closing a reign, like that of Amyntas, begun in a train of revolutions and bloodshed, had not sufficed for radical correction of the looseness of principle, political and moral, among the Macedonians, which had given occasion to those evils, and which such evils have in themselves a strong tendency to nourish and increase. Two pretenders to the throne, Argæus, who had been competitor with Amyntas, and Pausanias, perhaps son of him by whose death Amyntas had risen, still had each his party among the Macedonian people. Alexander, soon after his return from Thessaly, was assassinated. Concerning the conspiracy which produced this catastrophe our only trustworthy information, incidentally given by Demosthenes, amounts to no more than that a citizen of Pydna was principal in it. That either of the pretending princes was implicated

B. C. 369.  
OL 102. 4.  
[B.C. 36 $\frac{2}{3}$ .  
Cl.]  
Diod. l. 15.  
c. 71.  
Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 402. ed.  
Reiske.

[\* Dexippus, ap. Syncell. p. 263. A, specifies a year as the duration of the reign of Alexander II.; but Mr. Clinton considers the narrative of Diodorus, as well as Justin's account of his reign, as implying a longer space, nearly two years; his succession taking place B. C. 34 $\frac{6}{7}$  and his death 36 $\frac{2}{3}$ .]



in its guilt is not said, but both were at the time preparing to prosecute their claims to the throne.<sup>12</sup>

SECT.  
III.

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Such was the clouded prospect under which the right of Alexander devolved to his next brother, Perdicas, yet a boy. Pausanias hastened to profit from the confusion likely to prevail among the young prince's friends. Prepared with numerous adherents to his cause among the people he engaged a force of Grecian mercenaries, and, entering Macedonia, he quickly became master of Anthemus, Therma, Strepsa, principal towns, and some others of less importance. The expected confusion among those about the young king followed. Some, who had been supposed loyal, went over to the rising power; the intention of others became suspected, and the few of clear fidelity were at a loss for measures.

Æschin.  
de legat.  
p. 211. t. 3.  
Athen. l. 14.  
p. 629.  
Justin. l. 7.  
c. 4.  
Æsch. de  
legat.  
p. 212.

In these distressing circumstances, when manly wisdom and courage failed or were unavailing, the queen-mother, Eurydice, resolved to take upon herself to act for her unfortunate family; not by assuming any manly office, though in the foregoing history successful examples of such an undertaking

<sup>12</sup> The stories of Justin and Athenæus, dealers in wonderful tales of dark private history, seem unworthy of notice. The account of Diodorus, in the want of better, seems most reasonably to be taken, under correction from what the orators indicate of Macedonian affairs, and especially the scanty but unsuspicious testimony of Demosthenes, reported in the text. [Mr. Mitford places this fact of the assassination of Alexander by Ptolemy among the stories of Justin and Athenæus which seem unworthy of credit. We have this fact however, that Ptolemy was the murderer, upon the authority, not of Athenæus, but of *Marsyas*, (ap. Athen. xiv. p. 629. d.) almost a contemporary; whose means of information upon Macedonian affairs cannot be disputed.] Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 226. note r.]

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

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have occurred for notice, but in her proper character, as a woman and a mother. Iphicrates was then commanding an Athenian squadron on the Thracian coast, for the general purpose of maintaining and extending the empire of the Athenian people, but more particularly for restoring their dominion over Amphipolis, still asserting independency. The particular intimacy of the late king Amyntas with that general formed the ground of hope for the distressed queen. She sent her supplication to Iphicrates, who in consequence went to Pella. The interview ensuing, which the decency of ancient manners required to be very public, remains shortly and simply, but interestingly, described by a contemporary Athenian who was afterward ambassador from his commonwealth at the Macedonian court, the orator *Æschines*. The queen-mother, entering the chamber of audience with both her sons, introduced the young king *Perdiccas* to the hands of Iphicrates, and placed her younger boy *Philip* on his knee. Addressing him then, in the manner usual among the Greeks, as a suppliant, ‘ she conjured him, by the ties of that private friendship borne him by the late king Amyntas, who valued him no less,’ she said, ‘ than as an adopted son, and by the claims of public alliance between the Macedonian kingdom and the Athenian commonwealth, subsisting of old with the forefathers of the children now presented to him, and especially cultivated by their lost father, to take those children under his protection.’

The purpose of the queen’s pathetic address, favored as it might be by the generous feelings of the Athenian general, would obviously be favored also by his consideration of the interest of his commonwealth.

In the circumstances and with the views of the Athenian government it remained much an object to hold its interest in Macedonia. With the family of Amyntas the connexion was already old: with the opposing families it remained to be formed, and probably they were already engaged with hostile powers, Olynthus, and perhaps Thebes. Accordingly, whether using the force under his command, or only his influence and the terror of the Athenian name, Iphicrates interfered so effectually that Pausanias abandoned his enterprise, and the government of the young king Perdiccas was established over all Macedonia.

But when the authority and wisdom of Iphicrates were withdrawn, troubles, in the existing circumstances of Macedonia too likely to attend the minority of a reigning prince, arose. Female rule, we have seen, was not unknown among the Asian Greeks: the examples of Artemisia and Mania might afford encouragement for the attempt. But the Macedonian sceptre had never been borne by female hands. The direction of the government therefore was committed to a prince of the blood royal, named Ptolemy, and distinguished by the addition of Alorites. Troubles of no small amount followed; but what precisely they were, and whether more arising from the ambition of Ptolemy, or any perverseness of Eurydice, though both are accused, while the pretensions of Pausanias and Argæus, and the hostility of foreign powers, appear to have been concurring causes, trustworthy information fails. Still it is only where Macedonian affairs have been implicated with those of the leading Grecian republics that we find light beaming upon them; and even that light, given, as through painted glass, by some celebrated writers



CHAP.  
XXXIV.

of the later antiquity, especially Plutarch, with a dazzling splendor of coloring, shows too often but imperfect, incongruous, and distorted forms.<sup>13</sup>

When the Macedonian government, implicated in domestic troubles, could no longer extend its protecting arm to the Larissæans, Pharsalians, and other Thessalians, who had resisted the tyranny of the tagus Alexander of Pheræ, that tyranny threatened them again with redoubled violence. Fortunately however about this time a new protecting power appeared on their opposite border, through the rise of Thebes to a leading situation among the Grecian republics. The Theban government, with all the energy of recently acquired power, was willing to interfere as a protectress anywhere, for the sake of advancing that power. Accordingly a strong army

<sup>13</sup> Trogus, or his abbreviator Justin, for historians far over fond of tragical effect, tell of strange intrigues and horrid dark crimes, in which Eurydice was deeply implicated. But these tales, though such as in the violence of faction among the Greeks appear to have been ordinary, were either unknown to Diodorus and even to Plutarch, or even by them thought unworthy of notice. Diodorus makes Ptolemy Alorites a son of Amyntas, (meaning apparently an illegitimate son,) and the murderer and successor of the eldest legitimate son, Alexander.\* But some notice of this crime, had it been real, could hardly have failed among the orators, especially Demosthenes, who, as we have seen, mentions the assassination of Alexander; and, for the succession of Ptolemy, it is clearly marked by Æschines to have been only to the regency. We find the republican Greek writers frequently careless in applying the titles βασιλεὺς and τύραννος indifferently to kings, or to regents, or to men in commanding situations who were neither kings nor regents. Hence apparently has arisen much of the confusion, found among later ancient writers, concerning the Macedonian succession.

[\* It appears from Dexipp. ap. Syncell. p. 263. B, that Ptolemy Alorites was ἀλλότριος τοῦ γένους. That he was the assassin of Alexander, see additional testimony appended to note 12.]

marched, as formerly related, under the command of Pelopidas, to support the Macedonian party against the tagus. Co-operation from the Macedonian government was highly desirable, but the existing alliance of Macedonia with Athens was adverse to a connexion with Thebes; for Athens had then lately withdrawn itself from the Theban alliance, and become again the confederate of Lacedæmon in war against Thebes. Such being the obvious difficulty, Pelopidas quitted his army in Thessaly to act as ambassador from his republic at the Macedonian court. In this office his conduct appears to have been able, not less than in his famous embassy to the court of Susa; and the success was answerable. Not indeed that it could be a very hard task to show either the importance to Macedonia of preserving its Thessalian interest, or the impolicy of assisting so ambitious and restless and unscrupulous a government as the Athenian to hold so commanding a place as Amphipolis on the Macedonian frontier. The promised support therefore of the Theban confederacy in opposition to the Athenian pretensions, with perhaps some stipulated means for Macedonia itself to hold a commanding influence in Amphipolis, (for the sequel shows this probable,) induced the regent, Ptolemy, to desert the Athenian alliance and engage in the Theban.

Ch. 27. s. 4.  
 of this Hist.

Æsch. ut  
 ant.

But alliance with a regency, the regency too of an ill-settled kingdom, could not but be precarious; and Pelopidas desired to give permanency to the advantage of the Macedonian connexion which he had acquired for his country. It was already becoming a common practice among the Grecian states for youths of wealthy families to go, for the completion of their education, wherever any of those teachers, afterward dignified with the title of philosophers,

Isocr. de  
permut.

Plut. vit.  
Pelop.

Æschin.  
de legat.  
p. 213. 214.

acquired fame. Athens drew by far the greater number. There the great tagus of Thessaly, Jason, had placed his sons under the tuition of Isocrates. Thebes, though no rival to Athens in literary fame, was, for politics and war, the focus of everything greatest in Greece, and at this time it is said to have been also the residence of some eminent philosophers. To Macedonian prejudice it would be moreover a recommendation that Thebes was the birth-place of Hercules, the reputed great progenitor of the Macedonian royal race. Opportunity therefore for the king's younger brother Philip, with some other youths of the principal families, to go under the protection of such a man as Pelopidas to complete their education at Thebes, might be esteemed, by the queen-mother and regency, an advantage highly desirable. It is indeed said they accompanied his return from Pella not voluntarily, but as hostages, for ensuring due attention from the Macedonian court to the imperial will, whether of Pelopidas or of the Theban people. But however this may have been, it seems probable that the Theban general's able negotiation produced effects important and lasting. When, arriving at years of discretion, Perdicas assumed the government, he followed the line of policy taken by the regent for him in his minority, and persevered in it. He supported the Amphipolitans in their claim of independency; he sustained a war with Athens in their defence; and that he was not unsuccessful in that war is evident from the result; for the Athenians made peace with him, leaving Amphipolis free.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus makes Perdicas put Ptolemy to death to get possession of the government. But the silence of the contemporary orator concerning such a matter, when relating the



For the other circumstances of this reign, certainly interesting, we want authority like that of the con- SECT.  
III.

succession of Perdiccas and its consequences, and mentioning Ptolemy in the situation of regent, renders this more than questionable; and the refutation is still strengthened by the line of conduct which, as we learn from the orator, the king pursued after he had assumed the government.

It should be observed that the oration, whence all the circumstances mentioned in the text have been gathered, was pronounced by Æschines in defence of himself, when it was most important for him to conciliate the favor of the Athenian people, and avoid whatever might give them the least umbrage. Hence apparently he claims for them the honor of general success in a war in which they were evidently, upon the whole, unsuccessful, and imputes to their generous confidence in the uprightness of their enemies the disadvantageous terms of the peace. Some partial success of the Athenian forces may have given some ground for his assertion; but we know that, without ratification from the people, no compact of their generals was allowed to be valid. When therefore a disadvantageous peace was made, it may be apparently concluded with assurance that their success in the war was not great.

The amount of evident romance, extravagant romance, in Plutarch's *Life of Pelopidas*, which has been noticed in a note to the fifth section of the twenty-sixth chapter of this History, makes credit difficult for any part not in some degree confirmed by other writers. The succession of Perdiccas, the regency of Ptolemy, and the opposition of the Macedonian government, under the regency and after it, to the Athenian claim on Amphipolis, are simply authenticated by the contemporary orator Æschines; but for the transactions of Pelopidas in Macedonia, where Plutarch makes him do more with a word than Hercules with his club, and for Philip's journey to Thebes and residence there, we wholly want any comparable testimony. Diodorus is the oldest extant author from whom we have any mention of them. He places the embassy of Pelopidas into Macedonia (and here Plutarch follows him) in the short reign of Alexander. But this, if it was not refuted by the orator's better authority, would ill accord even with his own narrative, compared with his dates. Of Philip's journey to Thebes he has given two irreconcilable accounts; an inconsistency on which Wesseling

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

Caryst. ap.  
Athen. l. ii.  
c. 15. p. 250.  
vel 508.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 2.

temporary orator, which deserts us in the moment when the Macedonian affairs cease to be implicated with those of the leading Grecian republics. According to the shreds of information remaining, while the prince gave his time to science and literature, corresponding with Plato at Athens, and unfortunately misplacing his confidence in an unworthy scholar of that philosopher, the more important concerns of his kingdom, its military force, its foreign affairs, and its civil economy, were misconducted or neglected. Nevertheless, when necessity became pressing, he showed no deficiency of spirit. A very inconvenient and disgraceful claim is said to have devolved on him from his father. In the distressing pressures against which Amyntas had had to struggle he had purchased the friendship or forbearance of the Illyrians by payments of money. Whether farther payments were engaged for or no, the Illyrians, whose profession was predatory war, founded on past concessions new demands. These Perdiccas refused: the Illyrians were indignant, and the veteran Bardylis, perhaps otherwise unable to appease his turbulent and greedy people, led them into Macedonia. Perdiccas, taking the command of his forces to repel the invaders, in a battle ensuing was defeated and slain.

has given two good notes, in the second volume of his edition of Diodorus, p. 55. 8. and p. 82. 58.

It is remarkable that Nepos, supposed contemporary with Diodorus, neither in his life of Pelopidas, nor in that of Epaminondas, mentions either Philip or Macedonia; though he speaks of the war of Pelopidas in Thessaly, and of his captivity in one expedition and his death in another. Nevertheless that negotiation from Thebes was carried into Macedonia, and ably and successfully managed there, the account of Æschines seems to warrant belief.

## SECTION IV.

*Accession of Philip, son of Amyntas. Pretenders to the throne. War and negotiations with Illyrians, Pæonians, Thracians, and Athenians. Renewed alliance of Macedonia with Athens.*

By this disastrous event, in the summer of the third year after the battle of Mantinea, which was fought in autumn, and the second after the death of Agesilaus, which happened in winter, the Macedonian crown devolved to Philip, only surviving son of Amyntas. According to the account, in itself by far the most probable, and also the best authenticated, Philip was then settled in the government of a frontier province, committed to him by the late king his brother as an appanage, according to the ancient manner of providing for the younger branches of the Macedonian royal family; the recommendation of Plato, it is said, who had conceived a high opinion of the young prince, and held great sway with Perdicas, having overborne the obvious objections to such dismemberment of the kingdom. Here Philip had been diligent in training the military strength of the country in a system of tactics, improved upon the best practice which he had had opportunity to learn in Greece; and, from the advantage with which he was thus prepared for meeting the various dangers pressing upon him on succeeding to the throne, it became a favorite observation, among the schools of philosophy, that he owed his kingdom to Plato.

B. C. 360.\*  
Ol. 105. 1.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 2.

Caryst. ap.  
Athen. l. 11.  
p. 249. vel  
506.

[\* According to Mr. Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 227., Philip succeeded in the beginning of B. C. 359. at 23 years of age. In p. 278. he notices Mr. Mitford's remarkable inconsistency in giving the right date of the battle of Mantinea, B. C. 362., in vol. v. pp. 235. 307. yet here dating the accession of Philip B. C. 360. 'in the summer of the *third* year after the battle of Mantinea, which was fought 'in autumn;' and again, in p. 153. of this vol., assigning this battle to B. C. 363.]



CHAP.  
XXXIV.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 2.

Nevertheless the circumstances around him were highly perilous. More than four thousand Macedonians are said to have fallen with their king in the battle, and the victorious Illyrians were pursuing measures to profit from their success by extensive plunder. Excited by the desire of sharing in advantages thus opened, the Pæonians descended from their mountains upon another part of Macedonia. The unfortunate people knew not which way to turn to defend, if they might be at all able to defend, their property. Thus hope arose for the former rivals of the family of Amyntas, and they proceeded to put forward their pretensions. Pausanias, supported by the great sovereign of the Thracian hordes, Cotys, successor of Sitalces and Teres, prepared to invade the eastern border. Argæus had already a party, not inconsiderable, in some principal towns; and the Athenian government, resenting the conduct of the late king Perdiccas in joining the Theban confederacy and opposing the Athenian claim on Amphipolis, sent a fleet with a land force of three thousand men, under Mantias, to support him.

Æsch. de  
legat.

Fortunately the young king, who had to defend his own claim, and the welfare of that large majority of the Macedonian people which had a common interest with him, against so many formidable enemies, was in no ordinary amount qualified for the arduous undertaking. Blessed by nature with very superior powers of mind, and, in a degree scarcely less uncommon, with that grace of person which gives to mental powers their best advantage in communication among mankind, these natural excellencies had been improved by a very advantageous education. How far this was gained at Thebes, whether at all at Athens, and how far at Pella, among the learned

Greeks, especially of Plato's school, whom Perdiccas had entertained there, all information is very doubtful; but that the opportunities must have been very advantageous, the result, of which we have full assurance, amply shows. Even among the Athenians Philip's eloquence was allowed to be, not only of the readiest, but of the most correct, and his manners were universally admired as singularly polished and engaging.<sup>15</sup>

SECT.  
IV.

Æsch. de  
legat.

These qualifications, advantageous for all men everywhere, were peculiarly so for a prince in Philip's circumstances, and in a country where the powers of government were distributed among all ranks. His hope rested wholly on the energies of his own mind,

<sup>15</sup> Considering the confidence with which the residence of Philip at Thebes is mentioned by Diodorus as well as by Plutarch and other later writers, it appears extraordinary that, in all the various mention of him in the yet extant writings of contemporaries, Æschines, Demosthenes, and Isocrates, not a syllable should be found indicating their knowledge that he had ever been, in his youth, at Thebes, or elsewhere among the Grecian republics. In the third of the extant letters of Isocrates to Philip is a phrase which Auger has translated as if the rhetorician meant to say he had never seen Philip; but the phrase is far from necessarily meaning so much: *Οὐ γὰρ συγγεγενῆσθαί σοι πρότερον*. It relates to seeing him within a particular time, when a particular purpose might have been answered by it, and may be paraphrased: 'I had never seen you between the time 'when you might first have projected war against Persia, and 'the time when I first wrote to recommend it to you.' Any personal acquaintance of Philip with Isocrates however is thus left uncertain; but that the prince's education, whether at Thebes, at Athens, or wherever else, was completely Grecian, and excellent, is unquestionable. We find Æschines reproaching Demosthenes for low illiberality in joking on Macedonian phrases which Alexander, a boy when Demosthenes was at the Macedonian court, would be likely occasionally to use; but no opportunity was found for any such joke against Philip: his speech was the best Grecian.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 3.

and the attachment of his people to him; for he had no allies. He held frequent assemblies of the Macedonian people: how formed, and whether general meetings, or several assemblies in the several cities, information fails. The fact however, such as it is stated, and the phrase used by the historian, the same by which the general assemblies of the Grecian democracies are found described,<sup>16</sup> mark the freedom of the Macedonian constitution. In the assemblies his eloquence obviated despondency and infused animation; and wherever he went the manly confidence he expressed in his addresses to the people encouraged those attached to his cause, alarmed those disposed to any adverse party, and won the indifferent. In his free and extensive communication with individuals the readiest affability, dignified by justness of manner and obvious superiority of talent, ingratiated him with all. Sedulously then he applied himself to spread among the Macedonians generally that improved discipline which he had already established among the people of his little principality; and hence is said to have originated the fame of the Macedonian phalanx. Nevertheless, on a comparison of his own yet ill-prepared means with the combined power of his numerous adversaries, aware of inadequacy for contest with all together, he resolved, with ready decision, whither to direct the energy of his arms, and whither the policy which might obviate the want of them.

In the course of Grecian history occasion has frequently occurred to see how rarely the maintenance of conquest, or any use of a conquered country, was the purpose of ancient warfare. The Illyrians appear to have thought of no profit from their great victory

<sup>16</sup> Ἐκκλησία.



but plunder, with the means to bear it off unmolested, for enjoyment in their own country. If their view went farther, it was only to new and extended plunder, or, in their utmost refinement of policy, to being paid for abstaining from plunder. Those rude conquerors therefore being gone, the Pæonians, who remained within the country, required Philip's first attention. He threatened at the same time and negotiated; and, by many fair words, with, it was said, though such assertions must commonly rest on suspicion, a dexterous distribution of money among their chiefs, without the shame of a public payment, he prevailed upon them to return quietly home. Negotiation, upon the same principle, would be the easier with the rude monarch of the Thracian hordes, because among them, we are told, it was held, nearly as among the Turks at this day, not less honorable for princes and great men to receive presents than, among other nations, to make them. A suspension, at least, of the measures of Cotys in favor of Pausanias was procured; and thus Philip was enabled to direct his military force entire against Argæus and the Athenians, by whom alone he remained immediately threatened.

Herod. l. 5.  
c. 6.  
Thucyd.  
l. 6. c. 97.

But the power and the opportunities of these remaining enemies were formidable. Methone, a Grecian colony on the coast of the Macedonian province of Pieria, the key, on the seaside, to the richest part of the kingdom, the nearest seaport both to Pella, the new, and Edessa, the ancient, capital, at this time acknowledged the empire of the Athenian people. There the Athenian fleet under Mantias landed three thousand men, whom Argæus joined with the troops he had collected. In Edessa itself a party favored the cause of Argæus; and, encouraged by the power-

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

ful support of the Athenian republic, its leaders sent him assurance that, would he only show himself before the walls, the gates would be opened to him. Under this invitation Argæus and his allies marched to Edessa, the distance about thirty miles; not without prospect that, by the acquisition of so important a place, Pella itself, lying between Edessa and Methone, might be brought under his obedience, and that the submission of the rest of the kingdom must follow.

But Philip's friends in Edessa, holding still the powers of government, used them watchfully and ably in his cause and their own. When Argæus appeared before the walls his partizans feared to stir, and nothing was indicated but readiness for vigorous resistance. Disappointed thus of promised co-operation, it became his care that, instead of making acquisition, he might not incur loss, and he hastened his retreat for Methone. But Philip, prepared to profit from contingencies, attacked him on his march. Argæus fell, and the troops about him fled. The Athenians, with those nearest in the line to them, altogether a considerable body, retreated to advantageous ground where they repelled assault. Unable however to move, and unable to subsist without moving, pressed at length by evident necessity, they surrendered at discretion.

A victory more complete or more critical was perhaps never won. To use it was the complex and difficult task remaining. The most formidable competitor for the throne was no more, but numerous and powerful enemies remained. To obviate enmity by benefits, so as to make the farther prosecution of the hazardous trial of arms, as far as might be, needless, became Philip's object. To show his disposition,

SECT.  
IV.

he began with dismissing all his prisoners without ransom. But among his foes were Greeks and barbarians; and, of the former, two powerful states adverse to him, Athens and Olynthus, were so hostile to each other that peace with both was out of all hope. Could he choose, he could hardly hesitate to prefer the friendship and alliance of Athens, the old ally of his family, and less, through interference of near and deep interests, necessarily an enemy than Olynthus.<sup>17</sup> With youthful warmth then he seems to have proposed to overbear the repugnance of the Athenian people by a liberality approaching extravagance. Having, contrary to all common usage of the times, given unbought liberty to all his prisoners, he distinguished the Athenian with peculiar kindness, inquired after those losses of every individual which are incident to defeat in war and the condition of prisoners, caused restoration to be made or recompense, and provided conveyance for all to Athens. Knowing then that, of all their former empire, the Athenians most coveted the recovery of Amphipolis, he sent immediate orders for a body of troops stationed there, probably from the time of his brother Perdiccas, perhaps of Alexander, to be withdrawn; and, with this preparation, he sent ministers to Athens to propose peace, and, if a favorable disposition should be found, to cement it by alliance.

Demosth. in  
Aristocr.Demosth.  
ibid.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 3.

This generous policy was not unproductive of its proposed effect. The enfranchised prisoners, arriving

<sup>17</sup> In the defective accounts remaining of this contest for the Macedonian throne Olynthus is not mentioned; but, had the actual government of Olynthus not been adverse to Philip, it would have assisted him in opposition to Argæus whom Athens assisted; and had Olynthus assisted Philip, the notice of it, if failing from historians, would hardly have failed from the orators.



CHAP.  
XXXIV.

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at Athens, sounded the praises of the young king's liberality, affability, and magnanimity, which, so to their surprise, and out of all common course, they had experienced. Soon after came the account of the withdrawing of the Macedonian troops from Amphipolis. It was difficult then, for those who had been most forward for the support of Argæus against him, to contend that the interest of the commonwealth required still that opposition to him which was founded on the ground that he was successor to the politics of his brothers, who had connected themselves with the Thebans and supported the rebellious Amphipolitans. Rather, it would be contended, he succeeded to the better politics of his father, who had procured the allowance of the common congress of the Greek nation for the Athenian claim of dominion over Amphipolis, and of so many former kings of Macedonia, allies and friends, bound in hereditary hospitality with the Athenian people. A party nevertheless endeavoured to interpose impediments. The right of sovereignty of the Athenian people over Amphipolis, they said, should be formally acknowledged by the king of Macedonia. But those who obtained the lead were more liberal or more prudent. In return, they said, for conduct very uncommonly generous, to demand of a victorious prince to debase himself in the eyes of all Greece, by a breach of faith toward those whose common right of a Grecian people to freedom had been once declared by the common voice of the nation, and still existed in general opinion, a right of which the Macedonian kings had long been protectors, was not likely to produce cordiality in a restored alliance. A treaty of peace and alliance accordingly was concluded, in which all mention of Amphipolis was avoided.

SECT.  
IV.

Matters being thus accommodated with the Athenians, Philip had leisure to direct his measures against those of his remaining enemies whose deficiency of policy lessened the danger of their force. Of these, the Illyrians, the least tractable, and altogether the most formidable, were fortunately not disposed for new enterprise while the fruit of their former victory remained to be enjoyed. Meanwhile the circumstances of PÆONIA attracted attention. According to tradition preserved by Hippocrates, the Pæonians were once a more civilized and powerful people than the Macedonians. But this seems to have been in those very early ages, before Homer, when Thrace was held by a people capable of civilizing the savages of Greece; when the river Hebrus, the vales of Pieria, and the mountains of Hæmus and Olympus were the favorite haunts of the Muses, while the Castalian fountain and the heights of Parnassus and Helicon were yet less known in song. When Thucydides wrote, part of Pæonia was a province of the Macedonian kingdom, within the bounds of that called the Lower Macedonia. Whether this had been separated, or they were the highland Pæonians only who, after the battle in which Perdiccas fell, invaded the plains, we are not informed. It seems however to have been a powerful principality under the dominion of a prince bearing the Grecian name of Agis. This prince dying, Philip suddenly marched into the country. No claim being made of any heir to the principality, as far as extant authors tell, nor any resistance by the people, he quietly annexed the whole to his kingdom.

Hippocr. de  
Epidem.Ch. 1. s. 4.  
of this Hist.Ch. 13. s. 4.  
of this Hist.B. C. 359.  
OL. 105. 2.

The succinct and ill-connected narrative of Diodorus, with all the little incidental information dropping from the orators, affords but a glimpse of able

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

and rapid measures, assisted by popularity of manners and growing popularity of name, by which these acquisitions were effected. The very silence however of the orators, especially Demosthenes, enough indicates that, in the opinion of the age at least, nothing in the transactions was uncreditable to the Macedonian prince. It is a misfortune for history to be reduced to conjecture, yet, in the failure of direct testimony, it may behove the historian to offer that for which ground appears. The tradition then preserved by Hippocrates concerning the Pæonians, and their settlement within the Lower Macedonia, concur with the Grecian name of their prince to imply that they were a people of Grecian blood and language; whether originally, or through some colony, like those which had migrated from Argos into Macedonia, and from Corinth into Lyncestis; and all the circumstances together may perhaps warrant conjecture that the principality was the appanage of a younger branch of the Macedonian royal family, which became extinct with Agis. Thus, on his death, it would be the right and the duty of the Macedonian king to re-unite it with the kingdom; and thus the scheme of policy of the second Perdiccas, perseveringly directed to the acquisition of the severed principalities, would be completed.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 4.

Lucian. de  
Macrob.

Threatened still by the Illyrians Philip resolved, instead of awaiting inroad, to invade their country. The veteran Bardylis headed the Illyrian forces to oppose him; and, in a battle which ensued, exerting himself with the spirit of youth, though said to have passed his ninetieth year, he fell fighting. Philip's victory was complete; and he so pursued its advantages that, before the end of the next year, all the Illyrian tribes, so formidable to his predecessors,



were brought to submit to terms of peace in a great degree dictated by him. The Macedonian kingdom now was extended, if not beyond all ancient claim, yet far beyond any late possession; and a very advantageous barrier was either acquired or recovered, in the lake Lychnitis, which was to be thenceforward the boundary of the Illyrian lands against the Macedonian.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 8.  
B. C. 358.  
Ol. 105. 3.  
[B.C. 359.  
Cl.]

Called to a throne nearly overwhelmed by two foreign enemies within his country, attacked by a third, threatened by a fourth, and contested by two pretenders, each possessing an interest among the people, this young prince had thus, before the end of the third summer, not only overcome all the more threatening evils by defending his dominion, but, by a considerable extension, had acquired for it new power, and, still more, new security. Uneasy circumstances yet remained for him and for his people; but, to prepare for an account of them it will be necessary to revert to the affairs of the Grecian republics, and especially Athens.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Ἀνέκαμψεν (ὁ Φίλιππος) εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν, συντεθέμενος ἔνδοξον εἰρήνην πρὸς τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς, περιέσσητος τε ὑπάρχων παρὰ τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς δι' ἀνδρείαν κατωρθωμένοις. Diod. l. 16. c. 8. Philip's popularity among his own subjects, to which Diodorus here gives testimony, seems never to have been disputed; but, in vindication of the account given of his accession, it may be requisite to say somewhat more than, without inconvenient interruption of the narrative, could be inserted where the matter occurred.

The testimony to Philip's establishment in the government of a Macedonian province, at the time of his brother's death, has been preserved by Athenæus. For its probability only, compared with the commonly received story of his accession by Plutarch, it would deserve high consideration. But, in the opinion of some critics, averse to the contradiction of Plutarch, it has been considerably invalidated by an expression of Athe-

CHAP. næus himself: Τοῦτο δ' εἶπερ ἀληθείας ἔχει, θεὸς ἂν εἰδείη. To  
XXXIV. gather the just meaning of this expression the tenor of the

Athen.  
l. 11. p. 249.  
vel 506.

author's discourse must be observed, which relates not to Philip but to Plato, the piece of Macedonian history being introduced but incidentally. The passage runs thus: 'Speusippus asserts 'that Plato, who was most highly esteemed by Perdiccas king 'of Macedonia,' (for certainly we must read Perdiccas instead of the careless transcriber's Ἀρχελάφ,) 'was the cause of Philip's 'acquiring his kingdom. Carystius of Pergamus, in his historial 'memorials, writes thus: 'Speusippus, being informed that 'Philip had spoken disrespectfully of Plato, wrote in a letter, 'as if it was not generally known, that Philip owed his king- 'dom to Plato. For Plato sent Euphræus of Oreus to Per- 'diccas,' (Περδίκκαν here properly,) 'through whom he 'persuaded him to allot a principality to Philip. There 'established, Philip formed a military force, with which, upon 'the death of Perdiccas,' (Περδίκκας again justly,) 'he came 'out prepared for the circumstances.' 'Whether this was so,' says then Athenæus for himself, 'God knows.' Now it appears to me that Athenæus has not meant this expression to refer at all to the matters in themselves of public notoriety, namely, that Philip, at the time of the death of Perdiccas, held the command of a territory appendant to the Macedonian kingdom, that he had there prepared a well-trained military force, and that, thence issuing, he proceeded to assert his right against his numerous enemies: the doubt expressed by Athenæus, I apprehend, has been intended to relate only to the private history, Plato's interference in favor of Philip, and the effect of such interference; but especially he meant it to relate to the assertion of Speusippus, so flattering to the idle learned, that Philip actually owed his kingdom to Plato. 'Whether this was so,' Athenæus might well say, 'God knows;' though he considered the rest as undoubted fact, of general notoriety.

It may be farther observed that every circumstance of the account of Carystius carries evident probability. The known favor of Philip afterward to Aristotle assists to warrant the account of Athenæus of the attachment of Perdiccas to Plato and his scholars; surcharged perhaps, but no otherwise improbable. The well-attested accomplishments of Philip make it likely that, whether known from personal communication or otherwise, Plato might think highly of him, and judge him an object for recommendation to the king his brother's favor. Nor is it unlikely that, in maturer years, a preference of Aristotle's different

manner of treating philosophical, and especially political subjects, might lead Philip to speak of Plato so far with comparative disrespect as to excite the indignation of Speusippus, a zealous follower of Plato, and induce him to write a letter that might be shown and published, stating the fact of the recommendation of Philip to Perdiccas, and the advantageous consequences; namely, that a principality was given to Philip, which afforded him those opportunities through which he was enabled afterward to vindicate his kingdom.

But, instead of eliciting truth out of the varying and contradictory accounts of the later ancient writers, and giving credit only where it may appear most justly due, it has been a prevailing fancy of critics to employ their ingenuity in torturing into accordance those who have themselves evidently had no purpose of accordance, or disposition at all to accord. An instance in Wesseling may the more deserve notice because he is generally acute, and more than most others above prejudice. Nevertheless, in one of his notes, which, in a recent note of my own, I have observed to contain largely just criticism, he has made Diodorus responsible for much more than Diodorus has anywhere said. Diodorus's account of Philip's escape from Thebes really wants no violence to make it accord with the account of his establishment in Macedonia, given in the text from Carystius and Speusippus. 'On the death of Perdiccas,' he says, 'Philip, having escaped from his confinement as a 'hostage, took upon himself the government of the kingdom. *Τούτου δὲ (Περδίκκου) πεσόντος—Φίλιππος ὁ ἀδελφός, διαδρὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀμηρείας, παρέλαξε τὴν βασιλείαν.*' Diod. l. 16. c. 2. But Wesseling, apparently holding Plutarch's tale in a respect to which it is not entitled, speaking of Diodorus, says, 'Auctor 'dicit Philippum, *cognitâ fratris cæde, ex custodiâ Thebanorum 'elapsum, regni curam in se transtulisse;*' thus implying that he did not leave Thebes till informed of his brother's death; which the words of Diodorus, well rendered by Wesseling himself in his Latin text, are far from warranting.

Among extant ancient authors Justin alone tells of an infant son left by Perdiccas, who succeeded him on the throne, and for whom Philip long acted as guardian and regent: *Philippus diu NON REGEM, sed TUTOREM pupilli egit;* till at length *compulsus a populo, regnum suscepit.* The Delphin annotator, Cantel, says boldly to this: *Errat Justinus: cum enim hostes imminerent undique, continuo regia dignitas illi delata est.* To judge from Justin, even the great work of Trogius has been a



CHAP.  
XXXIV.

compilation of stories selected for amusement and tragical effect rather than a history, for which political and military transactions were with any care investigated, or with any judgment connected. From Justin we have many horrid tales of the queen Eurydice, wholly unnoticed by earlier writers, and some of them directly contradicted by the narrative of Diodorus. Were there any truth in them, had they even had any popular credit, some intimation of them from the extant orators would hardly have failed. However then occasion may occur often to mistrust the simplicity of Diodorus, yet Justin can deserve little consideration in the scale against him, and Justin's tale of a son left by Perdiccas, for whom Philip was regent, could hardly be more positively contradicted, by one who could not foresee that it would be told, than it remains from Diodorus. That writer declares his purpose to relate the manner of Philip's accession, thus: *Φίλιππος, ὁ Ἀμύντου υἱός, — παρέλαβε τὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν διὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας.* Mentioning then briefly his being placed as a hostage, first with the Illyrians, then with the Thebans, and noticing the death of Alexander, of Ptolemy, and of Perdiccas, he proceeds to say, 'that, on the death of Perdiccas, 'having escaped from his confinement as a hostage, Philip took 'upon himself the administration of the kingdom, then in distressful circumstances. The Macedonians were in the utmost 'perplexity; yet, notwithstanding the general consternation and 'the greatness of the dangers around, Philip was not dismayed, 'but proceeded immediately to the measures which the crisis 'required.' The whole account implies that the historian understood him to have left Thebes before the death of Perdiccas, and to have been ready in Macedonia for the emergency; and there is not a hint of his having had, among his numerous difficulties, those of a guardian or regent.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

*Affairs of Athens from the general peace following the battle of Mantinea, and of Macedonia from the establishment of Philip, son of Amyntas, to the renewal of war between Macedonia and Athens.*

## SECTION I.

*Revived political eminence of Athens. Increasing defect in the restored constitution. Uneasy situation of eminent men. Opportunity for political adventurers. Unsteadiness of government. Decay of patriotism. Subserviency of administration to popular passion. Decay of military virtue. Tyranny of popular sovereignty over subject states.*

WHEN the Macedonian kingdom, happily rescued from civil strife and foreign war, was placed in circumstances to grow in prosperity and power, the Grecian republics remained in that state of discord and confusion, of mutual animosity or mutual mistrust, of separate weakness and incapacity for union, which we have seen, in the description of Xenophon, following the death of Epaminondas, and which the orators sufficiently assure us did not cease. Demosthenes describes the state of things about the time of Philip's accession in terms very remarkably agreeing with Xenophon's picture: 'All Peloponnesus,' he says, 'was divided. Those who hated the Lacedæmonians were not powerful enough to destroy them, nor were those in the several cities, who had ruled,

SECT.  
I.

Ch. 28. s. 8.  
of this Hist.

Demosth. de  
Cor. p. 231.  
ed Reiske.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

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‘ under Lacedæmonian patronage, able to hold their  
‘ command. Peloponnesus, and, in short, all Greece,  
‘ was in a state of undecisive contention and trouble.’

But in the fall of the more powerful the people of the inferior republics found consolation, and even gratification; relieved from dangers, and raised to new importance. For as, in the Grecian system, unavoidably some state must take a commanding part, those which had been secondary rose to the first consideration, and the lower had their proportion of advancement; not in positive improvement, but in a flattering comparison of power and consequence. Hence, among other causes, there remained so extensive an attachment to that system whence unavoidably followed such national discord, with its infallible attendant, national weakness.

We have seen the Athenians, after the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, in the conscious feebleness of convalescency, generally submitting their executive government to the direction of able and moderate men. And fortunately, in that period, arose among them men who would have done honor to any government in any age. Thrasybulus, Conon, Iphicrates, Timotheus, Chabrias, valuable to their country as statesmen, have become conspicuous in history principally through their military achievements. The extraordinary estimation of Niceratus, son of the unfortunate Nicias who perished at Syracuse, a most steady opponent of democratical sway, and yet always highly respected and esteemed by the people, has survived through the contentions of the orators. Isocrates, by his writings, which have fortunately reached us, has transmitted his own fame. Under these men, while Thebes was contending with Lacedæmon for empire by land, the maritime power



of Athens so revived that, though the Syracusan navy might be superior in the western seas of Greece, nothing in the eastern could contend with the Athenian. The strength of Lacedæmon then being broken by the arms and policy of Epaminondas, and the energy of Thebes failing with his death, Athens remained, by her power, and by the reputation of her most eminent citizens, the most respected of the republics.

SECT.  
I.

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But the restoration of independency and democracy to the Athenian people by Thrasybulus was far from being attended with a restoration of the state of things throughout Attica which existed before the Peloponnesian war. It appears to have been the purpose of Pericles, when he brought all the people of Attica within the walls of Athens and Piræus, but what he was unable to accomplish, to persuade all beyond the numbers wanted for army or navy to pass to the islands of the Athenian dominion, where they would be safe, and where temporary support for them might be commanded. The plague ensuing from the failure was a great, but a temporary evil. Had Pericles lived, and brought the war to that early conclusion which appears to have been not unreasonably hoped for, those who had quitted their country habitations would mostly have returned to them, with all their former habits. But when after thirty years Thrasybulus restored the commonwealth, it was to a new generation wholly unpractised in a country life. Lands then, whether by just restoration or otherwise, became the possession of men of whom, if any, so few were disposed to live on them that perhaps none could have a satisfaction in it. No more then do we read of parties of the highlands, the lowlands, and the coast; no more of country residences in Attica supe-

CHAP.  
XXXV.

rior to those in Athens: the landholders lived in the city, committing their estates to the management of slaves.<sup>1</sup> The habits of the Attic people thus were no longer the same as formerly, or rather there were no longer Attic people, but only Athenian citizens. With change of habits in one part of the population, and cessation of intercourse with those of such habits in the rest, came a change of disposition, and with change of habits and disposition a great change of national character.

Unfortunately Athens had not a government capable of maintaining a conduct that could either hold or deserve the respect which a large part of Greece was ready to pay. When Thrasybulus, after overthrowing the tyrannical government of the Thirty, and of their successors the Ten, refused to meet any proposal for checking in the restored democracy the wildness of popular authority, it seems to have been because he saw no sufficient disposition to moderation among those who put forward such proposals. The faults of both parties had produced violence in both. The profligate tyranny of the former democracy had been such (Isocrates ventured, in a chosen opportunity, to aver the bold truth to the people in their restored sovereignty) that a majority, even of the lower ranks, had voted for the oligarchy of the Four-hundred. But the tyranny of the Thirty afterward so exceeded all former experience that, in natural course, the popular jealousy, on the restoration of popular power, would become in the highest degree suspicious and irritable. In this state of things it

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 29.

Isocr. de  
Pace,  
p. 242. v. 2.

<sup>1</sup> This state of things seems to have continued to the present day, with the difference only that the present cultivators of Attica, all Albanians, not speaking Greek, are not more slaves than the Greeks who occupy the city.

was a sense of public weakness, while the power of Lacedæmon or Thebes threatened, that enforced respect for the counsels of such men as Conon, Thrasybulus, Iphicrates, Timotheus, Chabrias, and Niceratus. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, sycophancy again reared its baleful head. Wise men accommodated themselves, as they could, to the temper of the times, endeavouring so to bend before popular tyranny as not to sink under it. But Thrasybulus himself, as we have formerly seen, though honored as the second founder of the republic, did not escape a capital prosecution. The great men who followed him began, like the Lacedæmonian kings, to prefer military command abroad to residence in the city. Giving their advice in the general assembly only when pressure of circumstances required, they avoided that general direction of the republic's affairs, that situation of prime minister, which Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, and Thrasybulus himself had held. It has been remarked that Conon chose to pass his leisure in Cyprus, Iphicrates in Thrace, Timotheus in Lesbos, Chares in Sigeum, and Chabrias in Egypt, or anywhere rather than in Athens.

SECT.  
I.

Ch. 25. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

Theopomp.  
ap. Athen.  
l. 12. c. 8.  
p. 264. vel  
532.  
Corn. Nep.  
v. Chabr.

The dereliction of civil situation by the great political and military characters of the republic encouraged the evil which produced it. The field was left open for adventurers, without other recommendation than readiness, and boldness of speech, to take the lead in public affairs; and oratory became a trade, independent of all other vocations. We have seen Iphicrates, appointed by the voice of the people to a great military command, requesting a colleague, and for that colleague a popular orator, unversed in military command, and not his friend. Such a choice, which elsewhere would be most absurd, was, under

Ch. 26. s. 8.  
of this Hist.



CHAP.  
XXXV.

such a government as the Athenian, obviously politic. The orator general became responsible, with the real military commander, for all the consequences of their joint conduct; and his popularity and talents, instead of being employed for the ruin, must, for his own sake, be exerted for the support and defence of his colleague. Perhaps Iphicrates drew from the prosecution of Thrasybulus the warning that urged him to a measure which Xenophon's manner of relating it shows to have been considered at the time extraordinary. But shortly after, if not for the business of the field, yet for that of the assembly of the people, the connexion of the orator and the general, the orator commander-in-chief with a general under him (it is the phrase of Demosthenes) became quite familiar.<sup>2</sup>

When the fear of Lacedæmon or Thebes, long the salutary check upon this vicious government, was removed by the event of the battle of Mantinea, its extravagances soon grew extreme. The people in general assembly being sovereign, with power less liable to question than that of a Turkish sultan, who dares not deny his veneration for Mahomet's law, or his respect for those appointed to high situations under it, any adventurer in politics, who had ready elocution, could interfere in every department of government. Ratification by the people was required for every measure of administration. The most delicate foreign interests were discussed before the people at large, and the contending orators abused foreign powers and one another with equal grossness. Unsteadiness then became a characteristic of the Athenian government. Propositions rejected in the morning, says Isocrates, are often ratified before

Demosth. &  
Æsch. & al.  
var. in loc.

Isocr. de  
Pace,  
p. 204.

<sup>2</sup> Πήτωρ ἡγεμὼν, καὶ στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τοῦτω.

Demosth. περὶ Συντάξ. p. 172.

night, and condemned again at the next meeting of the assembly; and we find even Demosthenes, the popular favorite of his day, complaining that a measure decreed was as uncertain of execution as if it had never been taken into consideration. Assurance therefore for foreign states of any maintenance of public faith was impossible. As soon as a treaty was concluded, it was the business of the opposing orators to persuade the people that they had been deceived and misled. If the attempt succeeded, the consistency of government and the faith of the republic were equally disregarded: the treaty was declared null, and those who had persuaded to it, rarely escaping capital prosecution, were fortunate if they could escape capital punishment. Seldom therefore, though everything must be discussed, could there be any free discussion. In the sovereign assembly of Athens, as in democratical assemblies in England, a common hall of the city of London, or a county meeting for political purposes, freedom of speech often was denied; the people would hear the orators only on one side. Flattery to the tyrant, as we have seen the people in democracy often called among the Greeks, was always necessary. But honest and plain admonition, tending to allay popular passion, to obviate mischievous prejudice, or even to correct popular misinformation, could rarely obtain attention, unless in times of pressing public danger, and alarm among all parties.<sup>3</sup>

SECT.  
I.Demosth.  
pro Rhod.  
init.Xen. resp.  
Ath. c. 2.  
s. 16.  
Isocr. de  
Pace, p. 176.  
Demosth.  
περί Συμμαχ.  
& al.

It seems to have been a liberal spirit that, on the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, gave the freedom of the city to all who had borne arms in the contest for it. Nevertheless the precedent was dangerous for a state where despotic power, the legis-

<sup>3</sup> Δημοκρατίας ούσης, οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία. Isocr. de Pace, p. 176.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

lative, the executive, and the judicial, was constitutionally vested in the whole people. Formerly, though the large patriotism which should have embraced the whole Greek nation was rarely found among the republics, yet that narrower political virtue, the love of the city, was often seen warm. But as, through the successive alterations of the constitutions of Theseus and Solon, security for property, and especially for landed property, was weakened and at length almost destroyed, attachment to the Attic soil would proportionally fail. So many strangers to Attic blood then, admitted among the citizens, would of course be desirous that the purity of Attic blood should no longer be the honorable distinction, and would be ready to vote, on all occasions, for the admission of others, who possessed it no more than themselves. Accordingly the freedom of the city became an ordinary favor profusely conferred. Perhaps we should

Athen. 1. 3.  
p. 119.

ascribe somewhat to joke in the story of the two youths raised to the once envied dignity of Athenian citizens for the merit of their father, an ingenious cook, in the invention of some approved new sauces. But the reproach which the cautious Isocrates ventured to address to his fellow-countrymen will command credit: ‘Boasting,’ he says, ‘that we hold our country from time beyond all tradition, we ought to afford example of good and orderly government; but, on the contrary, our administration is more irregular, and more abounding with inconsistency, than that of many newly founded colonies. Valuing ourselves upon antiquity of origin, and purity of Athenian blood, we give community in the rights of the city, and in all the honors of that origin and that blood, with less consideration and selection than the mountaineers of Thrace or Italy use in

Isocr. de  
Pace.



‘admitting associates to their clans.’ Demosthenes, the flatterer and favorite of the multitude, has been led in the course of his pleadings to declare, in still more pointed terms, the amount and the manner of the corruption. Decrees of citizenship, he has not scrupled to assert, were become an article of trade among the venal orators; to be procured for their foreign or metic clients at prices proportioned to the labor which deficient claim, or the discredit which bad character might implicate with the undertaking.

SECT.  
I.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 687.

Long ago Solon’s laws for promoting industry and disgracing idleness had been obsolete or ineffectual: a sovereign multitude would not work: they would live by sacrifices provided by the public treasury, and feasts given by the wealthy of their respective wards, or the daily salary for attending the courts of justice. Clothed, many of them, as Xenophon assures us, little better than the slaves, so much more numerous than themselves, and uncertain even of their daily food, they had nevertheless their favorite luxuries with which they would not dispense. Not the wealthiest individual, says Xenophon, could have his baths, his dressing-rooms, his places of exercise, and of meeting for conversation, of a splendor comparable to those erected for the multitude of Athens. The magnificence of the theatrical entertainments provided for them, as the yet existing ruins of the theatres show, was what nothing in modern times has approached. The excessive fondness of the Athenians for these entertainments commanded of course attention from those to whom the favor of the many was necessary. Pericles is said to have been the first who provided, by an act of the people which he proposed, that a portion of the public revenue should maintain the theatres, and furnish theatrical exhibitions. The example was found so

Xen. resp.  
Ath. c. 2.  
s. 9.

Xen. resp.  
Ath.  
Aristoph.  
& Isocr.

Xen. resp.  
Ath. c. 2.  
s. 10.

CHAP. commodious by following orators that, in process of  
 XXXV. time, almost the whole certain revenue of the re-  
 public became appropriated to theatrical entertain-  
 ments, together with what at Athens were nearly  
 congenial, the ceremonies of religious festivals; and,  
 when thus the means of former orators were ex-  
 hausted, bold ingenuity, pressed to a last resource,  
 procured the decree which has immortalized the  
 name of its mover Eubulus, making it capital even  
 to propose the application of the theoric revenue, as  
 it was called, to any other purpose. It requires  
 remark however that Eubulus is represented as alto-  
 gether one of the most respectable men of his age;  
 the associate in politics of the most approved patriots,  
 and a steady opponent of the extravagances of demo-  
 cratical power. Some light will occur in the sequel  
 on this curious, but altogether dark subject.<sup>4</sup>

Demosth.  
Olynth.

Æsch. de  
legat.  
p. 346.  
Dinarch.  
in Demosth.  
p. 66.

When such was the subserviency of the Athenian government to popular extravagance and folly, and such the luxuries which the multitude, living in idleness, commanded, to expect that the Athenian citizen would obey, as formerly, the call for military service abroad, or even bear the restraint necessary for maintaining the ancient discipline and skill in arms at home, would have been preposterous. The ancient law, of every Grecian state, required that every citizen should be trained to arms. Practice with weapons began in early boyhood. From eighteen to twenty the Athenian youth formed the regular standing garrison of the city and country; and thus, even in peace, acquired that practice of acting in bodies which

<sup>4</sup> Some modern writers have undertaken to pronounce judgment very boldly upon this law, and upon Eubulus, its author; but they have left what remains from the contemporary orators upon it, I must own, very dark to me, and, I must add, I rather think to themselves too.

prepared them advantageously for real warfare. But in later times the young Athenians, or their fathers, intent on more profitable employment for them, learnt to obtain excuse very extensively from this duty. Formerly the service of the panoply, or the phalanx, the first name describing the armour of the individual, the latter the formation of the body, was jealously vindicated as the exclusive privilege of the citizen. The most laborious service, and generally the most dangerous, but of overbearing efficacy, it was considered as that on which rested the superiority of Greeks to barbarians, the safety of every Grecian state against neighbouring Grecian states, and even the security of dominion, in every one, over resident foreigners and the slaves who, generally in Grecian states, far outnumbered the freemen. In the perpetual wars of Greece however, the reiterated calls upon the citizen to leave all his domestic concerns for service to the state in arms becoming more severely felt as civilization and the arts contributing to the comfort of private life improved, it is not wonderful that any expedient which might obviate such a pressure became popular. The hazardous resource thus of employing mercenaries, as we commonly find them termed from the Latin, soldiers by profession, engaged for hire, and forming what we call a standing army, grew into common use among all the republics. Men in the uneasy and perilous situation of generals under a democracy would be likely to approve and promote the change; for an army of sovereign citizens, impatient of control always, would in its turn, of course, but indeed whenever it pleased, command and judge its generals; whereas a hired army had no pretence but to obey while paid, and, when dismissed, had no legal authority to command or judge those who had been its legal commanders.



CHAP.  
XXXV.Ch. 24. s. 4.  
of this Hist.Ch. 25. s. 1.  
of this Hist.Xenoph.  
resp. Ath.Demosth.  
Olynth.  
Æsch. de  
legat.Xenoph.  
& Isocr.  
& Demosth.

For about ten years after the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, Athens, without foreign dependencies and unassailed at home, had no occasion for military exertion. But her engagement in confederacy with Thebes against Lacedæmon, and, still more, the revival of her empire over other republics, resulting from Conon's victory, produced necessity for again employing forces of land and sea. After so long a desuetude however, when affections had been engaged by domestic interests and the luxury of public entertainments, and passions by political intrigues and the contentions and flattery of orators, the call to arms was little satisfactorily heard by the Athenian people. Instead of jealously asserting their exclusive right to the honors of the panoply, they would make the metics, not Greeks only, but Lydians, Syrians, barbarians of various countries, share with them its labors and its dangers, and, with these, of course, unavoidably its honors. For this change indeed the admission of so many strangers to the rights of citizens, on the first restoration of the democracy, seems to have prepared the way. Nevertheless, in the first wars, against the Lacedæmonians, and the Thebans and their allies, though mercenary troops were mostly employed, yet a part still of the army was Athenian; both citizens and metics served under Iphicrates and other generals in Peloponnesus. Gradually however the sovereign citizens more and more dispensed with their own service; and when the fear of Thebes and Lacedæmon ceased to press, they would, on any ordinary occasion, serve no more. They did not so soon refuse themselves wholly for the ordinary service of the navy; where the labor and danger were reckoned generally less, and the hope of profit, through means accruing, as will be hereafter seen, from the command which the Athe-

nians possessed of the Ægean sea, was considerably greater. But in time this also, through the same indulgence of the sovereign people to themselves, was extensively avoided. Thus the glory of the Athenian arms, won at Marathon, at Salamis, and in so many battles since, by sea and by land, was in a manner renounced; and the maintenance and extension of the republic's empire abroad, if not its defence at home, was committed to men engaged for pay, from whatsoever country they could be collected.

SECT.  
I.

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Such, according to the remarkably agreeing testimonies of contemporary writers of different views and opposite interests, was the state of the Athenian government, when the decline of the Lacedæmonian power and the Theban energy left Athens, principally through her navy, and the revenue which it commanded from numerous little commercial republics, the first potentate of Greece. While the contest between Thebes and Lacedæmon lasted, Athens could disregard the treaty of Antalcidas, and other following conventions, whose purpose was to establish the independency of every Grecian commonwealth. That purpose indeed was evidently enough impracticable. In universal independency the incessant strife of each with its neighbours was found to produce greater evils than the admission of the superiority of one; and partial superiorities would arise while the general superintending power was denied. Piracy, meanwhile, with the endless opportunities afforded by the division of the islands and shores of the Ægean among almost numberless sovereign powers, threatened the annihilation of maritime commerce. For it was not confined to the private adventure of men in the situation of outlaws. There were states, powerful

Xenoph.  
Isocr. Lys.  
Demosth.  
Æsch.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Demosth. in  
Aristocr.  
p. 675.

Diod. I. 15.  
c. 95.

among those of Greece, which (like the barbarians of Africa, who have been tolerated to the shame of modern Europe) avowed piracy. It was a trade that suited equally republics and tyrants. Of the former, Alopeconnesus particularly is mentioned as principally subsisting by it; though Athens itself is not without its share of imputation; and Alexander, tyrant of Phæræ, is said to have acquired the wealth which enabled him to hold the tyranny chiefly by the plunder of the Grecian seas and shores, for which he sent out fleets and armies. The smaller maritime states therefore feeling their insufficiency for the vindication severally of their own security, and little disposed to concede enough to one another for coalition in any firm confederacy, were prepared for submission to a protecting power.

In this situation of things, the conduct of such men as Conon, Thrasybulus, Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, acquiring the reputation of liberality for the Athenian government, most of the islands, and many cities of the Asiatic and Thracian shores, desirous of the protection of the Athenian navy for their trade, and perhaps not less to avoid its oppression, became again tributaries, and effectually subjects of the Athenian people. The assessment of the just Aristides was restored, not without some degree of general satisfaction; recommended, not only by its moderation, but probably also by the advantageous regulation from which he had derived renown. Athens thus became again the head of a great confederacy. Timotheus alone, in his various commands, is said to have acquired to that confederacy seventy-five cities, of importance enough to have each its representative in the congress, or, in the original term, synedrium, which assembled at Athens. Never-



theless the little information remaining on the interesting subject of the constitution of this assembly, and the privileges of its members, as they stood indeed at a somewhat later day, does not show them calculated to give that security to the subordinate states which could make the Athenian empire satisfactory to those under it. To have protection against all enemies they renounced the right of separate war and peace, binding themselves by oath to have the same friends and enemies as the Athenians. To provide for a just attention to their interests in the councils of the sovereign people, their deputies at Athens had their separate assembly to consult together on their common interests; and either in common, or severally, as occasion required, they communicated with the executive council of the Athenian republic, the Five-hundred. They were admitted to the general assembly of the people only with the approbation and through the introduction of the Five-hundred; and only under restrictions, nearly as foreign ambassadors, they were allowed occasionally to address the sovereign people. But they had no vote; and in all other points they were upon the footing of foreigners, excluded from all rights of Athenian citizens. Nevertheless, for the readiness with which so many little states appear to have admitted again the supremacy of the Athenian people, though abundantly indicating uneasiness in their former independency, this restoration of empire, like its original rise, was honorable to the Athenian name.

SECT.  
I.

Demosth.  
pro Rhod.

Æschin.  
de legat.  
p. 247.

While Athens, with this empire growing beyond sea, was held in check and alarm at home by Lacedæmon or Thebes, the administration was so generally discreet, and the willing attachment of the synedrian allies was so obviously important, that the means of

CHAP.  
XXXV.

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Ch. 28. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Xen. resp.  
Ath. c. 2.  
s. 2. & seq.

Isocr. de  
Pace,  
p. 188.  
—194.

tyranny, which the imperial republic held, seem to have been little used. Even the old title of the subordinate ally, *hypecoös*, nearly synonymous with subject or dependent, a term familiar in the time of Thucydides, appears to have been avoided. The Grecian word which we render *ALLY*, thus becomes, with the writers after the age of Epaminondas, a term often of doubtful import; being used indifferently to imply independent sovereign states, or the tributary allies. Nevertheless, as we have formerly seen, while Thebes was successfully contending with Athens for the lead of the democratical interest through the Greek nation, and even aiming at a maritime rivalry, three of the most powerful of the syndrian confederated states, whether suffering real evil or seeking only prospective good, revolted. This possibly may have been taken as ground for new severity by the sovereign people, when the rebelling states were compelled again to submit to its authority. After the battle of Mantinea, when the decay of Theban influence over the confederacy whose councils Epaminondas had been able to guide became manifest, an altered disposition toward the subject states appeared. Interested adventurers in politics quickly saw the opportunity, and hastened in contention to profit from it. The former empire of Athens, and the advantages resulting to the body of the people, became the favorite topics of declamation in the general assembly. The people heard with eager attention, when it was asked, ‘Whence was the want of energy, that the fleets brought no treasures home? Why was free navigation allowed? The Athenian navy commanded the seas. Why then was any republic permitted to have ships and maritime commerce that would not pay tribute as formerly?’ Thus wrought into fer-

mentation, the public mind, with a favorite object in view, would no longer bear contradiction. To urge the injustice of arbitrary exaction would have been dangerous for the most popular orator. Even for showing the impolicy without venturing to name the iniquity of such measures, none could obtain a hearing. Fleets therefore were sent out, under the imperial mandate of the people, with general instructions to bring home tribute. For command in such enterprise, military ability and experience were little requisite; and, as the cautious Isocrates did not scruple publicly to aver, men of such mean estimation, that for managing any private concern none would trust them, were commissioned, with dictatorial powers,<sup>5</sup> to conduct the affairs of the republic with the Greek nation. A sovereign multitude, and the orators who by flattery ruled the sovereign multitude, would be likely to allow great indulgence to those ordered, without limitation by any precise instructions, to extend empire and bring home money. Complaints ensuing, endless from the injured allies, were generally disregarded. Money, judiciously distributed among the officers of the courts which ought to take cognizance of such complaints, was generally necessary even to bring the matter to a hearing; and then any justice in decision was very uncertain. Fraud, rapine, all sorts of iniquity and violence, not only went unpunished, but the people often showed themselves even amused with the attested reports of enormities, committed by their tribute-gathering armaments.

Isocr. de  
Pace,  
p. 170. &  
190.

p. 206.

p. 200.  
Xen. resp.  
Ath.

Isocrates,  
ut sup.

<sup>5</sup> Ἀντοκράτορας. Isocr. de Pace.



## SECTION II.

*Projects for improving the Athenian revenue. Affairs of the Athenian colony of Amphipolis. Produce of the Thracian gold mines. Summary of affairs of the Olynthian confederacy. Opposition of Olynthian and Athenian interest. Alliance of Olynthus with Amphipolis.*

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Ch. 29. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

The renewal of the old tyranny of the Athenian republic over its allies and subjects was professedly what gave occasion for that curious treatise, formerly noticed, which remains from Xenophon, on the revenue of Athens. His plan, more immediately concerning the revenue, as a necessary foundation for the rest, extended however to a general improvement of the government. Far from visionary, like Plato's, it might nevertheless have been difficult, or even impossible, to execute; less from any inherent impracticability than from its interference, real or apprehended, with the existing private interests of powerful men. That from which Xenophon proposed the greatest, or however the most immediate advantage, was an improved management of mines of the precious metals; and this appears to have been always a favorite purpose of those who actually held the principal direction of the popular will. But, though the objects were similar, the principles on which it was proposed to pursue them were widely different. Xenophon's first purpose, what he considered as most important, was to obviate all necessity for that oppression exercised by the Athenians against others; not only as the oppression of others was abominable, but as the evil would recoil on themselves. His project therefore was confined to the mines of Attica.

But the individuals to whom the working of these was already engaged, not indeed in perpetuity, but for terms of which they hoped renewal, would strenuously oppose any proposal for alteration of management. The Attic mines moreover gave only silver, whereas those of the Thracian mountains, in the neighbourhood of Amphipolis, afforded gold. For the superiority therefore, real or imaginary, of the object, and for avoiding interference with the private gains of fellow-citizens, perhaps friends and relations, persons however whose votes and influence might be important, they disregarded violence against any others.

SECT.  
II.

We have formerly observed the Thracian mines furnishing the first temptation for the Athenian republic, almost immediately on its rise to empire, and while Cimon son of Miltiades yet commanded its forces, to oppress those whom it had undertaken, as a sacred duty, to protect. The people of the little island of Thasos were driven, by the injustice of the Athenian government, to a renunciation of alliance, which was resented and punished as rebellion against the sovereignty of the Athenian people. The Thracian mines were then seized, as the proper possession of the Athenian people; and, to secure it, a colony of no less than ten thousand persons, Athenians, and citizens of the allied republics, was sent to occupy the neighbouring territory. The resentment of the surrounding Thracians, so exerted as presently to produce the total destruction of this numerous colony, seems to mark a sense of injuries, such as they had not experienced from the less powerful islanders of Thasos. The calamitous event however did not deter the Athenian people from new pursuit of so inviting an object. Under the able and benign ad-

Ch. 12. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Thucyd.  
1. 1. c. 100.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

ministration of Pericles the colony led by Agnon, father of the unfortunate Theramenes, was apparently conducted with juster policy; and the town which he founded, with the name of Amphipolis, quickly became flourishing.

Ch. 16.  
§. 4. 5. 6.  
of this Hist.

But the people of this colony, collected from various parts of Greece, respecting the Athenian government under Pericles, and attached to their leader Agnon, would be little likely to retain any firm attachment to a government tyrannical and capricious as that of Athens afterward became. Accordingly when Brasidas marched into Thrace, little more than ten years after the foundation of Amphipolis, disaffection was ready; and, with the assistance of a large party among the citizens, that able soldier and politician gained this favorite colony from the Athenian empire to the Lacedæmonian. By the treaty of peace however, which soon followed, while the other Grecian towns on the Thracian shore had their freedom assured, paying only the assessment of Aristides for the maintenance of the Athenian fleet, Amphipolis, as an Athenian colony, was restored unconditionally to the dominion of the Athenian people. Seventeen years it seems to have so remained, when the battle of Ægospotami gave it again, with all the other transmarine possessions of Athens, to be dependent on Lacedæmon.

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 46.  
47.

According to Herodotus, who says he made inquiries upon the spot, the Thasians drew from their Thracian mines a yearly revenue of from two to three hundred talents; at a medium perhaps fifty thousand pounds; which he appears to have reckoned, for them, very considerable. It seems probable that the Athenian government, while it held Amphipolis, though always intent upon the mines, yet distracted



by various troubles, never worked them to any great profit. The Lacedæmonians, implicated with a great variety of new and great concerns, and especially allured by prospects of golden harvests in Asia, were likely to be indifferent to adventure among the Thracian mountains, of a kind for which their institutions peculiarly unfitted them. We have seen even the highly cultivated settlements of the Thracian Chersonese, touching almost on Asia, so neglected by them as nearly to become the prey of neighbouring barbarians. Towns therefore farther removed from the countries whither their principal solicitude was directed would still less be objects of any very earnest care. Thus apparently the Amphipolitans were left to make the most they could of independency; and it appears they defended themselves against the Thracians, and managed their intestine disputes, but were little able to vindicate the possession and carry on profitably the working of the mines, so that these seem to have been abandoned.

SECT.  
II.

Ch. 23. s. 1.  
and  
ch. 24. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

It was in this dereliction by the Lacedæmonians of their dominion over the Thracian colonies that the growth of Olynthus, formerly noticed, and the rapid extension of its confederacy, almost overwhelmed the Macedonian kingdom, and became formidable to Lacedæmon itself. On the dissolution of the confederacy, which the united arms of Lacedæmon and Macedonia effected, those towns which had not been before of the Macedonian kingdom received the gift of nominal independency, each holding its separate government; but under conditions of alliance, which made them, with Olynthus itself, effectually subject to Lacedæmon. Taught then by experience the importance of maintaining its interest in Thrace, the Lacedæmonian government, to hold the Thracian

Ch. 26. s. 2.  
3. & 4. of  
this Hist.

CHAP.  
XXV.

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Or. Isocr.  
ad Philipp.  
p. 316. t. 1.  
Ep. Philipp.  
ap. Demost.  
p. 164.

Ch. 26. s. 7.  
of this Hist.

B. C. 371.  
Ol. 102. 2.

towns in subserviency, resorted to the common policy of the age, giving its patronage to a party in each, which, for the sake of that patronage, would obey its commands. Then perhaps it may have been that, under Lacedæmonian patronage, new colonists, principally from the Grecian town of Cyrene in Africa, were established in Amphipolis, in number so large that occasion was afterward taken to call it a Lacedæmonian colony. The Lacedæmonian authority however was thus altogether so maintained in those northern parts that, while so many of the southern republics, as we have formerly seen, joined Thebes in war against Lacedæmon, a body of Olynthian horse served with the Lacedæmonian armies in Peloponnesus.

But when, after the battle of Leuctra, fought about eight years after the dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy, Lacedæmon, pressed by the war with Thebes, became less and less able to stretch a commanding arm to the northern shore of the Ægean, those raised to power under Lacedæmonian patronage began to totter in their situations, and the prospect of success in opposition to them invited ambitious, and perhaps patriotic citizens. Olynthus, in its glory, had been the ally of Thebes. The party which had then led its councils would of course seek to share in that patronage which Thebes, become the leading state of Greece, was extending on all sides, and most ready in opposition to Lacedæmon. Thus it seems to have been that the administration of Olynthus reverted to that party. But Thebes, separated by many intervening states, and possessing little naval force, though she might check exertions of Lacedæmon against them, was little able to prevent the Olynthians from taking their own measures in their own concerns. To restore their dissolved confederacy

therefore becoming their object, it was quickly effected to a very considerable extent; how far upon the former model is not sufficiently said; but so that Olynthus became again a very powerful city, with influence over perhaps the whole of that fruitful part of the continent called the Chalcidic, and extending to the towns of the three adjoining peninsulas.

SECT.  
II.

Olynthus thus reviving in opposition to the decaying power of Lacedæmon, while Athens, to check the alarming growth of the Theban power, became the ally of Lacedæmon, the interest of the Olynthian would be placed in necessary opposition to that of the imperial Athenian people. About eight years after the battle of Leuctra followed that of Mantinea.

B. C. 363.  
Ol. 104. 2.  
[B. C. 362.  
Cl. See  
p. 117.]

In the state of things after that event the Athenian people, no longer, as before, restrained by the dread of Thebes, looked for empire wherever their fleets could sail. Among many and greater objects then, which their orators put forward in the general assembly, in a manner more adapted to promote their own interest with the many than the popularity of the Athenian name in Greece, or indeed any real interest of Athens itself, the recovery of their colony of Amphipolis became a favorite point. But in two successive congresses of the Grecian states, as we have formerly seen, (for, in unfolding the complicated interests of Greece, repetition is often unavoidable,) the claim which the Athenian people asserted, of sovereignty over the Amphipolitan people, was denied. In a third congress it was at length allowed, principally through the interest of Amyntas king of Macedonia, father of Philip. The Amphipolitan people nevertheless resisted, and being supported by the Olynthian confederacy, the able Iphicrates was in vain placed at the head of an armament to reduce them

Æsch. de  
legat.  
p. 212.



Demosth.  
Olynth.

to obedience. It was among the imprudent boasts of the Athenian orators, in flattery to their sovereign the many, that the Athenians had been formerly lords, not of Amphipolis only, but of Olynthus too. Circumstances indeed abounded to admonish the Olynthians, for their own safety, to support the Amphipolitans, and the Amphipolitans, if they would avoid the dominion of the Athenian people, to profit from the ready alliance of Olynthus. But the Amphipolitan people, a recent colony, were less divided, in the manner of the old republics, into parties of the many and the few, the rich and the poor, than into such as arose from their various origin, partly established under Athenian patronage, partly under Lacedæmonian, and accustomed to receive protection sometimes from Olynthus, sometimes from Macedonia. Now however the Athenian interest had been long overborne; Lacedæmon was utterly without means to support friends across the Ægean, and the king of Macedonia had abandoned his interest in favor of Athens. Thus for those averse to the sovereignty of the Athenian people the patronage of Olynthus only remained, and accordingly the connexion between Amphipolis and Olynthus became intimate.

### SECTION III.

*Armament under Timotheus. Expedition proposed to Asia; diverted to Samos. Measures of Timotheus against Olynthus. Co-operation of the king of Macedonia. Injurious conduct of Athens towards Macedonia.*

B. C. 359.\*  
Ol. 105. 2.

Affairs in Lesser Asia, the most favorite of all fields for military adventure, drawing the attention of the

[\* 'B. C. 360. Timotheus repulsed at Amphipolis in the year of Callimedes: Schol. Æschin. p. 755. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἠττήθη ἐπὶ ΚΑΛΛΑ-ΜΙΔΝΟΣ [leg. ΚΑΛΛΙΜΗΔΟΥΣ] ἄρχοντος.' Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 120.

leading men of Athens, gave a temporary relief from the pressure of their ambition to the Grecian states on the northern shore of the *Ægean*. Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, having engaged in that extensive revolt of the western provinces of the Persian empire which we have formerly seen excited by Evagoras of Cyprus, desired to strengthen his military force with Grecian troops. Evagoras was the ally and adopted citizen of Athens. Ariobarzanes, forming connexion with the Athenian people, accepted also the honor of becoming one of them. The Athenian government, professing to hold inviolate its peace with the Persian king, nevertheless sent an armament to co-operate with the citizen-satrap in rebellion; and Timotheus, for so inviting a field as Asia, did not refuse the command. His instructions forbade, in general terms, whatever might be contrary to the articles of the treaty with Persia; but it was common, as formerly observed, for the satraps to make war effectually against the king, pretending it to be only against one another.

SECT.  
III.

Ch. 28. s. 8.  
of this Hist.

Demosth.  
pro Rhod.  
p. 192.

Ch. 23. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Timotheus was on his way to join Ariobarzanes when intelligence reached him of the dissolution of the confederacy of the revolted chiefs. The tide thus turning in favor of the royal cause produced revolt on the other side. In the island of Samos, as in many Grecian states of the Asiatic main, was a party which preferred the patronage or sovereignty of the Persian king to that of the Athenian people. Cyprothemis, head of that party, assisted by Tigranes, the king's commander-in-chief in Lesser Asia, effected a revolution, by which he became chief of the island.

‘ The expedition to Eubœa was in B. C. 358., and the intermediate transactions, between the repulse at Amphipolis and the Eubœan expedition, might well have happened in the course of two years.’ Id. *ibid.* p. 122.]

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Timotheus was still on the Asiatic coast when news of this revolt reached him. He hastened then to Samos, overbore Cyprothemis, and, with the re-establishment of democratical government, restored the dependency of the Samian upon the Athenian people.

It was about this time that Philip king of Macedonia had completed his successes against the Illyrians, and established security for his western border, hitherto so much threatened. Olynthus and its confederacy remained his most dangerous and troublesome neighbour. A plan was concerted between the Athenian and Macedonian governments for the reduction of Olynthus by their combined arms. But with regard both to the leading circumstances, and to the stipulations on both sides, we are left by ancient writers wholly in the dark. Timotheus commanded still the Athenian fleet. For the Asiatic service perhaps it was needless to put the republic to expense in maintaining troops; volunteers being probably ready for adventure under a general of the reputation of Timotheus, in a field where so many Grecian soldiers of fortune had found large success. But for the war in Thrace, where stubborn resistance was in near view, and far less amount of gold even in distant prospect, volunteers could not be found without an expense which the orators dared not propose. For that service accordingly Timotheus appears to have been without a land force. This deficiency however the king of Macedonia undertook to supply. A Macedonian army and the Athenian fleet together laid siege to Potidæa, the contest for which had given birth to the Peloponnesian war. Potidæa was so critically situated, near Olynthus, as to give great opportunity for intercepting the communication of that town with the sea, and it completely commanded

Demosth.  
Olynth. 1.



the way by land into the fruitful peninsula of Pallene, full of commercial towns, and altogether the best territory of the confederacy. Yielding to the Macedonian arms, it was conceded to the Athenian general, and an Athenian garrison was placed there. Torone, the principal town of the neighbouring peninsula of Sithonia, was presently after taken by the confederate forces, and also received an Athenian garrison. Olynthus was thus so circumscribed in territory, reduced in strength, and checked in maritime communication, that its ruin seemed hardly avoidable.

For the next event, the hinge on which the following history of Athens and Macedonia turns, the historian wholly fails us, and the orators, to whom we owe certain knowledge of the important fact, have avoided all detail. The purpose of Athens in the Olynthian war evidently was conquest; nor have the orators disguised it. The views of Philip are less obvious. To reduce or even overwhelm the power of Olynthus, which could not but be inconvenient and dangerous to Macedonia, would be among them; but to establish the power of Athens over the whole Macedonian coast on its ruin, without any recompense for Macedonia, would seem to be carrying to excess the generous policy by which he had formed his first connexion with the Athenian government. Athens had long possessed Methone, the nearest sea-port to both his capitals; and Pydna was the only maritime town remaining to the kingdom, preserved, as we have formerly seen, by the policy of Archelaus. But those who obtained the lead in Athens had no disposition for liberality toward Macedonia. The term of the command of Timotheus seems to have been ended. Who led the Athenian fleet we are unin-

Ch. 34. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Demosth.  
Phil. 1.  
p. 13.

Theopomp.  
ap. Ulp.  
& Suid.

Demosth.  
ut sup.

formed. It went however to Pydna, and, giving its assistance to the party generally powerful in all the Grecian maritime towns adverse to connexion with the government of the adjoining country, enabled it to effect a revolt, and assured it of the support and protection of the Athenian people. Philip sent ministers to Athens complaining of the gross injury, and demanding reparation; but none was obtained. It is obvious that a change must have taken place among the leading men in the Athenian administration; and this indeed the exultation expressed by Demosthenes on the acquisition to Athens and loss to Macedonia, avoiding notice of all the circumstances, assists to prove. Justification of the profligate measure seems to have been no more attempted at the time than by the great orator afterward. But the forms of a democratical government gave facility for procrastination, and for shifting responsibility from shoulder to shoulder, while insult was added to the injury by professions, in the name of the republic, of the purpose of still honorably maintaining peace and alliance.

#### SECTION IV.

*Expedition under Iphicrates against Amphipolis. Supercession of Iphicrates by Timotheus. State of the Thracian Chersonese. Acquisition of Amphipolis to the Athenian empire. Honors to Charidemus of Eubœa.*

Farther co-operation from the king of Macedonia in making conquests for the Athenian people being no longer now to be expected, the prosecution of hostilities immediately against Olynthus was suspended; and it was resolved to direct the energy of the republic to the conquest of Amphipolis, in the

hope apparently that Olynthus, in its reduced state, could not interfere, and the king of Macedonia, notwithstanding the provocation given him, would not. Eminent men, we have seen, could not live at Athens in quiet: they must lend themselves continually, not only to public service, but to popular passion. Many circumstances strongly recommended Iphicrates for the command against Amphipolis. None had more military experience, or higher military reputation. He had then the extraordinary advantage of close connexion with the great sovereign of Thrace, Cotys, the successor of Seuthes, Sitalces, and Teres, by having received his sister in marriage.<sup>6</sup> Among the Amphipolitans themselves moreover, a mixed people, with an Athenian party, a Macedonian party, an Olynthian party, and a Thracian party, esteem for him was extensive. And farther, for his important services formerly to the Macedonian royal family, he was likely to be respected beyond others at the Macedonian court. Those then who led the Athenian counsels, while they evaded redress of injury, desiring nevertheless to obviate obstruction to their purposes from resentment, the popular vote directed Iphicrates to take the command of the fleet on the Thracian station.

But the favoring party in Amphipolis was not such that success could be reasonably expected from a fleet without a land force. Troops therefore were to be

<sup>6</sup> Demosthenes calls Iphicrates *κηδεστῆς* of Cotys, (Or. in Aristocr.) which is generally understood to mean brother-in-law. Cornelius Nepos calls the wife of Iphicrates daughter of Cotys. There can hardly be a doubt in preferring the contemporary orator's authority. But, if the father of the Cotys, of whom he spoke, was also named Cotys, which seems not improbable, the biographer's error would be only deficiency of explanation.



CHAP.  
XXXV.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 669.

provided; and the command by land and sea, being, in the usual manner of the ancients, committed to the same officer, the levy, or rather the hire of a mercenary force, was to be managed by Iphicrates. Of those who made the command of mercenaries, ready to fight the battles of any state, their profession, Charidemus of Oreus in Eubœa was eminent, and he was recommended to Iphicrates by his conduct in a service already of three campaigns under him. That officer with the body attached to him was therefore engaged, and the fleet and land force proceeded together to Amphipolis.

Demosth.  
ut sup.

The losses and consequent weakness of Olynthus, the increased and daily growing power of Athens, the formidable appearance of the armament, the reputation of the general, and his popularity, had together such effect that the Amphipolitans presently listened to negotiation. Terms were agreed upon; the gate was named of which possession was to be given to the Athenian troops, and hostages were delivered by the Amphipolitans to ensure performance of the conditions. Through what jealousy or what intrigue the Athenian people defeated their own fond hope, so long entertained, and now so nearly fulfilled, we have no information. Timotheus, hastily ordered to supersede Iphicrates, arrived in the critical moment. Alarm and hesitation of course arose among the Amphipolitans. Their confidence had rested, not in the Athenian people, but in Iphicrates, supposed capable of answering for the Athenian people. The character of Timotheus might perhaps have been not less respected than that of Iphicrates; but it was made inefficacious by a decree which presently followed him, commanding that the hostages, which had been specially intrusted to the faith of Iphicrates,

should be sent immediately to Athens. This profligate decree however was rendered vain by the provident integrity of Iphicrates; who, in surrendering his command to Timotheus, had committed the hostages to the general of the mercenaries, Charidemus; and, apparently with the consent of Iphicrates, we may hope also with at least the tacit approbation of Timotheus, they had been restored to their friends.<sup>7</sup>

The ungracious office remained for Timotheus to take up the negotiation, necessarily resigned with his command by Iphicrates. But the Amphipolitans would no longer treat with an agent of the Athenian government, though that agent was Timotheus. Force was therefore again to be employed; but the ready means of effective force were done away by the same violent and improvident measures which had overthrown an almost concluded negotiation. It seems probable that Charidemus and the troops under him had engaged with Iphicrates, whom they knew, for little or no present pay, under promise of large profit from success in enterprise. Disappointed of hope nearly realized, and altogether dissatisfied with the Athenian government, they refused now to serve under Timotheus, to whose personal character it is little likely they would have objected. Meanwhile

<sup>7</sup> It is remarkable enough how, in relating these transactions, Demosthenes, the favorite orator and minister of the Athenian democracy, has adopted and encouraged the profligate sentiments of the Athenian democracy. His object being to incense the Athenian people against Charidemus, he has not imputed to him any dishonesty; it sufficed to describe an honorable deed, adverse to the interest of the Athenian republic. It is then perhaps not less remarkable that the fascination of his oratory, even in the dead letter, has wrought upon some modern writers, especially the good Rollin, all the effect that could have been desired upon the Athenian multitude.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

the Olynthians, greatly relieved by the cessation of pressure from Macedonia, exerted themselves to provide support for the remains of their confederacy against the arms and the policy of Athens. They engaged large assistance even from the Thracian hordes; and, marching with the utmost Grecian strength they could assemble, they were so superior by land that Timotheus found it expedient to embark and withdraw.

It behoved him then to find enterprise within the limits of his commission, and not beyond his means, by which, if possible, he might maintain his credit with his wayward sovereign. Against Olynthus no hope remained; but the circumstances of the Thracian Chersonese, formerly under the Athenian dominion, afforded some prospect. That rich territory, once held by the celebrated Miltiades nearly as an independent principality, afterward brought under

Ch. 12. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

the direct dominion of the Athenian people by the great Pericles, at this time acknowledged a barbarian sovereign. The principal object of Pericles seems to have been to provide a resource, which the circumstances of the Attic government required, for occasionally disburthening the country of a superfluous growth of free population. For where industry became considered as the virtue of slaves, the number of citizens must necessarily be limited. Many then, who could not or would not maintain themselves by sober industry at home, might in the Chersonese, through adventure more suited to their disposition, find subsistence, and some even affluence. Land highly fruitful was nearly open for occupancy: the Thracians valuing it the less, as the Greeks far the more, for being nearly surrounded by the sea. The ready sword indeed was necessary to guard the spot



to which value might be given by husbandry; for the Thracian, little solicitous about the possession of land, was in his vocation fighting for plunder. The wants then of warring and mountainous Greece, and especially of rocky and restless Attica, made cultivation profitable wherever the soil was advantageous for produce, and the situation for export, and means occurred for procuring slaves to perform the labor. It was from the countries around the Chersonese that the Grecian slave-markets were principally supplied; and inroad, and violence, and surprise, such as, in the course of this history, we have had occasion to notice as ordinary with the Greeks, would provide either hands for husbandry, or an object of trade, for which, not in Greece only, but in all the richest countries within the sphere of Grecian navigation, there was a constant demand. Agriculture thus, in alliance with commerce, flourished so that the Chersonese became, next to Eubœa, the chief resource for supplying Athens with bread; and Sestus, the principal port for exportation, was called the corn-bin of Piræus.

SECT.  
IV.

Ch. 18. s. 4.  
and  
ch. 23. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

Arist. Rhet.  
l. 3. c. 10.

But though the Chersonesites had a double advantage in their peninsular situation, which made the escape of slaves as well as the approach of hostile armies difficult, yet, through some deficiency in their policy, they remained always unequal to their own defence against the thirst of plunder and unceasing enmity of the Thracians, from whom their country had been usurped. The gift of independency, given on the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war by Lacedæmon, brought them shortly in danger of utter ruin; from which they were saved, as formerly seen, by the private adventure of a Lacedæmonian exile, Clearchus. That able and enterprising soldier of fortune

Ch. 23. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Ch. 24. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

being called by more alluring adventure elsewhere, their dangers and sufferings recurred, and again they owed their relief to the voluntary exertion of a Lacedæmonian officer, vested indeed with more regular authority, Dercyllidas. If then, when through Conon's victory the Athenians recovered naval empire, they were to require tribute again, nowhere apparently, if protection were duly given in return, might it be required on fairer claim than from the Chersonese; not only as its Grecian inhabitants were mostly settled under Athenian protection, but as they never ceased to want protection. Little able, with their own means, to profit from independency, again restored to them by the peace of Antalcidas, it was fortunate for them that, though the barbarism of the Thracian people was little improved by any communication with the Greeks, yet the Thracian princes had gained better views of their own interest. They had discovered that more profit might be made by protecting than by plundering the Grecian settlements on their shores. The Chersonese was in consequence, without effort, as far as appears, re-vindicated to the Thracian dominion; and the Grecian towns flourished, while the Thracian monarch drew from their lands a revenue of thirty talents yearly, and from their trade three hundred; making together not less than six hundred thousand pounds sterling.

Demosth.

This revenue, from a country colonized from Athens, and made effectually Grecian, the Athenians, leaders and people, might not unnaturally see in the hands of a barbarian prince with some mixture of indignation and desire. But the barbarian prince, Cotys, had acquired it apparently as rightfully at least as they had ever acquired any dominion beyond Attica; and moreover they had admitted him to alliance

with them, and even acknowledged benefits received from him, by the double compliment of associating him in the number of Athenian citizens, and presenting him with a golden crown. It seems probable that Timotheus, however unlimited his commission to prosecute the interests of the Athenian people, may have been restrained by such considerations; and that two or three sea-port towns, which he added to the republic's dominion, were not torn from that of the Thracian prince.

With the accomplishment of these acquisitions the term of Timotheus's command appears to have ended. It is remarkable that, as in reporting measures against Macedonia contrary to all faith, the orator, though extolling the deed, has avoided naming the doer, so in reporting similar measures, which followed against the king of Thrace, the name of the officer directing the business is omitted. Attempts were made by the Athenian fleet to gain some towns from the dominion of Cotys. Iphicrates did not scruple to take the direction of the fleet of the king his brother-in-law against the officer commanding the fleet of his own country to oppose them, and he opposed successfully. In the failure, which there has been so often occasion to notice, of historians, we owe some interesting facts to the very profligacy of the times. The orators have little scrupled to avow matters indicating the grossest ill-faith in their party, if so the assertion of any claim to have promoted the good of the Athenian people might be assisted. At the same time it appears creditable to a large portion of the Athenian people, in these profligate times, and yet marks a strange versatility and inconsistency in the government, that Iphicrates, who, in the service of a foreign prince, had so opposed the measures of an Athenian

Demosth.  
or. in  
Aristocr.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.



CHAP.  
XXXV.

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armament, could presently after return to Athens, and without being called to any account for his conduct, resume his former importance there. It seems probable that against the Thracian towns, as before against the Macedonian, measures were ventured without regular instructions of just authority; and failing of success, it was judged not advisable to stir the question how they had failed, in fear of exciting the farther question why they had been undertaken.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 669.

Charidemus, with the troops attached to him, lately serving under Iphicrates, had passed into the Olynthian service, and a squadron of ships was intrusted to his command. No battle is noticed by the orator, from whom alone account remains, when Charidemus was made prisoner by the Athenian fleet. Vengeance against him as a deserter apparently might be expected from the sovereign many of Athens, were they still under the same guidance as when, refusing to serve under their general Timotheus, he engaged in the service of their enemies, the Olynthians. But, on the contrary, he was presently taken into the republic's service: he was even recommended to the people to be appointed to the command-in-chief in Thrace; it was urged in his favor that he alone held that influence with the Amphipolitans which might draw them from the Olynthian to the Athenian interest, and that he would effectually exert that interest. Amphipolis not long after was actually brought over to the Athenian interest; but how, the orator, who desired that Charidemus should have no credit with the Athenian people for it, has avoided to say. It seems likely that Iphicrates was the principal mover, and Charidemus his dexterous instrument. Some treachery to Olynthus is strongly implied in the orator's account; but, according to the principles

p. 625.

always asserted in his orations, treachery, whence advantage accrued to the Athenian people, was no matter for reproach to any one. That for some service Charidemus was esteemed to have deserved highly of the Athenian people direct information remains from the orator his violent enemy. Testimonies in his favor, transmitted to Athens by persons in the highest situations in the republic's service, or pronounced by them before the people, were numerous. Accordingly he was rewarded with the freedom of the city. But this, though probably valuable to him, being become a vulgar honor, he was farther presented with a reward reserved yet by the custom of the republic for merit in high station, a golden crown, placed on his head before the assembled people in pursuance of their decree; and he was thought worthy of a particular privilege, to which the frequency of the crime of assassination among the Greeks gave high value, a decree making any person who should attempt his life amenable to the Athenian courts from all the territories of the subject allies of Athens.<sup>8</sup> Little as this may appear among us, or among any, familiar only with the liberal governments of modern Europe, it seems to have required a far greater exertion of influence at Athens, and to have been esteemed a much more extraordinary favor, not only than admission to the freedom of the republic, but than the honor of a golden crown.

SECT.  
IV.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.

Ibid. p. 650.  
& 659.

<sup>8</sup> It is one among numerous instances of oversight or negligence in Diodorus that he has omitted all mention of so important an occurrence as the recovery of Amphipolis to the dominion or alliance of Athens, though, in the sequel of his narrative, he speaks of that city as actually recovered.

## SECTION V.

*Restored extent of the Athenian empire. Mal-administration of Athens. Growing oppression of the allies. Revolt of Rhodes, Cos, Chios, and Byzantium, and war ensuing, commonly called the Social or Confederate war. Revolt of Eubœa: summary history of Eubœa: interference of Thebes in Eubœa. Expedition under Timotheus, and liberal composition of the affairs of Eubœa. War impending from Macedonia.*

CHAP.  
XXXV.

Isocrates,  
Areop.

Demosth. in  
Aristocr. &  
Olynth. &  
περὶ συντάξ.  
& Philipp.

The empire of the Athenian people was now again approaching the extent which it had obtained before the Peloponnesian war. Their navy was not less preponderant; all the islands of the Ægean were tributary. The cities of the Asiatic main indeed, preferring the more liberal patronage of the Persian satraps, appear to have found that patronage effectual, both for their security and their prosperity, and far more favorable to their civil liberty than their former subjection to the Athenian people. But on the Thracian shore all was subject to Athens except Olynthus, (which, with the small relics of its confederacy, maintained a precarious independency,) and the towns of the Chersonese, which were under the patronage of the Thracian, nearly as the Asiatic of the Persian king. Toward these the ambition of the Athenian people was continually excited by the leaders of the high democratical party, and the Chersonese appears to have been the first object.

But with ambition in excess the republic's affairs were now misconducted in excess. Military commanders of high reputation led its armaments; orators, among the most celebrated of antiquity, were contending for popular favor, and yet who directed the administration does not appear; or rather it appears that there was no regular administration. Never



was more complete democracy. Every measure of executive government was brought before the assembled people. Candidates for the first places in public favor were numerous, and none held a decided lead. To flatter the multitude, and to flatter excessively, was the burthensome, disgraceful, and mischievous office principally incumbent upon all. There was a constant canvass for popular favor, which nothing perhaps, in modern Europe, has resembled so nearly as the contest for the representation of county in England, especially Middlesex. Amid so general and constant a fermentation of the popular mind, which those who have had most experience of contested elections in England will perhaps best, and yet but inadequately conceive, the three great men, whom all the respectable part of the community respected, and whose characters have been transmitted singularly pure from so corrupt and calumnious an age, Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias, unfortunately were not perfect friends: they did not lead opposite factions, but they seldom completely coalesced in public business. Their influence thus was not what it ought to have been. In public calamity and danger the public mind would turn to them; but, in prosperity, those who would flatter more were better heard, and public affairs at least appeared yet prosperous.

SECT.  
V.

Xenoph.  
ut ant.  
Isocrates,  
ut ant.  
Demosth.  
περὶ συντάξ.  
& al.

In every Grecian town of the Chersonese, as in Grecian towns everywhere, there would be an Athenian party, or a party ready for any revolution; but in every town also were those, and perhaps mostly a majority, interested in preserving the actual state of things. Expense then, such as the republic, if not unable, was unwilling to provide, would be necessary for the preparation and maintenance of a force equal

CHAP.  
XXXV.

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Isocr. de  
permut.

to the proposed conquest ; for the restless and impatient many of Athens would neither serve nor pay, but rather require distribution to themselves from the public treasury ; and the wealthier few were constantly, and not unnecessarily, intent upon obviating or evading the evils of the arbitrary and oppressive system of democratical taxation. Even the quiet and cautious Isocrates, who never sought military or civil honors, who had more extensive friendships and fewer interested enmities than perhaps any man of his time, could not avoid the pressure of the tyrannical law of exchange. Under authority of that law a person, required by a decree of the people to equip a trireme for public service, called upon Isocrates, at the age of eighty-two, to take the burthen from him, or make a complete exchange of property with him. Perhaps Isocrates could afford the expense better than many others who had been compelled to bear it, and yet possibly not better than the person who brought the action of exchange against him. Isocrates however, as the less evil, took the burthensome office, while the other, such was the inequality of that kind of taxation, escaped, for the time at least, all payment, all risk, and all farther trouble.

Isocr. de  
Pace.

A people in the circumstances of the Athenian, possessing power to tax others and spare themselves, would be likely, in the use of such a power, to exceed moderation. When the assembled many were told that the treasury was empty they would be indignant, and their indignation was always dangerous. Those who managed the administration at home endeavoured to put the blame upon those commissioned to collect tribute from the allies abroad. There could be no money in the treasury, they said, if none was brought in. Reproaches and threats then commonly followed

against the commanders of the tribute-gathering squadrons. 'If there was not dishonesty,' it was insisted, 'there was negligence. The tribute should 'be more exactly collected: the requisition should 'be extended: no state which had any maritime 'commerce should be excused the payment: free 'navigation should be allowed to none who refused 'tribute.'

SECT.  
V.

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Against such effusions of popular sovereignty the party for which Xenophon and Isocrates wrote, and with which Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias acted, vainly remonstrated. On the other side it was urged that 'men whom the people might trust, men of their 'own sort, ought to command the fleet, and direct 'the tribute-gathering business.' The people decreed accordingly, and oppression and insult to the allies increased. The commander of the tribute-gathering fleet made his own terms with all the numerous maritime states of the shores of the Ægean. Paying him as he required, they were to have protection for their commerce: not so paying, they would be open to depredation from pirates, especially the greatest of pirates, the commander of the Athenian fleet. The peculation was reduced to a system. Every man in the fleet, according to his rank, had regularly his share. The treasury profited little: but every individual seaman being interested in the corruption, and the fleet being a large part of the commonwealth, not only to bring any to punishment was seldom possible, but the peculator, through the interest he acquired by allowing a share in peculation, was generally safer than the honest commander, who would dare to deny to those under him the wages of corruption.

Demosth.

Æschin.  
Demosth.  
de Cherson.  
p. 96.

About six years before the acquisition of Pydna to the Athenian empire, while the extravagance of



CHAP.  
XXV.

Ch. 28. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Isocr. de  
Pace.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 21.

B. C. 358.  
Ol. 105. 3.  
[Cf. note  
p. 154.]

popular sovereignty was yet restrained by the fear of Thebes, three of the most powerful of the allied states, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, nevertheless feeling the pressure of that sovereignty, had revolted, as we have formerly seen, against the Athenian, and engaged in the Theban alliance. The same three states now united with the newly flourishing commonwealth of Cos to resist a dominion which they considered as intolerably oppressive and degrading; and they engaged in their alliance Mausolus, prince of Caria, who suffered with them from Athenian exactions upon the commerce of his subjects. Measures being then concerted, they joined in declaring to the Athenian government 'that they were resolved thenceforward to protect their own commerce with their own fleets, and wanting thus nothing from the Athenian navy, no more tribute could be required from them for its support.'

This declaration was as a stunning blow to the public mind at Athens. Felt as an injury, it excited indignation; but it excited also universal alarm. The multitude became furious, while the more serious and informed entertained perhaps more apprehension. How to maintain the navy, necessary to the pre-eminence and wealth of the republic, and which that very pre-eminence and wealth made the more necessary to its safety; how either to pay mercenary troops, or persuade the people to take military service upon themselves; how to feed the numbers habituated to profit from the various business of building, fitting, and equipping ships, and to share in the exactions of the commanders; and, what pressed perhaps not less than all these, how to appease or withstand the popular indignation, should the funds fail for public sacrifice and theatrical exhibitions, were

considerations urgently interesting all who possessed property at Athens. The circumstances of the moment nevertheless offered what, as the first emotions of alarm subsided, might not only elate the many, but encourage the ambition of leading men. The power and influence of Athens might be esteemed at this time predominant among the Grecian states. Lacedæmon and Thebes were become inert. The rising means of Olynthus were severely checked by Athenian garrisons almost blockading the city itself; and Macedonia, hardly yet reckoned formidable, was, by the loss of Pydna, nearly deprived of means to communicate with the sea but at the pleasure of the Athenian people. The interest of a party powerful among the many met these considerations, and the result of popular deliberation was a decree declaring ‘that the rebellion of the allies should be repressed ‘by arms.’

We find it the frequent reproach of Demosthenes to the sovereign people of Athens, that they were quick and spirited in resolving, but slow and deficient in executing. To resolve was the easy business of a moment: to execute required plan, money, selection of men. Little seems to have been done in prosecution of the decree against the rebellious allies when the alarming intelligence arrived of a revolt still more nearly interesting the commonwealth. Of all dominion beyond the bounds of Attica, that of Eubœa was most important to the Athenian people. On the produce of Eubœa Athens principally depended for subsistence. Nevertheless a civil war among its towns, for some time now going forward, had been little noticed by the Athenian government; perhaps reckoning it rather good policy to leave them at full liberty, if they had no other liberty, to vent their

CHAP. passions and waste their strength against one another.  
 XXXV. But as soon as it was announced that a Theban force had entered the island, and there was great danger that the whole would be subjected to Thebes, indignation with alarm pervaded Athens.

Why the people of Eubœa, the largest island of the Ægean sea, whose principal city, Chalcis, so flourished in the early ages as to establish in Italy, Sicily, and Thrace, colonies the most numerous of any one Grecian state, were, through all the more splendid times of Greece, mostly in a state of subjugation and always of political insignificancy, seems not to be completely accounted for. The form of the country indeed was evidently a contributing cause; divided, like the neighbouring continent, by lofty mountains into portions not commodiously accessible from each

Strab. l. 10.  
 p. 446. 7. 8.

other. Chalcis, on the Euripus, from early to late times the largest and most powerful city, maintained generally a fortunate harmony with Eretria, its nearest neighbour, and next in power. Oreus at the north-western and Carystus at the south-eastern end of the island were next to these. Some of the other towns might claim independency; the whole effectual dominion commonly rested with those four. Wars and seditions among the people probably gave occasion to the early colonies from Athens, of which both Chalcis and Eretria are said to have been. Before the first Persian invasion we find the greatest part of Eubœa was under the dominion of Athens. In proof of the

Demosth.  
 in Aristocr.  
 p. 691.

Ch. 19. s. 7.  
 of this Hist.

importance of that dominion we have observed Thucydides remarking that, when in the wane of the Athenian affairs in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, among the disturbances of the revolution of the Fourhundred, Eubœa revolted, Athens was more agitated than by the news of the destruction of



all the best military and naval force of the republic under Nicias and Demosthenes in Sicily.

SECT.  
V.

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With the reduction of Athens by the Lacedæmonian arms Eubœa became of course, with all Greece, dependent on Lacedæmon; but after Conon's victory at Cnidus it reverted again to the dominion of Athens. The rise of Thebes to eminence among the Grecian states gave much occasion for division among the Eubœan cities, but little to any assertion of independency. Bordering as Eubœa was on Bœotia, divided only by a water at times fordable, the discontented under Athenian sovereignty would of course look to Thebes for patronage. Connexion between some of the Eubœan towns and Thebes appears to have been of long standing. So early as toward the beginning of the war between Thebes and Lacedæmon we have seen a party in Oreus faithful even to Thebes in distress, and prevailing even while a Lacedæmonian garrison held their citadel. With the advancement then of the Theban power under Pelopidas and Epaminondas, when Theban patronage became extensively desired among the Grecian states, Theban influence spread over all Eubœa. It had been under the patronage of the Athenian democracy that Themison of Eretria became the leading man of that city, with power so preponderant and lasting that, with some Grecian writers, he had the title of tyrant of Eretria. Nevertheless when the Theban democracy undertook the patronage of those Athenian citizens whom the Athenian democracy had driven into banishment, Themison, in concert with the Theban government, assisted the exiles to get possession of Oropus, an Attic town on the confines of Bœotia, which they continued to hold under the protection of Thebes. Afterward however, when Thebes

B. C. 377.  
Ol. 100. 4.  
Ch. 26. s. 8.  
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 5.  
s. 4.

Æsch. con.  
Ctesiph.  
p. 478. t. 3.  
ed. Reiske.

Ch. 28. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

became less able to protect and Athens more able to revenge, Themison seems to have had the skill to make his peace with the Athenian government, so that Eretria returned quietly to its former dependency on Athens, though Oropus remained under the dominion of Thebes.

But when the revolt took place among the allies on the eastern side of the Ægean, Eubœa was ripe for similar measure. The troublesome and dangerous sea between them however, with the command which the Athenian navy held in it, made communication difficult, and mutual support uncertain. The Eubœans therefore negotiated with Thebes; fallen indeed since the death of Epaminondas, yet still in power and reputation considerable. The passage of the narrow strait separating Eubœa from Bœotia was easy. A Bœotian force was welcomed by the two principal cities, Chalcis and Eretria; and though there was in every town an Athenian party, yet the revolters had the superiority throughout the island.

On news of this rebellion, the Athenian people being hastily summoned, consternation and dismay pervaded the assembly. The usually forward talkers, accustomed to accuse the best men of the republic, and arrogantly to claim all political wisdom and probity to themselves, fearing now to be silent, yet feared to speak. Such circumstances invite and urge forward conscious worth. Timotheus, so often the leader of the republic's forces to victory, the surety of its faith in negotiation, diffident generally and backward in debate, now mounted the speaker's stand. 'What!' said he (we may perhaps trust Demosthenes for the words, which he probably heard) 'are the Thebans ' in the island, and is there a question what should

‘be done? Will you not cover the sea with your  
 ‘ships? Will you not, breaking up instantly this as-  
 ‘sembly, hasten to Piræus and go aboard?’

SECT.  
V.

This energetic address from a man so respected surprised the people into animation and energy; for so only now could the Athenian government be directed. The wisdom of the ablest in cool argument availed nothing: sober reason were in vain applied to: the fate of the republic depended on the popular passion that could be in the moment excited. Fortunately the quick and just judgment of Timotheus, which could excite the feeling that the moment required, was able also to conduct it to its proper end. Of the animating speech reported by the greatest of the contemporary orators, the fortunate result remains reported in panegyrical strain by his principal rival.

‘Only five days,’ says Æschines, ‘after the Theban  
 ‘forces landed in Eubœa, the Athenians were there.  
 ‘Within thirty the Thebans were compelled to a  
 ‘capitulation, under which they quitted the island;  
 ‘and the Athenian democracy gave freedom to the  
 ‘Eubœan towns, which it was the purpose of the  
 ‘Theban democracy to enslave.’

Æsch. con-  
Ctesiph  
p. 479.

We shall be aware that a Theban orator would have given a different turn to his account of the same transactions. If his candor, or the notoriety of the facts, compelled him to admit all the success that the Athenian orator claimed for the Athenian arms, he would still have asserted the good principle of his own and the bad of the Athenian democracy; he would have contended that the Thebans, solicited by the Eubœans themselves, went to restore to them the freedom which the Athenians had oppressed. But for the real character of the Eubœan war the account of Diodorus may deserve attention; apt as he is to be misled by



CHAP.  
XXXV.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 7.

party-writers, but least disposed to partiality where the Theban and Athenian democracies were in opposition. 'The Eubœans,' he says, 'torn by faction, called in, some the Thebans, some the Athenians. War pervaded the island in little conflicts, without any general action. After much slaughter on both sides, and war carried into every part of the country, the people, hardly at length admonished by their sufferings, settled into concord, and made peace with one another. The Bœotians then withdrew, and interfered in their affairs no more.'

p. 253. 4.

Strab. &  
Plut.

Demosth.  
de cor.  
Æschin.  
ut ant.

Comparing this account with what remains from the orators, we may gather that while the Eubœans contended only among themselves, the Athenian government was little solicitous about the event. Like some of the Italian governments of ages past, (what is to come remains to be seen,) as amends for the want of other liberty, it indulged the people in that of killing one another. But as soon as the Thebans interfered jealousy became at once violent. Under the wise guidance of Timotheus however, preponderance being restored to the Athenian interest, the Theban troops, without any military action that caught much the common eye, were reduced to such difficulty as to be glad to have means, under a capitulation, to leave the island. The liberality then shown toward the vanquished party of the Eubœans is eulogized by both the orators. Apparently the popular temper, chastened by alarms and dangers, restrained the noisy adventurers in the field of oratory, and allowed a just influence to the magnanimity and humanity of Timotheus. It was settled that every town should acknowledge, as formerly, a political subjection to Athens, and, for the benefit of protection against each other, as well as against fo-

reigners, pay a tribute, but of fixed amount; that, for the purpose of a regular and just superintendency of the general concerns of the island, every town should send its representative to reside at Athens, and attend the council and assemblies as occasion might be; but, for the management of affairs merely civil, that each should preserve its former constitution and its independent administration. All then being highly jealous of one another, and the governing party in every one jealous of another party among their fellow-citizens, all conscious of the want of a superintending power, and no other sufficiently powerful appearing, all were led to attach themselves again, by a subjection in a great degree voluntary, to the imperial democracy of Athens.

Thus the most pressing of the dangers which had threatened the republic was averted, and hope began again to soar high in the popular mind. Nothing was seen remaining to prevent the direction of the full force of the state against the contumacious allies, whose resistance, hitherto so distressing, could not, it was supposed, then be maintained much longer. They being subdued, not only the empire of the Athenian people might resume its former extent and splendor, but the public view might, with fair expectation of success, be extended to farther conquest. Such, as the contemporary patriot Isocrates informs us, were the intemperate purposes which a large part of the ill-judging multitude were led to hold.

Isocr. de  
pace, & in  
Areop.

On the return of the force under Timotheus from its truly glorious expedition the city was given up to gladness; and the greetings on the joyful occasion were still going forward when the vain hopes of the ambitious were checked, and the just gratification of the more moderate turned again into anxiety and

Demosth.  
Olynth. 2.

apprehension. Ministers arrived from Amphipolis with the alarming news that Olynthus and Macedonia were united in confederacy to carry their arms against that favorite colony of the Athenian people, so recently recovered to their dominion, and that it must fall, unless that speedy support were given which they were sent to supplicate.



## CHAPTER XXXVI.

*Affairs of Athens and Macedonia from the renewal of hostility between them to the end of the war between the Athenians and their allies, called the Confederate or Social war.*

## SECTION I.

*Historical memorials from the orators. Alliance of Macedonia with Olynthus against Athens. Negotiation between Athens, Macedonia, and Olynthus. Hostilities prosecuted. Successes of the allies.*

IN all Grecian history there is hardly any period more interesting than that with which we are now engaged; and for that interesting period we are almost without an ancient historian. The Sicilian annalist, Diodorus, fuller on the concerns of his native island, assists for the general history of Greece principally by the ground he affords for connexion and arrangement of materials given by others, especially the orators, but even for this often failing. Occasional assistance is given by Plutarch, but the orators furnish incomparably the richest mine. The testimony of an orator however must be received with much caution. For facts indeed, of general notoriety among those before whom he spoke, his first object, persuasion, would generally forbid gross falsehood. But whatever he might venture to disguise would receive a coloring from the purpose of his argument:

SECT.  
I.

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CHAP.  
XXXVI.

where he might venture to feign, even fiction may be suspected. Toward ascertaining truth, adverse orators, in the scanty opportunities offering, should be compared; the course of events, the character of the times, the characters of parties, the character of the orator himself, his purpose in the moment, and the opportunity for answering him, should be considered. The task of the modern writer on this portion of history thus becomes laborious, and sometimes, from an unsatisfactory result after all labor, irksome; but to do any justice to the subject it must be undertaken. Those who, like Rollin and some others, give entire confidence to Demosthenes, may produce an amusing romance, with touching panegyric and invective, but their narrative will be very wide of real history.<sup>1</sup>

The war against Olynthus, prosecuted with such advantage to Athens while she had the benefit of co-operation from the Macedonian arms, had nearly slept since that co-operation had been repelled by the insolently injurious aggression at Pydna. The situation of Macedonia meanwhile was such as could not but excite apprehension and anxiety in its government and among its people. After having lost Pydna, its last sea-port, it had seen Amphipolis pass

<sup>1</sup> One cannot but wonder in what confidence Rollin has represented even the private character of Demosthenes good and even perfect. Auger, whose translation of the orators has obtained wide estimation, eulogizing, after the manner which is not new with the French school, the politics of Demosthenes, and reckoning him a consummate patriot, admits, though with professed regret, that his private character did not assort with his public reputation: 'Je suis fâché (he says) pour l'honneur de Demosthene, qu'il nous ait laissé lui-meme des preuves de sa mauvaise foi, et de son défaut de probité.' Note on his translation of the speech on the Embassy, p. 230.

from the alliance of Olynthus under the dominion of Athens. Demosthenes rated the importance of Amphipolis to the welfare of Macedonia very high: 'While the Athenians,' he said, 'held Amphipolis and Potidæa, the king of Macedonia could not reckon himself safe in his own house.' When, with Amphipolis and Potidæa then, Methone and Pydna also were subject to Athens, and all the rest of the Macedonian coast was held by the Olynthians, against whom he had waged war for Athens, the danger to himself and to his people must have been great indeed.

It was hardly possible for two powers more to have interests unavoidably interfering, jealousies in consequence necessary and extreme, hostile disposition therefore ever ready, and real conciliation impracticable, than Macedonia and Olynthus: they were as Scotland formerly and England, or even worse: they must be completely united, or ever hostile. As then Olynthus was in a way to be subdued by Athens, but not to be united with Macedonia, and in subjection to the Athenian empire would be still more dangerous than in independency, it seems to have been fortunate for Macedonia that the Athenian government, by conduct apparently little less impolitic than profligate, prepared the way for what was of all things most desirable, but otherwise most impracticable. Alliance with the Macedonian kingdom, which the ambition of the Olynthian leaders, in the prosperity of their confederacy, would have scorned, was looked upon, in the present pressure, with more complacency. Philip used the open opportunity. Peace was made between the two governments, and an alliance followed, the express purpose of which was to profit from the existing embarrassment of the Athenians, in unsucces-

SECT.  
I.

Demosth.  
Phil. 2.  
p. 70. &  
Phil. 3.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 8.  
B. C. 357.  
Ol. 105. 3.  
[Cf. p. 188.]



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

ful war against their allies, for driving them entirely from the shores of Macedonia and western Thrace.

This alliance appears to have been a complete surprise upon the administration of Athens; who seem to have depended upon the speculation that friendly connexion between Macedonia and Olynthus was impossible. The occasion was fair for reproach to that party which had so embroiled the republic, and great contention of oratory ensued. Of the particulars no information remains; but it appears that the result was not altogether favorable to those who, by the nefarious aggression at Pydna, had forced a valuable ally to become a dangerous enemy. Though not driven from their leading situation, they were unable, or, in the existing circumstances, fearful to follow up their own measures, which nevertheless they would not abandon. The decree which the sovereign multitude at length was persuaded to ratify, declared, ‘That no military force should at present be diverted from the important purpose of reducing the rebellious allies; but that negotiation be entered upon for obviating the injury threatened by the Olynthians and Macedonians.’

Demosth.  
Olynth. 2.  
p. 19.

Ibid.

In pursuance of this decree ministers were sent into Macedonia; and, in return, ministers came from both Macedonia and Olynthus. The Macedonians appear to have been received with some due respect; but the spirit of freedom in the republicans of Olynthus was ill accommodated to the spirit of dominion in the republicans of Athens. These, holding the Olynthians themselves as rebellious subjects, heard with scorn the arguments of their ministers in favor of the freedom of Amphipolis, though it had been decreed by successive congresses of the Greek nation. Philip’s ministers are said to have proposed that the

Macedonian forces should be withdrawn from Amphipolis, provided Pydna were restored to Macedonia. Theopomp. ap. Ulpian. & Suid.

The Athenian administration however coming to no conclusion, yet pressing for a cessation of hostilities, Philip, in a letter to the Athenian people, if an oration of the time, transmitted among those of Demosthenes, may be trusted, declared that 'he would conquer Amphipolis for them.'<sup>2</sup> But the orator has carefully avoided notice of stipulations which Philip, taught by experience when he conquered Potidæa and Torone for them, would hardly fail now to annex to such a promise. The proposals however, of which the orator has avoided an account, appear to have excited serious attention, and produced much discussion. But the party, bent upon war and conquest, provided that decision should be delayed while ministers from the republic went again into Macedonia; and, they naming the ministers, nothing was concluded.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The character of the oration on Halonnesus, in which this is found, will occur for future notice.

<sup>3</sup> Should the reader, having perchance looked at the account of these negotiations in Rollin's Ancient History, or in Leland's Life of Philip, suppose that I have not related them so fully and clearly as ancient authorities would warrant, and especially that I have been deficient in exposing the wiles and falsehood of Philip, I would request him to look into Demosthenes, rather certainly into the original, but even Leland's translation, and see whether even Leland's Demosthenes will warrant half what is to be found in Leland's Life of Philip, for which the authority of Demosthenes is there claimed. The good sense and even perspicacity which Rollin has shown in treating the early part of Grecian history seem to have been bewildered when he lost those invaluable guides, the contemporary historians. For Sicilian history he has bowed to Plutarch, and for Macedonian he has been imbued with all the venom that Demosthenes could have wished to infuse into the Athenian multitude. Demosthenes himself is no such unfair historian. His credit and the

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

Meanwhile measures were put forward by the Macedonians and Olynthians for confirming their alliance, of the need of which the circumstances of their unsuccessful negotiation at Athens had afforded abundant proof. In this business we find Philip still pursuing that system of liberality approaching extravagance, by which he accomplished his first connexion with Athens, and in which he persevered while Athens allowed the connexion to hold. Anthemus, a principal town of Macedonia, in the neighbourhood of Olynthus, had formerly, in the early part of the reign of Amyntas, been among those which renounced their connexion with the distracted kingdom, to join the then flourishing Olynthian confederacy. On the dissolution of that confederacy it was restored to the kingdom, of which, before its defection, it had been a member from time immemorial. Philip now, resigning his right of dominion, allowed it to become again a member of the confederacy of which Olynthus was again the head.<sup>4</sup> The knowledge of a strong predilection among the Anthemuntines for the Olynthian connexion was probably among Philip's inducements to such a concession.

Demosth.  
Philip. 2.  
p. 70.

On the other hand we are told that, among the Amphipolitans, there was a Macedonian party of such fervent zeal that they paid divine honors to Philip, as a hero or demigod, the lineal descendant of the god Hercules. Among parties extravagance is apt ready means for conviction forbade. Guarding only against the fascination of his coloring, for facts necessarily of public notoriety he may apparently be generally trusted; though occasion will occur in the sequel to notice some important and curious exceptions.

<sup>4</sup> Thus, I think, the orator's phrase, Ἀνθεμοῦντα μὲν αὐτοῖς ἡφίλει, may be with most exactness represented.



to be mutual; a beginning on one side excites it on the other. Where it began among the Amphipolitans we are without information; but it seems to have pervaded them extensively. The party adverse to the Macedonian interest, holding the principal power in the city, proceeded to violences, which are no otherwise described by the historian than as very offensive, and giving large and repeated provocation for the direction of the Macedonian arms against them. Hence apparently, omitting for the present the nearer concerns of Potidæa, Methone, and Pydna, the united arms of Macedonia and Olynthus were directed against Amphipolis.

SECT.  
I.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 8.

For this interesting period much of our information comes from most consummate politicians, the Athenian orators; but writers with the military knowledge, as well as the candid impartiality, of Thucydides and Xenophon wholly fail. We learn however that the art of sieges had been much improved since the Peloponnesian war. Battering engines, then little known, or from inartificial construction and unskilful application little efficacious, were now brought to considerable perfection and into extensive use. The siege of Amphipolis being formed by the united forces of Olynthus and Macedonia, under the orders of the Macedonian king, battering engines were applied against the walls, and a breach was soon made. Some bloody assaults followed. According to Diodorus, the town was taken by storm. The contemporary orator's words indicate a capitulation; where, his purpose having been to excite odium against both Philip and the Amphipolitans of the Macedonian and Olynthian party, he has attributed the loss of the place to treachery. The fact, as far as it may be gathered, seems to have

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

[B. C.  
358. \* Cl.]

been that, when, after repeated assaults at the breach, defence became at length desperate, the leaders of the Athenian party could no longer hold their authority over the many, less deeply interested in the event. The friends of Macedonia and Olynthus then, regarded as those who alone could avert impending destruction, acquired a leading influence; and the surrender of course followed, which the orator, pleader for the Athenian interest, equally of course called treachery.

On this occasion the humanity and the magnanimous liberality, which had before shone in Philip's conduct, were again conspicuous. Executions, so common among the Greeks, and not least among the Athenians, were wholly avoided. The violent only of the Athenian party either were banished, because they could not be safely trusted in the place, or voluntarily withdrew, because they could not trust themselves among their fellow-citizens. According to Philip's custom, all prisoners of war were freely dismissed. None of the remaining inhabitants suffered for party opinions or past conduct. The king's usually engaging affability and civility were extended to all; but those who had exerted themselves in the Macedonian cause were rewarded with marked attention. In uniting Amphipolis to the Macedonian kingdom no violence appears to have been put upon its municipal constitution: it became a member of the Macedonian state nearly as our colonies, holding their several constitutions, are members of the British empire.

The necessary arrangements being made in Amphipolis, Philip marched to Pydna. A large party

[\* 'B. C. 358. Amphipolis taken by Philip, ἐπὶ Κηφισοδότου, after his victory over the Illyrians. Diod. xvi. 3.—Polyænus iv. 2, 7.' Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 122.]

there had remained attached to the Macedonian connexion, and with this party matters had been so prepared that the Macedonian army no sooner appeared before the town than the gates were opened. This important place being thus easily recovered to his kingdom, Philip proceeded, without delay, to employ his military force and his military abilities where the interest of his new allies the Olynthians most pressinglly wanted them. In conjunction with the Olynthian forces he formed the siege of Potidæa. A majority of the people were enough dissatisfied with Athenian sovereignty to have renewed long ago their connexion with Olynthus, but that an Athenian garrison restrained them. Presently therefore, after the united forces of Olynthus and Macedonia appeared before the place, the Athenians and their friends found themselves obliged to seek personal safety by withdrawing into the citadel. The town immediately opened its gates to the besiegers, and the citadel, being invested, was soon reduced to surrender at discretion.

We have many times seen, and we shall again have occasion to see, how very wretched, among the Grecian republics commonly, was the condition of prisoners of war, and how deplorable the lot of a town taken. The elder Dionysius had been giving examples of liberality and clemency, not only in foreign but even in civil war, scarcely heard of before among the Greeks. This is so uncontested that it may seem to have been in envy of his superior character that his reputation has been otherwise so traduced. Philip, who appears at least to have equalled him in nobleness of sentiment and conduct, has met with nearly an equal share of such malice. The clearest courage and extraordinary military talents have



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

Demosth.  
Olynth. 2.  
p. 19. 20.  
& in  
Aristocr.  
p. 656.

been his undisputed merits; yet, in the checkered accounts of him, his generous anxiety to obviate, by a liberal policy, the necessity for using arms shines through all the clouds of party invective, so that it seems to have been really the more prominent part of his character. Conceding Potidæa, with all its appurtenances, to the Olynthians, he was careful to require that the Athenian prisoners should be his; aware how necessary his interference would be against the revenge of the Potidæans of the party adverse to Athens, who had been held in a subjection so severe that we find it marked by a term implying almost slavery. Philip not only gave his prisoners present security, but liberally supplied their wants; and then, without requiring anything of the ransom which we have seen the republics, in their utmost liberality to prisoners of war, requiring of one another, he provided conveyance for them to Athens.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Modern writers have sometimes made ancient history wonderful, on the claimed authority of ancient writers, who really give them no warrant for miracles. Thus Leland, in his *Life of Philip*, says, ‘The Amphipolitans were obliged to surrender themselves to the mercy of the conqueror, whom they had provoked by an obstinate defence, though, by an unaccountable inconsistency of conduct, they continued to pay him divine honors.’ The wonder will vanish when it is observed there were at least two, but rather three or even four parties in Amphipolis. Diodorus, though not always so clear and explanatory as might be wished, has given here all necessary explanation: *Τοὺς μὲν (τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν) ἀλλοτρίως πρὸς αὐτὸν (τὸν Φίλιππον) διακείμενους ἐφυγάδευσεν, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις φιλανθρώπως προσηνέχθη.* It is obvious that the *ἀλλοτρίως πρὸς αὐτὸν διακείμενοι* would not be those who paid him divine honors, and that the *ἄλλοι* were not those who obstinately resisted him.

But, though Leland seems to have resigned his judgment often most weakly to the presumptuous liveliness of his French predecessor in the history of Philip, yet we sometimes find from him sober criticism, apparently his own, which does him credit.

'The revolt of Pydna,' he says, 'afforded Philip a fair occasion of marching against that city, to reduce it to his obedience. The siege was formed, and the Pydnæans, unsupported by their new sovereigns' (the Athenian people), 'were soon obliged to surrender. Libanius and Aristides have both asserted that, at the very time when the people were performing those solemn rites, by which the terms of their capitulation were ratified, Philip ordered his soldiers to fall on them without mercy, and thus cruelly massacred a considerable number of the citizens. But such an instance of barbarity would not, it may reasonably be presumed, have been omitted by Demosthenes, who represented all the actions of this prince in the blackest light; nor is it at all consistent with the tenor of his actions: for, although his humanity was, on many occasions, made to yield to his policy' (even for this accusation however I must say I know not what good authority is to be found), 'yet unnecessary barbarity was neither consistent with his temper nor his interest. It seems therefore more reasonable to suppose that he accepted the submission of the inhabitants without inflicting any extraordinary severities, and without disgracing his present to the Olynthians, to whom he now gave up Pydna, by putting them in possession of a city depopulated, and polluted by the blood of helpless wretches who had laid down their arms and yielded themselves to his mercy.' Leland's *Life of Philip*, book 1. sect. 2.

It is enough indicated by Demosthenes that Pydna was recovered to the Macedonian kingdom, through a party among the people, without any great effort in arms. That no execution of rebels, whom all law and policy would condemn, followed, were too much to conclude from the mere silence of one habituated, like Demosthenes, to the operation of the cruel law of treason of the Athenian and other surrounding republics; but that the report of Aristides and Libanius, if even it had such executions for some foundation, was grossly exaggerated, Leland seems with good reason to have judged. Demosthenes, who, with all his fire and vehemence, was a wise and discreet speaker, would not risk the assertion of falsehoods such as Aristides, who had less eminence to fall from, might hazard; but he was most ingenious in the use of hints and half-sayings, to raise or to confirm scandalous reports that might promote his purposes, without incurring the imputation of asserting falsely. Such we find concerning those who served Philip's cause at Amphipolis and at Pydna: Καὶ ἴσασιν (οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι) ἃ τ' Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἐποίησε τοὺς

## SECTION II.

*Cotys, king of Thrace. Expedition of Philip into Thrace. Acquisition and improved management of the Thracian gold-mines. Affairs of Thessaly. Liberal conduct of Philip in Thessaly, and advantages ensuing.*

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

By these rapid measures the scheme of offensive operations concerted between the Macedonian and

παραδόντας αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ Πυδναίων τοὺς ὑποδεξαμένους· Olynth. 1. p. 10. ‘The Olynthians know what he did to those ‘Amphipolitans who surrendered their town to him, and to ‘those Pydnæans who admitted his troops.’ If by such hints he could excite any mistrust of Philip’s frequent friendly proposals to the Athenian people, or obviate, in any degree, his growing popularity, it would be so much gained to his cause without risk. On this indeterminate phrase of Demosthenes seems to have been founded the story that Plutarch has preserved, of merit for its moral tendency, though utterly unlikely to be true. The Macedonian soldiers, says the biographer, reviled the Amphipolitans, who surrendered their town, with the name of traitors. The Amphipolitans complaining to Philip of this, he told them ‘they must not mind it: his soldiers were plain men, ‘who always called things by their names.’ The inconsistency of this with the deep and unremitted policy so frequently attributed to Philip, is obvious. But as the plain account of Diodorus, compared with all that remains from the orators, leaves no room for doubt but that it was a party from of old friendly to the Macedonian interest that delivered Amphipolis to Philip, it does not appear that the imputation of treachery could at all attach upon them.

Leland has followed the common reading of the passage of Diodorus, which says that Philip gave Pydna to the Olynthians. But the supposition of Barbeyrac and Wesseling, that in that place Pydna has been inserted, by the carelessness of transcribers, for Potidæa, is so warranted by Gemistius Pletho, by the scholiast on Demosthenes, citing Theopompus, and even by Demosthenes himself, who, in the second Philippic (p. 70.), mentions Anthemus and Potidæa as given by Philip to the Olynthians, without any notice of Pydna, that I have no scruple in following their proposed correction.



Olynthian governments was completed. The Athenian republic was deprived of every tributary dependency on the northern shore of the Ægean, from the border of Thessaly to the Thracian Chersonese, unless some small seaports, strong on the land side by situation, and subsisting either by commerce or piracy, might find urgency yet to respect the Athenian navy, and hope of needlessness to respect any other power. Meanwhile in their distressing war with their allies the Athenians had made no progress. Philip therefore proceeded to use the leisure afforded through the embarrassment of that war to the Athenian government for improving the acquisitions he had made; and he directed his attention particularly toward the gold-mines which seem to have given Amphipolis, in the eyes of the Athenians themselves, its principal value.

SECT.  
II.

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 8.  
B. C. 357.  
Ol. 105. 3.  
[Cf. date  
p. 188.]

The Amphipolitans, even when supported by a close political connexion with Olynthus, yet always threatened by the claims and growing power of Athens, appear to have been either unable or fearful to profit from the riches which the mountains of their neighbourhood contained. In this neglect of the mines by others, the people of the island of Thasos, their earliest Grecian possessors, again directed adventure to them, and had now a factory there. It seems probable (for in the loss of the many Grecian histories of the time we are reduced to rest upon probability) that the Thasians purchased the forbearance, and perhaps the protection, of the nearest Thracian princes by the payment of a tribute. Thus the Thracian mines, in the hands of the people of Thasos, would produce a profit to those princes which would never have accrued through their own labor-scorning people; and here appears probable ground for the

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

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war which, without noticing its cause, Grecian writers report to have ensued between the king of Macedonia and the sovereign of all the Thracian hordes, that successor of Seuthes, Sitalces, and Teres, whom those writers have described by the name of Cotys.<sup>6</sup>

Ch. 23. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

This prince is said, first among the Thracian kings, to have deviated from the ancient rough way of living of his nation, of which the authentic picture from Xenophon has been formerly noticed, and to have set the example of a soft and enervating luxury. His purpose however altogether seems to have been good; he desired to improve the ignorance and rudeness of his people by introducing Grecian science and arts among them. But, whether aware of the gross corruption of Grecian manners, and the extreme evils of Grecian politics, or habitually disliking confinement within the walls of a town, the favorite scenes of his luxury, and even of the conviviality in which after the disposition of his nation he delighted, were the banks of rapid streams among shady woods, chosen, as the account indicates, with taste and judgment, and improved at great expense by art, probably Grecian art, which Greeks might admire. The misfortune of a supervening derangement of understanding, rather than any original deficiency, seems early to have checked his improvements and thrown his government into confusion. He is said to have fancied himself enamoured of the goddess Minerva, and

Theopomp.  
ap. Athen.  
l. 12. p. 531.

<sup>6</sup> The king of Macedonia, in his letter to the Athenian people, extant among the works of Demosthenes, calls this prince Sitalces. Whether either Sitalces or Cotys may have been rather name or title, or whether the Thracians may have borne several names, as the ancient Romans, or several titles, as some of the modern orientals, or what else may have occasioned the variety in the appellation, is fortunately of little consequence, the person being sufficiently ascertained under either name.

sometimes to have supposed her his bride. Athens, as her favorite seat, had a large share of his respect; and his disordered imagination led him to insist that he would wait at table upon his brother-in-law Iphicrates, the general of the armies of her people. These anecdotes, from a contemporary, though of fabulous aspect, are probably not wholly unfounded. Another from a far more respectable contemporary may deserve attention, as it marks both the character of Cotys and that of the government of the Grecian commercial colonies; showing the freedom of those colonies while tributary to the Thracian prince, and expecting protection from him. Cotys, wanting money to raise a force of mercenary troops, applied to the rich citizens of the commercial town of Perinthus on the Propontis for a loan.<sup>7</sup> This being refused he requested that the Perinthians would undertake to garrison some towns for him, so that he might safely withdraw his own troops, and employ them on the service for which he had proposed the new levy. The Perinthians, thinking they saw here opportunity for advantage with little hazard, consented: once in possession of the towns they would keep them, or be paid their own price for restoring them. Perinthian citizens accordingly marched to the several places. But Cotys obviated the perfidy by concealing an overbearing force in every town, so that the Perinthians, on entering, were made his prisoners. The plan being everywhere successfully executed, he sent information to the Perinthian government, that he had no purpose of injury to them or their fellow-citizens; if they would remit him the loan he had desired, all should be

SECT.  
II.

Theopomp.  
ap. Athen.  
l. 4. p. 131.

Aristot.  
Æcon. l. 2.

<sup>7</sup> That Perinthus was among the tributary towns of the dominion of Cotys is marked by Demosthenes, in the or. ag. Aristocr. pp. 674. 675.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

released. Thus he obtained the money, and on his side was faithful to his bargain.

Plut.  
Apophth.

Cotys however was no emulator of the military virtues of his ancestors. When Philip invaded the Thracian territory, if we may believe Plutarch for the anecdote, Cotys fled, and wrote him a letter. Probably Teres and Sitalces could not write. The simple mention of a letter from Cotys is said to have excited wonder and ridicule among the Macedonians already beginning to esteem themselves a superior people. Of its contents we are no farther informed than that they drew a smile from the polite Philip; who proceeded unopposed to Onocarsis, one of the Thracian prince's favorite forest residences on which much expense had been bestowed, and still found no resistance prepared. His object then being not to oppress a weak prince, or conquer a wild country, but only to provide security for the territory containing mines of the precious metals, which he reckoned, as the Athenians had reckoned them, an appendage of his new acquisition, he turned his march to Crenidæ.

It would be under the impression rather of an opinion of possible future advantage than in any expectation of great immediate profit that Philip proceeded with his usual discernment and his usual liberality to take measures for an improved management of that much coveted possession. No way oppressing the Thasian settlers, he provided for them the protection which they were likely to want against the fierce votaries of Mars and Bellona around them, and which they might be still more anxious to have against the abler conduct of the tribute-gathering generals of Athens. By encouragement he added greatly to the population of the place; and, as a pledge of future attention, he gave it, from his own

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 8.

name, that new appellation of Philippi, under which it acquired fame some ages after through the decision of the fate of the civilized world, by the victory which Octavius and Antony obtained there over Brutus and Cassius.

SECT.  
II.

It was not without great expense that he improved the manner of working the mines. The abundance of subterranean waters, increasing as the veins of ore were pursued deeper, had confined the scanty means of the Thasians to superficial labors, and to adventure daily less promising. In the want of the astonishing powers of the steam-engine, which give such advantages to the modern miner, Philip did what might be done by the best mechanical art of his age, assisted by numerous hands. With well-directed perseverance he is said so to have succeeded at length as to draw from his Thracian mines a revenue of a thousand talents, nearly two hundred thousand pounds yearly. Small as this sum appears now for great political purposes, the Thracian mines have been supposed by some later ancient writers, and more confidently asserted by some modern, to have furnished a revenue which gave him preponderancy among the potentates of his time. But, from mention of the Macedonian revenue remaining from Demosthenes, it appears that, at least till late in his reign, Philip could not be a very wealthy prince; and that the produce of the Thracian mines never made any very considerable part of his revenue. The customs of some seaports in Thessaly are mentioned as an important source: even his share of prizes made by his cruisers was considerable to him: but of the mines no notice of any contemporary orator is found. Importance is attributed by Demosthenes to the possession of Amphipolis, only for the security of Ma-

Diod.  
ut sup.

Demosth.  
Olynth. 1.  
p. 15.

Demosth.  
Phil. 2.  
p. 70.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

cedonia. Indeed it is obvious that, though the produce might be considerable in the end, the expense, at first, would greatly reduce, or perhaps even overbear the profit; and after all possibly the plain between the mountains and the sea, one of the most extensive and fertile of that fine part of the world, when duly cultivated under the protection of a benign and steady government, would be a more valuable accession to the Macedonian kingdom than the mines at their utmost improvement.

B. C. 357.  
Ol. 105.  $\frac{3}{4}$ .  
[Cf. date  
p. 188.]

Ch. 34. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

s. 3.

In the next spring, while the Athenians were still engaged in doubtful war with those Grecian republics which they called rebellious allies, and at the same time distracted by contests of their orators at home, affairs in Thessaly called the attention of the king of Macedonia. We have seen his father Amyntas owing his throne to his hereditary interest among the principal families of that productive country, and his eldest brother, Alexander, repaying the obligation by protecting those families against the tyranny of the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ. During the ensuing troubles of Macedonia the tagus had again extended his authority among the townships where it had been reduced to constitutional, or perhaps narrower than constitutional bounds. With the restoration of tyrannical power grievances were renewed and augmented; insomuch that the crime by which the tagus had perished gave general satisfaction, and a momentary popularity accrued to the assassins. But the supreme dignity to which they succeeded, hazardous in the best-balanced government, would, in the defective constitution of Thessaly, be hazardous in extreme. To carry the necessary authority, and hold with it popular favor, would require the greatest talents united with the greatest prudence. The new



SECT.  
II.

Ch. 34. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

tagus Tisiphonus and his brother Lycophron, who is said to have shared his authority, were soon found not less tyrants, though far less able rulers, than Alexander. The Alevads, whom we have had occasion already to notice, connected by hereditary hospitality and intercourse of good offices, and, as they flattered themselves, by blood, with the Macedonian kings, looked with satisfaction toward one in whose conduct, with uncommon vigor and uncommon prudence, had been seen united such uncommon liberality as in that of Philip. They solicited his assistance, and he marched to their relief.

We have now seen too much of the Athenian democracy to be surprised that it should make common cause with the worst tyrants that ever oppressed a Grecian people. Nevertheless it must be recollected that in Athens were always two or more parties, and that not all Athenians, and often not a real majority, approved the profligate measures for which the authority of the sovereign people was in legal course procured. Often also the government became, through imposition upon the folly of the sovereign many, so implicated that the best citizens would be at a loss to decide between what its necessities in the actual state of things required, and what should have been done in circumstances of freer choice. The power of the king of Macedonia, growing in a manner out of the injustice of Athens, was becoming an object of jealousy perhaps not wholly unreasonable. That party which had excited the injurious conduct toward him, professing to be the high democratical party, watchful of course of all his measures, led the people to vote assistance to the Thessalian tyrants against him; but they were unable to procure effect to that vote, and none was sent. Diodorus, whose

Demosth.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 14.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

account receives support even from the hostile orator, relates what followed thus: ‘Philip,’ he says, ‘marching into Thessaly, defeated the tyrants; and acquiring thus freedom for the cities, he showed a liberality which so attached the Thessalians that in all his following wars and political contests they were his zealous assistants, and remained such to his son.’ Tisophonius and Lycophron continued to hold the chief authority in Pheræ; but in Pharsalus and Larissa, the principal seats of the Alevads, and nearly throughout the rest of Thessaly, the king of Macedonia was thenceforward looked to as the protector of the constitution of the country.<sup>8</sup>

### SECTION III.

*Affairs of Thrace. Different views of parties in Athens concerning foreign interests. Measures for recovering the dominion of the Thracian Chersonese. Charidemus of Eubœa, citizen of Athens, and son-in-law of the king of Thrace. Assassination of the king of Thrace, approved and rewarded by the Athenian people.*

The Athenians had now been engaged two years in war with their allies, upon terms so equal, and with consequences so little striking, that no account of the transactions has been transmitted. Indeed the ambition and avarice of the people seem to have been so variously directed in rapid succession from one object to another, as this or that set of orators prevailed, and occasionally interrupted in all by the momentary prevalence of those who desired quiet, that, with much undertaken, little was or could be

Demosth.

<sup>8</sup> Demosthenes himself has been led to confess, in plain terms, Philip’s assistance to the Thessalians against their tyrants: Οετταλοῖς—ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννικὴν οἰκίαν ἐξοήθησε. Olynth. 2. p. 22.

done. But while great public purposes were thwarted or neglected, each party would pursue its own objects, amid all interruptions and disappointments, with persevering ardor and watchfulness. Thus, though the decree for assistance to the tyrants of Thessaly produced them no assistance, and even the Confederate war in a manner slept, yet the active spirit of Athenian politics was busy. That party which had embroiled the republic both with its independent ally the king of Macedonia and with its subject allies the Chians, and others, now found a new object to engage a preference of their attention. Miltocythes, a prince of the royal family of Thrace, raised rebellion against Cotys the actual sovereign, the ally of Athens, who had been honored by the Athenian people with the two most flattering presents yet in use toward foreigners, the freedom of the city and a golden crown. Notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding the complicated circumstances and adverse events of wars in which the republic was already engaged, that party which had distinguished itself as the war-party persuaded the people to undertake a new war, in support of the rebel against his king, their ally and fellow-citizen. Just ground for the measure the able advocate of the party, Demosthenes, has utterly failed to show. Nor did success immediately reward the iniquity. The first commander commissioned to put it forward, Ergophilus, was superseded before he had done anything of which notice has reached us. The next, Autocles, was not only soon recalled, but prosecuted, and condemned for deficient zeal in the dishonest business. The party, successful in a measure so generally gratifying to the Athenian many as the prosecution of an emi-

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 655.

p. 659.



CHAP. XXXVI.    nent man, were still unable to procure the appointment of a commander hearty in their cause.

Ch. 35. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

After that train of mysterious circumstances, formerly noticed, the capture of the chief of mercenaries, Charidemus, by the Athenian fleet, the ensuing acquisition of Amphipolis to the Athenian dominion, and the honors that followed to the captive general

Demosth. in  
Aristocr.  
p. 672.  
Aristot.  
Æcon. 1. 2.  
p. 394. t. 2.  
ed. Paris.

from the Athenian people, that officer, with his band of mercenaries, had passed into the service of Artabazus satrap of lower Phrygia or Bithynia, who was in rebellion against the king of Persia. Whether then the military adventurer was unreasonable, or the satrap faithless, disagreement arising between them, Charidemus was without means for the remuneration to his troops for which they reckoned him responsible to them. The difficulty and danger immediately ensuing he obviated by dexterous management, through which he raised contribution from the towns of Æolia, which were within the Bithynian satrapy. But in a wide country, with the government hostile, though his small numbers with superior discipline might resist direct assault, he had to apprehend being at length starved into a submission which must be destructive to him. From these threatening circumstances he was relieved by a new favor of the Athenian people, a decree, directing their new commander on the Hellespontine station, Cephisodotus, to transport him and his troops to the European shore. Such a decree would not be the measure of the party promoting the rebellion against the king of Thrace, which on the contrary was ended by it: for Charidemus was taken with his troops into the king of Thrace's service; and Miltocythes, seeing his rival thus strengthened, and the Athenian people

issuing decrees indicating that he was to expect no more support from them, abandoned his enterprise.<sup>9</sup>

SECT.  
III.

Charidemus, who, through the force of mercenaries attached to him and his reputation for military and political abilities, had risen to be one of the most important characters of the age, was, if we should believe the invective of Demosthenes, the son of a woman of Oreus in Eubœa by an uncertain father, and began his military career in the lowest rank in the lowest service, a slinger in the light-armed. His first eminence, according to the same authority, was in the command of a small pirate-ship, in which he did not spare the allies and subjects of the Athenian people. The profits of his skill, activity, and boldness, in that line, enabled him to raise a considerable land force, ready for adventure under his orders, in the cause of any state among the almost numberless around the Grecian seas, which were now in the habit of employing such troops. From the silence of the orator, his vehement enemy, about any previous service, it should seem that the first in which he engaged was the Athenian, under that highly respectable general Iphicrates. The same orator's testimony then, still in the midst of invective, is positive to the advantageous circumstances already noticed, that, after having acted three years under that great man's orders, Charidemus was not only again engaged by him for the critical service of the siege of Amphipolis, but trusted as his most confidential friend;

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 691.  
p. 668.

<sup>9</sup> The orator's words, *τρήρων ἐμπορήσας παρ' ὑμῶν*, Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 672., seem fully to imply a decree of the people authorizing the conduct of Cephisodotus; and such a decree was obviously adapted to produce that despair of Miltocythes which he has attributed to a decree of the Athenian people. Or. in Aristocr. p. 665.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

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that his services were rewarded by decrees of the Athenian people with the freedom of the city, the honorary gift of a golden crown, and the still more extraordinary favor of a decree of privilege for the protection of his person against assassination. And though the recommendation of him to the people for the high trust of commander-in-chief of the republic's forces in Thrace was unsuccessful, yet that the proposal could be ventured for one not born an Athenian largely indicates a superiority of reputation. The esteem which it thus appears he held with the aristocratical party in Athens would no doubt assist to recommend him at the court of Thrace; and such was his estimation there that, apparently to secure his services for the support of a weak prince on a tottering throne, he received in marriage the daughter of Cotys, niece of the wife of Iphicrates.

Imperfectly as the military and political transactions of these times have been transmitted, yet the views and principles of the contending parties in Athens remain largely indicated in the works, which we have the advantage to possess, of an orator of each party, Isocrates and Demosthenes. The party for which the former wrote, and with which Iphicrates acted, adverse to the oppression of subjects and to injurious and insulting measures against independent allies, proposed to repair, as far as might be, the error of alienating Macedonia by improving the old connexion with the king of Thrace, and by supporting the Thracian monarchy as a valuable balance against the growing weight of the Macedonian. But the other party, whose leading orator Demosthenes afterward became, were not discouraged by their defeat. The right of the Athenian people to the rich dominion of the Chersonese was a topic on which they



were likely to be favorably heard, and nearly secure against contradiction, which might afford opening for the charge of corruption, or of disaffection to the popular cause. The intrigues however of the party its orator would not disclose. We can only draw conjecture concerning them from the events, for which also we are nearly confined to those which his purpose in public speaking led him to mention. The next transaction, of which we find notice is, that Charidemus besieged and took two Grecian towns of the Chersonese, Crithote and Eleus. The tenor of the orator's information sufficiently indicates that a party in those towns, holding correspondence with the war party in Athens, had led them to rebellion against the king of Thrace, in hope of support from the Athenian people.<sup>10</sup>

Not long after this Cotys was assassinated, in the midst of his court, such as a Thracian court might be, by two brothers, Heraclides and Python, citizens of the Grecian town of Ænus in Thrace. Both escaped,

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 659.

<sup>10</sup> Demosthenes, in his oration against Aristocrates, having in view to incite the Athenian people to the utmost against Charidemus, speaks of these two towns as the last remaining to the Athenian dominion in the Chersonese. But the tenor of his following argument shows that the conduct of Charidemus, on that occasion, was not, at the time, considered as any act of hostility against Athens. Indeed it appears that Charidemus never ceased to hold his connexion with that party in Athens with which he had originally been connected, which would not have ventured to countenance an act of notorious hostility against the republic. But if, as is probable, a powerful party in those towns remained always connected with that party in Athens of which Demosthenes became the leading orator, this would be ground sufficient for his assertion, to the Athenian people, that Charidemus had wronged them by reducing towns, friendly to Athens, under the dominion of the king of Thrace. In the sequel we shall find a Charidemus intimately connected with Demosthenes.

CHAP.  
XX XVI.

and both found places of refuge for assassins. Python went to Athens, presented himself to the assembled people, avowed the deed, and glorying in it, demanded the reward which the Athenians, universal patrons of democracy, had been accustomed to give for tyrannicide. The motive to the crime, according to the orator, was private revenge for the death of the father of the assassins; which however, for anything said to the contrary, may have been suffered in legal course and for just cause. The Athenian people however were persuaded to adjudge the murder of the king, their adopted fellow-citizen, to be highly meritorious. They decreed the freedom of the city both to the bold petitioner and to his absent accomplice; and they added for each the honor of a golden crown. Obviously the party of Iphicrates did not then guide the popular voice. It were indeed somewhat saving for the general credit of the Athenian people, might we believe, what the orator would not avow, but his account affords ground to suspect, that a political purpose did combine with the passion of revenge in prompting to the atrocious deed, and that the assassin confided in a party in Athens, from whose intrigues and incitement, rather than from any general sentiment deliberately held among the people, he derived his reward. Yet, on the other hand, when we find the greatest orator known to fame recalling to popular recollection both the assassination and the public approbation of it, solemnly given in a decree of the sovereign assembly, when we find this brought forward not for reprobation, but as just and solid ground on which public measures should be thereafter taken, it must be difficult to find apology, even for the people. For the orator, it may be doubtful whether the impolicy of his doctrine should most

excite wonder, or its flagitiousness indignation and disgust.

SECT.  
IV.

SECTION IV.

*Cephisodotus Athenian commander in Thrace. Political principles of the Athenian administration. Rebellion encouraged in Thrace. Admirable moral principle of the Thracians. Athenodorus Athenian commander. Pressure upon the young king of Thrace. Mission of Chabrias to Thrace, and liberal composition of differences.*

When the unfortunate king of Thrace was murdered, his son and legal successor, Kersobleptes, was yet a boy. Those then who had persuaded the Athenian people to cherish and reward the assassins of the father were not slow in endeavours to profit from the weak age of the son. War with Thrace was not avowed, the pressure of the confederate war and the strength of the opposing party forbidding; but, as before against both Thrace and Macedonia while still peaceful purpose was pretended, the most injurious and insulting hostility was committed. In the wealthy commercial town of Perinthus, opportunity, such as before at Pydna, inviting, Cephisodotus led the fleet thither. Fortunately Charidemus was at hand to assist the councils of the young king his brother-in-law; and to his abilities and superior acquirements the Thracians had the moderation and prudence to defer. He went to Perinthus; the party proposing revolt there was checked, and the purpose of the Athenians was defeated. Cephisodotus received then orders to besiege Alopeconnesus, a town situated at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, and, equally as Perinthus, within the acknowledged dominion of the Thracian king. Nevertheless, in directing their officer to take possession of

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 674.

p. 675.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 676.

this town, the Athenian rulers did not scruple to aver that the hostility was not at all intended against the king of Thrace, but only against the pirates, robbers, and drowners, as the orator calls them, who found refuge there.<sup>11</sup> Charidemus however, judging that, within the Thracian dominion the Thracian government should undertake the repression of wrong rather than an Athenian officer, marched to Alopeconnesus. Cephisodotus, hopeless of success through violence, entered into negotiation with him, and a treaty was concluded. Of the terms we have no information, except that they were dissatisfactory to the high democratical party, who procured the recal of Cephisodotus, and brought him to trial for his life. To institute prosecution against the officers commanding the republic's forces was now become so ordinary, that of itself it seems to involve no reasonable presumption of any guilt; and Cephisodotus appears to stand exculpated by the failure of the orator to specify any objection to the treaty, or misconduct of any kind in his command, if the treaty was not objectionable. Nevertheless death, in the usual form of Athenian prosecution, was the punishment proposed in the indictment; and, of the multitudinous court, a majority of three votes only saved his life. His condemnation to a fine, the delight of the Athenian many, to the amount of five talents, about a thousand pounds, his friends were unable to prevent.

The leaders of the party at this time governing Athens, the party which prosecuted Cephisodotus, proposed to oppress the infant monarch of Thrace, and decreed high reward for the assassination of his

<sup>11</sup> The similarity of the French republic's professions in invading Egypt, and on other occasions, cannot but occur to the informed reader.

father, are not named by ancient writers; but the principles of that party, should we doubt Isocrates, or did the facts reported leave them doubtful, we learn from authority utterly unsuspecting, that of the great orator who became its advocate. ‘The troubles and jealousies of your neighbours,’ Demosthenes told the Athenian people, ‘are the best foundation and surest support of your power and dominion.’ Mentioning then the frequent wars and unceasing discord of the principal Grecian cities, he says, ‘they are what Athens should always rejoice to see.’ Coming afterward to the consideration of the concerns of the Athenian people in the affairs of Thrace, he does not scruple to contend, in direct terms, that Charidemus, brother-in-law of the Thracian monarch, and trusted by him with the situation of first minister and commander-in-chief of his forces, ought nevertheless, being also an Athenian citizen, to have betrayed the king and people of Thrace to the people of Athens. ‘Charidemus,’ he says, ‘ought to have made the Chersonese yours; and not only so, but, when Cotys was assassinated, he ought to have consulted you how the Thracian throne should be disposed of; and, in common with you, he should have established one king or several, as your interest might require.’

SECT.  
IV.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.

When talents like those of Demosthenes were prostituted to the purpose of so instructing the sovereign many of Athens, it cannot appear wonderful that the sceptre in its hands was ill wielded; nor will candor attribute the vices of the government to anything in the natural character of the people. Profligate conduct only could be expected when a party, avowing such principles, carried a majority of votes in the general assembly. Accordingly not only ratification

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

of the treaty made by Cephisodotus with Charidemus was denied, but Miltocythes, who had before taken arms against Cotys, was now encouraged to resume them against Kersobleptes. The Eubœan adventurer still was the support of the Thracian monarchy. He got possession of the persons of the rebellious Miltocythes and his son. Aware then of a deficiency in the Thracian policy, which, though highly honorable to the Thracian character, was of a kind to be highly dangerous to any government, he committed his prisoners to the custody of the Cardians.

After observing in the Greeks, founders of science and fine taste among mankind, the shocking deficiency of moral principle, and all the horrors of practice ensuing, which so darkened and deformed the brightest days of that illustrious people, it is a phenomenon equally surprising and gratifying, a meteor, not surely out of the course of nature, yet seemingly out of all analogy within human comprehension, that we find among the barbarian Thracians: enemies of science and useful industry, votaries of the horrid imaginary deities of war and rapine, they held, in opposition to the Greeks, principles of the purest morality and humanity, and carried them in practice even to excess. ‘Charidemus knew,’ says the same great orator who has reported with complacency the murder of Cotys and the honors granted by the Athenians to his assassins, ‘that, had Miltocythes been surrendered to Kersobleptes, his life would have been secure: BECAUSE THE LAW OF THE THRACIANS FORBIDS TO KILL ONE ANOTHER.’ The Thracians, it appears, not only abhorred that flagitious and base assassination, so familiar among the most polished of the Greeks, but their institutes forbade all killing of those who had been once admitted to friendship;



so that even treason against the state did not, in their idea, justify capital punishment. Nothing in the history of mankind can be found more honorable to human nature than such principles, followed up by such practice, among such barbarians. Those eulogies of Scythian virtue, which might otherwise appear extravagance of fancy, imagined by Greek and Roman writers only for the purpose of reproaching, with more powerful effect, the profligacy of their own polished ages, seem thus in no small degree warranted. From such barbarians may seem to have been derived that generous spirit of chivalry of later times, which held it meritorious to seek combat everywhere, yet a sacred duty to spare the lowly and relieve the oppressed; and from such barbarians, could we trace our origin to them, we might be proud to derive our stock.

Whether Miltocythes was really more criminal or unfortunate we are without means to judge; any farther than as the support of a considerable party among the Thracians might speak in favor of his pretensions, and, on the contrary, the total omission of so able an advocate as Demosthenes to state them implies their deficiency. The conduct of Charidemus however appears to have been prudent; and nothing, even amid the orator's invective, affords fair presumption that it was in any point justifiable. To have shocked the generous principles of the Thracians by delivering Miltocythes to the executioner would have been impolitic; but to have allowed the means of renewing attempts against the actual government would have been to betray the high trust confided to him. The Cardians, to whom he committed his illustrious prisoners, were distinguished for persevering assertion of their independency against all claim of dominion of the Athenian people. Obloquy

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

from the Athenian orators would thus be earned; but the presumption seems warranted that the Car-  
dians would not acknowledge the sovereignty of the  
Thracian kings unless upon liberal terms. That they  
should be wholly free from the ordinary vices of the  
republican Greeks were however too much to expect.  
In revenge apparently for the purpose of reducing  
them under the subjection which they abhorred, or  
perhaps judging it necessary for the prevention of  
so great an evil, they put Miltocythes and his sons  
to death. The great orator, from whom alone the  
account remains transmitted, adds that the execution  
of those princes was rendered shocking by circum-  
stances of studied cruelty. Too consistent as this  
is with what we find ordinary among the Greeks, it  
should perhaps not be admitted without some allow-  
ance for the obvious and avowed purpose of the  
oration, to incense the Athenian multitude against  
those who had disapproved the patronage granted to  
Miltocythes, and the honors to the assassins of Cotys.

The party in Athens however which had so perse-  
veringly coveted the dominion of the Chersonese for  
the republic, or for themselves, was not, by the death  
of Miltocythes, deprived of resources. The branches  
of the royal family of Thrace were numerous; and  
most of them, like Seuthes son of Sparadocus, known  
through the service of Xenophon under him, appear  
to have held appanages, such as those of the Mace-  
donian princes, by which they might be formidable  
to the king on the throne. Two of the blood royal  
of Thrace, Berisades and Amadocus, were connected  
with Athens by marriage; a sister of the former  
being wife of Athenodorus, an Athenian, and two  
sisters of the latter married to Bianor and Simon,  
Thracian Greeks by birth, but adopted citizens of

Ch. 23. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 624.

Athens.<sup>12</sup> These were now excited to rebellion against Kersobleptes. What hopes were held out to them does not appear, but explicit information of the purpose of the ruling party in Athens remains from the great orator, who became one of its leading members. It was, first, that Athens should gain the sovereignty of the Chersonese, and of all the Grecian towns as far as the Euxine; and then that even the wild remainder of the extensive country should not be given to the two friendly, but divided between the three princes; that so, through their separate weakness and mutual animosity, all might be always dependent on Athens.

SECT.  
IV.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 654.

p. 676.

p. 654.

To carry this purpose into execution the party, after some struggle, obtained the appointment of commander-in-chief for one zealous in their cause, Athenodorus; apparently him who had married a sister of the Thracian prince. They feared however to press their interest with the people so far as to ask the service of Athenian citizens in the army to be employed; and, if they obtained any money, it was in very inadequate amount. A fleet, the wealthy as usual being charged with the equipment, was readily granted. For raising and maintaining a land force they probably hoped that the influence of an Athe-

<sup>12</sup> Leland has supposed, I know not on what authority, that Berisades and Amadocus were younger brothers of Kersobleptes, and entitled to divide the sovereignty of Thrace with him. It is amply marked by Demosthenes that they were not so nearly related, either to Kersobleptes or to each other; nor am I aware of anything in any ancient author to warrant the supposition that the kingdom of Thrace was legally so divisible. Younger brothers of Kersobleptes could not themselves have managed any such contest with him; for Demosthenes expressly says (or. in Aristocr. p. 656.) that Kersobleptes was a boy when his father was assassinated.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

nian general, and the zeal with which Bianor and Simon and Berisades and Amadocus would support him, might suffice, so that they might have the credit of making a great acquisition to the Athenian empire, free of cost to the people. The measures seem to have been ably concerted: a large force of mercenaries was raised; and Kersobleptes was so pressed that he was reduced to treat about the surrender of the dominion of the Chersonese to Athens, and a division of the remainder of his dominions. If the orator might be believed, the treaty was concluded. But from the sequel it appears probable that, increase of troubles arising for the republic, Charidemus found opportunity to protract the negotiation. Evidently no surrender had been made, either to the Athenian republic, or to the Thracian princes, when the want of pecuniary supplies, which we have seen in better times crippling or deranging the measures of the greatest Athenian commanders, disabled Athenodorus so that he could neither command nor persuade his troops to continue their service. This being once known to Kersobleptes and Charidemus, no surrender was likely to follow.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 677.

The sudden and total failure of the expedition under Athenodorus, after great hopes raised, appears at least to have assisted to produce a change of men and measures in the government of Athens. The sway reverted once more to that party which, with Isocrates and Xenophon, always reprobated a policy oppressive to allies and injurious to all neighbouring powers. Chabrias was sent, without any new force, to take the direction of the republic's affairs in Thrace. He found Kersobleptes and Charidemus, as Demosthenes himself confesses, disavowing the treaty pretended to have been concluded by them; but

Ibid.

disavowing equally any purpose of enmity to the Athenian people, and professing, on the contrary, a readiness and desire to renew alliance upon any equitable terms. Chabrias meeting them with only just views, a treaty was presently concluded. What advantages were stipulated for Athens, the treaty having been managed by those adverse to his party, the orators would not say; but he has mentioned as of injury to the Athenian people, and so matter for complaint, that the dominion of the Chersonese, with the undivided sovereignty of Thrace, remained to Kersobleptes.

SECT.  
V.

#### SECTION V.

*Slowness of the Athenians in the Confederate war. Expedition under Chares; death of Chabrias. Characters of Chares and of the Athenian people. Offensive operations of the allies. Exertion of the Athenians. Relief of Samos. Trial of Timotheus and Iphicrates.*

When the affairs of Thrace were thus for the present composed, the Confederate war still held a threatening aspect. The states, combined to resist the sovereignty of the Athenian people, not without some thought and preparation, had engaged in a contest in which failure, as from all experience they must expect, would bring a lot the most severe. Ships, such as the ancients used in war, being soon built and equipped, they had raised a fleet capable of balancing the naval power of the imperial republic, and disputing with it the command of the Ægean. At Athens on the contrary hitherto, through the opposition of opinions, the contention of parties, and the fluctuation of a commanding influence in the general assembly, decrees for the prosecution of the war were slowly, interruptedly, and at last defectively, carried into

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 7.  
Ol. 105.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .

execution. To repair and augment the fleet and to engage mercenary troops would be necessary; while the existing force could ill be spared from the important business of awing the remaining allies and subjects, and preventing farther defection. Enterprize therefore, through the first year, was confined to depredations on commerce, and invasions without view beyond plunder.

B. C. 357.  
Ol. 105.  $\frac{4}{5}$ .

At length, after the establishment of peace with Thrace by Chabrias, some serious consideration, among all men, of the waning state of the republic's affairs appears to have led to a coalition of parties, apparently through concession of the moderate to the high democratical or war party. Chares, the most eminent officer of that party, was appointed to the command; Chabrias consented to serve under him,<sup>13</sup> and it was resolved to carry attack first against Chios.

Assistance meanwhile for the Chians from their confederates was ready; and so powerful that the meditated blow must be rapidly struck, or it would be obviated, and before invasions and sieges could be undertaken the command of the sea would be to be vindicated. The land force under Chares and Chabrias being small, the co-operation of the fleet was necessary for any measures against the city of Chios. The resolution was therefore taken to force the way into the harbour. In this enterprise Chabrias led;

<sup>13</sup> Diodorus joins Chabrias in the command with Chares, assigning him however the second place. According to Nepos, he served as a private individual, but, even so, was more respected and more consulted, says the biographer, than any officer of the armament. The sequel of the account rather marks him to have held the command of his own trireme, which seems more probable. In comparison of the commands to which he had been accustomed he might be called in that situation, as the biographer calls him, *privatus*.



and, not being duly supported, he was overpowered. Others engaged with him found personal safety by throwing themselves into the sea. Thinking this an example at all risk to be discountenanced, Chabrias refused to quit his ship, and fell fighting. The loss of the Athenians, beyond the valuable life of Chabrias, appears not to have been great; but the enterprise wholly failed; and, in the course of that year, nothing farther of importance was attempted. SECT.  
V.

It may be gathered from scattered information, regular history for this period failing, that the loss of Chabrias to the republic, in its existing circumstances, was as great as that of one man could easily be.<sup>14</sup> The Roman biographer seems justly to rank him among the first characters that Greece had produced. Aristotle has left an anecdote indicating the exalted estimation in which he was held, and which

Aristot.  
rhet. l. 3.  
c. 10.

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus has related the death of Chabrias among events of the first year of the Confederate war, Ol. 105. 3. but this is hardly to be reconciled with what the contemporary orator has left concerning the transactions of Chabrias in Thrace. [Mr. Clinton places the death of Chabrias B. C. 357. without question.] Indeed Diodorus seems often, in reporting matters summarily, to have gone on beyond the year of which he was particularly treating. Thus we shall shortly find him, in regard to the siege of Methone, stating its beginning perhaps in the proper place, but proceeding immediately to relate its conclusion, which probably did not happen till the next year, when he again relates the same story more circumstantially. For all such matters I miss, in this part of the history, my valuable assistant for them in the former part, Henry Dodwell. Reiske's gleanings of chronology are little satisfactory: *Congessi hunc indicem*, he says, *ex observatis Schotti, & Corsinii, & Taylari, in schedis. Universe præmonendum duco nos tres auctores interdum in annis discrepare; aliis eadem eventa vetustiora anno, aliis juniora facientibus.* Observing then that the Attic year began at midsummer, he says justly, those writers may seem to differ by a year when they really differ only by a month.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

yet had not secured him against a criminal prosecution. Even Demosthenes has been led to high eulogy of him; and it is remarkable that, in an age of such licentiousness, and such violence of party-spirit, destruction of him is found from none; while of Chares, whose associate and advocate Demosthenes afterward became, no good remains reported even by his own party. Favorite as he was of the multitude, and always the most eminent military man of the high democratical party, yet we find him vehemently decried by those later writers who have favored that party; while his opponents, not Chabrias only, but Timotheus and Iphicrates also, have received from them large eulogy. It is to the candor of Xenophon that the character of Chares is indebted for refutation of the sarcasm, which Plutarch has not scrupled to attribute to Timotheus, 'that Chares was fit only to be a baggage-carrier.' Xenophon describes him, in his service in Peloponnesus during the Theban war, an active, enterprising, brave, and able officer. Less equal to greater commands, he was nevertheless, according to the observation of a contemporary writer, more made for the times than his more virtuous and higher-gifted opponents. It was probably not a discovery peculiar to Chares that, in the Athenian service, real merit little found its just reward or credit: but he, less than most others, scrupled to take advantage of the vices of the Athenian government; careless of the duties of command, indulging himself to excess in the gratifications it might furnish, and diligent principally in watching and flattering the fancies and passions of the people. In figure, in bodily strength, and in speciousness of conversation, supported by boldness of manner, he confessedly excelled. Confident thus in his power to maintain

Ch. 28. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

Theopomp.  
ap. Athen.  
l. 12. c. 8.

SECT.  
V.

popular favor, he even made a parade of luxury, carrying about with him, on foreign command, a train of musicians, dancers, and harlots. Public money and private fortune he spent freely together on the ministers of his pleasures and those supporters of his conduct, the leading orators, framers of decrees, and all who gave their time to their courts of justice. Thus not only he obviated resentment of his profligacy, but became and remained, longer perhaps than any other since the great Pericles, the most popular man in Athens. 'And this,' says the same contemporary writer, the Chian Theopompus, 'was no more than fair; for just so the Athenian people live themselves. The young men pass their time in hearing music and conversing with prostitutes: the elder in playing at dice, and other such dissipation; and the people, whose imperial voice disposes of the public money, require more for public banquets and distributions of meat than remains for all public services.'

With such claim for public favor, notwithstanding his failure at Chios, Chares remained commander-in-chief of the republic's forces. Zeal however for the prosecution of the war seems to have become less general, and exertion in consequence deficient. The allies meanwhile were active. In the next spring, while Chares had only sixty ships, they put to sea with a hundred, and proceeded to offensive operations. The islands of Imbrus and Lemnus had been allowed, even by the peace of Antalcidas, to remain under the dominion of Athens. These they plundered, and then proceeded against Samos, perhaps the richest of the republic's remaining tributaries. The critical circumstances of the commonwealth then either produced a renewal of the coalition, or gave it new vigor. Iphicrates and Timotheus consented to

B. C. 356.  
Ol. 105. 4.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 7. [See  
p. 223.



Corn. Nep.  
v. Timoth.  
& Iphicr.

serve with the favorite general of the multitude. If the Latin biographer should be trusted, Menestheus, son of Iphicrates, who had married a daughter of Timotheus, was appointed to the command, and the illustrious veterans embarked with him only to assist with their advice. It appears however that responsibility, and of course effectual command, rested with them. Sixty triremes, rapidly equipped, were hastened under their orders to join the fleet of equal number under Chares.

The fleet of the allies then would no more quit the harbour of Samos, but lying there assisted in the prosecution of the siege. The Athenian commanders, judging attack upon it in its station too hazardous, sailed for the Hellespont; judging that, of two desirable events, this could hardly fail to produce one: if the enemy followed, Samos would be relieved; if they remained, Byzantium might be assailed, weak in the absence of its principal force at Samos. The result answered expectation. The course taken by the Athenian fleet was no sooner ascertained than alarm, in some degree pervading the allies, was among the Byzantines vehement; and it was quickly resolved by all to postpone the begun enterprise against enemies for protection of friends.

They reached the Hellespont before the Athenians had entered it, but found them in a situation forbidding the passage. It happened that the wind became violent, yet not contrary to their course, which they resolved at all hazards to pursue; the disturbance of the elements, if it should not become extreme, being favorable for their purpose of progress, and adverse for that of the enemy to prevent it. The storm then did increase, so that Iphicrates and Timotheus concurred in opinion, that the danger of

attempting action overbore all reasonable hope of advantage from it. Chares held, or affected afterward to have held, a contrary opinion. Action however was avoided, and the enemy passed up the Hellespont, molested only by the storm. The project against Byzantium was then necessarily abandoned, but relief of Samos, the great object of the re-enforcement recently sent to the fleet, was fully accomplished.

SECT.  
V.

Nevertheless Chares, thinking the opportunity favorable for ruining his colleagues, whom he considered as his rivals, resolved to use it. In his letters to the sovereign people, he averred that the enemy's fleet would have been destroyed, but for the failure of Iphicrates and Timotheus in their obvious duty. The suspicious and irritable multitude was inflamed: Timotheus and Iphicrates were recalled, and put on trial for their lives. We have an anecdote from Aristotle implying the conscious integrity of Iphicrates and the notorious profligacy of his opponent:

'My speech,' said the veteran general, whose rhetorical talents are noticed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 'must take its way through the middle of the actions of Chares.' But when a party-purpose was to be

Aristot.  
rhet. 1. 3.  
c. 10.  
Dion. Hal.  
in Lys.  
p. 85.

served, calumny of every kind was vented by the accusing orators, with licentiousness of which a conception can be gathered only from perusal of their extant works. Aristophon, who conducted the prosecution, averred that the accused generals had taken bribes from the Chians and Rhodians. We find it asserted by a later orator that Timotheus confessed having received money from the Lesbians. He would however hardly confess a dishonorable transaction. It was ordinarily incumbent upon Athenian commanders to find supplies for the force under them, by taking money wherever it could be obtained. Such

Dinarch.  
orat. in  
Demosth.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

Polyæn.  
Strat. 1. 3.  
9. 29.

Ch. 21. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Corn. Nep.  
v. Iphicr.  
& Timoth.  
Æschin.  
de legat.  
p. 247.

courts then as those of Athens could not always enter into very accurate examination, and would not always require the most regular proof. Bold assertion would suffice to excite suspicion, and suspicion often, even where party-views did not warp, would suffice to decide the vote. Not in the sovereign assembly only, but in the courts of justice also, freedom of speech was always liable to be overborne by the turbulence of party. Against such injustice Iphicrates is said to have provided himself in a way which the licentiousness only of democracy could admit, and only the profligacy of democracy could in any degree justify. Some daring youths, whether of low or high rank is not said, but known favorers of his cause, attended the trial with their daggers under their cloaks, which they managed to show so far as to intimidate his opponents. The same measure practised, as formerly observed, under the tyranny of the Thirty, may very possibly have been repeated in the lawlessness of the following democratical sovereignty. But in attending to such stories, even where the fact may be perfectly credible, we must guard against the coloring which may be given by a contemporary, through party interest or prejudice, and by a late writer (and it is from a very late writer among the ancients that the story in question comes) through utter inexperience of the character of republican times. The result of the trial however affords some presumption in favor of the report. Iphicrates was acquitted; while Timotheus, than whose reputation hardly a purer has been transmitted from antiquity, and who, if the averration of Æschines to the Athenian people was not exaggerated, had in the course of his long services added to the republic's empire seventy-five cities of consequence enough to



be represented by their several deputies in the assembly of the allies, was condemned in a fine of nearly twenty thousand pounds sterling. This operating as a decree of banishment for life, he spent the remainder of an honorable elderhood at Chalcis in Eubœa.<sup>15</sup>

SECT.  
VI.

### SECTION VI.

*Deficient supply to the armament under Chares. Irregular measure of the armament. Oration of Isocrates on peace. Peace with the confederates.*

The political victory of Chares was for the moment decisive: he remained sole commander of the great

B. C. 366.  
Ol. 106. 1.  
[See note.]

<sup>15</sup> Diodorus speaks of Timotheus and Iphicrates, without discrimination, as condemned to pay many talents; not specifying the sum, nor mentioning any consequence. But the acquittal of Iphicrates, positively asserted by Nepos, receives confirmation from Demosthenes in his oration against Aristocrates, so far at least as to show that he was not driven into banishment; and the biographer's account is farther supported by the contemporary orator, Dinarchus, who mentions the amount of the fine on Timotheus. Dinarch. or. adv. Demosth. p. 11. t. 4. or. Gr. ed. Reiske.

[Mr. Mitford seems to make the trials of Iphicrates and Timotheus contemporaneous, and to place them in the year in which the transactions occurred that gave rise to the prosecutions. Mr. Clinton has thus dated the events of this period of history:

B. C. 357. *Commencement of the Social War.*—Death of Chabrias.—Delphi seized by the Phocians.

— 356. *Second campaign of the Social War.*—Birth of Alexander.

— 355. *Third campaign of the Social War.*—Peace concluded with the confederates 'about midsummer.'—*Trial and acquittal of Iphicrates.*

— 354. *Trial and condemnation of Timotheus*, who, according to Mr. Clinton's computation, must have died almost immediately after his retirement to Chalcis.

See *Fasti Hellen.* pp. 124—130.]

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

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armament on the Asiatic station. But that great armament, of which the land force was wholly mercenary, wanted great funds for its support; and his friends at home either dared not ask the people for supplies, or could not obtain them. He was therefore to find them, in the way to which we have seen the most renowned commanders before him driven, often to the great interruption of the public service, by exactions from any states weak enough to be readily compelled to pay them, or, like Athenodorus lately, he must dismiss his forces. But those allies, who had principally supplied former commanders, were now the enemy to contend with whom the supplies were wanted; and to dismiss his forces would have been to ruin at once the public service, the power of his party, and his own greatness.

An extraordinary resource happened to occur. The satrap of lower Phrygia or Bithynia, Artabazus, whose rebellion against the king of Persia Charidemus had assisted, was now again threatened with overbearing numbers marching from the interior provinces. Report made them seven hundred thousand fighting men. Hopeless of resistance with any barbarian force he could collect, Artabazus saw his only safety in Grecian troops, could he obtain them timely in sufficient number. Need thus pressing, his offers probably were high. The temptation sufficed for Chares, who, with the whole armament placed under his command for the reduction of the rebellious allies of the Athenian people, went to Bithynia to assist Artabazus. Demosthenes, who became afterward the leading orator of the party of which Chares was the principal military character, bound to apologise for his friend, has been reduced to plead his deficient authority over those he was

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 22.

appointed to command, and even to hazard imputation against the Athenian people. In the failure of remittances from home, he says, it was impossible to retain the unpaid and starving troops; they would go into the satrap's service, and Chares did not lead, but was led by them. The historian Diodorus, following probably some elder writer, calls it a very irregular measure.<sup>16</sup> Chares however did not disappoint the satrap's hope or his own. The royal army was defeated; and the amount of reward for the important service enabled him to conciliate so many orators, and so to gratify the Athenian people with sacrificial suppers, that he obtained, not pardon, but approbation and applause.

SECT.  
VI.Demosth.  
Phil. 1.  
p. 46.Diod.  
ut ant.  
Theopomp.  
ap. Athen.  
l. 12. p. 264.

In this extraordinary state for a government to exist in, alarm arose for all Greece, but especially for Athens. Report came that great naval preparation was making by the Persian government in the harbours of Phenicia. The purpose was not declared, but it was said that the great king, incensed at the support given to rebellion in his dominion by Charidemus, but more especially afterward by Chares, would send his Phenician fleet of three hundred ships of war to assist the revolted allies of Athens against their oppressors, and revenge the Persian name for the defeats formerly suffered from Athenian arms.

Under this disadvantageous impression negotiation was opened with the hostile confederates, who seem to have made no difficulty of entering into treaty. Ministers from their several states came to Athens, and a decree of the Athenian people authorized negotiation with them. All the better men of the republic, and men of property in general, desired to

Isocr. de  
Pace,  
p. 186.

p. 178.

<sup>16</sup> ——— πρᾶξει παραβόλῃ ———.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

Isocr. de  
Peace,  
p. 168. 172.  
& 176.

Ch. 4. s. 3.  
ch. 5. s. 3.  
ch. 11. s. 1.  
and  
ch. 16. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

use opportunity, thus far opened, for making peace with all powers with whom the republic was at war, and putting an end to the system of war and troubles. But Chares and the orators his associates had acquired such command over the many that none in opposition to them could speak in the general assembly. Disapproving voices, and the tumult of overbearing numbers, prevented their being heard. Thus denied their right of addressing the sovereign assembly in the way which the constitution prescribed, the peaceful resorted to the resource, with us so familiar, of circulating their opinions and arguments among the public by pamphlets. In earlier times, as we have formerly seen, when writing and reading were less familiar, poetry was commonly used for such purposes. Now the form of an oration, such as might be spoken from the bema, was preferred; and Isocrates in this crisis published his oration entitled 'On Peace;' one of the most interesting for its matter, as it is also one of the most ingeniously composed, and most exquisitely wrought and finished, of any remaining from him.<sup>17</sup>

In this publication, managing argument with much art and delicacy, and introducing public facts to support it, he proceeds by degrees to strong imputation against those whom he describes only as having possession of the public ear and the direction of the affairs of the commonwealth. Bad men he calls all; notorious drunkenness he mentions of some, and peculation he repeatedly imputes to them generally. 'Ruin,' he says, 'must come upon the common-

Isocr. de  
Peace,  
p. 173.

<sup>17</sup> The oration on peace has been a favorite of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who has chosen it for exemplification of the author's powers and best manner in political discourse, in preference to the more artificially adorned compositions of his earlier age.

SECT.  
VI.

' wealth, if counsellors and measures are not changed.  
 ' The decree just made, concerning peace, will avail  
 ' nothing, unless a general reformation follow. Peace  
 ' should be made, not with the Chians, Rhodians,  
 ' Coans, and Byzantines only, but with all mankind;  
 ' and not upon the terms now offered for your con-  
 ' sideration, but upon the liberal principle formerly  
 ' established by the king and the Lacedæmonians,'  
 (in the convention commonly called the peace of Ant-  
 alcidas,) ' requiring that all Grecian states should be  
 ' independent, and garrisons of the troops of other  
 ' states allowed nowhere. Not justice only, but the  
 ' republic's interest requires it. Were we just to  
 ' others, we should neither have war with Kerso-  
 ' bleptes for the Chersonese, nor with Philip for  
 ' Amphipolis; but seeing us never contented with  
 ' what we possess, continually grasping at what does  
 ' not belong to us, they are reasonably fearful of such  
 ' neighbours. Opportunity is abundantly open for  
 ' increasing the power and wealth of the republic in  
 ' better ways. Colonies might in many parts be  
 ' established, as many have been, without injury to  
 ' any; and this would more become those ambitious  
 ' of being esteemed the first people of Greece, than  
 ' what now is the favorite purpose, to be eminent by  
 ' making continual war with hired troops. Far from  
 ' such extravagance, it should be our care not only  
 ' to make peace, but to maintain it. But this will  
 ' never be till we are persuaded that quiet is more  
 ' profitable than disturbance, justice than injustice,  
 ' the care of our own than grasping at what belongs  
 ' to others. Of these matters nevertheless none of  
 ' your orators has ever dared to speak to you, while,  
 ' on the contrary, some have not scrupled to contend  
 ' that, though injustice may be shameful, yet it is

Isocr. de  
Peace,  
p. 184.

p. 186.

p. 190.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

‘profitable, and even necessary; that uprightness, honorable indeed, is however a starving virtue, beneficial to others rather than to its owner. It were easy to show such arguments as false as they are disgraceful.’<sup>18</sup>

Isocr. de  
Pace,  
p. 198.

p. 200.

‘The popular passion now is to command all the world, and yet avoid arms; committing the honor and safety of the republic to vagabonds, deserters, runaways for all crimes, ready always to leave our service for better pay in any other. Hence we are obliged to indulge such miscreants as if they were our children. If complaint comes to us against them of rapine, violence, every kind of disorder, not only we do not resent their misconduct, but rather seem amused with it; and, while in want, many among us, of daily necessities, we oppress our allies with exaction of tribute to pay these common enemies of mankind. Those of our forefathers who made themselves most obnoxious by their ambition went to war however with a treasury able to support it, and they carried arms themselves; but you, poor as you are, and numerous as you are, will, like the great king, have your hired armies. They, when they sent out a fleet, employed foreigners and slaves to pull the oar, and themselves took shield and spear; but now those who aspire to be lords of Greece go ashore in foreign parts in the garb of galley-rowers,<sup>19</sup> while the vagabonds, whom I have described, bear the honors of the panoply.’

<sup>18</sup> We shall however in the sequel find Demosthenes avowing these maxims.

<sup>19</sup> Ὑπηρέσιον ἔχοντες—*remum in manibus habentes*. Auger. This seems the bold guess of a Parisian, the idea gained from the wherries on the Seine. Had Auger ever been at Marseilles, such a notion would surely have been corrected. The uncer-



The orator adverts afterward to the pains taken to persuade the people that the desire of peace marked a disposition to oligarchy, while the promoters of war were all sure friends of democracy; to the unsteadiness of administration and frequency of contradictory measures; to the carelessness and profusion with which the rights of the city were given to strangers; to the neglect of the important law, making it death to give money for votes to obtain offices, so that the most important situation in the commonwealth, that of general, on which rested not only the supreme military command, but the principal direction of executive government, was obtained by the most notorious bribery; to the departure from ancient practice in electing to that exalted office men incapable of speaking from the bema, and dependent upon professed orators to communicate with the sovereign assembly for them. 'It may be asked,' he proceeds to observe, 'How, with all this mismanagement, do we exist? How is it that we are inferior to no Grecian state in power?' I answer, because our adversaries are no wiser than ourselves. They make allies for us by their tyranny, as we for them by ours; and so we are balanced.'

Isocr. de  
Peace,  
p. 202—  
208.

The most difficult subject, yet that on which he laid principal stress, was the tyrannical empire which the Athenians asserted over the *Ægean*; requiring, from every island and every shore, tribute for permission to sail on the business of commerce without interruption from the Athenian fleets maintained for the purpose of such interruption. This he insisted ought wholly to be abandoned; not only as the injustice was glaring, but as the object was neither

tainty of the meaning of the term *ὑπερέσιον* has been noticed in a former note.

CHAP. attainable nor desirable; and this he proceeded to  
 XXXVI. show by arguments supported by reference to all  
 past experience both of their own and of the Lacedæmonian government.

Isocr. de  
 Pace,  
 p. 254.

p. 252. 254.

Drawing toward his conclusion, he spoke more at large of those actually holding popular favor, and directing the republic's affairs. 'Pericles,' he said, 'took the administration when the constitution was already injured considerably, yet he used his power in no degree for his private profit; but, on the contrary, leaving his own estate, at his death, less than he received it from his father, he carried into the public treasury eight thousand talents (nearly two millions sterling) exclusively of the dedications and sacred money. But these men so differ from him that while they dare tell you their care of the public interest is such as to prevent all attention to their own, we see those neglected affairs of their own so improving as formerly they would not have ventured to pray the gods for: while we, for whom they profess so much care, are faring worse than the people of many states under oligarchal government. None live in any ease, but the whole city abounds with complaint: some being obliged to declare publicly their poverty and wants; some lamenting them among their friends; all, who have anything, feeling the pressure of troublesome duties, expensive offices, requisitions for contribution to the treasury, or demands for change of property; altogether bringing so many evils that those of some estate live more uncomfortably than those in absolute poverty.

p. 256.

'I wonder then you cannot see that there is no race of men more evil-minded toward the people than ill-principled orators and demagogues. It is

' for their interest that, in addition to other evils,  
 ' you should be scanty even of daily necessities. For  
 ' they observe that those who are able to live upon  
 ' their own are attached to the republic, and look to  
 ' better men for advice on its concerns; but those  
 ' who depend for their livelihood upon the pay of  
 ' juries, and general assemblies, and emoluments in  
 ' whatever way thence arising, are compelled by want  
 ' to look up to them, and are always ready to thank  
 ' them for the accusations, prosecutions, sycophancies  
 ' of every kind, which they put forward. They would  
 ' therefore gladly see all the citizens in that penury  
 ' through which themselves are powerful. And of  
 ' this you have the most evident demonstration; for  
 ' you see all their measures directed, not to provide  
 ' an independent livelihood for the needy, but to  
 ' bring all, who possess anything, to one level of  
 ' want.'

He finishes then with summing up his advice for  
 mending the evil state of things; reducing it to two  
 points: 'First,' he says, 'with regard to government  
 ' at home, we must take such men for advisers on  
 ' public affairs as we should desire for our private  
 ' concerns; we must cease to reckon sycophants  
 ' friends of the people, and men of worth friends of  
 ' oligarchy. Then, for foreign interests, we must  
 ' treat allies as friends, and not, while we give them  
 ' independency in words, permit our generals, in fact,  
 ' to use them as they please; knowing as we may  
 ' now from experience that, though we are stronger  
 ' than any one state among them, we are weaker than  
 ' all united. We should show our equal aversion to  
 ' all tyrannical power: we should imitate and emulate  
 ' the regal authority of Lacedæmon; where the kings  
 ' are more restrained from committing injury than

Isocr. de  
 Pace,  
 p. 258.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

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‘ any private persons, yet so honored that those who  
 ‘ in battle show any unreadiness in their defence to  
 ‘ lose their lives are subjected to greater ignominy  
 ‘ than those who quit their ranks and abandon their  
 ‘ shields. Such is the supremacy that it should be our  
 ‘ ambition to obtain among the Greeks: and it might  
 ‘ be ours, would we show that our power is directed,  
 ‘ not to their subjection, but to their preservation.’

This picture of the party of Chares is from an adversary, but a most respectable adversary: checked also by the irritable jealousy of the sovereign people whom he was addressing; and it is contradicted by nothing, but on the contrary supported by everything, remaining from antiquity, though far most remains from those partial to the opposite, as more the democratical cause. This appeal to the reason of the Athenian people seems to have had considerable effect, but it was very far from completely successful. The party of Chares, that they might not be compelled to treat, as the other party desired, with all those with whom the commonwealth was at war, and thus abandon their system, hastened to make peace with the confederates. Arrangement clearly would have been readier, friendly connexion and confederacy might more easily have been restored, could those have had the direction on the part of Athens who had always shown themselves adverse to the tyrannical system which had occasioned the war. With those of the political principles publicly avowed by the orators of the party of Chares, the allies would of course treat with diffidence, and not readily engage in any new alliance.

Accordingly the terms were, for Athens, very disadvantageous and even degrading. Every object for which the war had been undertaken was abandoned.

The claim of the Athenian people, equally to military command over the forces, and to political authority over the states of Rhodes, Cos, Chios, and Byzantium, was abandoned. Ships were no more to be required from them to swell the Athenian fleets, nor pecuniary compositions instead. The Athenian tribute-gathering squadrons were no more to visit their ports, nor were their subjects any longer to be liable to the intolerable inconvenience of being summoned to the courts of Athens by others, or necessitated to go thither to solicit justice for themselves. Nor does it appear that, in return for so complete a renunciation of long exercised despotism, together with, what was far more important, the revenue which so contributed to the power of the imperial republic, anything was conceded by the allies. Demosthenes, afterward apologizing for the conduct of his friends on this occasion, has admitted that the terms of the treaty were not what the republic might have expected; but he says, the blame was due to those who terrified the people into acceptance of them, by spreading the alarm, which he asserts to have been unfounded, of war threatened from Persia. The success nevertheless of the party of Chares in their principal purposes was complete. Not only they obviated treaty for peace with Macedonia, with Thrace, with Thebes, with any except the revolted allies, but they so held their influence that they could soon engage the republic to pursue the purpose, to which Isocrates so energetically objected, of conquest with mercenary armies. But circumstances meanwhile occurred, deeply involving the interest of all Greece, to which it will be necessary to give some attention, previously to proceeding with the particular history of Athens.

Demosth.  
pro Rhod.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

*Affairs of Greece during the first period of the contest for possession of the temple and treasury of Delphi, called the Phocian or the Sacred war.*

## SECTION I.

*Persevering ambition of the leading Grecian republics. Circumstances of the council of Amphictyons. Summary history of Phocis. Ancient sacred wars. Regulation of the council of Amphictyons by Solon: treasure deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia. Subjection of Delphi to Lacedæmon, and depression of the Amphictyonic authority.*

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

B. C. 355.  
Ol. 106. 2.  
[See p. 223.]

WHILE the Athenians were prosecuting schemes of ambition and avarice wherever, among the Grecian republics and beyond them, their naval strength might avail, neither the Thebans nor the Lacedæmonians had abandoned their pretensions to an imperial authority over the land force, and a supremacy in the general councils of all the states of the nation. Much as a superintending power, under just regulation, was wanted, and beneficial, even with very defective regulation, as it had sometimes been, yet the continued contest for it teemed with evil for almost every state, and could hardly fail, in the end, to ruin the independency of all. Hence, in the next year after that in which the Athenians made peace with their revolted allies, a new war, originating with a people hitherto of little name, quickly involved all the European continental republics, and led to consequences most momentous, not for Greece only, but for the whole civilized world.



Among circumstances of very early Grecian history Ch. 3. s. 3. of this Hist. the council of Amphictyons has formerly occurred for notice; but from the Sacred war, in which the great Athenian legislator Solon commanded that Ch. 5. s. 5. of this Hist. called the army of the god, to the period at which we are arrived, scarcely any mention of it is found among ancient writers. Occurrences now brought it forward to a new or revived importance; whence a view of its history, such as among the very deficient memorials remaining may be obtained, will be necessary for elucidation of the following general history of the nation.

The principal information extant on the subject is contained in an oration of Æschines, who, as representative of Athens, was a member of the council at the time of its revived eminence. The very detail however, which the orator thought necessary to lay before the assembled Athenian people concerning it, is among indications of the obscurity and disregard into which it had fallen. Its history, and even its constitution, though the Athenian people had always the right of representation in it, were at that time, in Athens, it appears, little generally known. The orator informs the assembly that the Amphictyonic people, whose cities participated in the right of representation in the council, were twelve nations or races. Of the twelve names, which he certainly proposed to give, one has been lost from the extant copies of his works. The eleven mentioned are, Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnes, Locrians, Cætæans, Phthiots, Malians, Phocians. But two other differing lists are extant: one, from Pausanias, has twelve names; two of which, Dolopians and Ænians, are not mentioned by Æschines: the other, from Harpocraton, has

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

only ten; and one of these, the Achæan, is found in neither of the others. The list of Æschines will carry most authority for things as they stood in his age. But it seems probable that instances of depriving an Amphictyonic people of its Amphictyonic rights, and giving them to others not of the Amphictyonic association, occurred in different ages, and warranted the example which occurs for our notice in the sequel. Possibly also, in the different catalogues, the same people may be designated under different names, or two races may be included under one name. Very anciently, we are assured, the Ionian name was very widely applied, if not even as extensively as afterward the Hellenic; and in Homer's time the Achæan had very wide prevalence. But far more important than any difference in these catalogues is their agreement in one remarkable point, the prevalence of Thessalian interest, indicated in all. Every name, in each catalogue, the Locrian and Phocian only excepted, is of people seated, or deriving their origin from those seated, on the Thessalian side of Thermopylæ. For the Ionians, Dorians, and Bœotians, though the celebrity of those names was acquired in settlements to the southward, were, according to the geographer, all emigrants from Thessaly; and the Achæan name always remained among the Thessalian people. Hence it appears that the distribution of the right to a seat in the council of Amphictyons had been originally accommodated to the extent only of that territory over which, according to tradition, thus not lightly confirmed, the sons of Deucalion, king of Thessaly, reigned; and that this distribution, whether always subsisting or at whatever time restored, was standing, little if at all altered, in the time of Æschines.

Ch. 3. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 5. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

We inquire in vain what were the regulations made by Acrisius king of Argos, on which, according to Strabo, the constitution of the assembly at one time rested. But a king of Argos, interfering with power enough to make essential regulations, would hardly have failed to provide that, during his time at least, or during the permanence of his power there, more of a balance against Thessaly should rest in the southern, and especially the Peloponnesian states. From Homer, as formerly observed, notice of the Amphictyons fails: whence it seems probable that the power of the council sunk, at least in southern Greece, with the expulsion of the princes of the Persian line; and that, under Pelops and his posterity, it was insignificant, or limited, as in its original constitution, to the affairs of the northern states, formerly members of the Thessalian kingdom. The Dorians however, who, under the Heraclidæ, expelled the Pelopidean princes, carried with them into their new settlements the claim to be an Amphictyonic people. But the wars, quickly ensuing among themselves, and rarely intermitted, left them little leisure or means for interfering with much effect in an assembly of states on the border of Thessaly; while the northern people, holding the principal sway in the Amphictyonic council, might equally be impotent, or careless, to interfere in quarrels which little disturbed any beyond the bounds of Peloponnesus. Thus, though all the Peloponnesian Dorians always maintained their claim to Amphictyonic rights, yet the patronage of the assembly would revert to the Thessalians the more readily as Iphitus king of Elis, to supply its deficient means or deficient disposition to answer the purposes of its institution within the peninsula, established the Olympian meeting there.

Strab. l. 9.  
p. 420.

Ch. 3. s. 4.  
of this Hist.



Herod. 1. 8.  
c. 27. 30.  
Xen. Anab.  
1. 6. init.  
Æsch. de  
Cor.  
Pausan.  
1. 10. c. 1.

It appears indeed enough, in the scanty documents of Thessalian history scattered among ancient writers, that the Amphictyonic council was far from equal to its office: even in the immediate neighbourhood of its session, even among the Thessalians themselves, it could not prevent wars, nor humanize the virulent and destructive spirit of Grecian hostility. Nevertheless it will not follow that, because many and great evils escaped or overbore its preventing power, it therefore prevented none. Benefits to mankind, we have had occasion to observe, far less than troubles, engage the notice of recorders of events. What benefits, unnoticed by historians, may have resulted from the Amphictyonic institution, may perhaps best be conjectured from a view of the evils of which report has reached us, when no superintending power has interfered with the animosities arising among the unnumbered little self-governed states of Greece.

In the more powerful and eminent republics, even those called imperial, through deficient administration of law, frequent sedition, and danger almost unceasing from foreign enemies, we have seen the safety and quiet of private life always highly precarious; and yet, wherever we catch any light on the smaller and obscurer states, we discover only greater uncertainty, and generally an uneasier lot. The province of Phocis, bordering Bœotia on the west, was a mountainous country, comprising the southern part of the lofty and craggy range of Parnassus, with its rugged appendages; itself a branch from the vast mass of mountains, Cæta, Othrys, and of various other names, on the confines of Thessaly and Epirus. One small plain, called sometimes Crissæan, sometimes Cirrhæan, bordering on the bay, was of renowned fertility, but of extent scarcely six miles square. Through

the rest of the country, cultivation and population were confined to narrow dales with each its torrent stream, and each its town; so enclosed by mountain-craggs that the torrent's course alone afforded means for a practicable road. The people, divided thus into portions by natural barriers, all acknowledged a political connexion, revered for its antiquity, and valued for its obvious advantages; every town sending its deputies to a general council, which, as a common arbiter, might compose injurious disputes, and, in common danger, might provide means of common defence. The municipal government of every town nevertheless ruled its valley with sovereign authority; and not unfrequently, in spite of the superintending council, made war on its neighbour. This inconvenient sovereignty entitled each town to the appellation of *POLIS*, which we render commonly *CITY*; and so, in this small and little populous province, were twenty-two cities.

SECT.  
I.

Strab. l. 9.  
Pausan.  
l. 10.

Pausan.  
l. 10. c. 3.

Among these the early and lasting importance of Delphi, arising from its oracle, has already required frequent mention. The population assembled there, and the great concourse of occasional visitants from other parts of Greece, occasioning demands which the rugged Delphian territory could not supply, gave new value to the rich Crissæan plain. Two small seaports on the verge of that plain, Crissa and Cirrha, flourished, not only by the produce of their lands, but still more by the maritime commerce to which Delphi gave occasion. This commerce the circumstances of the adjoining shores enabled them to command. For the bottom of the bay, where stood those towns, alone afforded convenient landing; the sides being abrupt and rocky, and the mountainous coast of the Corinthian Gulf, far eastward and westward, denying

Strab. l. 9.  
p. 418.419.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

a port for those arriving by sea, and a road for passing by land; so that, not only the maritime commerce of Delphi, but the approach of strangers, numerous from Peloponnesus, depended upon the people of Crissa and Cirrha.

These advantages, after a season of prosperity, produced the ruin of both towns. With increasing wealth the spirit of rivalry between them became violent; and, due restraint from the defective political system of Phocis failing, war followed, as between independent states. Crissa used victory with the intemperance which we have seen common among the Grecian republics, and Cirrha was utterly destroyed.

The rivalry of these towns had been a common benefit to the Greek nation, interested in the oracle of Delphi. As soon as it was removed by the destruction of Cirrha, the Crissæans proceeded to use their advantages, with no more moderation toward all others than toward their vanquished enemy. The exorbitance of their exactions, both upon the commercial and the personal intercourse with the sacred city, at length excited extensive indignation through Greece. Accusation was formally preferred against them before the Amphietyons, then holding their session only at Thermopylæ. The council issued a proclamation for a sacred war, a kind of crusade, against Crissa, exhorting all Greece to arm, in the cause, as it was called, of the god. The Thessalians took the leading part; and their general, Eurylochus, commanding the sacred army, for such was the title it assumed, retaliated upon Crissa the destruction of Cirrha.\*

[\* According to Strabo, ix. p. 418. 419. (whom Mr. Mitford follows) there were two wars: *Cirrha* was first destroyed by



It seems probable that the claims of the ancient Thessalian kings, whose power, according to all

SECT.  
I.

‘ *Crissa*, and the Amphictyonic general, Eurylochus, retaliated upon *Crissa* the destruction of *Cirrha*: ἡ Κίρρα καὶ ἡ Κρίσσα κατεσπάσθησαν· ἡ μὲν πρότερον ὑπὸ Κρισαίων· αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ Κρίσσα ὑπερον ὑπ’ Εὐρυλόχου τοῦ Θετταλοῦ κατὰ τὸν Κρισαῖον πόλεμον.

‘ Id. p. 421. μετὰ τὸν Κρισαῖον πόλεμον οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες ἱππικὸν καὶ γυμνικὸν ἐπ’ Εὐρυλόχου διέταξαν στεφανίτην, καὶ Πύθια ἐκάλεσαν.

‘ But there is no mention of this war between *Cirrha* and *Crissa* in any other ancient writer; and the terms *Cirrha* and *Crissa* are often used indiscriminately to express the same place:

‘ Steph. Byz. v. Κρίσα:—τινὲς τὴν αὐτὴν [*sic. leg.*] τῇ Κίρρα φασίν. Etymol. v. Κρίσα:—ἡ αὐτὴ Κρίσα καὶ Κίρρα. Eustath. ad Il. β. p. 273. Κόλπος Κρισαῖος. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ Κιρραῖος. διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν Κρίσσαν διπλάζουσιν κατὰ τοὺς νεωτέρους τὸ σ Κίρραν λέγεσθαι.—ὁ δὲ γεωγράφος [*sc. Strab. IX. p. 418.*] λέγει ὅτι Κρίσσα τῆς Φωκίδος ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ἰδρυμένη τῆς θαλάσσης, κ. τ. λ. ὥστε κατ’ αὐτὸν ἑτέρα ἡ Κρίσσα καὶ ἑτέρα ἡ Κίρρα. implying that the opinion of Strabo differed from that of others. Pausan. X. 37, 4. λέγεται δὲ ἐς τὴν Κίρραν [λόγος], καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Κίρρας τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τεθῆναι τῷ χωρίῳ φασίν. “Ομηρος μέντοι Κρίσσαν ἔν τε Ἰλιάδι ὁμοίως καὶ ὕμνῳ τῷ ἐς Ἀπόλλωνα ὀνόματι τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καλεῖ τὴν πόλιν. Callisthenes apud Athen. l. c. uses both the terms: and describes by the name of the *Crisæan* war that in which *Cirrha* was destroyed by the Amphictyons. Two scholiasts upon Pindar (Olymp. XII. 1. Pyth. IV. 1.) call the enemy *Cirrhaeans*: but a third has the name of *Crissa*: πολλὰ τῶν Κρισαίων ἐργαζομένων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ ἀποσυνλύντων τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ χρηστήριον βαδίζοντας, οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες ἐλθόντες εἰς τὴν Κρίσσαν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων, κ. τ. λ. Æschines, Plutarch, the Parian Marble, and Polyænus have *Cirrhaeans*. The following facts are stated in the account which is given of the war by the son of Hippocrates: Thessali πρεσβευτικ. p. 937—942. tom. II. ed. Linden.—that the *Crissæans* had formerly acquired great power: (ἦν γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ὅτ’ ἦν Κρίσαιον ἔθνος) that, by their exactions, they excited an Amphictyonic war against them: that in the course of this war they stood a siege, and that after an obstinate resistance their town was taken: that Eurylochus commanded the Amphictyonic forces: that the Amphictyons, after they had captured the town, ἀγῶνα γυμνικὸν καὶ ἱππικὸν πρότερον οὐ τιθέντες νῦν τιθέασιν τὴν τε τῶν Κρισαίων χώρην ἅπασαν καθιε-

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

accounts of the early ages, was respected widely over Greece, were asserted by Eurylochus as his pretension for the chief command of the sacred army; and that he used the authority, acquired by his success, for committing the superintendency of the temple of Delphi and its treasury to the Amphictyons, whence their vernal session was thereafter held at Delphi. Pretences, that might appear plausible for a conqueror, were not wanting; for the Thessalians were always considered as in some degree fathers of the Greek nation, and the Amphictyons as from time immemorial its representatives. Nor can the restoration of the town of Cirrha, which we find was restored, be attributed to any other with such apparent probability as to Eurylochus. While then concord and good government enabled the Thessalian administration to exert the united strength of the country, Phocis would be in a great degree subject to Thessaly. But Herodotus, unconnected as his accounts are, shows divisions and weakness in the Thessalian po-

‘*ρώσαντο*. The name of *Cirrha* does not occur in this narrative. Pausanias X. 37, 4. has *Cirrha*; where, speaking of the war, and of Clisthenes, he adds—πολεμεῖν πρὸς τοὺς Κιρραίους ἔδοξεν Ἀμφικτύοσι, καὶ Κλεισθένην τε Σικυωνίων τυραννοῦντα προεστήσαντο ἡγέμονα εἶναι, καὶ Σόλωνα ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ἐπηγάγοντο συμβουλεύειν. This is not to be understood of a former war, distinct from that which Eurylochus conducted: (as some have understood it; cf. Tzschuck. ad Strab. tom. III. p. 499.) there was only *one* Amphictyonic war, and only *one* in which Solon assisted. And the stratagem, which Pausanias ascribes to *Solon* on the occasion on which he assisted Clisthenes, is ascribed to *Eurylochus* by Polyænus VI. 13. and to Nebrus, in the war which was led by Eurylochus, by Thessalus πρεσβευτικ. p. 941. The same war therefore is spoken of; and Pausanias has accurately described Clisthenes as *general*, when (as it may be collected from Pausan. II. 9, 6) he only co-operated with, or served under, Eurylochus.’ Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* pp. 195, 6. note f.]

litical system, ample to account for its failure to maintain its superiority. The Cirrhæans therefore, flourishing in their restored city, and unrestrained in the now unrivalled enjoyment of the same advantages which formerly had given prosperity and insolence to Crissa, forgot the lessons of adversity, and abused those advantages. Arms being at length taken or threatened under authority of the Amphictyons against them, they carried their impious violence so far as to attack the temple itself of Delphi.

SECT.  
I.

Æsch. de  
cor.

Of the numerous states interested in the temple and its appendages, none at this time commanded so much respect as Athens, under the administration of its great legislator Solon. The ensuing interference of the Athenian government, and the success of Solon in the command of the sacred army, have been formerly noticed. Arrangement, necessarily to follow, would of course be much in his power; and he is said to have settled the difficult business so as to give extensive satisfaction through the Greek nation.

Ch. 5. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

Of Solon's legislation for the Amphictyonic assembly precise information has been transmitted only in regard to one matter, but that very important. The form of the Amphictyonic oath, as it remained in the time of Æschines, and as it has been given in treating of the origin and constitution of the council, was, according to that orator, settled by Solon. What has been altogether the tenor of his regulations, may then perhaps be gathered from circumstances. The Amphictyonic council being in so large a proportion composed of representatives of the states of Thessaly, a Thessalian legislator would be likely to propose extension of its political authority, which, on the contrary, a member of any of the southern Grecian states would rather abridge. Athens and

Æsch. de  
cor. p. 502.

Ch. 3. s. 3.  
of this Hist.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Sparta would not be disposed to commit their interests to the votes of Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Œtæans, Phthiots, Malians, and other obscure people, with names hardly known in Grecian history. Solon then, respected as he was for his legislative wisdom, and powerful at the head of the victorious sacred army, could little hope for such influence among the many republics of divided Greece as to procure their admission of a new authority, to have a direct control over all the political concerns of the nation, even under the best and most equitable constitution that could be devised. Aware of his deficiency, he seems to have legislated for the general good of Greece with the same wisdom and the same temper which are attributed to him in his legislation for his own commonwealth. Avoiding to grasp at that best which could not be attained, he earned the just gratitude of his country by doing the best that its circumstances would bear. After him the Amphictyonic council seems no longer to have claimed that direct political authority, apparently intended in its institution, but impossible, as Greece was politically constituted, to be carried advantageously into effect. He gave it however great power and importance, of a less invidious kind, and therefore, as circumstances stood, more really useful. By securing to it, with the general consent of the Grecian republics, the presidency of the temple of Delphi, he strengthened that bond of union, a common attachment to a common religion, which principally held the Greeks, in their several republics, in any degree together as one people. At the same time, by providing more certain protection for the Delphian treasury, he gave a security, far the best that the circumstances of the times would admit, and altogether a wonderful

security, to a national bank; he gave firmer establishment to that quadrennial respite from war among the republics, the armistice for the Pythian games; and he restored and extended respect for that beneficial law of nations, which was sanctioned by the Amphictyonic oath.

But a farther alteration, of considerable importance in the constitution of the Amphictyonic assembly, evidently not the measure of a Thessalian, may, apparently, with most probability, be referred to Solon. Originally every Amphictyonic city sent only one representative, whose title of Pylagoras, indicating no reference to religious affairs, marked simply that he was charged with the interests of his republic in the assembly held at Pylæ, otherwise Thermopylæ. Afterward an additional member was sent from every city, with the title of Hieromnemon; marking that he was charged with the religious concerns of his republic and of the nation; and he was honored with priority of rank. We have formerly seen it of the temper of the republics of Solon's time, and after him, to be jealous of committing any important office to a single person; an embassy scarcely ever, and even the command of an army seldom, was intrusted to one man. The innovation which doubled the number of the Amphictyons, and marked, by a new title, the special designation of the new members to the charge of sacred matters, giving them also priority of rank, seems to have been judiciously adapted to obviate jealousy of political designs, and to lead those republics, formerly careless of their Amphictyonic rights, or perhaps adverse to Amphictyonic pretensions, to concur in supporting an institution so little threatening any evil, and so much promising advantages.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

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Ch. 6. s. 1.  
of this Hist.  
Herod. l. 1.  
c. 46. & seq.

The account given by Herodotus of the treasure deposited at Delphi by Cræsus king of Lydia, contemporary with Solon, however mingled with tales of superstition, and carrying otherwise, on first view, perhaps some appearance of extravagance, may not be undeserving of attention here. When that prince became apprehensive of the result of the contest in which he was going to be engaged with the mighty conqueror of the Assyrian empire, he sent deputations to consult the more celebrated oracles known in that part of the world, Delphi, Dodona, and others in Greece, Branchidæ in Ionia, and the temple of Ammon in Africa. We have observed it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to gather from Xenophon's account of forebodings of sacrifices and consultations of oracles, by himself and by his master Socrates, what should be attributed to superstition, and what to policy. Not less difficulty will be expected in an account, from Herodotus, of the consultation of oracles by a king of Lydia of the age of Solon. But it seems nevertheless sufficiently evident that Cræsus had more in view than merely to obtain the guidance or assurance of prophecy. He gave a decided preference to the oracle of Delphi, the historian says, because he had proof of its prophetic powers, which entitled it to such preference. This was between himself and, at most, a very few others. But the matter public and notorious was that he sent a very great treasure to Delphi; thus decisively showing that, whatever he thought of the several oracles, he judged, from the accounts brought to him by his ministers, and perhaps from personal communication with Solon, who is said to have resided some time at his court, that the temple of Delphi was the safest bank.



His manner of proceeding also on the occasion, as it remains reported by the historian, may deserve notice. He made a most magnificent sacrifice; the number of cattle slain, great and small, being three thousand. At the same time, and with the same pretence of a pious offering to the gods, were committed to the flames, of his own and of the wealthy Lydians who were persuaded to follow their king's example, furniture and utensils of gold and silver to a great amount, with much costly apparel, purple robes and rich habiliments of various kinds. But in this sumptuous oblation there seems to have been little, besides the apparel of luxury, lost to the use of men; and nothing done without a political and economical purpose. The feast of victims would conciliate the goodwill of the many, and the whole ceremony was calculated to infuse hope of divine protection, both much wanted for the coming trial. The gold and silver were so disposed among the flames that, as they melted, they were cast into the form most commodious for carriage and store, that of ingots, or, in the Greek phrase, bricks. Much of the common temptation of the age for invading armies was thus removed, perhaps with the least waste that easily might be. 'The ingots,' says the historian, 'were some six palms long, some three, and all 'one palm in thickness. The whole number was a 'hundred and seventeen, of which four were pure 'gold, each weighing a talent and a half, the others 'of white gold (perhaps gold mixed with silver) each 'weighing two talents.<sup>1</sup> Cræsus made besides a 'figure of a lion, of pure gold, weighing ten talents, 'which was placed in the temple of Delphi upon the

SECT.  
I.

Herod. 1. 1.  
c. 50.

<sup>1</sup> The talent was about fifty-seven pounds Troy.—Arbuthnot on Weight and Measures.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

‘half ingots: whence it fell when the temple was  
 ‘burnt, and it now stands in the Corinthian trea-  
 ‘sury, reduced in weight by the fire to six talents  
 ‘and a half. Cræsus sent also to Delphi two very  
 ‘large vases, one of gold, the other of silver, which  
 ‘were also moved when the temple was burnt, and  
 ‘the golden, weighing eight talents and a half and  
 ‘twelve mines, now stands in the Clazomenian trea-  
 ‘sury; the silver, holding six hundred amphors, re-  
 ‘mains in the corner of the vestibule. In this the  
 ‘Delphians mix the wine at the feast of the Theo-  
 ‘phanies, or manifestations of the gods. It is said  
 ‘to have been made by the Samian Theodorus: and  
 ‘I believe it; for it is of no ordinary workmanship.  
 ‘Cræsus sent moreover four silver barrels, which are  
 ‘in the Corinthian treasury. He dedicated also a  
 ‘golden and silver ewer, of which the golden bears  
 ‘an inscription attributing it to the Lacedæmonians.  
 ‘But this was done, with the desire of gratifying the  
 ‘Lacedæmonians, by a Delphian, whose name I  
 ‘know, but will not tell. The boy, through whose  
 ‘hand the water runs, is a dedication of the Lacedæ-  
 ‘monians; but neither of the ewers. He sent  
 ‘moreover a small figure of gold, three cubits high,  
 ‘and very many other things of smaller note, orna-  
 ‘ments of his queen’s person, necklaces, and various  
 ‘toys. Beside these deposits at Delphi he sent to  
 ‘the temple of Apollo Ismenius, at Thebes, a shield  
 ‘and a spear, with furniture, all of solid gold, and  
 ‘a golden tripod. All these things remained to  
 ‘my time, but many others have been lost. The  
 ‘golden oxen at Ephesus, and most of the columns,  
 ‘were also offerings of Cræsus; and his dedications  
 ‘in the temple of Apollo at Branchidæ, in the Mi-  
 ‘lesian territory, are said to be nearly equal in value,

‘and nearly of the same kind, with those deposited  
‘at Delphi.’

SECT.  
1.

The transport of such treasure to Delphi must have been difficult and hazardous, and to draw thence, when occasion might require, not obviously easy. Accordingly little, if any, seems ever to have been withdrawn by the proper owner. The communication with Branchidæ was comparatively ready; but, if the Lydian kingdom fell, the Milesian republic would not be likely to avoid the conqueror's power, and therefore the prudent king seems to have divided his wealth; a policy in which we have seen Xenophon, in later times, following his example. Nevertheless it appears that the liberality of Cyrus, and the fidelity of those under him, left the treasury of Branchidæ untouched, so that the deposits of Cræsus there were matter for question, as has been formerly remarked, among the Asian Greeks, when they afterward revolted against Darius. Such a treasure as Cræsus sent to Delphi would not be committed to a place the object of a sacred war, or any place not supposed of rather peculiar security. The fame of a recent arrangement widely satisfactory, as that attributed to Solon, would on the contrary be most likely to recommend Delphi to the preference which it obtained.

Ch. 28. s. 9.  
of this Hist.

How the power of voting in the Amphictyonic council was distributed, and in what way the business was managed, though some account remains from Æschines that might suffice for the Athenian people, is insufficiently explained for assurance to the modern inquirer. It appears however indicated that the representatives of each of the twelve nations or races of Amphictyonic people had its separate poll, where the majority of votes of individuals de-



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

cided the vote of the race or nation, and that the decree of the council was decided by a majority of votes of races or nations, and not of individuals. Æschines says expressly that, for the Ionic name, the towns of Eretria in Eubœa, and Priene in Lesser Asia, the former rarely independent, the other often subject to a Persian satrap, were each equal to imperial Athens; and, for the Dorian, the obscure village-republics of Dorium and Cytinium, among the mountains of Doris, were each a balance to Lacedæmon, holding nearly half Peloponnesus as its own territory, and commanding all Greece besides.<sup>2</sup>

When the Lacedæmonians had established that ascendancy among the Greeks which already in Solon's time they were beginning to acquire, they found the matters over which the Amphictyonic council presided highly interesting to them, but the council itself, on account of the great preponderancy of the

<sup>2</sup> Æschines, neglecting distinctions which for his auditors probably were needless, uses the word *ἔθνος* equally to describe nations or races, as Thessalian, Ionian, Dorian, and cities, as Lacedæmon, Athens, Cytinium, Priene. But the manner in which he opposes the two inferior Ionic towns to Athens, and the two Doric to Lacedæmon, tends to indicate that it was a majority of the votes of the twelve races that decided the decree of the council; and this seems strongly confirmed by the substitution afterward of the one double vote of Macedonia for the vote of the twenty-two cities of Phocis. Learned commentators too often, passing by more important matters, which really want explanation, have wasted their ingenuity upon little ones, and sometimes with a haste and negligence that must expose to error. Wolfius would correct the common reading of Æschines in this place, *τὸν Ἐρετρίεα*: he says, *τὸν Ἐρυθραῖον fortasse: nam Eretria Eubœa est*: and this Reiske has carelessly enough thought worth inserting in a note of his edition. Eretria was in Eubœa true enough, but the Eretrians claimed to be Ionians, equally with the Erythræans of the Asiatic Ionia.

Thessalian and other northern votes in it, not readily within their influence. The silence of historians concerning what followed indicates the prudence which obviated such disturbance as would force their notice. It is to the geographer we owe the information, that the resource of the Lacedæmonians was to take the Delphians under their particular protection, declaring them a sacred people, dedicated to the god, and therefore independent of the general council of Phocis, and of all other human authority. Thus the temple and the treasury, of which the Delphians had the immediate charge, were brought effectually under the power of the Lacedæmonian government, and the authority of the Amphictyons was in a large degree superseded. Yet though the Phocians could scarcely but consider this as a great injury, the Lacedæmonians, in whatever way cultivating their favor, held them so far attached that, throughout the Peloponnesian war, they were among the allies of Lacedæmon; and, in the wars which followed between Lacedæmon and Thebes, they still maintained the connexion till after the battle of Leuctra. Then Theban influence, or Theban power, pervading northern Greece, the force of the Phocian towns swelled the army with which Epaminondas invaded Laconia. The Phocians however, who had suffered from the enmity, and perhaps the injustice of Thebes, seem to have been, of all the Theban allies, least hearty in the cause. When called upon, nine years after, \* for the expedition which

SECT.  
I.

Strab. 1. 9.  
p. 423.

Ch. 24. s. 4.  
and  
Ch. 25. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 27. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

[\* Not so long, if Mr. Mitford means the interval between the first invasion of Laconia B. C. 369. and the battle of Mantinea B. C. 362. His inconsistency, both in stating the date of that battle, and in speaking of time relatively to it, has been already shown in vol. v. p. 307.]

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Ch. 28.s. 7.  
of this Hist.

ended with the fatal battle of Mantinea, they refused to march; boldly maintaining that the terms of their alliance with Thebes required their contingent only for defensive war. After the death of Epaminondas, as the patronage of Thebes was less inviting, so its enmity was less formidable, and thus Phocis became prepared for renewing its old connexion with Lacedæmon.

## SECTION II.

*State of Thebes after the death of Epaminondas. Prosecution of Lacedæmon by the Thebans in the court of Amphictyons. Prosecution of Phocis.*

The event of the battle of Mantinea, the glory of which accrued principally to Thebes, was to no other republic of Greece perhaps so effectually disastrous. The loss of such a man as Epaminondas, great to any state at any time, was rendered singularly so to Thebes by the circumstances in which she stood; with a democratical government, recently become the head of a confederacy of numerous democratical governments. In him the Theban people, in him the allies of Thebes, had confided. Eminent men may have survived him: we read of Pammenes, his most confidential friend. But the influence of Epaminondas himself had been sometimes overborne by the adverse or misguided will of the imperial many, even in his own city; and the means he possessed to command so extensively over Greece, the respect which had enabled him to hold so many little jealous republics in union and energy, could pass immediately to no talents. Thebes nevertheless retained a high situation among the Grecian states; regarded



still, though with diminished attachment, as the head of a great and glorious confederacy. Nor did the popular pride, founded on the consciousness of admired actions and increased estimation, in any degree fail; and the popular ambition, which had maintained corresponding growth, and the popular hatred of Lacedæmon, which was of much elder birth, remained in full vigor.

SECT.  
II.

The party ruling in Thebes, the same which had been the party of Epaminondas, maintained the friendly intercourse in Thessaly which had been formed or confirmed by Pelopidas; and the Theban party in Thessaly was that with which the Macedonian reigning family had friendly connexion, the party adverse to the tyrant tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, the ally of Athens. It was become almost habitual for Macedonia to be allied with Athens and Thebes alternately; so that, if the connexion of Macedonia with Thebes was not already renewed, the breach with Athens would have cleared the way for its renewal. On this view of things the Theban leaders appear to have rested in a project for making the Amphictyonic council an instrument of their ambition and revenge; of power to obviate the decay of their political influence, and balance the failure of their military talents.

Ch. 27. s. 4.  
and  
Ch. 28. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Injured as Thebes had formerly been by Lacedæmon, revenge had been so largely taken that it might have been just, not less than wise, to have forborne pressing it farther. One king, and a greater number of the Lacedæmonian people than in any war within tradition, had paid the forfeit of their lives; empire, and the hope of empire, were overthrown, much territory lost, the rest plundered and wasted, the capital itself insulted, the glory of the Lacedæmonian name

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 23. & 29.  
Pausan.  
l. 10. c. 2.

tarnished. Unsatisfied with this splendid vengeance of their predecessors, and impotent to emulate it, the Theban government instituted a prosecution in the court of the Amphictyons against Lacedæmon, for the old crime, so already punished, of seizing the citadel of Thebes. That court, now little fit to be, as in its original institution, what the Theban leaders would assert for it, the great council of the Greek nation, that court pronounced against the Lacedæmonian people, in their humiliation, a sentence which too evidently it would not have ventured against them vigorous in uncurbed guilt; it condemned them in a fine, according to Diodorus, of five hundred talents, near a hundred thousand pounds sterling, to be paid to the god. Reduced as Lacedæmon was, yet neither the Amphictyons, nor the Thebans as their vicegerents, could enforce obedience to the sentence. The time was past when all northern Greece could be united under Theban banners, to march into Peloponnesus, and be joined by half the peninsula itself to invade Laconia. The fine therefore remaining unpaid was, according to the Amphictyonic law, after a limited time doubled, and equally remained unpaid.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The time, when this prosecution was instituted, is very loosely indicated by Diodorus, relating the fact twice, under different years, and by Pausanias not mentioned. The omission of all notice of it by Xenophon affords strong presumption that it was posterior to the term of his history, and of course not a measure of Epaminondas. It may have been among the circumstances of trouble and confusion which Xenophon lived to see, and with the mention of which, in general words, he concludes his historical work. Diodorus has in one place (c. 23. l. 16.) named five hundred talents as the amount of the fine assessed on Lacedæmon, in the other (c. 59.) a thousand, meaning, in the latter place, apparently the double fine.

In these measures the Theban leaders appear to have had no view to immediate contest in arms with Lacedæmon; knowing its inability to attack them, and sensible also of the deficiency of their own means for carrying war to the farther end of Peloponnesus. But embarrassment for the Lacedæmonians and the animosity of other states against them, maintained and extended, would be useful and even necessary toward the success of an enterprise they had projected, less glorious, but safer, and teeming with great means for farther enterprise. The people of the little bordering province of Phocis, always ill-affected towards Thebes, were always for that, if for no other reason, disposed to maintain connexion with Lacedæmon, and also with Athens, if at the time hostile to Thebes. Beyond the Phocians, westward, was the country of the Ozolian Locrians; always at variance with them, and therefore, if without other cause, friendly to Thebes. Northward was Doris, also of the Theban alliance; but Phocis stretched beyond Doris to Thermopylæ and the border of Thessaly. Between the Phocians and neighbouring Thessalians, from the time of the old sacred wars, enmity had subsisted, such that not even by heralds was communication allowed between them. Hence it seems to have been that the Thessalian interest in the Amphietyonic council was given readily to Theban purposes. The Athenians then could not assist Phocis but across the Theban territory, nor without exposing Attica. Lacedæmon was yet more liable to have its support intercepted. The confederacy of the two might indeed be formidable, if their combined energies were exerted; but it was known that the party generally prevailing among the Athenians was utterly indisposed to any cordial co-operation with Lacedæmon.

Herod. l. 8.  
Xen. Hel.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 56.

Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 347.  
Isocr. Or.  
ad Philipp.

Phocis therefore, excluded by surrounding enemies from friendly succour, seemed, for the power of Thebes, an easy conquest. Delphi, with its oracle, perhaps no small advantage, but with its treasury too, certainly a very great one, would thus be at the mercy of the Theban rulers. According to Diodorus, the value of the precious metals at this time lying in the several treasuries of Delphi (for every considerable republic had its separate treasury, or separate apartment in the treasury) exceeded a thousand talents, two millions sterling. Of this the riches deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia seem to have remained yet the largest portion, and the historian appears to have considered them as unimpaired. But the far more exact Herodotus assures us that, even in his time, there had been, beside loss by the burning of the temple, other losses. Nevertheless the treasure altogether at Delphi, according to all accounts, was such that we might perhaps more reasonably wonder it had lain so long inviolate, unless by small purloinings, than that at length it should become an object of appetency among the contending states of Greece. That it was now the object of the Theban rulers is asserted equally by Demosthenes, at the head of one party in Athens, and by Isocrates, at the head of the opposing party; and transactions, as far as they are made known to us, mostly by writers favoring the Theban cause, are generally of a tendency to confirm, and never to refute, the imputation.

With this then their great purpose, a pretence for war with Phocis, but especially a pretence to be sanctioned by a decree of the Amphictyons, with Amphictyonic law for its ground, was desirable. No violation of the common law, or law of nations of the Greeks, such as that notorious of the Lacedæ-

monians, in seizing the Theban citadel, could be imputed to the Phocians. Ingenious policy nevertheless discovered, in an obscure tradition, foundation for a charge which might possibly even better answer the purpose, a charge of offence against the common religion of Greece. Various instances are found of such consecration of land to some deity that all disturbance of the soil afterward for tillage, or whatever purpose, was esteemed highly sacrilegious. In Attica we have observed consecrated olive-trees, whose fruit was legally brought to use, but to break the earth, as far as the roots might spread, utterly forbidden. Offence against the sacredness of the ground was there the concern only of the state in whose territory it lay. But often the bordering lands of neighbouring republics were made the nominal property of a deity, and in some consecrations of ground all Greece was reckoned interested. It seems probable that these consecrations did not originate from superstition, but rather from a wise and beneficent policy, calling superstition to its aid. The advantage of the consecration of olive-trees we have already noticed; and that of giving the estimation of holy land to the borders of jarring states is obvious; especially where no indelible features of nature marked the boundary. On the soil then whose sacredness was placed under the common protection of the whole nation, as great part of mount Parnassus, the unfortunate exile from any state might find security of person, when he could find it nowhere else. But, as often happens of human institutions, what was originally good became bad, by excess, by perversion, or by mere change of circumstances. Land was sometimes consecrated, not under a blessing, but under a curse; and then pasturage, and all use of any of its productions, was held impious.

SECT.  
II.

Ch. 21. s. 1.  
and  
Ch. 22. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Aristot.  
Polit. 1. 5.  
c. 4.  
Duris, ap.  
Athen. 1. 13.  
c. 1. p. 560.

A vague report, of uncertain foundation, seems to have obtained some extent of credit in Greece, that after one of the sacred wars, doubtful which, the Cirrhæan district of the rich vale of Crissa had been consecrated by the Amphictyons to the god of Delphi; under a heavy curse against any who should convert it to any human, or, as it was called, profane use. In all states the interest of powerful individuals will be too much interfering with the public interest, but most in the two congenial governments, as Aristotle calls them, simple or absolute monarchy, and simple or absolute democracy; and more in others as they more approach those extremes. It is to Aristotle also we owe report of a private quarrel, which gave immediate origin to a war involving the interests of all the republics of the Greek nation. A wealthy heiress in Phocis, of Theban extraction, sought in marriage by a Theban of an eminent family, was won by a Phocian. The disappointed Theban, unable to revenge himself by any measures against his individual rival, proposed to use the ready enmity of his fellow-citizens against the Phocian people as the instrument of his private passion. The purpose of oppressing Phocis, and, through the Delphian treasury and Amphictyonic decrees, commanding Greece, appears to have been already extensively cherished; but the decisive measure of prosecuting the Phocian people in the Amphictyonic court, for sacrilege committed by cultivation and pasturage on the accursed Cirrhæan land, is attributed to the disappointed lover.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> When we meet with such anecdotes as this, warranted by two unconnected contemporaries, such as Aristotle and Duris, they must be entitled to respect. We might better know how to form some opinion of many, some of them much stranger anecdotes, related by writers under the Roman empire, if they



SECT.  
II.

The fact asserted as the foundation of this prosecution, that the Cirrhæan land ever had been consecrated or accursed by the Amphictyons, or any other competent authority, appears to have been utterly doubtful. That diligent antiquarian Pausanias, whose curiosity the question engaged some ages after, assures us that those writers who insisted on it contradicted one another; some asserting that it followed the sacred war in which Solon commanded the sacred army, while others ascribed it to the earlier age, when the Thessalian general Eurylochus destroyed Crissa. His honest conclusion then is that he was unable to satisfy himself, from any documents remaining in his time, whether the Phocians, in cultivating the Cirrhæan land, had committed any transgression. It remains however reasonably ascertained that this land had been used by the Phocians from time beyond certain memory, and was become necessary to the subsistence of the actual population; and that, though it was the right and the duty of every Amphictyon to demand the execution of the Amphictyonic law, most especially against all profanation, yet neither memory of man, nor record of the court, could be produced to show that any notice had ever before been taken of the use of the Cirrhæan land as a profanation. Nevertheless the Thessalian interest among the Amphictyons concurring with the Theban, a decree was made, declaring ‘that the Cirrhæan land had been devoted, that the Phocians must immediately cease to use it, and pay a fine,’ the amount of which the decree stated.<sup>5</sup>

Pausan.  
l. 10. c. 37.

would all, like Athenæus, have informed us whence they had them.

<sup>5</sup> Accounts remaining in the time of Pausanias, it appears, so marked the preponderancy of the Thessalian interest among

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

In the long desuetude of all interference of the Amphictyonic council, and enforcement of the Amphictyonic law, in any momentous concerns of the Grecian republics, it seems to have fallen into doubt, if indeed it was ever clearly decided, whether fines decreed should be imposed on the state, whose government should then proceed to ascertain and assess the criminal individuals, or whether the council itself should not make the inquiry, and direct its vengeance only against those really implicated in the imputed guilt. The Amphictyonic oath may seem to imply the latter; but the council took the method in itself easier, and far most accommodated to the purpose of the Theban leaders, making the Phocian government responsible. Much uneasiness was excited, but the fine remained unpaid, and the land continued to be used. On the expiration of the appointed time, the fine, as before on Lacedæmon, was, by a new decree, doubled, and the increased severity of the law only excited a stronger disposition to evade or resist its execution.

### SECTION III.

*Decrees of the Amphictyons against Lacedæmon and Phocis. Alarm of the Phocians. Philomelus general of the Phocians. Support from Lacedæmon to Phocis. Expulsion of the Amphictyons from Delphi.*

The Theban leaders were disappointed in their hope of exciting a general readiness in their confe-

the Amphictyons, and the inveterate enmity of the Thessalian people toward the Phocians, that he doubted if the oppressive decree was not a Thessalian measure. But the train of history enough shows, even without the corroborating testimonies of Aristotle and Duris, that the Thebans, using the Thessalians, were the real leaders in the business.

deracy for their meditated war. The strength of Bœotia might have sufficed to overwhelm Phocis, but they feared the jealousy of their allies, should they move in the invidious business without them. Recurring therefore again to the Amphictyons, the hatred of the Thessalians toward the Phocians standing instead of zeal for the purpose of the Thebans, they obtained a decree declaring that all Amphictyonic states, guilty of so pertinacious a contempt of the law as, after the duplication of a fine imposed, to let the limited time pass without any measures for payment, forfeited all their lands to the god; and that accordingly all the lands of the Lacedæmonians and Phocians were forfeited. A proclamation followed, in the manner of those of the crusades of after-times, admonishing the Greek nation, ‘that it behoved every state and every man, as they hoped for divine favor, or would avoid divine wrath, to do their utmost toward carrying the decree into strict execution.’

SECT.  
III.

B. C. 355  
Ol. 106. 2.  
[See p. 266.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 23.  
Pausan.

The Phocians now apprehending the long-threatened storm ready to burst upon them, dismay pervaded their valleys. They had always maintained the reputation of brave and good soldiers. But to the might of Thebes and its confederacy, or even of Bœotia alone, their collected strength bore no proportion. Their government moreover had no practice in the conduct of a great contest; they had been accustomed to act only in the subordinate situation of auxiliaries; nor had Phocis ever given a splendid character to the list of Grecian warriors or politicians. In such circumstances, if there is not a man already eminent, ready to engage popular confidence, vigor in public measures is hardly possible. Such a man however was fortunately ready in Philomelus, against whose family the private enmity, which gave immediate spring to the public measures of the Thebans,

Diod. l. 16.

Aristot. ut  
ant.



Diod. &  
Pausan. ut  
ant.

had been directed. In the congress of the Phocian cities, assembled to deliberate on the critical circumstances of the country, Philomelus maintained that  
 ‘ a firm resistance to the oppressive decree of the  
 ‘ Amphictyons was not less just than necessary, nor  
 ‘ only just, but a religious duty; and, would the  
 ‘ Phocian people confide in him, he had no doubt of  
 ‘ making it successful. The mercy, to which some  
 ‘ with ill-judging timidity proposed to trust, might  
 ‘ readily be estimated. The very amount of the fine,  
 ‘ utterly over-proportioned to the imputed crime,  
 ‘ even were the imputed crime real, would sufficiently  
 ‘ show it. But no such crime had been committed:  
 ‘ the Cirrhæan land never had been devoted: their  
 ‘ ambitious and implacable enemies, adding new to  
 ‘ old injuries, proposed nothing less than their utter  
 ‘ ruin: they would rob them now of land necessary  
 ‘ to their subsistence, while they required of them a  
 ‘ fine, not only unjustly imposed, but beyond their  
 ‘ means to pay. Long ago they robbed them of the  
 ‘ presidency of the temple and oracle of Delphi,  
 ‘ always of right theirs, and never, of any right, com-  
 ‘ mitted to the Amphictyons. Possession, wrongful  
 ‘ possession, was the only ground of claim the Amphic-  
 ‘ tyons could show; whereas tradition, the most au-  
 ‘ thoritative, recorded by the great poet, to whose  
 ‘ works all Greece had always most deferred for its an-  
 ‘ cient history, reckoned Delphi, by its well-known and  
 ‘ unquestionable description, the rocky Pytho, among  
 ‘ the Phocian towns.<sup>6</sup> The Phocians then, and not their  
 ‘ oppressors, had a holy cause to maintain. It behoved  
 ‘ them to exert themselves, and they might most  
 ‘ reasonably hope for the divine blessing upon their

<sup>6</sup> Αὐτὰρ Φωκίων Σχεδὸς καὶ Ἐπίροφος ἦρχον,  
 Οἱ Κυπάρισσον ἔχον, Πυθῶνά τε πετρήεσαν.

HOM. II. 1. 2. v. 517.

‘endeavours.’ The assembly accepted the argument; and the supreme direction of the military and political affairs of all the Phocian cities was committed to Philomelus, with the title of general-autocrator.

The fulmination of the Amphictyons, diligently spread over Greece, produced little of the effect the Thebans desired. Curiosity and conversation were extensively excited; as about old matter, nearly buried in oblivion, and now brought forward as of new interest. In some places warm public discussion ensued; but still as of facts questionable, with reasoning on them uncertain. Nevertheless the crisis for Phocis, were the contest to be only with the Amphictyons and with Thebes, was highly formidable. But Philomelus, in persuading his fellow-countrymen to resistance, had not relied solely on the narrow means of Phocis. The interest of Lacedæmon, of Athens, of all Greece, to prevent the Thebans from becoming masters of Delphi, was obvious. The great advantage however, which Philomelus saw, was what the imprudence of the Theban leaders gave, in making the cause of Phocis and of Lacedæmon so completely one. He resolved therefore to proceed immediately to communicate in person with the Lacedæmonian government, leaving the defence of Phocis, if in the interval it should be attacked, weak in troops, but strong by its rocks and mountains, to his brothers Onomarchus and Phaÿllus.

The king of Lacedæmon, Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, appears to have been, according to all ancient testimony, excepting what has come from sources evidently tainted with party malice, one of the most respectable characters of his age; not of shining talents, but of much courage and firmness, and, like Archidamus his grandfather, in the phrase

Diod. 1. 16. of Thucydides, a wise and moderate man.<sup>7</sup> Philomelus  
 c. 24. was well received by the Lacedæmonians generally,  
 Pausan. but especially by Archidamus. To prevent Phocis  
 1. 10. from becoming an accession to the dominion, and an  
 instrument of the ambition and animosity of Thebes,  
 was itself of important interest for Lacedæmon. Yet  
 even this was little, compared with the obvious con-  
 sequences, that, not the oracle only of Delphi, so  
 interesting to Grecian superstition, would be in their  
 power, but the treasury, the great national bank of  
 Greece, would become the fund for means to destroy  
 Lacedæmon and overbear the Greek nation. Whether  
 through the difficulty of keeping the counsels of a  
 democratical government secret this purpose became  
 demonstrated, or rumor, to which Demosthenes and  
 Isocrates have equally given authority, arose and  
 gained credit on probability only, the circumstances  
 appear to have been such as to excite, on most  
 reasonable ground, very alarming suspicion. Scarcely  
 more than ten years before, the Olympian treasury,  
 probably much less rich than the Delphian, but  
 hardly held less sacred, had been plundered by the  
 Arcadians, allies of Thebes. Epaminondas, so famed  
 for virtue, was then at the head of the Theban go-  
 vernment; yet the Arcadians neither lost the alliance  
 of Thebes, nor, as far as appears, even incurred any

Demosth.  
 de legat.  
 p. 347.  
 Isocr. Or.  
 ad Philip.

Ch. 28. s. 6.  
 of this Hist.

<sup>7</sup> Ἀνὴρ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων. Thucyd. 1. 1. c. 79. &  
 ch. 13. s. 5. of this Hist. Diodorus gives the grandson's cha-  
 racter thus: Ἀρχίδαμος—ἀνὴρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν στρατηγίαν καὶ τὸν  
 ἄλλον βίον ἐπαινούμενος, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς Φωκεῖς συμμαχίαν  
 μόνην βλαυσφημούμενος. Diod. 1. 16. c. 63. It is much to say for  
 him that, in the very difficult circumstances of his reign, with  
 party raging as it did throughout Greece, he earned praise for  
 all his conduct through life, excepting his alliance with the  
 Phocians, the character of which it will be the business of the  
 sequel to unfold.



censure from the Theban government for a sacrilege so extensively injurious. Were then the Theban government only as little scrupulous now, as when the virtuous Epaminondas presided in it, the Delphian treasury could not be considered but as in very great danger.

SECT.  
III.

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Whatever may have been at this time the state of parties or the influence of Archidamus in Lacedæmon, where often the kings had little political weight, it would apparently have been difficult for any not to concur in the resolution that Phocis should be supported against the oppression of Thebes. This being decided, what followed, however otherwise questionable, seems to have been urgently required by the necessity of the case; that the temple and treasury of Delphi, in danger from the subserviency of the Amphictyons to the Thebans and Thessalians, should be placed again, as of right, it was asserted, it ought to be, in charge of the common government of the Phocian people. But the Lacedæmonian government could not easily afford either men or money for those purposes. The treasury instituted by Lysander, to be filled from various tributary states, was no more; and men, on whom the government might depend, could ill be spared from the defence of the remaining frontier, and the watch of the disaffected within it; nor could a Lacedæmonian force perhaps reach Phocis without fighting its way through adverse intermediate states. The resource therefore was to open, in the modern phrase, a subscription, for the support of the common cause, depending upon that pressing interest which wealthy individuals had in supplying the deficient means of government, for the preservation of private property and public order. Archidamus accordingly and Philomelus are said to have contributed,

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 24.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

each from his private fortune, no less than fifteen talents, near three thousand pounds sterling.

Philomelus having succeeded, perhaps to the utmost of his hope or beyond it, in his negotiation at Lacedæmon, his next business was to use the means he had acquired for raising a mercenary force to assist the small strength of Phocis. Opportunity for this abounded; for, beside the common throng of exiles from various republics, the remission of hostilities, following the battle of Mantinea, had left numbers of practised soldiers restless in indigence and ready for adventure. Philomelus, by his emissaries, quickly engaged between two and three thousand. These reached the Corinthian gulf without exciting alarm. The strength of Phocis meanwhile was quietly prepared. The mercenaries were brought across the gulf at the critical moment; and Delphi, unfortified, was suddenly attacked by a force vainly resisted by the partisans of Thebes, described by the unexplained name of Thracidæ; possibly having some reference to the Thracian founders of Grecian religious ceremonies. Philomelus and his party became completely masters of the place. The property of the Thracidæ was declared forfeited for the benefit of the army which had delivered the temple: the other Delphians were assured of safety for themselves and their estates, under the just protection of the common government

[B.C. 357.\*  
Cl.]

[\* The Phocians seized Delphi, Ἀγαθοκλέους Ἀθήνησιν ἄρχοντος, τετάρτῃ δὲ ἔτει πέμπτῃς Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐπὶ ταῖς ἑκατόν. Pausan. x. 2, 2.—Diodorus xvi. 14. ἐντεῦθεν [sc. ἀπὸ ἄρχοντος Ἀγαθοκλέους] ἀπὸ τῆς καταλήψεως τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ ὑπὸ Φιλομήλου. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 124. This variation should be borne in mind in considering some of the subsequent dates of Mr. Mitford. Mr. Clinton and Mr. Mitford concur in dating the commencement of the siege of Methone in s. 8. of this chap. See the remarks on the duration and conclusion of the Phocian war in s. 8. of chap. xxxix.]

of Phocis, to the advantages of which they were restored. SECT.  
IV.

It was apprehended that, upon intelligence of this violence against the sacred city, rapidly communicated every way, all the neighbouring people under Theban influence, but especially all Bœotia, would have been immediately in motion. The measure however had been so well concerted, and the Theban government was so little prepared for it, that only the Ozolian Locrians, in unadvised zeal, marched toward Delphi. Philomelus, informed of their approach, met and easily overcame them. Occupying then the principal passes of the frontier with detachments of his army, especially against Locris and Bœotia, he placed Phocis so far in security that he could proceed in some quiet to provide for its future government and future defence.

#### SECTION IV.

*Measures of Philomelus for defence of Delphi and Phocis: difficulties of the Phocians: violence of their enemies: oracle: manifesto of Philomelus: disposition of Athens: disposition of other states: allies of Thebes: barbarity of the Thebans: retaliation: death of Philomelus.*

Philomelus and the governments in concert with which he acted asserting, as a principle of their conduct, that the authority exercised by the Amphictyons at Delphi was usurped and of no legality, it was among his first businesses to destroy, with public ceremony, their decrees against the Phocians and Lacedæmonians, and to deface the marble which, after the common manner of diplomatical publication among the Greeks, bore engraved copies of them for the public eye. A care more important was at the

B. C. 355.  
Ol. 106. 2.  
[See preceding p.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 24.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

same time pressing, to obviate, as far as might be, the alarm his enterprise might cause among states not before hostile to Phocis. Accordingly he circulated a declaration, stating that ‘he came to Delphi under  
‘ the just authority of the common government of  
‘ Phocis, for no irreligious or unlawful purpose, but  
‘ to assert the ancient indefeasible right of the Phocian  
‘ people to the superintendency of the temple, and to  
‘ maintain their laws against the usurpation and their  
‘ property against the unjust decrees of the Amphic-  
‘ tyons: that, under that superintendency therefore,  
‘ the temple, and its ministers, and the treasures placed  
‘ in sacred deposit there, should be most religiously  
‘ and zealously protected.’<sup>8</sup>

Delphi, strong by its situation, yet stronger hitherto by the sacred character of the place, and the deep interest of all Greece in its security, had remained unwallled and open. But being gained now by arms, those who held it would of course have to apprehend the use of arms against them. It was therefore among the earliest cares of Philomelus to raise fortifications for its better safety. Meanwhile he was diligent in arming and training the Phocian people. Like the Greeks in general of the western highlands, less familiar with the panoply, they excelled in the use of light arms and missile weapons. Philomelus, judiciously avoiding to thwart the popular propensity, directed his attention to improve their method in the

<sup>8</sup> Justin, who, among much absurd matter, has some very good sentences to which he has owed his reputation, describes the origin of the sacred war thus: ‘Causa et origo hujus mali  
‘ Thebani fuere: qui, cum rerum potirentur, secundam fortunam  
‘ imbecillo animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedæmonios et Pho-  
‘ censes, quasi parva supplicia cædibus et rapinis luissent, apud  
‘ commune Græciæ concilium superbe accusaverunt: prorsus  
‘ quasi post arma et bellum locum legibus reliquissent.’ l. 8. c. 1.

kind of warfare to which they were habituated, and which was peculiarly accommodated to their mountainous country: he formed a body of middle-armed in the Iphicratean discipline. Nor did the temper of the people disappoint his hope, but, on the contrary, the general firmness in attachment to him, and readiness to act under his orders, seemed to warrant expectation of final success. Shortly, beside the force stationary in the towns and passes, he had a moving army of five thousand men.

SECT.  
IV.

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 24.  
Ch. 25. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

The inaction of the Thebans, whether owing to wisdom or weakness, appears to have disappointed and even distressed the Phocians. While the armies of the Grecian republics, as on various occasions we have seen, consisted of citizens, the soldier, in defensive war, subsisted on his own means, with assistance commonly from those public means only which were equally ready to relieve the wants or promote the enjoyments of the citizen in peace. In offensive war plunder was always looked for, as that in the failure of which offensive war could hardly be prosecuted. When afterward the practice of employing mercenary troops obtained, a revenue appropriated to the purpose became indispensable; but still, in offensive war, plunder was always calculated upon, at least to lessen the call upon the revenue. But the expense of a mercenary force, which might enable the people of the Phocian valleys to balance in arms the powerful confederacy of Thebes, was so over-proportioned to its revenue that, when once such a force was raised, to rest would not be in the choice of the general or the government. Hence, in the forbearance of the Thebans, Philomelus may have found offensive measures necessary. Hitherto Phocis had been actually attacked only by the Locrians. In

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 25.

the delay of threatened enterprise from Thebes therefore he carried war into their country. Entering it with little resistance his troops made considerable booty. But as he was bearing it off, the irritated enemy hung upon his rear; and, choosing well their opportunity among defiles, killed about twenty of his men, whose bodies he was obliged to leave in their power. As usual, on such occasions, he sent a herald to request the restoration of the slain for burial; but he received for answer that 'the common law of the Greeks denied burial to the sacrilegious.' Indignation pervaded his army; but he had influence to check the dangerous effervescence, and prevailed that the just vengeance should be submitted to his direction. The enemy's little success increasing their confidence, he soon found opportunity for advantage over them; put many to the sword, compelled the rest to flight, and the dead remained in his power. Such was then the force of the common notions of the importance of burial that neither fear nor shame were powerful enough to prevent the Locrians from becoming solicitors to their enemy for what they had themselves so lately denied to his solicitation. Philomelus, on condition of receiving his own, did not refuse the Locrians their slain; but he proceeded to punish their former insults by prosecuting his new success. Advancing again into Locris, he extended plunder to parts before untouched; and conducting his retreat then with caution taught by experience, he led back his army highly gratified with the expedition.

The command which Philomelus now held of the temple and oracle and treasury of Delphi, all so interesting to the whole Greek nation, gave him great means, but requiring uncommon discretion in the



use. The Thebans, and their party throughout Greece, were urging against him and all his supporters the charges of impiety, profanation, and sacrilege. To obtain from the oracle a response of a tendency to justify his measures, probably not difficult, would be highly important, could credit be obtained for it. A response of a tenor very favorable to him did then so gain reception that even his enemies, hopeless to invalidate its authenticity, endeavoured only to obviate its force. They asserted that it came from the Pythoness in an effusion of anger, indignant at the violence of profane hands dragging her to the tripod; and they contended for an interpretation of her words as applied only to such profanation. But the Phocian cause being favored by a large part of Greece, including the two powerful republics of Lacedæmon and Athens, an interpretation advantageous to that cause had more general acceptance. Reports moreover of omens and prodigies portending success to it obtained popular credit extensively, and assisted the reception of the oracle in the favorable sense.

SECT.  
IV.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 22.

Philomelus now, from a man hardly known but among his own people, who were low in consideration among the Grecian republics, had not only himself risen to be one of the leading characters of the age, but had raised his hitherto obscure country to be among the leading powers; and, what deserves notice among Grecian revolutions, the measures by which he rose had been mild and almost bloodless. With the better confidence therefore he addressed now a second declaration, in the name of the Phocian people, to all the Grecian states: ‘The Phocians,’ he said, ‘in repossessing themselves of Delphi, their  
‘ancient right, neither intended, nor would allow,

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 27.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

‘ any violence to the temple or any of its appendages.  
‘ The treasure should be preserved with the most  
‘ religious care. An account of the number of  
‘ offerings, with a specification of the weight of the  
‘ precious metals in each, should be given on demand  
‘ to any state which had offerings there, with free  
‘ leave to examine their condition. With regard to  
‘ the presidency of the temple, the Phocian people  
‘ not only held themselves justified in assuming it as  
‘ their ancient indefeasible right, but reckoned upon  
‘ a fair claim to the support of the whole Greek  
‘ nation. If therefore from malice, or envy, or what-  
‘ ever bad motive, for no good one could be, any  
‘ state should wage war against them, they were  
‘ bold to request assistance from all others, as in a  
‘ holy cause. Should that be denied by any, still  
‘ they claimed peace with all, entitled to so much  
‘ at least for their own peaceful principles and pur-  
‘ poses.’

This declaration was communicated by ministers sent to every state, not omitting even Thebes. It would hardly be expected to find, in the ruling party there, a disposition to peace with Phocis on any moderate terms; but the hope would be reasonable that such demonstration of a disposition to conciliation in the Phocian government would tend to its credit. The measure indeed appears to have been like those of Philomelus in general, judiciously conceived and ably executed. No particulars remain of discussions on the occasion at Athens, but preceding and following circumstances indicate the temper with which the application of the Phocians would be received by the contending parties there. Isocrates, and others who associated in politics with Timotheus and Chabrias, would be ready to concur with Lacedæ-

mon in support of Phocis and in opposition to Thebes. Chares and his party would be ready to seize occasion for gaining the command of Phocis, and to prevent any others from gaining it; but they would oppose any advantage to Lacedæmon, not less than to Thebes. Animosity against Thebes however was a popular passion, and the partisans of Chares were courtiers of the sovereign people. Thus circumstances altogether were favorable for Philomelus, and the Athenian government avowed the support of Phocis against the Amphictyons supported by the Thebans. Rarely as any measure of executive government escaped reprobation from some party at Athens, yet the Phocian alliance on this occasion, it appears from the orators, none would venture to blame.

Nevertheless it could not be denied that the expulsion of the Amphictyons from Delphi was a measure of extreme violence against an establishment for ages held sacred by the Greeks, and a principal bond of the several governments of the nation; a violence to be justified only, as civil war, by the last necessity. Accordingly the Thebans were sedulous to profit from the advantage so before them. In the name of the Amphictyons the call was sounded throughout Greece to arm against the sacrilegious Phocians, as in the common cause of the country and the god. But so prudent, in his critical and difficult circumstances, was the conduct of Philomelus, and so little popular the cause of the Amphictyons under Theban patronage, that, of the numberless republics of the nation, only that branch of the Locrian name, which was distinguished and degraded by the epithet of Ozolian, the stinking, would obey the call. The Thebans therefore ventured upon no offensive ope-



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

rations; the common season of warfare ended, and winter passed without farther hostilities.

But the season of repose seems to have produced no disposition to peace. The Phocians therefore could not safely reduce their mercenary force, which neither could they, with any ordinary means, maintain. But the abilities and popularity of Philomelus found extraordinary means, and apparently nevertheless unexceptionable. Among the Phocians were

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 28.

men of wealth, mostly acquired through the commerce of all Greece with Delphi; and whether by loan or how otherwise is not said, the sum wanted for the public exigency was raised, and no complaint appears to have been excited.

Spring came, and the Thebans, still refusing peace, nevertheless forbore action. Their powerful native military was of no expense to their government, and, unable as they were to excite their former confederacy to energy, they might hope for the advantage of victory without risk and without effort. It was much for the Phocians to have maintained their mercenaries through the winter. When the season for action came, that predatory war, which circumstances probably made indispensable, Philomelus directed where, with the best justification, it might be directed, still against the Locrians, who had invaded Phocis.

B. C. 354.  
Ol. 106. 3.  
[Cf.  
p. 266.]

The Ozolian Locrians, a little subordinate people, aware of their inferiority to Thebes, Athens, and Lacedæmon, but accustomed to reckon themselves more nearly equal to the Phocians, flew to arms, probably with more courage than good conduct, to defend their ravaged country; and venturing a battle with Philomelus, were again defeated. The slaughter was such that the survivors, far from hoping to protect their fields, doubted of their ability to defend

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 28.

their towns against an enemy to whose slain they had denied burial. In extreme alarm therefore they addressed supplication and remonstrance to Thebes, praying that relief and support to which, suffering in the common cause of the god and the Theban confederacy, such faithful allies were entitled.

The successful inroad of Philomelus, whether the wisest measure in his circumstances we are without information sufficient for any clear judgment, was however in its result not altogether fortunate. The cries of the Locrians produced a sensation in Greece which the decrees of the Amphictyons, supported by the influence of Thebes, could not excite; and exaggerated report of the successes and power of Philomelus increased the effect. The advantage thus afforded to the Theban leaders, and their associates in the Amphictyonic assembly, was not neglected. If, when the Phocians first possessed themselves of Delphi, the Amphictyons took any of those measures which might have become their pretensions and their generally acknowledged dignity, the effect was so little as to have escaped the notice of the only extant historian of these transactions, their advocate Diodorus. But now the council met, apparently at Thermopylæ; and while the Theban government sent ministers to every state in which it could hope to excite an interest suited to its views, the Amphictyons issued decrees in the name of the Greek nation, invoking all to arm, in the cause of the god, against the sacrilegious Phocians. But even now the voice of that reverend council was, in the confession of the same historian, but as the trumpet of discord through Greece.<sup>9</sup> The violent measures of Philomelus on one side, the known ambition of Thebes

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 28.

<sup>9</sup> Πολλή ταραχή καὶ διάτσεις ἦν καθ' ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, κ. τ. λ.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

on the other, the critical situation of the Delphian treasury, and the means it might afford, whichever party prevailed, for prosecuting purposes of ambition and violence, to the general injury of Greece, were subjects of anxious consideration for all informed and thinking men. Meanwhile among the many, while some were vehement in indignation against the Phocians, and eager that they should suffer all the severity of punishment decreed for the most abominable sacrilege, (a crime, to judge from remaining accounts, far more engaging their solicitude than the overthrow or weakening of a political institution of common importance to the Greek nation,) others contended no less ardently that they were an injured people, whom it behoved united Greece to protect against the cruellest oppression, wickedly, with the pretence of service to the god, attempted against them.

[B. C. 354.  
Ol. 106. 3.  
Cf. p. 266.]

The deficient merit, or credit, of the Theban leaders at this time, successors of the renowned Epaminondas and Pelopidas, is not weakly indicated by the ancient writers, advocates of their cause, in the failure to name a single man of them. In ambition nevertheless and arrogance they seem not to have been below their great predecessors. Yet, in measuring censure to them, the uneasy and difficult situation of party-leaders among the Grecian republics, and the impossibility of avoiding party, should be considered. It appears indeed a truly wonderful tendency to tyranny, in various shapes, and from various causes, that we find in every democratical government which has been at all laid open to us. All that remains from antiquity on this part of history tends to show, though no writer has so entered into detail of Theban and Bœotian affairs as to explain



satisfactorily the cause, that the democratical party could not hope to maintain their power in Thebes without holding the other towns of Bœotia in a political subjection, such that civil freedom, if any were really left them, must be utterly precarious: with the restoration of freedom to the Bœotian towns, the supreme power in Thebes would surely revert to the aristocratical party, and the democratical chiefs must probably seek personal safety in exile. This we have seen a principal moving spring of Theban politics in the long contest with Lacedæmon, and it remained so in the contest now with Phocis.

When the Thebans, under Pelopidas and Epaminondas, proposed to establish their own power over all Greece on the ruin of that so long, with more or less plenitude, exercised by Lacedæmon, they could persuade almost all the northern republics, and half Peloponnesus itself, to zealous co-operation with them. But now, making common cause with the Amphictyons, the ancient representative council of the nation, violently driven from that by long custom their place of meeting, and resisted in the execution of their offices, the list of allies they could obtain is of a very different description. The zeal of the Ozolian Locrians, already unfortunate enough, did not however abate. The Thessalians, apparently checked by domestic troubles, had assisted hitherto only by their influence to procure Ampictyonic decrees. The people now coming forward were the Perrhæbians, Dolopians, Athamans, Magnes, Ænians, and Achæans; Thessalian names all, but so little familiar in Grecian history that it hardly appears what part those who bore them ever before took in any of the great concerns of the Greek nation. Lacedæmon and Athens, with all the states where their interest

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

prevailed, avowed themselves the allies of Phocis. The rest, even the Arcadians of Megalopolis, who owed their actual political existence to Thebes, appear to have avoided stirring.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 30.

But neither from Lacedæmon nor Athens was any effectual assistance ready when the force of the Theban confederacy was assembling. Philomelus therefore found it necessary to increase his mercenaries, and, for their maintenance, to carry them again into the enemy's country.<sup>10</sup> Again he chose the Locrian territory for invasion. A body of Bœotian horse hastened to assist in its protection. A battle, in the usual way of Grecian warfare, followed, and Philomelus was victorious. Soon after no less than six thousand Thessalians joined the unfortunate Locrians; another battle was fought, and still the victory was with Philomelus. Then at length the Thebans got the whole force of Bœotia to move, to the amount of thirteen thousand men; but fifteen hundred Achæans, from Peloponnesus, joining the Phocian army, Philomelus ventured to hold his ground.

c. 31.

Superior as the Thebans must have been in force, yet they did not hasten to a general action; but they intercepted the return of a foraging party of Phocian mercenaries, and made them prisoners. With the hope of superiority, the disposition to a barbarous severity in the execution of the law, of which they took upon themselves to be the judges, prevailed with the Theban leaders. They declared by proclamation that a sentence of the Amphictyons con-

<sup>10</sup> Diodorus, apparently following some author of the Theban party, says that Philomelus now trespassed on the sacred treasury. Afterward we find him, with candid simplicity, stating evidence that this was unfounded slander. Farther notice of this will occur hereafter.

demned the prisoners, as accomplices in sacrilege, to death; ‘and immediately,’ says the historian, ‘following up their words by deeds, they put all to the sword.’ Vengeance was indignantly demanded by the Phocian army, and the abilities of the general soon provided means for the necessary gratification. He found opportunity to make a considerable number of Bœotians prisoners, and, with the formality of retaliative justice, he delivered them to his incensed soldiers, who put all to death. ‘Thus,’ says the historian, ‘Philomelus checked the cruel arrogance of the Thebans.’ But when, in consequence of the enemy’s superiority or equality, he could carry depredation no farther, as he had entered Locris principally to find subsistence for his troops, so, for subsistence, it would become necessary for him to withdraw again into Phocis; and, among the mountains, pressed in his retreat, he received a mortal wound.

Occasion was taken by the Thebans, from the death of Philomelus, to boast of a great victory; but, whatever may have been their success in action, it is evident that they were unable to prosecute the advantage. Winter indeed was approaching, which in the stormy atmosphere of a mountainous country made a pause of military operations generally necessary for armies so unprovided as those of the Grecian republics; yet, if the success of the Thebans had been clear, they would have endeavoured to penetrate to Delphi, the great object of the war. But without an effort they returned home, leaving their enemies to retreat unmolested, and take their measures at leisure for repairing their loss, whatever, beyond that of one most valuable life, it may have been. The Phocians thus retained the entire and

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 31.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

undisturbed possession of their own country, including their new acquisition, or what they called their recovered and enfranchised dominion of the sacred city.

## SECTION V.

*Negotiation for peace between Thebes and Phocis unsuccessful. Assistance from Thebes to the satrap of Phrygia, otherwise Bithynia, against the king of Persia. War of invective among the Greeks. Onomarchus successor of Philomelus. Invasion of Doris and Bœotia by Onomarchus.*

B. C. 354.  
Ol. 106. 3.  
[Cf. p. 266.  
Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 347. &  
in Aristocr.  
Isocr. Or.  
ad Philip.

Those who directed the administration of Thebes and Bœotia, whose names are to be found neither among historians nor orators, had expected, (so Demosthenes and Isocrates have concurred in observing,) that Phocis must yield to them, and would probably yield without resistance. The only hazard of their measures would arise, they supposed, from the alarm and indignation of Lacedæmon and Athens, and their confederates. But with these the Theban confederacy had been accustomed to contend, and would contend with better hope when Delphi should be in their power, and a clear majority of the Amphictyons subservient. Rarely we gain any direct information of the state of parties in Thebes. Events however imply that those who had hitherto directed its councils were, in consequence of the total failure of their projects, obliged to yield in some degree to wiser and more moderate men, but of the same party; at least so far that they were of the party of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. In the winter following the death of Philomelus, the Phocians, before represented as involving in the contamination of sacrilege, and subjecting to the high displeasure of the gods,

all who should communicate with them, unfit even to be allowed burial when slain in battle, were looked upon with somewhat less severity. Negotiation was opened with them, and the propositions were such as to engage the serious consideration of the Phocian leaders, in consultation with their allies. But the liberal party in Thebes could not carry their measures through. The terms at last insisted on were too severe, or too obviously insidious, to be accepted by men with arms in their hands, and led by able advisers. If any remission of the utmost rigor of the sentence of the Amphictyons was proposed, it was only partial, and calculated, by dividing the Phocians, to reduce them to their enemy's mercy. The negotiation therefore produced nothing.<sup>11</sup>

SECT.  
V.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 32.

<sup>11</sup> Diodorus, compiling, abridging, and remarking, with his usual honesty of purpose and deficiency of judgment, has given a very inconsistent aspect to his narrative, which nevertheless affords, for the careful investigator, a store of materials in a great degree satisfactory, giving means at the same time to discover their general coherency, and to distinguish the sophisticated matter which party-writers have led the historian to mix with them. Speaking of the battle in which Philomelus fell as a great and nearly decisive victory won by the Thebans, and his death as his own act, the result of despair, he shows withal that it was really a small part only of the Phocian army that was overpowered among the mountains by a superior force. *Οἱ Βοιωτοὶ, τῇ πλήθει πολὺ προέχοντες, ἐνίκησαν.* But if even over that small part it had been a clear victory, they would have possessed themselves of the body of the slain general, which, as it is not said they did, we may very safely conclude they did not. Diodorus however proceeds to say: 'The Bœotians then returned home, because they thought the death of Philomelus sufficient for their purpose.' This conclusion is too ridiculous. Their ultimate purpose avowedly was to carry into full effect the decrees of the Amphictyons, and their first object to recover possession of Delphi, and restore the Amphictyonic session there. Undoubtedly they would have marched thither without delay, had they gained a victory to open means

CHAP.  
XXXVII.Diod. l. 16.  
c. 34.Ibid.  
Polyæn.  
strat. l. 5. 16.  
et Frontin.  
l. 11. 3. 3.Diod. l. 16.  
c. 34.  
Plut. v. Pe-  
lop. p. 292.  
Demosth.  
περὶ συμμα.

Successful so far as to prevent peace, the turbulent were however unable to command so as to carry on the war with any vigor. The Thessalians declined furnishing troops, and the other allies were little more disposed to exertion. A remission of hostility with Phocis ensued, and the attention of the Thebans was drawn another way. Artabazus, satrap of lower Phrygia or Bithynia, still maintaining his rebellion against the great king, and again threatened by eastern multitudes under loyal satraps, desired again the experienced advantage of Grecian science and discipline to enable him to resist them. Whether less satisfied with the character of the Athenian general Chares than with the service of the troops under him, the satrap's commissioners now sent into Greece were instructed, it is said, to seek, in preference, men raised to fame under Epaminondas. It is not a little remarkable that, while not a name of a Theban officer who commanded against the Phocians, or a Theban politician who promoted the sacred war, not a name of an Amphictyon, or of any one engaged in council or in cause with the Amphictyons, has been preserved by the historian or by any other extant author, yet when, within the same period, the Theban arms were directed other ways, the names of generals immediately appear. Pammenes, the philosophical Pammenes, the friend of Epaminondas, said to have been also the host and protector of Philip king of Macedonia when a youth at Thebes, did not refuse to take the command of

for it. But on the contrary, as the historian proceeds to inform us, 'The Phocians withdrew to Delphi, delivered, for the present, from all pressure of war; and, holding council with their allies, deliberated concerning war and peace.' The sequel amounts to proof that they had not been materially weakened by the events of the campaign.



SECT.  
V.

the auxiliaries for the satrap. From the time of the invasion of Xerxes the Persian connexion had been the reproach of Thebes among the Greeks. War against the king's forces therefore, though in the cause of a rebellious satrap, might carry some credit with it, to the commander and to his country. At the same time Asia would be, both to general and army, a more inviting field than Phocis, for profit as well as for glory. Under such a man as Pammenes accordingly such was the zeal for this service that five thousand volunteers were presently raised; whether all Thebans, or men promiscuously collected, we are uninformed. Possibly the Thebans among them were such as the promoters of the Phocian war would willingly see emigrate; and Pammenes himself may have been not a warm approver of their measures. Contributing principally however toward two great victories obtained over the king's forces, with much profit to those engaged under him, he added not a little to the military renown of Thebes.<sup>12</sup>

B. C. 353.  
Ol. 106. 4.  
[Cf. P. 266.]

In a war of the character of that called the sacred, which produced the deliberate massacre of prisoners as a measure of piety necessary to the justification of one of the parties in the sight of the deity, minds

<sup>12</sup> Diodorus remarks on this expedition of Pammenes, that 'it appeared wonderful how the Bœotians, deserted by the Thessalians, and pressed by the Phocian war, could send an army beyond sea and be everywhere successful.' He had just before shown that, in Greece, they were very generally unsuccessful. The inducement therefore to send such a force, if really a Theban force, or composed of Bœotians friendly to the Theban connexion, would indeed appear mysterious. But the measure was more than probably that of a party adverse to the Phocian war, whether obtaining a temporary superiority, or only licence for the adventure.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

would be more than commonly heated, invective would of course abound, and the rancorous spirit would not cease with the contest in arms, but live with the survivors, and fade but gradually among their posterity. Of virulence then only second to that of a war for which perverted reason claims religion as its ground, would be hostility so founded as that between the Lacedæmonians and Messenians. Bound to the Thebans, as the restorers and second

Ch. 27. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

founders of their nation, the Messenians had however yet taken no part in the sacred war; but they were adverse to the Phocians, not more because the Phocians were enemies to Thebes than because they were befriended by Lacedæmon. Popular prejudice

Pausan.  
l. 4. c. 5.

therefore among the Messenians gave ready circulation to a story, wherever originating, that the kings, the ephors, and all the senate of Lacedæmon favored the impious cause under the instigation of bribes from the Delphian treasury. Men of letters, then abounding in Greece, and even men of superior talents and acquirements, some excited by party-attachments, some allured by profit, addicted themselves to the compilation and perhaps often invention of anecdotes and secret history, and especially of the

M. T. Cic.  
Orat.  
Dion. Hal.  
Ep. ad  
Amin.

defamatory kind. Among these, the Chian Theopompus, a scholar of Isocrates, admired for the force and elegance of his style, was at this time eminent. From him a tale has been preserved, nearly to the same purpose as the Messenian, but throwing the mire with more ingenuity, and not with such undistinguishing boisterousness. Archidamus, according to Theopompus, was not himself disposed to favor the sacrilegious Phocians; but the dispensers of Delphian gold at Lacedæmon, gaining his queen, Dinicha, her interest with the king at length overbore his

probity.<sup>13</sup> Such stories would be likely to have circulation. But with the clear and pressing interest of Lacedæmon to support the Phocians against Thebes, it is obvious that bribery could be little necessary to persuade to it; and if, for any matter not of completely public notoriety, Diodorus is worthy of credit, his report that, instead of receiving money from the Phocians, Archidamus and perhaps others assisted them with money, will deserve it. The probity of Philomelus, and his abstinence from trespass on the sacred treasury, will be seen in the sequel by evidence beyond what is common in such cases, placed above just suspicion. If he was clear, the imputation against remoter hands, while he ruled at Delphi, must fall of course.

On the death of Philomelus, his next brother, Onomarchus, who had been his principal assistant in council and in the field, was raised by election of the Phocian people to the arduous office which he had so ably held. In talents not inferior, Onomarchus seems to have had a more soaring ambition and less scrupulous probity. He is said to have begun his administration with trespass upon the sacred treasury. But the proof seems to rest wholly on the difficulty of otherwise accounting for the means he appears to have possessed for maintaining and considerably in-

B. C. 354.  
OL. 106. 3.  
[Cf.  
p. 266.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 31. 32.

<sup>13</sup> Athenæus, quoting Heraclides Lembus, relates that a king of Lacedæmon, named Archidamus, was fined by the ephors for preferring a rich bride, with a person under the proper size for breeding successors of Hercules, to one of a finer person with less wealth. (Athen. l. 3. p. 280. vel 586.). Plutarch mentions the same story (De lib. educ. init.) Some modern writers, to make so good a story more complete, give the name of Dinicha to the little lady, unnamed by either Athenæus or Plutarch, and make her husband, equally without authority from either, the son of Agesilaus.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 31.

creasing the military force raised by his late brother.

According to the same historian, who relates that the Phocian army was completely defeated when Philomelus was killed, the Phocian force was, within a few months after, greater than Philomelus had ever commanded. The Thebans, to deter enemies and allure friends, would endeavour to profit from the death of the adverse general for spreading the belief of a great victory; while they circulated also new fulminations of the Amphictyons, threatening with divine as well as human vengeance all who should in any manner or degree favor their sacrilegious foes. Nevertheless the Phocian cause continued rather to gain ground among the Grecian states; the policy of Onomarchus, which was evidently able, being apparently assisted by the credit which the wise and honorable conduct of Philomelus had extensively conciliated. During the season of rest from arms, according even to the historian's partial account attributing all success of the Phocian cause to bribery, the turn in politics, where any occurred, was in favor of Phocis. The principal defection was of the Thessalians, who did not indeed join the Phocians, but no longer sent auxiliaries to Thebes. Open then as the treasury was to the examination at least of the states friendly to Phocis, if there was trespass to any considerable amount, it must have been managed either with extraordinary dexterity or extraordinary concert.

The continued inactivity of the Thebans, in a war of their own seeking, is unaccounted for by ancient writers any farther than as it is indicated that the leaders of the war party were not superior men, and that an opposing party was powerful. Nevertheless the forbearance may have resulted in some degree from policy; for Onomarchus could not, any more than

Philomelus, remain inactive, and he was probably not yet strong enough to invade Bæotia. Accordingly he led his army into the Epicnemidian Locris, where he took Thronium, the principal town, and, if the historians followed trustworthy authority, sold the inhabitants to slavery. Possibly he may have exercised such severity against some of them, obnoxious for violence, such as we have seen some of the enemies of Phocis disposed to; but the historian's own account of his general conduct and his political success forbid the belief that he would passionately, or for small profit, make himself odious and his cause unpopular in Greece. From Doris he turned back across Phocis into the Ozolian Locris. Amphissa, the principal town of that province, only threatened by his army, surrendered. Amphissa was but seven miles from Delphi. Probably the inactivity of the Thebans in support of their allies had excited disgust; and possibly a party adverse to the Theban connexion, and holding communication with Phocis, was powerful. But a capitulation, little common as it was among the Greeks, and especially considering all the circumstances of the sacred war, would imply confidence in the conqueror's faith. From Amphissa, Onomarchus turned upon Doris, and plundered great part of the country.

SECT.  
V.

B. C. 353.  
OL. 106. 4.  
[Cf.  
p. 266.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 33.

The remissness and unpopularity of the Theban government, together with the conciliating conduct of the Phocian general-autocrator, seem to have produced the opportunities which now occurred for attempts within Bæotia itself. Orchomenus, so cruelly desolated by the Thebans about three years before the battle of Mantinea,\* had been repeopled; under what circumstances we are uninformed, but certainly

Ch. 28. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

[\* See vol. v. p. 195. and p. 307.]

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

under Theban patronage; and probably the new population was mixed, of ancient Orchomenians, and new settlers from other parts of Greece. But whatever preventive care may have been taken, aversion to the Theban government grew: communication was held with the Phocians; Onomarchus, turning suddenly from Doris, arrived unexpectedly; and the Theban party was so surprised and awed that (whether any contest in arms intervened is not said) Orchomenus became a member of the Phocian alliance. Under similar encouragement apparently, Onomarchus then proceeded to Chæronea; but, the Thebans having hastily collected their forces, he was there disappointed. The historian's expression rather implies a defeat in battle. It could however be little important; for it appears he was presently after in circumstances for new and great enterprise.

But the contest between Phocis and Thebes in its progress more involving the other states of Greece, it will be necessary to advert to what had been passing among the principal of those states, and observe the circumstances in which at this time they stood.

## SECTION VI.

*Politics of Athens. Circumstances of Macedonia: marriage of Philip: circumstances of the kingdom of Epirus. Disposition to peace thwarted by a party in Athens: confederacy against Macedonia: accumulated successes of Philip.*

The sacred war, with the command of the temple and treasury of Delphi its object, was a concern of such magnitude for the Greek nation, and especially the two great republics of Athens and Lacedæmon, that the very permission of the contest, and the allowance for such an obscure people as the Phocians to



take the leading part, strongly indicated decay and beginning decrepitude, the result of long and almost ceaseless divisions. Athens however, though weak in land force, slow to put forward armies of citizens, and having among her citizens few practised soldiers like those which had fought her battles under Miltiades and Aristides, was powerful still by sea, ambitious not less than formerly of command over other states, and, even more than formerly, active and deep in policy. Among those who contended for the lead in public affairs, from the great Cimon's time downward, there had always been some who held it for the republic's interest to maintain a constant friendly connexion with Lacedæmon. But the party of Chares, which of late had been mostly the ruling party, admitted the Lacedæmonian alliance, even when most necessary, with reluctance; nor had they ever ceased to support the enemies of Lacedæmon, so as to frustrate her great purpose, the recovery of the dominion of Messenia. In joining such an ally, or any ally, for the critical purpose of defending the Delphian treasury, some jealous care might become every Athenian statesman. But the party of Chares, while they thwarted all separate interests of their ally, would press any separate interest of their own, to the injury of their ally: not satisfied with obviating the preponderance of Lacedæmon, they would make Phocis their instrument for purposes adverse to the interest of Lacedæmon. Hence, though the two governments concurred in the general purpose of supporting the Phocians and opposing the Thebans, yet they co-operated little. The several distractions of each also prevented vigorous interference from either. Lacedæmon was perplexed by the necessity of constantly watching enemies on all her borders,

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

and even within them; and Athens, after abandoning the contest with her confederates, was implicated still in war, maintained with purposes of ambition and revenge, against Macedonia.

The Macedonian kingdom meanwhile was become, at least in comparison of former times, settled within itself, powerful among states around, and secure in its increased possessions. Any considerable preponderancy it had not yet attained. Able administration was wanted, much for its improvement, but much also even for any permanence of its existing fortunate circumstances: the Thessalian connexion, so advantageous for its power, the Olynthian, so necessary to its daily safety, might be in a moment lost. In this state of things the king, strongly inclined to literature, the fine arts, cultivated society, and perhaps in general to pleasure, seems, notwithstanding the consciousness of military talents, and the stimulation of military successes, to have proposed rather to emulate his great predecessor Archelaus in the enjoyment and improvement of what he possessed than hazard all in contest for farther acquisitions, and to place his farther glory in cultivating the arts of peace.

B. C. 354.  
Ol. 106. 3.  
[Cf. p. 266.]

Soon after his return from his successful expedition into Thessaly, a year or more before the beginning of the sacred war, Philip married Olympias, daughter of Neoptolemus king of Epirus. That

Strab. 1. 7.  
p. 326. 327.

country, occupied, from earliest tradition, by a people of kindred blood with the Greeks, and speaking a dialect of the Greek language hardly differing from the Macedonian, had preserved also, as we have seen

Ch. 34. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

of the neighbouring country of Lyncestis, a form of government nearly resembling the Macedonian. Moreover the royal race, like the Macedonian and Lyncestian, boasted a Grecian origin; highly illustrious,

but not, in remaining accounts, equally authenticated: they claimed however descent from Neoptolemus, called also Pyrrhus, son of Homer's great hero Achilles, who is said to have settled in Epirus on returning from the Trojan war. The country consisted of vales of considerable extent and great fertility, among mountains of uncommon height and roughness: as a land of husbandmen, it was well peopled, and wealthy. Altogether these kingdoms and principalities, held by people of Grecian race under mixed monarchal government, were perhaps in extent, and in free population, nearly equal to that held by the republics. Like their neighbours the Thessalians these people were fond of show, and the courts of the princes were not without some elegance of splendor. The magnificence with which the nuptials of Philip with the Epirot princess were solemnized has been celebrated by ancient writers. Thenceforward, even more than before under Archelaus, the Macedonian court became the principal seat of polite gaiety, and the greatest and safest resort of cultivated society, perhaps then in the world.

Amid the deficiency of materials for the history of these times we find unequivocal indication that, after all Philip's successes against the Athenians, he not only was always ready to admit negotiation upon liberal terms, but used every opportunity to invite it; nor is it left doubtful that the greatest and most respectable men of the republic were anxious to meet his purpose. But it was not least because peace and friendly connexion with Macedonia were desired by one party in Athens, that the other opposed them; and they so opposed that though the esteem which the king of Macedonia had acquired did not cease, yet it became dangerous to own esteem for him.

SECT.  
VI.

Plut. vit.  
Alex. init.

Demosth.  
Olynth. 1.  
p. 15.  
De legat.  
p. 358. 372.  
& 442.



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 358.

Æsch. de  
legat. p. 198.

Demosth.  
Olynth. 2.  
p. 22.

The party which had produced the unfortunate war of the republic with its republican confederates, excited revolt against its very beneficial ally the king of Macedonia, rewarded and honored the assassination of another ally, its citizen, the king of Thrace, which avowed, as principles, that to foment disturbance among neighbouring states, and to be itself always at war with some of them, was the just and necessary policy of every democracy, but especially the Athenian; that, though truces might, from momentary pressure, become necessary, yet to make a perpetual peace was treason against the people, inasmuch as it denied the use of future opportunities against other people; this party opposed every step toward peace with Macedonia: the endeavour to lead the people to allow negotiation appears to have been frequently repeated by the most respectable citizens, but it was always ineffectual. At length, finally to check it, a moment of popular passion was taken for procuring a decree, by which communication from the Macedonian government, even by a herald, was forbidden. The policy of such a measure, unexplained by ancient writers, seems, with any view to any common interest of the Athenian people, the less readily imaginable as, since the loss of so many towns on the Macedonian and Thracian shores, the means of Athens to injure Macedonia, farther than by depredation on its commerce, were greatly narrowed. But the particular interest of the war-party, the party of Chares, in such a decree is not obscure. Peace with Macedonia not only must have produced arrangements adverse to the views of those of whose policy war and troubles were the very foundation, but would probably have replaced the administration of the republic in the hands of

others who had always professed a peaceful policy. The two objects which especially engaged the ambition and cupidity of the party of Chares were perhaps objects of desire for the Athenians very generally, the sovereignty of the Thracian Chersonese, and the command of the passage into the Euxine sea by the Bosphorus; the former held by the king of Thrace, the ally of Athens, the latter surrendered to Byzantium by the treaty of peace which ended the confederate war. Both were great objects, for revenue and for commerce; for commerce especially in two principal articles of the Attic market, corn and slaves. If then, by peace concluded with Macedonia under management of the friends of Isocrates, allowance might have been gained for pursuing these objects, which seems not improbable,<sup>14</sup> the war-party would have so much the deeper interest in the decree which forbade even treaty with Macedonia.

Of either the opportunity for so violent a measure, or the time, we are uninformed; but it appears to have been nearly about the time when a formidable confederacy was raised against Macedonia, in which the king of Thrace, the king of Illyria, and a pretender to the principality of Pæonia were engaged. Diod. I. 16. c. 22. How far the war-party in Athens had originally excited or afterward promoted this league is not indicated, but its coincidence with their views is obvious, and that their ingenuity and activity were great, and their communication extensive, is also evident. Nor is it left doubtful that, without instigation or almost compulsion from Athens, the king of Thrace, Kersobleptes, would not have concurred in such a measure.

<sup>14</sup> Its probability is especially indicated in the oration of Isocrates to Philip, where he mentions his view of the business of Amphipolis.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

The combination appears very well imagined; Macedonia was to be attacked at the same time on the eastern and western side, while rebellion was excited within.

But, according to the remarkable testimony of the great orator, sometimes in the midst of violent invective his eulogist, Philip, with all his disposition to pleasure, was never unready for business; neither labor nor danger stopped him when occasion called.<sup>15</sup> Sending Parmenio, whom he esteemed the ablest of his generals, against the Illyrians, he marched himself into Pæonia, and the pretensions of his opponent there were soon finally crushed. Turning then into Thrace, and profiting ably from the discord which the Athenians themselves had fomented in that country, one of the princes, Teres, fighting by his side against the others, he brought all to such submission that, as the great orator afterward indignantly expressed himself, he made and unmade there what kings he pleased. The successes of the Thracian expedition were just completed when information was brought of a great victory obtained by Parmenio over the Illyrians; and, what has been thought worthy of notice by ancient writers, presently after a messenger arrived with intelligence that his horse had won the palm in the Olympian race.<sup>17</sup> Occasion has heretofore occurred to observe the importance which the Greeks attached to this kind of victory: likely to

B. C. 355.<sup>16</sup>  
Ol. 106. 2.  
[Cf. p. 266.]  
Epist. Philipp. ad  
Ath. ap.  
Demosth.

Demosth.  
Olynth. 1.  
p. 12.

Plut. vit.  
Alex. p. 666.

Ol. 106.

<sup>15</sup> Καὶ ὅση δεινότης ἦν ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ θεάσασθε, κ. τ. λ.

Dem. de Cor. p. 275.

<sup>16</sup> Diodorus assigns this war to the first year of the 106th Olympiad. Reason for supposing that, though it may have originated in the first year of the 106th Olympiad, it was not concluded in that year, will be stated in a following note.

<sup>17</sup> —'Ολυμπιάσιν ἵππῳ κέλῃτι νενικηκέναι. Plut. v. Alex.



have been the more grateful to Philip as it would  
beyond anything, in the judgment of the many  
throughout Greece, convict the adverse orators of  
impudent falsehood when, at a loss for other invective  
equal to their malignity, they called him in their  
public speeches a barbarian. But he had scarcely  
been congratulated on these successes when a third  
messenger arrived with information that his queen  
had brought him a son and heir, afterward the great  
Alexander. Then, in consonance with the opinion,  
old among the Greeks, that accumulation of un-  
interrupted prosperity had in itself a tendency to  
bring signal calamity through a disposition in the  
deity, as Herodotus expresses it, to envy human  
happiness, he is said to have exclaimed: 'O fortune,  
' send some little evil to temper all this good.'<sup>18</sup>

SECT.  
VI.

Demosth.

Ch. 6 s. 3.  
of this Hist.

Plut. vit.  
Alex.

Through these successes the Macedonian kingdom  
became truly great and formidable, extending from  
the Euxine sea to the Adriatic. Diodorus reckons  
both Thrace and Illyria completely reduced under  
the Macedonian dominion. We learn from following  
circumstances that it was not precisely so, yet from  
the great contemporary orator it appears that they

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 22.  
Demosth.  
Ol. 1. p. 15.  
& al.

<sup>18</sup> Plutarch, to whom we owe this anecdote, has added that Philip was so delighted with the success of his racer, that he celebrated it by a representation of the animal and his rider on the reverse of the golden coins from his mines of Philippi. Perhaps the collection of coins was not equally an object of the curious in Plutarch's as in the present day, and possibly Plutarch never saw or never noticed a Macedonian coin older than Philip. It is now enough known that a horseman unarmed, a κέλης, was the common ornament of the reverse of the Macedonian coins many reigns before him. The story may deserve thus much notice as one among many proofs of the carelessness and ineptitude with which writers, even of eminence, under the Roman empire, adopted or imagined remarks and anecdotes concerning the republican age of Greece, and perhaps of Rome too.

CHAP. were brought to no small degree of dependency. The  
 XXXVII. Athenian fleets, commanding still the Ægean, could still interrupt the maritime commerce of the Macedonians and their allies; but the king applied himself diligently to obviate this evil through the opportunities which his conquests and alliances afforded for raising a navy; and, with the advantages afforded by the Amphipolitan territory, and the zealous concurrence especially of the Thessalians, whose commercial towns were considerable, he made rapid progress.

### SECTION VII.

*Politics of Athens. Orators. Measures for acquiring dominion in Thrace. Areopagitic oration of Isocrates.*

Meanwhile at Athens, notwithstanding the disadvantage and disgrace to the republic with which all the objects of the confederate war had been abandoned, the party of Chares maintained an ascendancy with the multitude; and, notwithstanding their disappointment in the complete defeat of the confederacy of kings against Macedonia, they persisted in their purpose of prosecuting war against that country. We have formerly observed Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus concurring in the policy of supporting the Thracian monarchy, as a balance to that growing preponderance of Macedonia which its vehement enemies, the war-party in Athens, had so much contributed to produce. Macedonia might now become a maritime power. That the Thracian monarchy would become such was not within reasonable view; and hence apparently the policy of Chabrias, in the treaty which confirmed to the king of Thrace the dominion of the Chersonese. Though the revenue

of that country thus went to another, yet the advantages of its commerce might be, without expense or hazard, all for Athens. But no sooner had the partizans of Chares produced the disgrace of Timotheus and Iphicrates than they became sedulous to procure public disapprobation of the measure which Chabrias was no longer living to support. The management appears to have been very artful. Boldly asserting, what the many were ready on any assertion to believe, that the sovereignty of the Chersonese of right was theirs, and affecting a just respect for the character of Chabrias, they said, ‘that able officer  
‘and statesman would never have so yielded to the  
‘unjust violence of Kersobleptes and Charidemus,  
‘but that he had been improvidently sent without a  
‘force to oppose them.’ The confederate war was yet going forward when they brought the matter before the assembled people. Glaucon moved, that ten commissioners be sent to Thrace, to demand of Kersobleptes his accession to the terms formerly required of him by Athenodorus, and, should he refuse, to provide means of compulsion; and the people decreed accordingly. But the interest of the party seems to have failed in the nomination of commissioners; a majority of whom, as the censure of Demosthenes shows, were not disposed to forward their views in Thrace. Troubles then breaking out in Eubœa, and the alarm of the king of Persia’s threatened vengeance concurring, those most disposed to engage the republic in new wars feared at that time to press the purpose farther.

Demosth.  
Aristocr.  
p. 678.

But peace being made with the confederates, the troubles of Eubœa appeased, and the alarm of invasion from Persia subsided, the orators began again to mention the Chersonese, and the people to listen with



CHAP. interest. The superior powers of oratory appear to  
 XXXVII. have been on the side of Chares. The name of Lycurgus, from whom an oration remains, is eminent. An oration also is extant, attributed to Hegesippus.<sup>19</sup> Of Timarchus, Clitomachus, Polyeuctus, and, more celebrated than all, Hyperides, the fame only has been transmitted.

Æsch. de  
 legat. p. 294.

Nevertheless it seems questionable whether the party of Chares was indebted for its superiority on the bema more to the talents of the men or to their unscrupulousness in using the arbitrary powers of democratical government. Leosthenes, of the adverse party, had, at least with that party, the reputation of being the most eloquent man of his time, excepting only Callistratus. But Leosthenes was a sufferer from that common tyranny of democracy which Isocrates has mentioned as prevailing at Athens, the denial of freedom of speech. Though ostracism had fallen out of use, banishment remained for party purposes common, and Leosthenes was banished; apparently, like so many other illustrious Athenians, for his merit. Isocrates only wrote. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, among large and warm eulogy of that distinguished patriot, has expressed admiration especially at his boldness in venturing to publish that called the Areopagitic oration, which carries within itself evidence of its date of this time. The object was to produce a reformation of the government, such as to restore nearly the constitution of Solon, or at least of

<sup>19</sup> The supposition that the oration on Halonnesus, among the works of Demosthenes, has been the work of Hegesippus, will require notice hereafter. Clitomachus and Polyeuctus, are mentioned by Demosthenes in the third Philippic, p. 129. Hyperides has been highly celebrated by Dionysius and Cicero. Timarchus will occur for future notice.

Clisthenes. To open such a purpose, not only for the safety of the orator, but for a chance of success, and even to obtain a hearing, great caution was necessary. In addressing therefore his irritable sovereign, venturing but to glance at the turpitude, speaking more directly to the folly, he dwells chiefly on the danger of past conduct and actual projects.<sup>20</sup>

‘The Athenians had now,’ he observed, ‘within a short space of time, lost all their possessions on the northern shores of the *Ægean*, from the Thracian Chersonese to the border of Thessaly, and all the islands on the Asiatic coast, with Byzantium, and the important pass of the Bosphorus: yet, in the course of these disasters, twice had the evangelian sacrifice been performed, as if thanks were due to the gods for signal victories. After all their great losses of dominion and revenue indeed they remained possessed of two hundred triremes, whence they were ready to exult in the idea of being still masters of the seas: and holding also yet many allied cities dependent and tributary, and having besides friendly connexion with some independent states, bound to them by a common interest, they did not cease to extend their ambition to the dominion of all Greece.’<sup>21</sup> How revolting these pretensions were

<sup>20</sup> Τίς δὲ τὸν Ἀρειοπαγίτικὸν ἀναγνούς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κοσμιώτερος; ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν θανμάσειε τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος; ὃς ἐτόλμησε διαλεχθῆναι περὶ πολιτείας Ἀθηναίοις, ἀξιῶν μεταθέσθαι μὲν τὴν τότε καθεστῶσαν δημοκρατίαν, ὡς μεγάλα βλάπτουσαν τὴν πόλιν, ὑπὲρ ἧς τῶν δημαγωγῶν οὐδεὶς ἐπεχείρει λέγειν. Dion. Hal. in Isocr.

The Areopagitic carries within itself clear indication of its own date, after the conclusion of peace with the confederates, and before the measures which quickly followed, p. 96. 100. 102. t. 1. edit. Auger.

<sup>21</sup> Πᾶσαν ἐλπίζετε τὴν Ἑλλάδα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει κατασχῆσιν. Isocr. Areop.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

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to the Greeks in general, how unfit a government like the Athenian was to hold extensive dominion, how much, for the Athenians themselves, it wanted reformation, and what must be the danger of prosecuting their ambitious purposes and omitting the wanted reformation, he then proceeds to show. But, with that caution which democratical despotism required, he ventured to indicate the present state of things only by comparison with the past; showing the past perhaps less exactly as it really was, than as, in improved representation, it would form a completer contrast to the present. The picture however is clear, and exhibits far more fully than any other extant, the state of Athens at the time.

Isocr.  
Areop.  
p. 112.

Beginning with the subject of religion, ‘the divine worship,’ says the venerable statesman, ‘was not, with our forefathers, a scene of riot and disorder: it was not sometimes, for wantonness, a sacrifice of a hundred oxen, and sometimes, through want, an omission of ancient rights. Magnificent feasts were not given to the people after foreign customs; nor did the proper ceremonies of the holy temples fail through penury of the treasury, being always regularly supplied from the proper sacred fund. Our forefathers conceived true worship to consist, not in extravagant expenditure, but in the careful observation of divine precepts, transmitted from their forefathers.’

‘Congenial with those on the concerns of religion were their principles of communication among one another, as inheritors of a common country. The poor were so far from being hostile to the wealthy that they considered the fortunes of the few as the surest sources of competence for the many. The land-owners letting farms at moderate rents, the



' monied men employing the poor in manufactures,  
 ' or lending what enabled them to manage business  
 ' on their own account, all were bound together by  
 ' mutual interest. Nor did lending involve the  
 ' danger that either the whole sum lent would be  
 ' lost, or that, with much trouble, only a small part  
 ' could be recovered. For the juries then did not  
 ' prostitute lenity, but decided according to law;  
 ' they did not, by warranting the wrong of others,  
 ' prepare the way for themselves to profit from wrong;  
 ' but, on the contrary, they showed more indignation  
 ' at such wrong than even those who suffered by it;  
 ' for they reckoned encouragement for faithlessness  
 ' in contracts injurious to the poor, even more than  
 ' to the rich. None then feared to own their riches.  
 ' The wealthy saw with more satisfaction those who  
 ' came to borrow than those who came to pay: pro-  
 ' perty was secure to its just owner; and a share in p. 118.  
 ' its advantages was diffused, in the course of things,  
 ' among all ranks.

' Such then was the security of the Attic territory p. 130.  
 ' that better houses and better living in them <sup>22</sup> were  
 ' found about the country than within the fortified  
 ' towns. Many Athenians did not come to the city  
 ' even at the principal festivals; satisfied with the  
 ' enjoyment of their private fortunes, and not desirous  
 ' to prey upon the public. But now what reasonable  
 ' man can, without indignation, see citizens, uncer-  
 ' tain whether they shall that day have common ne-  
 ' cessaries, casting lots for the office of jurymen, and  
 ' decreeing subsistence for other Greeks who will pull  
 ' the oar for them; or strutting in processions in  
 ' golden robes, furnished by the public, and then

<sup>22</sup> Ἐπισκευὰς, *festæ*. Auger. *Ameublements*. Mably, *rech. sur les Grecs*, p. 17.

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

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‘ passing whole seasons in a way that I am ashamed  
‘ to describe.

p. 152.

‘ The result is that, among other states, we are  
‘ hated by some, and by the rest despised; proof of  
‘ which is open to you in the reports of your own  
‘ generals, and in the king of Persia’s letter lately  
‘ received. Among ourselves meanwhile we have  
‘ such perpetual discord that the inconvenience is  
‘ daily felt by almost all; and at the same time the  
‘ public good and even the ordinary defence of the  
‘ country are so neglected that none, without pay,  
‘ will attend the muster for military service. Some  
‘ indeed are so poor, or so shameless, as to disgrace  
‘ the city by becoming common beggars.’

In his oration on peace, published during the confederate war, lamenting the changes in the constitution of the republic as the principal causes of its evil condition, he had proposed generally the restoration of the government as established by Solon. We find no intimation that any reform followed. He now offered a less extensive but more specific proposition; to restore to the court of Areopagus, formerly so much venerated, its ancient dignity and authority, and especially its censorial power. Thus, he said, best the malversation of magistrates might be restrained, frauds upon the revenue prevented, sober conduct enforced among the wealthy, industry revived among the poor, and relief duly administered to the want of those unable to maintain themselves. His object evidently was to establish a check upon the wildness of popular despotism, to prevent the administration from falling into hands so unworthy as those which had too commonly directed it, and to provide a steadiness for the government altogether to which it had been long a stranger. But so much it would

have been dangerous to declare. That the people in assembly should hold an uncontrolled despotism, was a maxim so instilled by the flattery of candidates for popular favor, and so maintained by demagogues in power, that he seems not to have known how to be cautious enough in proposing any balance to it, or mixture with it. He ventures hardly more than a hint, referring to the constitution of Solon, who of all legislators of any fame, he says, had most favored democracy, and yet had established the Areopagus in all the power to which he himself proposed now to restore it. Fearing however this might not be accepted as sufficient apology, he concluded with what could not apparently but have the most direct tendency to overthrow his own work: 'It was a maxim 'with him,' he said, 'equally as with their ancestors, 'who had instituted and supported the venerable court 'of Areopagus, that the PEOPLE, as a TYRANT,' for that precisely is his term, 'should hold absolute sovereignty, the legislative power, the judicial, and 'the executive; and that nothing should be committed to others but offices merely ministerial.'<sup>23</sup>

In truth the censorial power, which Isocrates proposed to revive, was but a species of the very defective and very hazardous general resource of the ancient republican legislators: not a concurrent authority; nothing that could harmonize with the other powers; but, like the college of ephors at Lacedæmon, and the tribunate of Rome, merely another despotism, to

<sup>23</sup> Δεῖ τὸν μὲν Δῆμον, ὥσπερ τύραννον, καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχάς, κ. τ. λ. p. 112. The use of the word *τύραννος*, in this place, by so late a writer as Isocrates, will assist to indicate its just import when applied, by himself and others, to those who, according to our law-phrases, may be termed *tyrants sole*, in contradistinction to *tyrants aggregate*.



CHAP. war against that already existing rather than to temper  
XXXVII. and accord with it.

## SECTION VIII.

*Purpose of the war-party to carry war into Asia. Opposition of Demosthenes. Circumstances of Methone and of Thrace. Chares General-autocrator in Thrace. Massacre of the Sestians. Conquest of the Thracian Chersonese; and partition of the Thracian monarchy.*

The arguments of Isocrates produced no reformation of the government. The party of Chares, though checked by repeated failure of public measures under their direction, maintained yet a general superiority. On the conclusion of peace with the revolted allies the mercenary army should have been disbanded, and the fleet at least reduced. But Chares would be unwilling to return from a lucrative command abroad, with princely power, to the situation of a simple citizen of Athens, most uneasy for those most distinguished; and numbers, at home as well as abroad, had a share of common interest with him. The disbanding accordingly was delayed; on what pretence we do not learn; but indication remains, that it was not without some oppression of the allies of the republic.

Demosth.  
περὶ συμ-  
μοριῶν.

B. C. 354.  
Ol. 106. 3.  
[Cf. p. 266.]  
Ch. 37. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

Meanwhile the satrap of Bithynia, Artabazus, relieved for a time by Chares, being again pressed by royal armies, negotiated again among the Grecian republics for assistance; and it was now that he engaged the Theban Pammenes, whose service, formerly noticed, was also highly advantageous to him. But service in Asia, as Xenophon's account of himself shows, might offer allurements for an adventuring

commander, even without a satrap's pay. Whether with any view to promote such a project, the rumor was revived at Athens that a large fleet was preparing in the ports of Phenicia, to bring a Persian army to Greece. The people were assembled to consider of measures to be taken, in circumstances asserted to be highly critical. The leading orators of the war-party evinced a feeling of a strong interest on the occasion. They warmly urged that 'attack should not be waited for; that the best and safest way to obviate the threatened evil was to invade the enemy's country; that past experience showed encouragement for this abundant; the successes of the late king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus, the return of the Greeks who had penetrated as far as Babylonia with Cyrus, and, above all, the heroic deeds of their own forefathers, in Greece and in Asia, against the same enemy when far more warlike than now, all invited.'

The project, with any view of advantage to the Athenian commonwealth, especially when such an enemy as Macedonia was to be left behind, appears utterly preposterous; but for ambitious individuals, whose situation was uneasy or precarious at home, it may, with only a change of hazard, have offered lofty hopes. The peace-party however obtained on this occasion new assistance. Demosthenes, afterward so celebrated, made now the first of his speeches on political subjects that has been transmitted, and probably the first ever published. When an oration, spoken from the bema, obtained applause, the orator, if decidedly connected with a party, would publish it to promote the purposes of his party; if of undecided connexion, he would publish it to acquire fame and clients; which would give him

Demosth.  
περὶ συμ-  
μοριῶν.  
[B. C. 354.  
Cl.]

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

importance with any party, and otherwise lead to wealth. Demosthenes spoke in opposition, and the opposition succeeded. The war-party abandoned their measure, and no hostility being committed by Athens, none followed from Persia.

Disappointed of Asiatic plunder, the party turned their view to a field of far inferior, but still of considerable promise, and which they had long held in view, the Thracian Chersonese. But for reasonable hope of success there now it would be necessary to provide some distraction for the Macedonian arms; which otherwise might too effectually interfere. The circumstances of the little republic of Methone, on the Macedonian shore, offered opportunity from which able politicians could profit. Methone was the place whence we have seen the Athenian arms directed against Philip amid the difficulties of his first contest for his paternal throne. Its situation, opportune beyond others for offensive war against Macedonia, would expose it of course more to the jealousy and to the coercion of the Macedonian government. In weakness therefore its leaders would be cautious of offence to Macedonia; and hence probably the forbearance of the Macedonian government, through which Methone remained a republic when other towns, less obnoxiously situated, had been reduced by the Macedonian arms. It was now become very populous and strong, having been probably the resort of the Athenian party flying from the conquered places, Pydna, Potidæa, Torone, Amphipolis, and others. Being then, from Attica to the Hellespont, or at least as far as Athos, the only sea-port continuing to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Athenian people, it would be the only one whose commerce, more secure than others against smaller pirates, would



also be little liable to depredation from Athenian commanders. Under such circumstances flourishing, its connexion with Athens would be intimate, and its dependency unavoidable.

SECT.  
VIII.

It is no light indication of great moderation in the Macedonian government that, under such circumstances, offensive measures against Methone were so forborne that even the Athenian orators, with all their invective against Philip, have imputed none. On the other hand the historian bears direct testimony to aggression from Methone against Macedonia, and even actual war, concerted with Athens, previous to any hostility from Macedonia against Methone. The Methonæans then, having so taken their part with the Athenian government, which was engaged in a war with Macedonia of such rancor that all communication even by heralds was denied, vigorous exertion against them became indispensable. Their territory probably was small and of little value: the sea was the element to which they looked for wealth and plenty. On the approach of the Macedonian army therefore they shut themselves within their walls, which were so strong, and the defenders so numerous, that the siege was likely to be lasting, and the event uncertain.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 34.

B. C. 354.  
Ol. 106. 3.  
[Cf. p. 266.]

While measures thus were taken for employing the Macedonian arms without expense or risk to the Athenian people, intrigue was managed with equal success in Thrace. Were the sovereign of that country, Kersobleptes, involved in no trouble which might prevent his interference with the purposed measures of his allies and fellow-citizens against him, (for we have seen he was a citizen of Athens, as well as an ally,) their purposes, if practicable, would have been difficult. The princes Berisades and Amadocus

CHAP.  
XXXVII.

however, their instruments formerly, were still ready, for the reward in prospect, to become their instruments again. Rebellion was provided against Kersobleptes, and encouragement was held out for the discontented in every Grecian town of the Chersonese.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 678.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 34.

B. C. 353.  
Ol. 106.  $\frac{3}{4}$ .  
[Cf. p. 266.]

Matters appear to have been thus prepared when at length Chares returned to Piræus with the fleet and mercenary troops which had been employed in the confederate war. The people being then assembled, the question was put, 'whether the ships should be laid up to decay uselessly, the seamen turned to idleness, and the troops dismissed, when all might be employed most advantageously for the republic?' The war-party prevailed; Chares was appointed general-autocrator for command in Thrace; and the fleet and army were again committed to his orders with the plenitude of power commonly attached to that title.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 34.

B. C. 353.  
Ol. 106.  $\frac{3}{4}$ .<sup>24</sup>

Arriving in the Hellespont, Chares summoned the city of Sestus. The people refusing to abandon their existing engagements, and become tributary subjects of the Athenian people, he laid siege to it. Far more known for ages past in history and in song, Sestus was not now defended like Methone. Whether its walls, or its population, or military discipline, were deficient, or able conduct, or concord among its people failed, it yielded after apparently little contest. Chares then added to the numerous instances of sanguinary cruelty in democratical government, and of disregard for the Grecian name among the Athenian people,

<sup>24</sup> Diodorus has related all the transactions of Chares in Thrace under the fourth year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad. Possibly, as well as the war of Methone, they were begun in the preceding year.

by putting all the adult males of that ancient Grecian city to the sword, and selling the women and children to slavery. The terror of this example, the failure of support from the Thracian monarch, produced the submission of all the towns of the peninsula, Cardia alone excepted.

The important conquest of the Chersonese being thus easily made, Chares proceeded to give law to its former sovereign, the king of Thrace, Kersobleptes. By the deficiency of his understanding, the decay of respect among his people, the opposition of the princes of his family, and the failure, however happening, of the assistance of his brother-in-law Charidemus, that weak prince seems to have been almost helpless. No information of his attempting any opposition in the field is found. By treaty he surrendered to the Athenians the sovereignty of the Chersonese, and to his kinsmen, Berisades and Amadocus, portions of his remaining dominion so large that, equally with himself, thenceforward they bore the title of kings. Nor did this effectual humiliation of the unfortunate monarch satisfy democratical arrogance. The two kings, whom it had created, were required to be present as witnesses to the cession of dominion by the successor of their common ancestors Teres and Sitalces to the Athenian people; and, to complete the offensiveness of a ceremony in itself degrading enough, his former less successful oppressor, Athenodorus, as if to make him appear to admit the breach of a contract which he had publicly declared he never made, presided at the ceremony.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
ut ant.

But history seems nowhere to show democracy more lenient to subjects than to princes. To provide security for the new acquisition, and opening for farther conquest, would be among the purposes in



CHAP.  
XXXVII.

thus dividing the Thracian kingdom. But the Chersonese itself was not thought by that alone secure; nor was the ready submission of its people esteemed a sufficient pledge of their fidelity. Though the Athenians would not be persuaded either to serve in garrison or to pay garrisons, yet numbers among them, troublesome to the government at home by their poverty and their arrogance, would emigrate to a fine country in a fine climate, to take possession of houses and lands and slaves, and from the lowest of their old, become the first men of a new community.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 34.

The succinct account of Diodorus indicates a violent and extensive seizure of property; justifiable by nothing but the democratical principle, always asserted by Demosthenes, of right for whatever is profitable to the sovereign people. New colonists from Athens appear to have become the principal proprietors of the lands and houses, as well as rulers of the towns of the Chersonese.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Ἀπέσειλεν ὁ δῆμος κληρούχους εἰς τὰς πόλεις. Diod. l. 16. c. 34.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

*Affairs of Greece during the second period of the Sacred War, when Macedonia was implicated.*

## SECTION I.

*New views of the war-party in Athens. Trespass on the Delphian treasury. Methone taken by Philip. Invasion of Thessaly by the Phocians, assisted by Athens, opposed by Macedonia: victory of Onomarchus, and distress of Philip: death of Onomarchus, and liberal use of victory by Philip.*

THE conquest of the rich territory of the Chersonese, and the reduction of the once formidable monarchy of Thrace to receive law from the Athenian people, were, with whatever uncreditable circumstances accompanied, great and splendid advantages, balancing, in no small degree, the losses in the wars with the allies and with Macedonia, and powerfully promoting among the Athenian people the credit of the party which had put them forward. But war remained with Macedonia and with Phocis; in the former of which Athens was a principal party, and in the other had a deep interest. The difficulties and dangers hence arising, one party in Athens, had they had power, would easily have obviated. By negotiation with Macedonia, for which its king at every opportunity showed himself ready, they would have made peace for the republic; and by a sincere union with Lacedæmon for settling the affairs of Phocis, they

SECT.  
I.

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Demosth. de  
legat. p. 442.  
& al.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 367.

would have given quiet to distracted Greece. But neither measure suited the professors of war and trouble. The maintenance of the sacred war they considered as especially favorable to their views; and from the circumstances of Phocis and of Thessaly their ingenuity drew means for making others fight their battles.

Æschin.  
de legat.

In Thessaly there had long existed an Athenian interest in opposition to the Macedonian: the tagus Lycophron, commonly styled tyrant of Pheræ, or of Thessaly, successor of the tyrant Alexander, was the ally of the Athenian people. The Thessalian allies of Thebes, by inheritance inveterate enemies of the Phocians, were of the Macedonian interest. Lycophron therefore would of course concur with Athens in favoring the Phocian cause; and Phocis, as well as Athens, would desire to promote the cause of Lycophron. On this ground the Athenian leaders formed an extensive plan, for the execution of which however they wanted armies. The Athenian people would neither serve nor willingly pay; and armies of mercenaries were not so easily to be maintained by plunder and contributions in Greece as in Asia. To have armies therefore they must raise money, and to obtain it they hazarded their interest among the people in a very bold attempt. Nearly the whole of the ordinary revenue of the republic, as we have seen, was under the sanction of most severe laws, appropriated to matters of gratification for the many; religious ceremonies, sacrifices, theatrical exhibitions, payment for attendance on the general assemblies and courts of justice, or distributions of money. The leaders of the war-party endeavoured to persuade the people to concede, for purposes of war, some part of their accustomed indulgences. Demosthenes on this



occasion again came forward in opposition. ‘Instead of Athenian citizens,’ he said, ‘it was proposed to give the money to an army of foreign mercenaries, with which the generals might enrich themselves at the republic’s expense.’ The prejudices of the people, more strongly perhaps than their reason, would favor his argument, and his opposition was again successful.<sup>1</sup>

Demosth.  
περὶ συν-  
τάξεως.

This measure failing, a resource hardly requiring more boldness in the Athenian leaders, who would not appear as principals in it, was to use the Delphian treasury. Circumstances at this time favored. Lacedæmon, always troubled with hostile neighbours in Peloponnesus, was now at actual war with Argos; and, though carrying it with advantage into the enemy’s country, would thus be less able to interfere in more distant concerns. Onomarchus, new yet in his arduous situation at the head of the affairs of Phocis, and, though hitherto successful, surrounded still with difficulties, could not hope to maintain himself without support from some of the principal republics. The connexion of the Athenian government with the Phocian accordingly became of the closest kind. It is described by Demosthenes, ‘friendship, fellowship in arms, mutual support.’<sup>2</sup> The connexion with Lacedæmon of course slackened.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 34.

<sup>1</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus has not noticed the time of delivery of the oration entitled *περὶ συντάξεως*. The most judicious modern critics have ascribed it to the time with which we are now engaged. It appears to me to carry very sufficient evidence in itself that they must be nearly right, and that it cannot belong to the latter period, after the delivery of all the Philippics, to which Leland, apparently to accommodate his own purpose in narration, would give it.

<sup>2</sup> Φιλία, συμμαχία, βοήθεια. Demosth. de legat. p. 360.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

But it seems probable that the Lacedæmonian government also had begun to give sanction to some drawing on the sacred treasury; nor does it appear easy to say where positive crime in such drawing would begin. Every considerable state of Greece had its separate treasury, or chamber in the treasury, at Delphi; and, little exact as remaining information is, it is clear that every state had some right over its own. A nice question might arise concerning those principal riches of the temple deposited ages ago by Cræsus king of Lydia, and the subject will recur in the sequel. What requires observation now is that the means afforded by the sacred treasury growing daily more necessary to supply the expenses of the war, the use of them appears to have been daily less scrupled. Nevertheless it seems doubtful if the Phocian government had ever yet ventured upon it without some sanction from the states of their alliance, especially Lacedæmon and Athens. But it was afterward the boast of Demosthenes that at this time ‘neither Greek nor barbarian gave any assistance to the Phocians, but the Athenians only;’ and we find him avowing the importance of the pecuniary resources of Phocis for the measures of Athens in the war with Macedonia. That there was henceforward little confidential intercourse between Lacedæmon and Athens being evident in all accounts, the command of the Delphian treasury must have rested with the Phocian government and the Athenian.

With such powerful means, and opportunity to use them so that the first danger and the first scandal would belong to the Phocians, the Athenian leaders resolved upon great attempts. The mercenary force which had recently conquered the Chersonese, and enabled the Athenian people to dispose of kingdoms,

Demosth. de  
legat. p.443.  
Demosth.  
Olynth. 3.  
p. 30.

SECT.  
I.

Ch. 37. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

was not yet dismissed; and hence it seems to have been that, presently after what the historian has called the defeat of Onomarchus at Chæronea, the army under that general was so powerful that he could detach seven thousand men (should the same historian be trusted for numbers) to co-operate with Lycophron in Thessaly.<sup>3</sup> Nor may this be exaggeration, the Athenian government zealously co-operating with the Phocian; for, on a following occasion, in circumstances very similar, we find the transfer of a still greater mercenary force, from the Athenian service to that of allies of the Athenian people, attested by the contemporary orators.

The obstinate defence of Methone afforded encouragement, and provided opportunity, for the great stroke proposed in Thessaly. The importance of that place, its critical situation, and its close connexion with enemies so irreconcilable and so restless as the war-party in Athens, induced Philip to postpone some other interests to the prosecution of his

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus says that Onomarchus at this time bribed extensively among the Grecian republics. l. 16. c. 33. Occasion has already occurred to remark on the uncertainty of this kind of imputation, and more will occur hereafter. Whatever author Diodorus followed in his simplicity, he seems to have mistaken the fact, where he says (l. 16. c. 33.) that Onomarchus, by bribes among the Thessalians, produced a cessation of their exertions against Thebes. The sequel of his own narrative shows that, if money went, as is probable, from Delphi into Thessaly, it was not to enrich the party there hostile to Phocis by bribes, which could have but a very uncertain and temporary effect, but to subsidize the tagus, the ally of Phocis and Athens, and enable him to make those exertions against the other Thessalians, the common enemies of Phocis, Athens, and the tagus, which the historian proceeds to relate. So also levy-money for mercenary troops might probably go to some of the smaller republics, allies of Phocis.



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

Strab. l. 8.  
p. 374.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 34.  
Demosth.  
Or. in ep.  
Phil.

B. C. 353.  
Ol. 106. 4.

measures against it. The employment of the Macedonian arms there had left the field open for Chares to make his highly valuable, yet easy, conquest of the Chersonese. The siege was protracted through the winter.<sup>4</sup> In the course of it Philip, who superintended much in person, and often incurred the blame of an over prodigal courage, received a wound which deprived him of the sight of an eye.<sup>5</sup> The place at length became severely pressed; but, depending upon the promised relief of an Athenian fleet, the people persevered to extremity. A decree of the Athenian assembly directed that a fleet should go; but, as would be likely, and, according to Demosthenes, was common, where the whole people directed administration what was decreed was not always executed; the equipment was dilatory, and the fleet sailed too late. The Methonæans, unable to withstand the pressure longer, capitulated. Their town and its independent sovereignty they would not expect to

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus relates the taking of Methone among events of the third year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, and then repeats the story, with added circumstances, among events of the following year. No other ancient writer has at all marked the year. All accounts however being compared, there seems no reason to doubt that the siege, or at least the war with Methone, begun in one year, was continued into the next; and the annalist intending, in his succinct way, only one mention of this little war, in which the beginning and the end should be related at once, has, through forgetfulness, left the same story, and it is not a singular instance in his work, twice told.

<sup>5</sup> Thus simply the geographer and the annalist have related the fact, which Demosthenes also has noticed, and in a style of eulogy more creditable to him than his illiberal invective, which has had such warm admirers. The improvements of the story by writers later than the geographer and annalist, who themselves wrote three centuries after the event, improvements calculated for delighters in the marvellous, seem unworthy even of a note on history.

retain; but mercy for their persons was not denied, as by the general of the Athenian people to the wretched Sestians. To withdraw in safety was allowed for men, women, and children, carrying only the clothes they wore. The town was dismantled, and, with its territory, added to the Macedonian kingdom.

Meanwhile Lycophron, apparently assisted by a subsidy from Delphi, had so increased his forces that the Larissæans, Pharsalians, and other Thessalians, allies of Macedonia and Thebes, unable to meet him in the field, and apprehensive of siege to their towns, applied to Philip for support. But that prince had scarcely entered Thessaly on one side when Phaÿllus, brother of Onomarchus, came with the great detachment, already mentioned, from the Phocian army, to assist the tagus on the other. Philip however, joined by the collected strength of his adherents in Thessaly, defeated the united forces of Lycophron and the Phocian general.

This blow, following that of the loss of Methone, placed both Onomarchus and the war-party at Athens in circumstances highly critical. If means were not found to repair them, Thessalian forces, and even Macedonian, might be expected to join the Theban. The war might then, with more effect than ever yet, be brought home to Phocis; and, instead of new means acquired to annoy Macedonia, the way might be opened for the Macedonians to invade Attica. Either the exertion then was extraordinary, or the previous preparations had been great; for, before even Philip's activity could draw any considerable advantage from his victory beyond the immediate relief to his allies, Onomarchus marched into Thessaly at the head of such a force that, on joining the

SECT.  
I.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 24.

c. 35.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

Frontin.  
Polyæn.

defeated tagus, their united numbers exceeded those of the combined Macedonians and Thessalians. This force then he conducted with such skill that he defeated the king of Macedonia in two successive battles, and reduced him to such difficulty and danger that his retreat, at length effected into his own country, was reckoned among the most masterly military operations known to antiquity. All Thessaly, some of the strongest towns excepted, fell under the power of the tagus and the Phocian general.

The exertion of the Thebans had not gone so far as to send assistance to their Thessalian allies, yet they did not wholly neglect the opportunity afforded by the absence of the army from Phocis. Onomarchus, amid the joy of victory in Thessaly, was alarmed with information that the force of Bœotia was collected, and Phocis threatened. The Thebans seem to have been slow; for, before they had passed the Bœotian frontier, Onomarchus was within it. Reduced thus to defend their own fields, venturing a battle, they were defeated; and the important acquisition of the Bœotian town of Coronea to the Phocian alliance was among the fruits of this new success of the Phocian arms.

But the king of Macedonia was not of a temper to be dismayed by defeat, or slow in measures for repairing it. Every consideration indeed of his own welfare, and of his people's welfare, as well as of his own and his kingdom's honor, would require exertion to prevent the destruction, or subjection under the tagus, of that large proportion of the Thessalian people which was connected with him and with Macedonia by mutual and deep interest. While Onomarchus was on the other side of Thermopylæ he entered Thessaly again with fresh troops: the Thes-



saliens rallied round his standard; and quickly his force amounted to twenty thousand foot, and three thousand horse.<sup>6</sup> Lycophron, unable to keep the field against him, expected siege in Pheræ.

SECT.  
I.

It was, according to the historian's arrangement of events and dates, in the autumn still of the same year that Onomarchus returned into Thessaly with more than twenty thousand foot: his horse are stated at only five hundred; but even that number, among the establishments of the southern republics, was considerable. The tagus would add to his cavalry proportionally more than to his infantry; in Thessaly, and there only within republican Greece, horses and horsemen abounding. Athens, now free from other engagements requiring any great proportion of her navy, could afford large co-operation of that kind which a fleet might afford to an army; and in the ancient system of war we have already seen often this very important. A powerful fleet accordingly, under the command of Chares, took its station in the Pagasæan bay.

B. C. 353.  
Ol. 166. 4.  
[Seep. 320.]

Philip, with inferior numbers, did not fear to seek action again with the general from whom he had recently suffered defeat. Onomarchus probably was sensible that, with advantage of numbers, his army, a large part of which had been hastily collected, was inferior in discipline. He had to apprehend also the use which a skilful adversary would make of his superiority in cavalry. Unable perhaps, under all circumstances, to avoid, or much delay a battle, he chose his field near the shore of the Pagasæan bay, with

Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 444.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 35.

<sup>6</sup> The tenor of Diodorus's account and especially his phrase *βοηθῶν τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς* mark that he considered the body of the Thessalian nation as disposed to the Macedonian party; and this receives confirmation from the orators, even Demosthenes.

CHAP. the Athenian fleet at hand.<sup>7</sup> The contest was severe:  
 XXXVIII. but the victory, (the Thessalian cavalry, it is said,  
 largely contributing to it,) was at length complete on  
 the Macedonian side. The routed Phocians mostly  
 fled toward the friendly ships, and the refuge was  
 important; but, being pursued even into the sea by  
 the best horse of Greece, their loss was very great.

[B.C. 352.\* Onomarchus himself fell: those who perished by the  
 Cl.] sword or the water are said to have been together six  
 thousand, and the prisoners full three thousand. Ex-  
 cepting those who reached the ships, hardly any un-  
 mounted could escape.<sup>8</sup>

Through this great victory Thessaly came entire  
 into the power of the conquerors. Lycophron, flying  
 from the field of battle to Pheræ, and despairing of  
 means to maintain himself there, surrendered the  
 city, under a capitulation, to the king of Macedonia.  
 Pagasæ, the immediate sea-port of Pheræ, and Mag-

<sup>7</sup> Diodorus says the Athenian fleet under Chares was acci-  
 dentally sailing by. It is not unlikely that a bold orator, whom  
 the compiler may have taken for his authority, would venture  
 to tell such a story to the Athenian many. But it remains in-  
 dicated by Demosthenes that an Athenian naval force, greater  
 or less, had been constantly, or at least commonly, kept on the  
 Thessalian coast, co-operating with the tagus.

<sup>8</sup> The stories of the destruction of Onomarchus by his own  
 people, and of the crucifixion of his dead body by Philip's  
 order, could surely not have passed unnoticed by Demosthenes,  
 had they had in his time the least credit, or even had they been  
 invented so early.

[\* B. C. 352. 'Lycophron of Pheræ calls in Onomarchus, who is defeated  
 'and slain by Philip, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Εὐδήμου. Diod. xvi. 32. 35. Lycophron  
 'surrenders Pheræ, and joins Phaÿllus, ἐπὶ Ἀριστοδήμου. Idem xvi. 37.  
 'Philip, after the liberation of Pheræ, and the defeat of Onomarchus, attempts  
 'to pass the Thermopylæ, but is prevented by the Athenians, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος  
 'Ἀριστοδήμου. Diod. xvi. 38. It is plain that these transactions, distributed  
 'into the years of two archons, happened in one campaign; namely, the spring,  
 'summer, and autumn of B. C. 352.' Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 132.]

nesia, another principal emporium of Thessaly, dependent on the Pheræan government, presently followed the example of the capital.

Strab. l. 9.  
p. 436.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 35.

Intelligence of these great events conveyed to Athens excited alarm there, among the war-party extreme, but perhaps not little even among those unconnected with that party. It was apprehended that the united army of Macedonia and Thessaly might penetrate through the strait of Thermopylæ, and being joined by the Thebans, nothing within Greece could resist. The people were hastily summoned. The command of the sea, it was observed, which Athens still possessed, gave facility for sending troops to guard the pass, by which the dreaded evil might yet be prevented, if measures were diligently taken. A force accordingly sailed under the orders of Diophantus, who took possession of the commanding posts, nothing being there to oppose.

Had it been Philip's own purpose to carry war into southern Greece, unquestionably he would have been rapid, and it seems hardly to be doubted but he might have occupied the strait before the Athenians could reach it. But the inveterate enmity among the Thessalians against the Phocians, sharpened by the invasion of their country with the purpose of reducing it under the power of a hated tyrant, would lead them to desire and urge the measure. Philip at length marched to Thermopylæ. A small movement of the Theban forces would have placed Diophantus as between two fires: his only safety would have been in retreat by sea. Nevertheless on his refusal to allow passage, Philip, without any attempt to force it, withdrew; and, staying in Thessaly no longer than to make some requisite arrangements, returned into Macedonia.



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

To those leading men among the Athenians, who were adverse to the system of war and trouble, circumstances appeared now altogether advantageous for renewing their instances to the people to allow negotiation for peace. War, it was observed, had been enough tried, and constantly to their disadvantage. Every measure yet, against Macedonia, had produced aggrandizement to the enemy and loss to themselves. At the same time the moderation of the king, and especially his disposition to peace with the Athenian people, had been largely shown in his recent conduct; when, to the dissatisfaction of some of his allies, he had yielded to the first remonstrance of an Athenian general, objecting to his passing in arms through the strait of Thermopylæ. But the ingenuity of the war-party was ready with an answer. ‘Not Philip’s moderation,’ they said, ‘or desire of peace with Athens, but his fear, and the formidable aspect of their troops, and the patriotic firmness of the general Diophantus who commanded them, prevented Greece from being overrun by an army of Macedonians and Thessalians.’ They did not scruple the extravagance of imputing dismay to the king of Macedonia, and terming his retreat from Thermopylæ, at the head of an army flushed with victory, flight; and they proposed, and the people voted, honors and rewards to Diophantus, for his bloodless and uncontested success, equal to what had ever been given by the republic to any general for the greatest victory, under the severest trial. What failed of real triumph over the king of Macedonia, and of fame for their general, which they would have equalled with that of Miltiades and Themistocles, was compensated for them in triumph over their fellow-citizens of the peaceful party, which, for the time, was complete.

SECT.  
I.

This however was confined to Athens. Over the rest of Greece other sentiments, and over a great part directly contrary sentiments, prevailed. A worse opinion of the Phocian cause grew, as, under the direction of the war-party, Athens superseded Lacedæmon in its patronage, and at the same time trespass upon the Delphian treasury became more notorious, or stronger grounds were afforded for suspecting its large extent. The ingenuity of the Athenian politicians, and the advantage they possessed in the circumstance that their city was the capital of the literature of the world, were diligently used to divert outcry from themselves toward those whose protection they had undertaken; and the zeal, with which the historian Diodorus has inveighed against the unfortunate Phocians, indicates that they had considerable success. But to a large part of Greece their influence could not reach. Thebes and other states produced historians to transmit what was said against Athens; and a late ancient writer, who among much ineptitude has some good things, may apparently deserve credit for his report of it. ‘Absurdly the Athenians,’ he says it was observed, ‘would compare their recent measure at Thermopylæ with the glorious exploit of Leonidas there formerly. Then indeed the freedom of Greece was to be vindicated, but now a sacrilegious injury to the nation; then the object was to defend the temples against the rapine of foreign enemies; now to defend the plunderers of those temples against their proper judges. If those who claim to have the best constitution, who certainly have a system of law universally admired, who lead the world in philosophy and all learning, will admit and support such enormities, with what hereafter can we reasonably reproach barbarians?’

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 60.Justin. 1. 8.  
c. 1.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

Nor was it in the power of the Athenian leaders to prevent great and extensive credit accruing to the king of Macedonia. On the contrary, their opposition and obloquy sharpened the zeal of his partizans, and contributed to excite panegyric and attachment, in Greece and beyond it, in some parts even to excess.

Justin. l. 8. c. 2. ‘It is incredible,’ says the same writer, still apparently reporting common fame not unfaithfully, ‘what glory the victory over Onomarchus earned to Philip among all nations. ‘He was the avenger of sacrilege,’ it was said, ‘he was the protector of the religion of Greece. For expiation of a crime, which ought to have called out the united strength of the world to oppose and punish, he alone was seen worthy to take the direction. Next to the immortal gods is he by whom the majesty of the gods

Diod. l. 16. c. 60. ‘is vindicated.’<sup>9</sup> Diodorus, less oratorical, and perhaps less exactly giving the popular expression of the day, is however more pointed and precise in his eulogy. ‘Philip,’ he says, ‘having abolished the tyranny in Pheræ, and given liberty to the city, returned into Macedonia with the credit of having advanced the power and estimation of his kingdom, by his achievements, and by his reverence for the deity.’ And indeed so his popularity was now established in Thessaly that, whether regularly elected to the situation of tagus, or under what other description vested with the power, he seems to have been henceforward considered, by the Thessalian nation, as the constitutional chief of their confederacy.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Wesseling has been struck enough with this passage to quote it at length in a note of the 60th chapter of the 16th book of Diodorus, introducing it with the phrase, ‘Pulchre Justinus.’

<sup>10</sup> Τὴν ἐν Φεραῖς τυραννίδα καθεῖλε, καὶ τῇ πόλει τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποδοὺς ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς Μακεδονίαν, ἡνέγκως τὴν βασιλείαν ταῖς πράξεσι, καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείᾳ. Diod. l. 16. c. 38.



## SECTION II.

*Phayllus successor to Onomarchus: large assistance to Phocis: Bæotia invaded, and Epicnemidian Locris conquered: Phælæcus successor to Phayllus.*

The overthrow of the great army under Onomarchus, and the reduction of all Thessaly under the power of the party connected with Macedonia and Thebes, were blows requiring the utmost exertion of the supporters of the Phocian cause to repair, if by any exertions they could be repaired; and this,

We find even Demosthenes bearing testimony to Philip's merit with the Thessalians in assisting them against their tyrants, — ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννικὴν οἰκίαν ἐξοήθησε. Olynth. 2. p. 22. Yet in the same oration, a little before, he had spoken of the Thessalians as held in unworthy subjection, and sighing for liberty: οἱ παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀξίαν δεδουλωμένοι Θετταλοὶ νῦν οὐκ ἂν ἐλεύθεροι γένοιτο ἄσμενοι; p. 20. Present impression being often, in the Athenian assembly, of great power, an orator might sometimes risk contradictions, to produce wayfaring effects. But if he committed his speech to writing with a view to publication, he would propose to do away what might not bear reflection. The apparent contradiction here however is perhaps nothing more than Demosthenes might deliberately risk, even in writing. It was the body of the Thessalian nation that Philip assisted against the τυραννικὴν οἰκίαν. If among his auditors many would believe that, while he promoted the interest of a party, the body of the Thessalian nation were held in unworthy subjection, and anxious for a change of government, his purpose would be best answered. But were the inconsistency objected to him, or to any of his more informed friends, it would be answered, 'you misunderstood the orator: he did not say the Thessalians universally or generally were held in subjection; but that *those* Thessalians, who were reduced to unworthy subjection,' (namely, the party which had befriended the tyrants, and were now deprived of their superiority of power and privileges,) 'desired to recover their former advantages, and no longer to see the government of the country held by their adversaries.'

CHAP. should Macedonia engage earnestly on the opposite  
XXXVIII. side, might seem hardly possible. Hitherto however, notwithstanding provocation given, no symptom had appeared of a disposition in Macedonia to take any forward part. Nevertheless those blows were alarming, perhaps in some degree to the Athenian people generally, but highly to the party which had been directing the administration. The opposition, before powerful, would of course be strengthened by them; yet the superiority still of the war-party had been proved in the extravagant reward procured for its general Diophantus. The sovereign assembly accordingly was persuaded not only to maintain the connexion with Phocis, but also to pursue the hostile line taken against Macedonia. In Phocis Phaÿllus was raised to the dignity of general-autocrator, in the room of his deceased brother Onomarchus. The intimacy of the connexion of the Athenian government with the Phocian appears not to have been slackened by the change, and Lacedæmon saw still its interest in supporting Phocis against Thebes.

Trespas upon the sacred treasury seems now to have been carried on with some degree of system by the Phocians in concert with their allies, and with no other reserve than their own views of their own interests dictated. The resource being yet good, to collect another great army would not be difficult. Not only professed mercenaries might be readily obtained, but citizens of allied states, if pay were ready, might be persuaded to take arms. Accordingly in the spring following the death of Onomarchus large succours from friendly states are noticed, for the first time since the death of Philomelus, as joining the Phocian army. Athens furnished, according to the historian's report, no less than five thousand foot

and five hundred horse, apparently all mercenaries; and yet, he says, the Athenian government received pay from the Delphian treasury for more. Lacedæmon sent one thousand men; Achaia, from various towns, two thousand; and the ejected tyrant of Pheræ himself joined with two thousand. Of these forces, serving in the name of states formerly so jealously arrogating military command, the new general-autocrat of the little province of Phocis was allowed to hold the command-in-chief.

With preparation so expensive considerable enterprise would be in view. It may have been disappointed by some failure in the projected combination; and some jealousy of the purposes of Athens, especially among the Lacedæmonians, might be not unreasonable. Bœotia however was invaded: but, according to the historian, Phaÿllus was twice defeated by the Thebans. It is however evident that he suffered little; the defeats having been perhaps little more than disappointment of attempts to take some towns through intelligence among the people. Failing however of his object, he turned into the Epicnemidian Locris; and the Thebans, whatever may have been their success in their own country, not following to protect their allies, every town yielded to him except Aryca. A party everywhere seems to have favored the Phocian cause; even at Aryca a gate was opened for him, and some of his troops entered, but, for want of due previous concert, were driven out again.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 37.

The Thebans at length, excited by the loss which earlier exertion perhaps might have prevented, sent their forces into Locris. Phaÿllus, leaving a part of his army to blockade Aryca, led the rest to meet them. But so was the pride of the Theban prowess



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

sunk that, even after advantage gained over a body of Phocians by night near Abæ, they avoided a battle, and, leaving Aryca to its fate, turned into Phocis for plunder. Phaÿllus followed, and put them to flight. Aryca soon after yielded, and thus all the Epicnemidian Locris was gained to the Phocian alliance.

B. C. 352.  
OL 107. 1.  
[Cf. p.320.]

Soon after this conquest, in the third year only yet of the war, the Phocians had the misfortune to lose the third of that extraordinary brotherhood, which had so supported their affairs and raised their fame. Phaÿllus fell, not, as his predecessors, by the sword, but by a consumptive disorder, which destroyed him at an age when his faculties of body as well as mind should have been in their fullest vigor. Onomarchus only of the three brothers left a son, Phalæcus, and he was under age; yet such was the popular respect for his father and uncles that he was appointed to the first dignity, civil and military, with the continued title of general-autocrator. To provide assistance for his deficient experience being however indispensable, Mnaseas, one of the most confidential friends of the former generals, was appointed his colleague. In a state otherwise situated such appointments might mark only the ascendancy of family interest, or the power of a party, or the favor of the soldiery. All these probably concurred to produce the elevation of Phalæcus. Yet, in the circumstances of Phocis, all these would have been insufficient without high esteem for the family of those autocrators, not only among the Phocian people but also among all the allied republics of various constitutions; the continuance of whose support was essential to enable any general to hold command, or even existence, in Phocis.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 37.  
Pausan.  
l. 10. c. 2.

To support that popular estimation which had

SECT.  
III.

raised Mnaseas and his youthful colleague to their arduous post, as well as to assist the maintenance of their mercenary force, early exertion in enterprise probably was necessary. Mnaseas, very soon after his elevation, lost his life in action. His young colleague nevertheless ventured an incursion into Bœotia with a body of horse, but near Chæronea he received a check, which the historian again calls a defeat. The consequences however appear to have been little important, except that the acquisition of Chæronea to the Phocian alliance, the apparent object of the expedition, was prevented. Little enterprises thus were engaging the Phocian arms, while the Thebans remained inert or on the defensive, when movements elsewhere called the attention of both, together with that of all the principal states of Greece.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 38.

## SECTION III.

*State of parties in Athens: Isocrates; Phocion; Æschines; Demosthenes: Grecian settlements in Scythia. Politics of Demosthenes before he acquired a share in the administration.*

The war of oratory at Athens, always of weight in Grecian affairs, had at this critical period more than common importance, when, fortunately for history, it becomes also more known to us through preserved orations. At this time that party of which Chares was the ostensible chief, and for its measures may be entitled either the high democratical party or the war-party, held still a general ascendancy; yet wholly not unbalanced by the party of better men who, though compelled to profess great reverence for the purest democracy, may perhaps not improperly be named the aristocratical party: their opponents affected to call them the Macedonian.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

M. T. Cic.

Plut. vit.  
Phocion.

This party had, for its leaders, all the men whom ancient writers, with remarkable concurrence, have described as the most respectable of their time, or, almost of any time. Isocrates, toward the age of ninety, without having ever held or sought political office, was as the father of the band. Timotheus, now in banishment, if yet living, had been the favorite scholar of Isocrates, and remained always his intimate friend. Iphicrates and Chabrias, (the latter we have seen losing his life in his country's service,) however differing about inferior political interests or private concerns, concurred nearly with Isocrates and Timotheus and each other in general political principles, and on the leading interests of the republic. Phocion, not ill selected by Plutarch, from among all the worthies of all the republics of Greece, as a model of inflexible integrity in a corrupt age, the fittest parallel to the celebrated Utican Cato, had been coming forward under those three great men, but more particularly attached to Chabrias.

Phocion appears to have been of no family eminence, but of wealth that enabled him to attend the philosophical school of Academus, under Plato, and afterward under Xenocrates. His temper was particular; he is said to have been scarcely ever seen either to weep or laugh: with an aspect singularly sour, his manners were mild and pleasant. He chose the military line, and rose early to considerable command under Chabrias, who discerned his superior claim to confidence. Before the Confederate war, when so many synedrian allies paid tribute to Athens, Chabrias, being commander-in-chief, committed to Phocion the office of collecting the tribute, and placed under his orders for the purpose a squadron of twenty triremes. Phocion remonstrated: 'To



‘meet enemies,’ he said, ‘the force was insufficient; to visit friends, it was needlessly great.’<sup>11</sup> At his own choice Chabrias allowed him to go with a single trireme. Probably he was contented with smaller presents for himself than the Athenian naval commanders were wont to exact from maritime states; and the appetites of those under him in one ship were of course more easily satisfied than those of the crews of twenty. He made his mission altogether so acceptable as to afford demonstration that, for that time at least, he had rightly estimated the necessary force. Numerous vessels of the allies voluntarily attended his return to Attica, bearing the full amount of the customary tribute.

SECT.  
III.

The circumstances of the times, the state of parties, and the perils of the republic, rather than his inclination, seem to have led Phocion to engage in civil contest, and become a public speaker; for which however he had great and singular talents. Not a flowing orator, no speeches have been preserved from him; but he excelled in quickness of perception and readiness of words for reply and debate. None equalled him in detecting the fallacy of specious argument, which would make the worse appear the better cause, or in the cutting sententiousness with which he exposed it; whence Demosthenes, who feared him more than any other speaker, is said to have called him the Hatchet. Expectation was thus always kept alive by his speeches; and hence, curiosity being a prevailing passion of the Athenian

<sup>11</sup> These words rest only on Plutarch's authority; but they relate to a public transaction, and are in consonance with it; whence they may perhaps derive somewhat a higher title to credit than accounts of words passing in private or confidential communication.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

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many, though he showed scorn, as no other dared, of the common flattery of the orators to them, yet, unless when an adverse party was violent enough and strong enough to overbear all contradiction, he was always well heard.

Opposed to these, in the high democratical cause, the name of most eminence is that of Chares; whose early promise in military command which earned him the good report of Xenophon, and whose abandonment of himself afterward to every vice, equally by which a corrupt people might be courted, and for which a corrupt people would allow indulgence, have been already noticed. His eloquence was of the kind for communicating with persons of all ranks and descriptions in conversation, but not for impressing attentive numbers from the bema. To hold high situation therefore, either political or military, under the Athenian government, it was necessary for him to have able orators for his associates; and he was skilful and fortunate enough to gain support from most of those most eminent in his age. Lysias, Lycurgus, Hegesippus, Hyperides, and others of considerable note, spoke mostly in the high democratical cause, and were of his party. But of the numbers who contended for public favor, in the general assembly and in multitudinary courts of justice, two now became distinguished for a superiority of talent; whence one has been esteemed the greatest orator Greece, or perhaps the world, ever produced, and the other second only to him, Demosthenes and Æschines.

It is remarkable, and proves a great change in the character of the Athenian government and the habits and prejudices of the people, that neither of these men, who so rose to the head of the republic, was

regularly born an Athenian citizen. Æschines, by some years the elder, is said to have been the son of a slave, Tromes, the domestic of a schoolmaster of Athens. During the tyranny of the Thirty, whether attending the flight of his master, or profiting from the confusion of the times to escape from slavery, Tromes passed into Asia, and there entered as a soldier into a band of Grecian mercenaries. It was perhaps then that he took opportunity to change the servile appellation of Tromes, for a name of more respectable sound to Grecian ears, Atrometus. On the invitation held out by Thrasybulus for associates in war against the Thirty, he joined the standard of freedom; and, carrying probably some recommendation earned in service in Asia, was appointed, by that great and discerning man, to a situation of some command. In the restored commonwealth, in which by his service he had earned the rank of citizen, he took the profession of schoolmaster.<sup>12</sup> He had married a woman of proper Athenian birth, and sister of a man who rose to considerable military rank, but herself of an occupation highly disreputable, though required for what the Greeks called religion, a bacchanalian dancer and teacher of bacchanalian ceremonies.

SECT.  
III.Demosth. de  
cor. p. 313.Æsch. de  
legat. p. 313.  
Demosth.  
ut sup.Æsch. ut  
sup.Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 415.  
& 431.  
Æsch. de  
leg. p. 256.  
Demosth.  
de cor.

<sup>12</sup> Demosthenes, in his oration on the embassy, speaks contemptuously of the father of Æschines as Atrometus the schoolmaster, but not as having ever been a slave, nor does he mention his servile name Tromes. These circumstances are brought forward only in his oration on the crown, spoken twenty years after, and to which we find no reply from Æschines. Nevertheless the evident lameness of Æschines's account of his family, avoiding all notice of his father's origin and early age, leave us at least at full liberty to believe what Demosthenes would hardly have ventured to assert, could it have been convicted of falsehood. *Tromes* bears analogy to the English word *Quaker*; *Atrometus* to *Unquaking*, *Unshaken*, *Steadfast*, *Fearless*, *Dreadnaught*.



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.Æschin.  
de legat.  
p. 331. 2. 3.

Æschines was one of a numerous progeny from this match. An Athenian citizen, as the son of an Athenian citizen, he was, at the usual age, eighteen, enrolled of the ward into which his father had been admitted, the Pandionidean; and during the next two years he fulfilled the duty of military service within Attica, as required by law for all youths of that age; a duty however, in the growing licentiousness of the people and neglect of the old constitution, so commonly avoided that the performance appears to have been considered as ground for claiming merit. On reaching the age of military manhood, twenty, he joined the Athenian troops, auxiliaries to the Lacedæmonian, in Peloponnesus; and he earned the commendation of his general in the battle of the Nemean glen, defending a convoy going to Phlius, then suffering, as we have formerly seen, for its faithful attachment to Lacedæmon. He continued to serve with the Athenian troops through that war, and was engaged in the great concluding battle of Mantinea.

Demosth. de  
leg. p. 313.  
and 403.  
p. 449.

But military service in Greece rarely led to fortune, and carried no constant pay. After the peace therefore which followed the battle of Mantinea, Æschines took the place of clerk to the council of Five-hundred,<sup>13</sup> and at one time he was an actor on the public

<sup>13</sup> The situation of Æschines in public offices is thus described by Demosthenes: Ὑπογραμματεύων ὑμῖν (τῷ δήμῳ) καὶ ὑπηρετῶν τῇ βουλῇ, αὐτὸς ἐξεγγεῖτο τὸν νόμον τοῦτον τῷ κήρυκι. Demosth. de legat. p. 363. The office seems nearly to have resembled that of the clerks of the houses of Parliament with us, and to have been less creditable only because, as Demosthenes a little farther intimates, it was so ill paid that from eighteen-pence to half-a-crown was a bribe for those who held it: Ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑπογραμματεύοντα, καὶ δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν δραχμῶν πονηρόν. Demosth. de legat. p. 403.

stage. He was there, as Demosthenes repeatedly mentions, remarked for his fine voice. When, and how introduced, he first began to avail himself of his talents as an orator in the general assembly we do not learn. This however, now in Athens truly a trade, became at length the trade of Æschines.

SECT.  
III.

Demosth. in  
Aristocr.  
p. 687.

Demosthenes had so far advantage of birth that his father was an Athenian born; but his mother was of half blood, being the produce of an illicit marriage with a Scythian woman. It is moreover remarkable that these two great orators, who became two of the most eminent men, not of Athens only, but of Greece and the civilized world, giving an account each of the other's family and of his own, have both avoided to own a grandfather. Of the maternal grandfather of Demosthenes only report remains, and that from his rival; but authenticated by his own omission of contradiction when occasion offered and required, if it might be done; and the story is interesting enough, with a view to public as well as to private history, to deserve some notice.

The thorny situation of wealthy and eminent men, in the actual state of the Athenian government, not only induced those who had means, as we are told of Iphicrates, Chabrias, and others, to provide foreign retreats, but would operate as temptation to betray the republic for the acquisition of an advantageous retreat. In the failure of Grecian harvests, through continual wars and the political circumstances of the country, to supply food for the population, the singularly productive peninsula, on the northern side of the Euxine sea, called by the Greeks the Tauric Chersonese, and by us the Crimea, attracted the attention of Grecian merchants. The country was held by a Scythian horde, acknowledging a king,

Strab. l. 7.  
p. 307.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

whose authority extended far on the northern shore of the Euxine. But, the Scythians caring little for land and less for trade, the Greeks proceeded from commerce to settlements; which seem to have been made nearly in the manner of the modern European settlements in India. The merchants obtained leave to establish factories, paying a tribute. They fortified the factory; and then, paying still the tribute for the sake of security for their trade, they would however defend their possession against any claim of the sovereign. In this country the Athenians had a settlement, called Nymphæum. The town was considerable, the harbour commodious, the adjacent territory highly fruitful. Gylon, an Athenian, was, under appointment of the Athenian people, governor of this colony when the sovereign of the country desired to recover possession of it. Powerful in the field, the prince was probably aware that, against Grecian fortification, Scythian science in the war of sieges might fail. He therefore entered into negotiation with the governor; who, for the town and territory of Kepi on the same shore as a lordship for himself, with a rich Scythian heiress in marriage, betrayed the trust committed to him by his country, and surrendered Nymphæum to the Scythian king. Cited then to take his trial at Athens, he of course avoided to appear; and, in consequence, according to the practice of the Athenian courts, in his absence he was condemned to death. As a feudatory lord, under a Scythian prince, he was probably secure enough against Athenian vengeance: his return to his native country only was precluded. But when two daughters, born of his irregular marriage, approached womanhood, whether less satisfied with the private manners of the people among whom he was

Æsch. de  
cor. p. 561.  
Strab. l. 7.  
p. 309.



established, or with the existing political circumstances about him, he sent them to Athens. Having acquired wealth in his distant lordship, he offered fortunes with them, of an amount esteemed inviting; perhaps hoping, through the connexions he might so make, to procure his own pardon from the people. We have seen some of the most illustrious Athenians marrying the daughters of Thracian princes, with no detriment to their progeny; but possibly those princes might have received the freedom of the city, which would obviate legal objection. One of Gylon's daughters obtained a man of eminence, Demochares; but the match seems to have been considered as derogatory to him. The other took for her husband Demosthenes, a citizen of the Pæanian ward, by trade a sword-cutler.<sup>14</sup>

The only child of the latter of these matches, born in the fourth year of the ninety-ninth Olympiad, and, from his father, named Demosthenes, was left an orphan of seven years old, with property which ranked him among the wealthy of Athens. Educated as became his fortune, and introduced into life advan-

Dion. Hal.  
ad Amm.  
[Cf. p. 341.]

Demosth.  
de cor.

<sup>14</sup> Æschines, avoiding specific mention of Demochares, speaks of Gylon's daughters thus: 'One married—let it be anybody, that I may not say what may be unpleasant to many: Demosthenes the Pæanian, in contempt of the laws of his country, took the other for his wife.' We owe the name of Demochares to the son of the latter match, the celebrated orator, who seems to have been proud of the connexion. (Demosth. de cor.) Demosthenes was no favorite character with Plutarch, who has yet shown himself unwilling to allow, though unable to deny, that the most renowned of Grecian orators was, as Æschines has called him, a semibarbarian. The care with which Demosthenes himself has avoided the subject where, in his reply to Æschines, he has strained to represent his birth and connexions in the most advantageous light, amounts to an admission that the story of Gylon and his daughters was true beyond controversy.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

Demosth.  
de cor.  
p. 312.  
Æsch. de  
cor. p. 563.  
vel 78.

Æsch. ut  
sup. & in  
Timarch.  
p. 167.  
vel 24.  
Athen.  
l. 13. c. 7.

tageously through his connexion with Demochares, he was of course to take his share of the combined evils and honors which the Athenian constitution made the lot of the wealthy. In earliest manhood he was appointed to the expensive but honorable offices of choregus, or president of theatrical entertainments, and trierarch, or director of the equipment of a ship of war. To the burden of the latter office was annexed the honor of the command of the ship equipped. But while none of the wealthy were legally excusable from the one, many would be very unfit for the other, which therefore was not so rigorously imposed. Demosthenes, though apparently little of a seaman, acted however at one time as a naval captain in the Athenian service. He contributed also to the treasury, as we find him boasting, by gift; called free, but no more to be avoided than the office of trierarch. Nothing however beyond common pressure seems to have been put upon him; yet through his disposition to luxury and ostentation his fortune was quickly dissipated.<sup>15</sup> Want thus drove

<sup>15</sup> Plutarch, in his preface to his life of Demosthenes, well observes that a village-life altogether cannot suit one whose purpose is to write general history, because such a purpose requires opportunity for extensive communication among books and among men, without which the work, whatever may be the writer's talents, will be very defective. For himself, he adds, it was his lot to pass the greater part of his life in a little town; preferring such residence through his attachment to the place, and desirous, through his services, to obviate its otherwise threatened decay. Thus the sad inaccuracy of the general history, which his Lives of great men necessarily involved, may be in large part accounted for; and yet there are some things that still we may wonder at. Few anecdotes of private life remain, from all antiquity, so authenticated as those which have come out in the controversy between Demosthenes and Æschines. If then Plutarch had any library at Chæronea, it might be supposed the works of Demosthenes would have been found in it. Were

him to apply his talents to business ; and at the age of five-and-twenty he began with that employment which had raised Isocrates to fortune, consequence, and fame, composing speeches for suitors in the courts of justice.

Dion. ad  
Amm. [Cf.  
p. 341.]

Æschines, to balance the disadvantage of his birth, possessed, with great mental abilities, a superior

Demosth.  
de cor.  
p. 320. &  
329. & de  
legat. 449.  
& al.

they not there, or in any library in the place, it might be thought, when he was writing the life of Demosthenes, extracts the most necessary for his purpose might have been obtained from Athens, if not from some nearer source. But in his life of Demosthenes he has utterly neglected the great orator's account of himself, given in the most celebrated of his orations, that on the crown. Demosthenes there boasts of his education: Ἐμοὶ μὲν τοίνυν ὑπῆρξε, παιδὶ μὲν ὄντι, φοιτᾶν εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα διδασκαλεῖα, καὶ ἔχειν ὅσα χρὴ, κ. τ. λ. Demosth. de cor. p. 312. But Plutarch has not scrupled to say he was absolutely without liberal education:—τῶν ἐμμελῶν καὶ προσηκόντων ἐλευθέρῳ παιδὶ μαθημάτων ἀπαιδευτὸς δοκεῖ γενέσθαι. Vit. Demosth. p. 847. Again we find Demosthenes proceeding to boast of the figure he made on coming of age, for which considerable wealth was necessary:—Ἐξελθόντι δὲ ἐκ παίδων, τὰκόλουθα τούτοις πράττειν, χορηγεῖν, τρηφαρχεῖν, εἰσφέρειν, μηδεμιᾶς φιλοτιμίας μήτε ἰδίας μήτε δημοσίας ἀπολείπεσθαι. Ibid. Yet Plutarch represents him, on coming of age, as absolutely pennyless: ἐκπρᾶξαι μὲν οὐδὲ πολλοσὸν ἡδυνήθη μέρος τῶν πατρῶων. It seems probable that Plutarch made notes from books as he had opportunity, in his residence at Rome and elsewhere ; whence, and from his small library at Chæronea, his occasional references to books for historical matters. In composing then his great work, in his little native city, when both his library and his notes failed him, he would recur to the uncertain store of his recollection ; and when all these did not suffice to complete his picture to his mind, a striking effect being necessary in every one of his lives, he seems (judging from other remaining accounts, and some of the highest authority) to have been very little scrupulous of adding from his own invention. It follows by no means that his assistance is to be wholly rejected ; but, as observed heretofore in the text, that his word is not to be taken without considerable circumspection and caution.



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.Plut. vit.  
Demosth.

figure, a voice uncommonly melodious and powerful, a reputation for courage repeatedly shown in his country's cause, a private character without stain, and manners that made him generally acceptable.<sup>16</sup> Demosthenes had nothing of all these. A weak habit of body and an embarrassed manner seemed to deny him, equally as Isocrates, the hope of becoming a speaker to win the attention of listening thousands, and he had the farther great disadvantage of a defective utterance. With this, a sour, irritable temper was repelling to friendship; and an extraordinary deficiency, not only of personal courage, but of all that constitutes dignity of soul, made respect difficult and esteem apparently impossible. Nor were these defects shown only among familiar acquaintance; they were exhibited in public, and made extensively notorious. In the earliest youth he earned an opprobrious nickname by the effeminacy of his dress and manner. On emerging from minority, by the Athenian law, at five-and-twenty, he earned another opprobrious nickname by a prosecution of his guardians, which was considered as a dishonorable attempt to extort money from them.\* Not long after, when

Æsch. de cor.  
Plut. vit.  
Demosth.  
p. 847.  
Æsch. de cor. p. 441.  
Plut. vit.  
Demosth.  
p. 851. &  
v. dec. Or.  
p. 844.

<sup>16</sup> Demosthenes has ingeniously attempted to make even the advantageous person of his rival an object of ridicule, calling him 'that fine statue,' τὸν καλὸν ἀνδριάντα. Demosth. de cor. p. 270. His uncommon power and melody of voice he repeatedly mentions for the purpose of cautioning the hearers against their effect. Against his manners, his military merit, or even his private character, he seems not to have had an insinuation to oppose. The charge so often reciprocally made, by contending politicians among the Greeks, of corruption in public business, will come under notice hereafter.

[\* 'Mr. Mitford, who is not favorable to Demosthenes, asserts 'that this prosecution of his guardians 'was considered as a 'dishonorable attempt to extort money from them.' He quotes 'Æschin. de Coron. and Plutarch. Vit. Demosth. as authorities

in the office of choregus, which carried high dignity, he took blows publicly in the theatre from a petulant

‘ for this charge. The passage of Æschines, which Mr. Mitford  
 ‘ has in view, (for in the oration de Coronâ there is nothing  
 ‘ to his purpose,) is probably the following: Fals. Leg. p. 41.  
 ‘ 15. ed. Steph. ἐκ παίδων ἀπαλλαττομενος καὶ δεκαταλάντους  
 ‘ δίκας ἐκάστω τῶν ἐπιτρόπων λαγχάνων Ἀργᾶς ἐκλήθη. Some  
 ‘ deduction ought in reason to be made from the charges of an  
 ‘ adversary, which are not to be considered as containing strict  
 ‘ historical truth. But in reality the terms of Mr. Mitford much  
 ‘ exceed the measure of what is expressed even by Æschines.  
 ‘ The account which Plutarch gives has directly an opposite  
 ‘ meaning: ὥς γοῦν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενόμενος τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις ἤρξατο  
 ‘ δικάζεσθαι, καὶ λογογρυφεῖν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς, πολλὰς διαδύσεις καὶ  
 ‘ παλινδικίας εὐρίσκοντας—οὐκ ἀκινδύνως οὐδ’ ἀργῶς κατεντυχίσας,  
 ‘ ἐκπράττει μὲν οὐδὲ πολλοστὸν ἐδυνήθη μέρος τῶν πατρῶων. Vit.  
 ‘ Demosth. c. 6. Besides, it is utterly improbable that a boy of  
 ‘ eighteen or nineteen (*puer admodum*, according to Quintilian,  
 ‘ *μεираκύλλιον κομῆδῃ*, according to Demosthenes himself in Mid.  
 ‘ p. 539. ed. Reisk.) should have acquired sufficient influence to  
 ‘ be successful in an *unfounded* charge against his guardians. In  
 ‘ Mr. Mitford’s narrative indeed this improbability does not  
 ‘ appear, because he represents Demosthenes to be *twenty-five*  
 ‘ at the time of the prosecution: *on emerging from minority, by*  
 ‘ *the Athenian law, at five-and-twenty, he earned another op-*  
 ‘ *probrious nickname by a prosecution of his guardians.* But  
 ‘ the testimonies which I have collected in the preceding inquiry  
 ‘ demonstrate that this was plainly impossible. Even the erro-  
 ‘ neous dates of the Pseudo-Plutarch only make the orator  
 ‘ twenty-two at the time: and Mr. Mitford could not profit by  
 ‘ those dates, because he himself adopts the chronology of Dio-  
 ‘ nysius; fixing, with that writer, the birth of Demosthenes at  
 ‘ the fourth year of the ninety-ninth Olympiad. [p. 337.] It  
 ‘ is probable that, by inadvertence, he applied to the *prosecution*  
 ‘ *of the guardians* that date, twenty-five years, which his author  
 ‘ Dionysius applied to the *first public cause*: δημοσίους λόγους  
 ‘ ἤρξατο γράφειν—εἰκοστὸν καὶ πέμπτον ἔχων ἔτος. Dionys. ad  
 ‘ Amm. p. 724. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. pp. 353-4. The reader  
 ‘ desirous of accurate information respecting the age of Demo-  
 ‘ sthenes and the dates of his orations should consult chap. xx. of  
 ‘ Mr. Clinton’s Appendix, pp. 348—364.]

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

Æsch. de  
legat. p. 314.  
de cor.  
p. 440. 441.  
Plut. vit.  
Demosth.  
p. 852.

youth of rank, named Midias; brought his action for the assault, and compounded it for, it was said, thirty mines, about a hundred pounds. His cowardice in the field became afterward notorious. Even his admirers seem to have acknowledged that his temper was uncertain, his manners awkward; that he was extravagant in expense, and greedy of gain; an unpleasant companion, a faithless friend, a contemptible soldier, and of notorious dishonesty, even in his profession of an advocate. Yet so transcendent were the faculties of his mind and the powers of his eloquence that, after having, by great assiduity judiciously directed, overcome the defects of his utterance, he quickly made himself mighty among the multitude, terrible to his enemies, and necessary to his party.

In all governments, free enough to give opportunity for fortune to be made by speaking, the young adventurer finds the widest field for displaying talent and catching popular favor, and far least requiring care and circumspection and scruple, in opposing the existing administration; unless where, in a democracy, the opposition wants to restrain popular tyranny, while the administration finds an interest in supporting it. But any administration must want occasionally to moderate the extravagances of popular sovereignty; so that, in taking the side of opposition, the opportunity for invective, the easiest and readiest artillery of the orator, will always be surest. Of the political outset of Æschines no information remains. He was already, when first noticed as a public character, eminent in that party of which Chares, if not the principal director, was the most eminent person, the man who had most filled high situations, and who bore the most extensive influence among the sovereign many.



Demosthenes was yet but a candidate for that party-connexion which might lead to power, when, in the second year of the Phocian war, Chares and his partizans, after peace made with the revolted allies, wanting a field for military adventure, desired to lead the republic into a war with Persia. Then, at the age of nine-and-twenty, he delivered a speech, already noticed, in treating of the circumstances of the times, the first that seems to have attracted public attention enough to induce its publication; and he spoke in opposition. The orators of the war-party, who had spoken before him, had been endeavouring, by strained panegyric of the heroic deeds of their forefathers against the Persians, to incite the many to concurrence in their purposes. Demosthenes, in an opening of singular art, elegance, and conciseness, admitting the deeds of their forefathers to have been above all praise, turned their panegyric, and argument founded on it, most successfully into ridicule. He then proceeded to say, ‘that he considered ‘the king’ (for, as usual among the Greeks, he called the king of Persia simply THE KING) ‘as the common ‘enemy of Greece; but then he wholly doubted any ‘intention of the Persian court to proceed to actual ‘war. It would therefore,’ he contended, ‘be rashness for Athens to provoke hostility from so mighty ‘a foe. As for that union of the Greeks, proposed ‘on the other side, it was obviously not to be effected. ‘Many Grecian states, it was well enough known, ‘were much more disposed to trust the king of Persia ‘than one another. Nevertheless preparation was ‘advisable, against hostility from Persia, and from ‘all others.’ The whole speech is temperate in style, clear and powerful in argument, and apparently was

SECT.  
III.

B. C. 354.  
OL. 106. 3.  
Ch. 37. s. 8.  
of this Hist.

Demosth.  
περί συμ-  
μοριῶν.

CHAP. successful in effect; for the project of carrying war  
 XXXVIII. into Asia failed.

Nevertheless the war-party, with unabated diligence looking around for opportunities, proceeded to engage the republic in projects of complex hostility; conquest in Thrace, conquest in Macedonia through support to Methone, conquest in Thessaly with the arms of Phocis, and conquest, or what would be equivalent to important conquest, in Greece itself, through the establishment of a commanding influence in Phocis. To avow these projects beforehand, to their sovereign the Athenian people, would be to proclaim them to all the world, which would be to prepare their defeat; yet from their sovereign the Athenian people they must obtain the means for carrying them into execution. Under this difficulty they ventured upon the bold attempt, formerly noticed, to persuade the people to surrender, for the purposes of war, some of those gratifications which, under the sanction of severe laws, consumed almost the whole of the public revenue.

Demosth. Demosthenes now again spoke in opposition. He  
 περὶ  
 συντάξεως,  
 p. 169. had, as his speech indicates, already made himself conspicuous, so as to be confident of popular attention while he gave to invective against Chares and his associates a stronger tone. He objected to the proposed abolition of distributions from the treasury; the purpose being, he said, to raise a mercenary force for the generals of their party to command, more for their private interest than any public good. If war must be made, if troops were wanted, the citizens themselves should serve, as in good times of old. 'Were your armies composed of citizens,' he says, 'your generals would not, as now, plunder allies

‘ without seeing enemies; on the contrary, they  
‘ would do that by your enemies which they do now  
‘ by your allies. But those whom you now support  
‘ in the highest situations are carelessly employed in  
‘ canvassing for those situations; slaves to the favor  
‘ of the voter, sedulous to procure advancement to  
‘ the dignity of general, and careless of every deed  
‘ becoming a man.—Thus, in our assemblies, an orator  
‘ is commander-in-chief, a general under him, and the  
‘ wealthy in array under both: you, the citizens, are  
‘ divided, some under one leader, some under another;  
‘ and what you gain at last by your contention is,  
‘ that one leading man is honored with a brazen  
‘ statue, another acquires wealth and consideration,  
‘ one or two rule the republic, and you look on with  
‘ habitual indifference, abandoning to them, to use  
‘ for their own purposes, what should make a whole  
‘ people respectable and happy.’

But, in thus opposing those who had risen as leaders of the democratical cause, and held their power by their credit as its supporters, Demosthenes had no view to concur with Isocrates and Phocion in imposing legal restraints upon popular despotism. He already saw his line. For the favorite of an individual sovereign to have the greatest means of wealth and power, the power of the sovereign himself must be unlimited; and so, for the favorite of a people to have the greatest means, the despotism of the people must be complete. After therefore representing the Athenian democracy such as every democracy must be, if it settles into any order, the many nominally, but one or two really ruling, he proceeds to recommend a jealous vindication of the most unbalanced democratical tyranny: ‘ The cause,’ he says, ‘ of the superior condition of the republic in



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

‘ former times was, that then the people was despot and lord of all: <sup>17</sup> honor, authority, good of every kind, all depended upon the people.’ While he asserted this, the impossibility that the people could hold and exercise such power, the necessity that they must employ some favorite who would be the real ruler, was no secret to him.

For preventing the abolition of the distributions, the passions and prejudices of the many would be ready assistants; and so far the orator seems to have succeeded. But he was not equally successful in persuading the people to take foreign service upon themselves, or in preventing new and cruel oppression, in the old course, with armies of foreign mercenaries. It was in the same summer that Chares, with a mercenary force, destroyed the Sestians, and, providing means for Athenian citizens to take possession of the best lands of the Thracian Chersonese, earned favor with the Athenian people.

#### SECTION IV.

*Project of the Lacedæmonian government for an extensive arrangement of interests in Greece: tract of Isocrates entitled Archidamus: constitution of the new Arcadian city of Megalopolis: oration of Demosthenes against the project: war in Peloponnesus: imperfect accommodation: continuation of the Sacred war between Phocis and Thebes.*

The ambitious purposes of the war-party at Athens being defeated by the victory of the Pagasæan bay, with the ensuing expulsion of the tagus of Thessaly and subjection of his party in that country, the vic-

<sup>17</sup> Τότε μὲν ὁ δῆμος ἦν δεσπότης καὶ κύριος πάντων. Demosth. περὶ συντάξεως, p. 175.

torious king of Macedonia avoided interference in the disputes of the republics, not even pushing his advantages against Athens. Greece was thus left to its own discord. A chance of amended lot seemed offered in the very weakness to which the principal republics were reduced by the consequences of their ambition. The recent check to the means of the war-party in Athens was great. Thebes, beside the whole Epicnemidian Locris, and part of the Ozolian, had lost some considerable towns of Bœotia itself: but, what was perhaps more important, her failing energy in war and failing wisdom in politics were become notorious, whence followed a rapid decay of the high estimation acquired under Epaminondas, so that she was verging toward her old condition of a subordinate power. Lacedæmon, risen somewhat from the brink of ruin, but not yet in circumstances to entertain extensive views of ambition, looked nevertheless unceasingly to the recovery of Messenia, for which the situation of Greece seemed to offer now some improved hope.

It was too ordinary, as we have seen, among the Grecian republics, and most among the most democratical, to avoid a liberal communion of interest with other Grecian states; and, in prosecuting purposes of ambition each for itself, to deny all share in advantages to all others. But, under the admonition which Lacedæmon had derived from sufferings, the king Archidamus being the principal mover, a plan was put forward not unworthy of his character for wisdom, moderation, and liberality. The recovery of the dominion of Messenia for Lacedæmon was of course the first object; but benefit was proposed to other commonwealths, as widely and equitably perhaps as the divided state of Greece, where some one generally

CHAP. must lose what another gained, would easily admit.  
 XXXVIII. Restitution was the principle: Athens was to regain

Demosth. her frontier town and territory of Oropus, now under  
 pro Megalop. p. 203. the dominion of Thebes. The unfortunate people  
 & 206. of the Bœotian towns, desolated by the Thebans, Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Plataea, were to be restored: Tricranum, unjustly withheld by the Argives, was to be recovered for the Phliasians: a part of Triphylia, apparently that conquered by the Arcadians, was to return under the dominion of the Eleans: 'some of the Arcadians,' such is the phrase of Demosthenes, 'were to have again their own 'proper territories.' The import of this cautious expression would be hardly now to be gathered, but

Ch. 23. s. 8. for the account remaining from Xenophon, of the  
 of this Hist. founding of the new Arcadian city of Megalopolis. From the tenor of the oration of Demosthenes, compared with that account and with the narrative of Diodorus, it becomes evident that the Arcadians to be restored were those unfortunate men who had been forced, by democratical tyranny, from residence on their estates, and, with the destruction of their houses and villages, compelled to live, under the jealous eye of democratical rulers, in Megalopolis, as the capital of Arcadia.

For success in this extensive arrangement, which could not be carried into effect but by force or terror of arms, the concurrence of the Athenian government was especially necessary; and it seems probable that concert was early held on it with that party in Athens which desired that arms should be used only to procure justice to the injured, repression for the turbulent, and repose for Greece. There remains from Isocrates a political pamphlet, in the form of a speech of the king of Lacedæmon, Archidamus, which had



been published with the evident purpose of preparing the Greeks generally for the measure, but especially the Athenian people.\* The state of the Athenian government and Athenian parties required cautious expression about popular interest, and very delicate treatment of popular prejudices. Hence apparently Isocrates has referred so much to old and even fabulous times, venturing little on the actual state of things. He has however enough indicated that he, and those who concurred on political subjects with him, reckoned the revival of the Messenian state, such as it was under Theban patronage, no way beneficial to Athens, no way tending to the general independency of Greece, no way an act of justice even to the persons put in possession of the country, unless perhaps to a very small proportion of them, but really a transfer only of the sovereignty of the country from the Lacedæmonians to the Thebans, whose purpose

SECT.  
IV.

Isocr.  
Archid.

[\* *Isocratis* Ἀρχιδάμος. Written at the juncture of the peace, B. C. 366., to urge the Lacedæmonians ὑφίεσθαι οὐδέποτε, ἦν παρὰ τῶν πατέρων παρέλαβον Μεσσήνην, ταύτης στερηθῆναι. Xen. Hel. vii. 4, 9. Συνετάξατο Ἀρχιδάμῳ νέφ μὲν ὄντι καὶ οὐκ ἔτι βασιλεύοντι. Dons. Isocrat. p. 551. The oration itself attests that it was composed before the battle of Mantinea, and before the second invasion of Laconia: c. 24. p. 127. d. ed. Steph. ἅπαξ ἡγηθέντες καὶ μιᾶς εἰσβολῆς γενομένης (referring to Leuctra and to the expedition in B. C. 369.): and it is affirmed that Agesilaus is still living: c. 3. p. 117. d. τοῦ πατρὸς βασιλεύοντος, αὐτὸς δ' ἐπίδοξος ὦν τυχεῖν ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς. Nor is anything discussed beyond the single question of the recovery of Messenia. Mr. Mitford therefore is not quite accurate when he places this piece in B. C. 353. and considers it as an exposition by king Archidamus of future arrangements. He had already in vol. v. p. 188. placed it at the true period B. C. 366.' Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 117. Mr. Mitford, in the volume referred to, has not only placed this oration at the true period, but more correctly termed it, 'in the form of a speech of the prince Archidamus,' &c.]

CHAP. was to subdue Lacedæmon, Athens, and all Greece.<sup>18</sup>  
 XXXVIII. Hopeless as was, what all true patriots would most desire, a political union of the whole Greek nation, they considered the proposed arrangement as the most extensively beneficial for the present, and affording the best hope of opportunity for an improved state of things in future, that, with the consideration necessary for them of the particular interest of the Athenian commonwealth, could in existing circumstances be reasonably attempted; an arrangement by which the numerous little states, anxious for independency, and unable severally to maintain it, might best avoid the tyranny of one republic, which they had learned from experience of all things to dread, and subjection under a monarch, of which alarm was now industriously circulated. Thebes being depressed, Athens would remain the unrivalled head of the democratical cause. Lacedæmon would be raised no more than might be necessary to hold the lead of the aristocratical. Northward of the isthmus democracy, within Peloponnesus aristocracy, would preponderate; and between the two, more than at any former time, would be established the balance which had always been found the best protection for the smaller republics, and altogether most beneficial for the nation.

But the party of Chares having, as the extant orations of Demosthenes show, and even not obscurely avow, the same view to the sovereignty of Greece

<sup>18</sup> This transfer of the dominion of Messenia from Lacedæmon to Thebes, and the purpose of the Thebans, have been noticed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus; who, though more an elegant scholar than a deep politician, saw farther than most other writers under the Roman empire into the real character of the republican times of Greece. Dion. Hal. de Isocr.

for themselves in the name of the Athenian people, as the Theban leaders in the name of the Theban people, would, for no general advantage of Greece, or even separate advantage of Athens, allow an increase of power to Lacedæmon, which might be efficacious to obstruct that view. On the contrary, seeing in the circumstances of the moment opportunity for promoting their great purpose by contesting with Thebes the lead of the democratical interest in Peloponnesus, they resolved to use it at whatever risk of offence to Lacedæmon: whose alliance, should they succeed, they might perhaps despise.

In opposing the project of Lacedæmon, what they selected, as principal matter to contest in the assembly of the people, was the change proposed at Megalopolis. The founding of the new city had been a measure ingeniously conceived, and ably executed, (it is said by Epaminondas,) for a lasting curb upon Lacedæmon, and it had proved singularly efficacious for securing the new state of Messenia against the superiority of the Lacedæmonian arms. The site was chosen for the command it held of the principal pass from Arcadia into Laconia. The population was compounded with a view to make it always hostile to Lacedæmon, and necessarily dependent on Thebes. The greater part of the Arcadian land-owners, compelled to migrate thither, were warmly attached to aristocratical government and to the Lacedæmonian connexion. The democratical party, under whose rule they were placed in Megalopolis, adverse of course to Lacedæmon, wanted the support of some powerful state the more, as their aristocratical fellow-citizens were always ready to join their enemies. Argos was of their confederacy; but Argos could not always protect itself, and of course could not be



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

depended upon alone for protecting them. Thus Megalopolis was as an outpost for Thebes against Laconia, whence, if Messenia were attacked, inroad upon the Lacedæmonian lands was ready. But were the aristocratical land-owners allowed to return to their villages, and live, under their former constitution, with arms in their hands, as free members of the Arcadian nation, and no longer subjects of the Megalopolitan democracy, they would be a check upon the democratical population there, for prevention of inroad into Laconia, as Megalopolis itself was upon Lacedæmon for prevention of the employment of its force in Messenia. This therefore was what the Lacedæmonians desired; and it was so just in itself, and so little obviously interfering with any just interest of Athens, that, when proposed in the Athenian assembly, as the desire equally of Lacedæmon, now so long the necessary and beneficial ally of Athens, and of the Arcadian land-owners themselves, accompanied with the offer of the strength of Lacedæmon to assist Athens in recovering Oropus from the Thebans, it might seem difficult to find arguments likely to be popular in support of the denial of it.

The purpose of Lacedæmon however no sooner became known than the democratical Megalopolitans carried their complaints to every state in Greece, where they could hope to interest a party; and, though virtually at war with Athens since Athens had quitted the Theban alliance for the Lacedæmonian, they did not scruple, as apparently they did not fail of encouragement, to solicit the favor of the Athenian people to their cause. Ministers being sent from Lacedæmon to negotiate the proposed arrangement with the Athenian government, ministers also

attended from Megalopolis; and both were equally allowed to address the assembly of the people which was to decide on the measure.

SECT.  
IV.

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The superior talents of Demosthenes for public speaking had now raised him to importance, and he appears to have been already engaged in the party of Chares. Having always professed zeal for the most unlimited democracy, he was secure against any charge of inconsistency in taking, with that party, the patronage of the democratical Megalopolitans. His speech on the occasion, which has fortunately been preserved, is among the most striking examples, not of his fire, which he always knew how and when to suppress, but of his art, which the occasion especially required, and in which perhaps he not less excelled. What however principally gives it importance for history is the politics it unfolds. The existing alliance of Athens with Lacedæmon, and war with Thebes, made the business of the advocate for Megalopolis, the ally of Thebes, difficult and delicate before the Athenian people. His resource was in the popular disposition to that narrow and dishonest patriotism, which would scruple nothing to promote the interest of the Athenian people, at the expense of all the rest of Greece and the world. That profligate principle, which the party of Chares appears always to have asserted, Demosthenes is found directly avowing first, among his published works, in the oration for the Megalopolitans. There he urges, that the interest of the Athenian people required the depression of their allies the Lacedæmonians, not less than that of their enemies the Thebans. The interest of the democratical Megalopolitans then he most artfully puts forward by affecting contempt for them, and representing them as worthy any regard of the Athenian people only as,

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

through any favor to them, the interest of the Athenian people might be promoted. The result of the contest is not reported; but it remains among ancient writers to be gathered that, though the Athenian people were not prevailed upon directly and openly to oppose their allies the Lacedæmonians, yet the associates of Isocrates could procure no concurrence in the arrangement proposed by Lacedæmon.

Failing thus at Athens, the Lacedæmonians resolved nevertheless to use the opportunities, otherwise favoring, for prosecuting their purpose. Their hope seems to have been founded, on one side, on the weakness which Thebes had shown in the Sacred war, and the decay of Theban influence over the extensive confederacy which Epaminondas had led; on the other it rested much on the abhorrence in which the Arcadian land-owners held their democratical government, and the Theban patronage which supported it, and on their desire of the restoration of that Lacedæmonian patronage, under which they and their forefathers had been accustomed to hold their estates in better freedom and more security, and which they considered as an inherited right and privilege. To give encouragement and opportunity then for these men to declare themselves, a Lacedæmonian army marched into the Megalopolitan territory.

B. C. 352.  
Ol. 107. 1.  
Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 39.

This measure excited an interest through Greece such as to produce a kind of transfer of the Sacred war into Peloponnesus. The states of the Theban confederacy seem to have considered the support of the democratical cause in Peloponnesus as more their interest than the oppression of Phocis; and those who would not hearken to the call of the Amphictyons, when they suspected the result might be to place the Delphian treasury at the mercy of Thebes, would



march at the cry of the democratical Megalopolitans to defend them against the Lacedæmonians and aristocracy. The Theban general, Cephision, for here again (what has never yet occurred in the war with Phocis) a Theban general is designated by his name, Cephision led four thousand foot with five hundred horse into Peloponnesus: the whole force of Sicyon, of Messenia, and of the democratical Arcadians, presently arranged themselves under his orders, and the Argives were preparing to join him.

Soon after the death of Phaÿllus, or perhaps before it, the policy of the war-party in Athens towards Phocis was changed: the connexion with the autocrat-general and the executive government of Phocis slackened, and some democratical party-leaders were encouraged in opposition to them. Hence to cultivate again the Lacedæmonian connexion became highly important for the Phocian government, and on this the Lacedæmonian government seems to have had some reliance in taking its measures against Megalopolis. Under these circumstances, when the Theban army moved into Peloponnesus, the Phocians did not take any advantage of it for measures directly against Thebes, but sent three thousand foot, with a hundred and fifty horse, to join the Lacedæmonians.

The utmost force however that Archidamus could collect was so inferior to the united numbers of the Thebans and their Peloponnesian allies that the aspect of things was threatening for Lacedæmon. But the Argives were yet only moving to join their confederates, and had not passed the bounds of their own territory, when Archidamus, by an unexpected movement with the Lacedæmonian forces only, attacked and dispersed them. The town of Orneæ presently after yielded to his arms; and, by that

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

acquisition, he gave at the same time increased security to Laconia, and provided new means for checking the exertions of Argos. Proceeding then to join the Phocian army, their united force amounted still scarcely to half the numbers already under the Theban general's orders.

Ch. 27. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

Nevertheless, aware of the difference since the ability of Epaminondas no longer directed the Theban arms, Archidamus did not fear to meet the ill-compounded mass. A battle ensued of doubtful issue, so that both sides claimed the victory. But many of the Peloponnesian allies of Thebes, to enjoy the fruit of their claim, went directly home; a kind of desertion which even the influence of Epaminondas, we have formerly seen, could not always prevent. Archidamus meanwhile, being fortunately able to keep his army together, gained essential advantage by taking the Arcadian town of Elissus.

The Theban leaders however, after their Peloponnesian confederates had indulged themselves with a short visit to their families, found means to collect their strength again with added numbers; and, Cephision still commanding, they defeated the Lacedæmonian forces commanded by Anaxander, and made the general prisoner. They were superior also in two following actions, but apparently little important; for the Lacedæmonians afterward gained a complete victory.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 39.

What then led to negotiation we are not informed, nor why the Lacedæmonians, after their success, consented to the terms on which a partial peace was concluded. There is some ground for conjecture only that the king of Macedonia, solicited by the Thebans and Peloponnesians for assistance; interfered as mediator. Peace was made between the Lacedæ-

monians and Megalopolitans, leaving things nearly as they stood before the war, and the Theban forces withdrew from Peloponnesus. SECT.  
IV.

The unfortunate country, the seat of the Sacred war, thus had but a short respite. Whether in the autumn of the same year, or in the following spring, Phalæcus invaded Bœotia. Encouraged apparently by a party in Chæronea, he made his way into that town, but was driven out again. The Thebans then collecting their forces revenged themselves by invading Phocis, and, finding no effectual opposition, carried off much booty. But both parties were now so exhausted that neither could prosecute offensive war longer than plunder would afford means and encouragement. Incursion for plunder and waste was occasionally repeated on both; and, with this destructive kind of warfare, the hostile spirit remained as when the war began. B. C. 352.  
Ol. 107. 1.  
  
Diod.  
ut sup.  
  
c. 40.

Thus, though Athens had no share in the business of arms, all the advantage of this new Peloponnesian war was for the Athenian war-party, and for them complete. The result of the complex contest was precisely what Demosthenes stated, in his speech for the Megalopolitans, as what the Athenians should most desire: Lacedæmon was confined to a state of depression, Thebes nearly exhausted, and Greece more than ever divided.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> The French translator of the orators, Auger, has given a very different account of the result of the oration of Demosthenes for the Megalopolitans. 'Ce discours,' he says, 'prononcé dans la quatrième année de la cvi. Olympiade, fit sur les Athéniens l'impression qu'il devoit faire: ils envoyèrent à Megalopolis une armée, sous la conduite d'un de leurs généraux, qui remit les choses dans leur premier état, et rappella les familles qui avoient commencé à retourner dans leurs anciennes patries.' Where he found authority for this he has not said; nor can I



## SECTION V.

*Sedition at Rhodes: speech of Demosthenes for the Rhodians. Troubles of Eubœa: Phocion commander of the Athenian forces in Eubœa: battle of Tamynæ. Embassy from Thebes to the court of Persia. Treaties of subsidy between the Persian court and the Grecian republics.*

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

While the democratical cause, fostered by the two hostile governments of Thebes and Athens, was thus gaining ground in Greece, the embers of its fire,

guess what may have led him to the imagination, unless some imperfect recollection of the account given by Diodorus of interference in the affairs of Megalopolis twelve years before, attributed, by an error apparently of the transcriber, to the Athenians instead of the Thebans. But Auger's reputation as an editor and translator may require that, on some convenient occasion, farther notice be taken of his boldness in assertion on historical subjects, and extreme negligence of investigation.

Meanwhile it may be allowed here to notice a matter hardly to be passed without observation. Modern writers of ancient history have mostly followed some of the later ancients in reporting an expedition of Philip into Peloponnesus. Among the contemporary orators no mention is found of it, nor in the annals of Diodorus. The modern learned, who have most studied the matter, have differed much in conjecture, having ground for no more than conjecture, concerning the time when it happened; some thence have placed it before, others after the war reported in the text. It seems to me difficult to assign for such war any time in which it might not be shown from the contemporary orators that it could not be; and it is therefore principally for the support it may appear to derive from so early and so very respectable a historian as Polybius that I think it worthy of any discussion. With regard to Polybius then, it is to be observed that he does not, in his own person, at all mention the matter, that he introduces two contending orators, an Acarnanian and an Ætolian, speaking of it. The expressions which he puts into the mouths of these orators may imply, and probably will at first impress the reader with the idea, that Philip son of Amyntas in person made war in Peloponnesus; but they do not necessarily imply it. The modern phrase is familiar, that

nearly smothered by the event of the confederate war, broke out afresh on the eastern side of the Ægean.

Lewis XIV. made war in Spain, and Lewis XV. made war in America; not meaning to say that those princes were ever in those countries. It is then to be observed that Philip's *speculating* in Peloponnesus is found repeatedly mentioned by Demosthenes. In the oration on the crown his first speculation there is noticed; ὅτε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνος εἰς Πελοπόννησον παρεδύετο, p. 252. In the second Philippic we are told that he required the Lacedæmonians to resign their claim to the dominion of Messenia, and threatened that otherwise a great force should march against them, p. 69. In the third Philippic his speculations in Peloponnesus are again mentioned, p. 115. In the oration on the latter, delivered after every assigned and imaginable time of the expedition, embassies from the Peloponnesians to Philip are mentioned, and alliances with him, but no war made by him. Finally then, in the oration on the crown again, delivered several years after Philip's death, the zeal with which many Peloponnesian states sought his alliance, and the civil war between the Macedonian and Anti-Macedonian parties in Elea are mentioned, but no war made by Philip. This seems to me conclusive against his having ever interfered either in person, or by any Macedonian force, in any war in Peloponnesus. But we find Æschines mentioning that the Megalopolitans, and other Peloponnesians, hostile to Lacedæmon, took offence at Athens for her connexion with Lacedæmon; though the connexion of Athens with Lacedæmon was never very friendly. The same Peloponnesian states were those so zealous in the Macedonian connexion; and though we find no mention of Macedonia from Diodorus, in his account of the war under the Theban Cephision in Peloponnesus, yet, if Philip did at all interfere, it would be against Lacedæmon; nor does it seem improbable but that some threats, such as Demosthenes has mentioned without noticing the precise occasion, may have assisted to produce the final accommodation, on terms perhaps better so accounted for than under any other consideration. Possibly then such may have been the grounds on which the orators mentioned by Polybius, and Polybius himself, may have considered the king of Macedonia as principally contributing to the effects which the war produced.

Pausanias mentions a military station which he saw near Mantinea, called Philip's camp. The ignorance of the country

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

In Rhodes, renowned for the liberality of its aristocracy, and the prosperity of its people under a mixed constitution, the contention of adverse factions became violent. A common evil of civil contest ensued; foreign aid was sought by the weaker, and, in turn, by each party. Alliance had been ancient, and probably of mutual benefit, between the Rhodians, under their aristocratical government, and the people of the neighbouring continent of Caria, whose constitution was monarchical; being a kind of feudal principality under the Persian empire, whence the sovereign, or first magistrate, was called sometimes prince or king, sometimes satrap. In that principality Artemisia had recently succeeded to the authority of her deceased husband Mausolus. The aristocratical Rhodians, unable to withstand the democratical party, and fearing from its sovereignty worse oppression than from any foreign power, applied to that princess; and, to prevent the evil they most dreaded, received a Carian garrison into their citadel. Their superiority being by this dangerous expedient ensured, what had been their fear became that of their adversaries, the chief of whom fled.<sup>20</sup>

people, in his age, would be likely enough to attribute this to the more celebrated Philip, though it were really, as it is likely to have been, the work of the later king of Macedonia of that name, who did command armies in Peloponnesus. As for such writers as Frontinus, whose books are but bundles of stories, when they have found a good one they must find good names for the principal personages; and all will not be so honest as Ælian, whom we find sometimes confessing that he cannot tell to which of two or three great men a remarkable deed or a pithy saying should be attributed.

<sup>20</sup> Such are the plain and probable facts to be gathered from Demosthenes. But some embellishing circumstances of apparently the same story have been given by the great teacher of ancient architecture, Vitruvius. The democratical leaders, he



In the war of the allies against Athens, in which we have seen Rhodes taking a principal share, the Rhodian many had been forward and zealous; all parties concurring in aversion to the dominion of the Athenian people, of which experience was then recent. Whether encouragement from Athens had promoted the sedition which at length produced the flight of the democratical chiefs, does not appear, but there was a disposition ready in the war-party there to forgive former offences for the sake of advantage to be derived from future services. Not probably without some assurance of the existence of such a disposition, they addressed supplication to the Athenian people for assistance against their aristocratical fellow-citizens who now held Rhodes. Demosthenes undertook to be their advocate, and his speech on the occasion remains extant; interesting especially for its farther display of the great orator's political principles.

SECT.  
V.

Demosth.  
pro Rhod.

The business was of considerable nicety; for prejudice was strong in the minds of the Athenian many against the Rhodians, whom they had been taught, by those who now desired favor for them, to consider

says, having obtained complete possession of the government of Rhodes, sent a fleet to Halicarnassus, the capital of Caria, with the purpose of extending the democratical interest by exciting revolt against Artemisia. The princess, apprised of the purpose, captured the whole, and putting her own seamen into the ships, sent them immediately back. The Rhodians, receiving their returning fleet without suspicion, were overpowered, and the Carians became masters of the city.

Possibly there may have been circumstances to afford some foundation for this report. Such a stratagem however, producing consequences so important, would hardly have escaped all notice, from the contemporary orator, whose account they yet in no respect contradict. According to both authors, the democratical party, at first superior, were afterward overpowered through Carian assistance to their opponents.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

as rebellious subjects ; and to reckon the democratical party, under those circumstances, more especially objects of indignation. Fearing directly to meet this prejudice, the orator's art to obviate its opposition to his purpose is remarkable. ' It was not the cause of ' the Rhodians he was pleading,' he said, ' but the ' common cause of democracy. Such was the uni- ' versal connexion of the democratical cause, so ' readily, if variance arose between democratical go- ' vernments, they fell into concord again, that it ' would be better for Athens to be at war with all ' the states of Greece together, if all were under ' democratical government, than to have peace and ' alliance with all under oligarchy ; for between men ' who desire to rule others and men anxious for uni- ' versal equality no peace could be sincere.' Those among his audience, who reflected at all, would wonder why the stone-quarries of Syracuse formerly had been the graves of so many Athenians, why the hatred was so rancorous now between Athens and Thebes, and how, in the confederate war, the democracy of Rhodes itself became so hostile. Such explanation the orator prudently avoided, and, proceeding to catch at the passions of his audience, he mentioned it as a lamentable state of things that ' not ' the Rhodians only, but the Chians, Lesbians, in ' short almost all mankind, were living under a form ' of government different from the Athenian. The ' danger ensuing to the Athenian democracy was ' alarming, and those who establish any other form ' of government ought to be esteemed the common ' enemies of freedom.'<sup>21</sup> The Athenians therefore, he contended, ought to lay aside all other considera-

Demosth.  
pro Rhod.  
p. 196.

<sup>21</sup> The orator's phrase is, ' those who establish oligarchy ; ' but the tenor of his discourse shows that he uses that term to imply all governments other than democracy.

tions, and esteem it sufficient cause for assisting the suppliants that they were the democratical party.

SECT.  
V.

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But he was aware that notorious and celebrated facts, which had been repeatedly urged by more liberal politicians against the intolerance of the high democratical party, would be recollected as strongly contradicting this branch of his argument. In the extreme distress of Athens, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, when completely at the mercy of her enemies, and afterward, in the weakness of her first convalescency, when the republic was restored by Thrasybulus, the generosity of some aristocratical governments had saved and supported her when the rancor of democratical enemies would have doomed her to utter destruction. To obviate this he relates a story of democratical generosity. 'I would not have you,' he says, 'holding as you do, the reputation of universal protectors of the unfortunate, appear inferior to the Argives. When the Lacedæmonians, after the Peloponnesian war, were lords of Greece, they sent a requisition, it is said, to Argos, for some Athenians, who had taken refuge there, to be surrendered. But the Argives, far from yielding to a power so formidable, persevered so in friendship to you that they ordered the Lacedæmonian ministers to leave the city before the sun should set.'

Hence the orator proceeds to an avowal of political principles that will deserve notice. To subdue others, to grasp at dominion on all sides, he is found frequently urging to the Athenian people, in terms more or less direct, as their proper policy; but he constantly denies equal right to other people. Chalcidon on the Bosphorus, subjected in common with other Asian Greek cities to the first empire of Athens,



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

had passed, after the battle of Ægospotami, under that of Lacedæmon, and, after the seafight of Cnidus, had yielded to Persia. The Byzantines had now conquered it from the Persians. This, it might seem, should be esteemed creditable and praiseworthy among those who reckoned the Persians, as we have seen Demosthenes declaring he reckoned them, common enemies of Greece. But now, on the contrary, he considers the conquest of Chalcedon by the Byzantines as a crime, a robbery; not against the Persians, from whom they took it, not against the Chalcedonians themselves, Greeks whom they held in subjection, but against the Athenians; as if Athenians, and Athenians alone, had a right to hold all others in subjection.

Against him it appears to have been contended that Athens had now long held peace and friendly intercourse with Rhodes under treaty with its aristocratical government, and that to support rebellion against that government would be unjust, and contrary to the oaths which sanctioned the treaty. In answer to this we have again remarkable political principles. ‘I reckon,’ says Demosthenes, ‘it would be just to restore the democratical government in Rhodes: but even were it not just, still, observing what other states do, I should think it advisable for its expediency. If all indeed would be just, then it would be shameful for the Athenians to be otherwise. But when all others are providing themselves with means to injure, for us alone to abide by justice, and scruple to use advantages offered, I consider not as uprightness but weakness; and in fact I see all states regulating their rights by their power.’<sup>22</sup>

Demosth.  
pro Rhod.  
p. 198.

<sup>22</sup> Very much, in such arguments, depending upon the force of particular words, I will give the original passage at large,

He proceeds then to confirm this curious argument by a remark, showing the miserably precarious state of the boasted liberties of the Greek nation. ‘Political rights, among the Grecian states,’ he says, ‘are decided for the smaller by the will of the more powerful.’ An analogous justice seems to have pervaded the democracies. If persuasion failed, an orator, sufficiently powerful in popularity, would resort to threats and violence; nor did those endowed with the greatest powers of persuasion scruple to use a resource which their policy apparently, not less than their liberality and every consideration of public good, should have reprobated. But Demosthenes concludes this oration for the Rhodians in the way of the ordinary popular railers, endeavouring to intimidate those who differed from him by imputing all opposition to a spirit of disaffection to the government, and intended treason. What decree followed we are not informed, but no measures, or none effectual, were taken to support the Rhodian petitioners;<sup>23</sup> perhaps

that the learned reader, without the trouble of turning to another book, may judge whether I have rendered it to his mind. Ἐγὼ δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι νομίζω κατάγειν τὸν Ῥοδίῳ δῆμον. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ δίκαιον ἦν, ὅταν εἰς ἃ ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι (Byzantines and others) βλέψω, προσήκειν οἶομαι παραινέσαι κατάγειν. Διὰ τί; Ὅτι πάντων μὲν, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν ὀρηκώτων, αἰσχροὺς ἡμᾶς μόνους μὴ ἐθέλειν. Ἀπάντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὅπως ἀδικεῖν δυνήσονται παρασκευαζομένων, μόνους ἡμᾶς τὰ δίκαια προτείνεσθαι, μηδενὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένων, οὐ δικαιουσίνην, ἀλλὰ ἀνανδρίαν ἡγοῦμαι. Ὅρῳ γὰρ ἅπαντας πρὸς τὴν παρούσαν δύναμιν καὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀξιουμένους. Demosth. pro Rhod. p. 198. 199.

The French translator Auger, though generally a warm admirer of Demosthenes's democratical politics, exclaims, in a note on this passage, ‘Voilà donc les principes d’équité de la politique! — Comme si la justice n’étoit pas toujours la justice quand tous les hommes negligeroient la pratique!’

<sup>23</sup> Auger, at the conclusion of his summary of the oration for the Rhodians, ineptly enough observes, ‘Il y a toute apparence

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

because the attention of the Athenian government, as we shall see, was forcibly called another way.

Among the complicated circumstances of Greece in this eventful period some occurrences of no small importance remain indicated by the orators, of which not the smallest mention is made by our only historical guide; the failure of whose assistance for arrangement and dates, notwithstanding his frequent inaccuracy, is here felt as a loss. Nearly however to the time we are engaged with must be attributed some transactions in Eubœa, which may have assisted to prevent any effectual interference of the Athenian government in the affairs of Rhodes.

By the expulsion of Timotheus from Athens the connexion established by him, between the Athenian administration and the Eubœan towns, would of course be shaken: the confidence which the Eubœans had in his probity, liberality, and wisdom, would not be readily transferred to his oppressors, and they would not be disposed particularly to respect his arrangements. Nevertheless we have no information of oppression exercised against the Eubœans; on the contrary, the event of the confederate war seems to have been taken as a lesson, by Chares and his asso-

‘qu’Artemise étant morte cette même année, les Rhodiens furent ‘remis en liberté.’ There is no appearance whatever that the democracy could be restored in Rhodes without the interference of Athens: and democracy restored by Athenian interference would have brought the Rhodian people again under subjection to Athens: they must have sworn, as Demosthenes shows in this very oration, to have the same friends and enemies as the Athenian people; they must have marched and sailed and paid tribute at the pleasure of the Athenian people or the Athenian tribute-gathering admiral, and thus they would have been ‘remis en liberté.’ There is no appearance that anything of this happened.



ciates, for their conduct toward a subject country so nearly under the eye of every citizen, the importance of which was so highly rated by all: they did not here, as generally in more distant dependencies, establish democracy by violence: every town seems to have retained its constitution, as under the compact with Timotheus; and among proofs of ease and security in the island may perhaps be reckoned that Timotheus chose it for his exile. Probably he had ended a life neither short nor inglorious, when the Eubœan cities come presented to our view by the orators in circumstances that appear extraordinary. They were under the rule each of a chief, who bore the title of tyrant; if not regularly and as a legal description, yet commonly, and as an accepted designation. Thus Charigenes was tyrant of Oreus, Mnesarchus of Chalcis, and Plutarchus had succeeded Themison in the tyranny of Eretria.<sup>24</sup> But neither do we learn that these tyrants excited complaint among the people under them; on the contrary, they appear to have been the most popular men of their respective cities. Their eminence among their fellow-citizens for property and popularity seems to have recommended them to the Athenian government; and, the favor of that government confirming and increasing their importance among their fellow-citizens, they became in reality common agents, for the Athenian government equally and for their fellow-citizens, for the management of all their com-

SECT.  
V.

Æsch. de  
cor. p. 494.

<sup>24</sup> The title of tyrant is given by Æschines to Mnesarchus, and by Plutarch to his own namesake the chief of Eretria. Charigenes is called by Æschines dynast, which is not exactly a convertible term; but, as titles, tyrant and dynast were often used indifferently. The constitution of Oreus was democratical, and, as such, indicated by Æschines to have differed from that of the other towns.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

mon concerns.<sup>25</sup> Supported thus by their personal interest among their fellow-citizens on one side, and by the patronage of the Athenian government on the other, they held that kind of princely sway which was commonly in the language of the times between Homer and Demosthenes designated by the term tyranny.

Probably the party which, before the intervention of Timotheus, had, with Theban assistance, nearly obtained complete command of the island, was not entirely crushed or converted by his arms or his policy. But among so many independent townships, of various constitutions, within one island, grounds of disagreement, such as had given occasion to the former wars, could hardly fail to abound. If then better or more favorite assistance was not immediately in view, all, of course, would vie for the support of Athens. But the Athenian government seems to have been disposed to its former policy of letting the Eubœans fight their own battles after their own way, so only that the interference of foreign powers was avoided.

Æsch. de  
cor.

In this neglect of the interests of the Eubœans, and of their just claim of protection as subjects and tributaries, the people of Chalcis, the most populous town of the island, under the lead of Callias and Taurosthenes, sons of the late tyrant Mnesarchus, proposed a general assembly of deputies from the several towns to be holden at Chalcis, for the purpose of composing the present differences, and regulating in future the general affairs of the whole island. Cal-

<sup>25</sup> The transaction of Demosthenes with Gnosidemus of Oreus, son of Charigenes, shows that this was their real character, and all that we farther learn of them is consonant to it. Æsch. de cor. p. 494.

lias and Taurosthenes appear to have been able men, and not very scrupulous: they negotiated with the king of Macedonia, while they professed all fidelity to the old engagements of their city with Athens. What those engagements were indeed we have no information; and considering Callias and Taurosthenes simply as Eubœans, if their final object was not their own power rather than their country's good, their measure would seem truly patriotic. Their final purpose however certainly was to place themselves at the head of the affairs of the whole island. Plutarchus of Eretria therefore saw, in their success, the ruin of his own authority in his own city, with no small danger probably for his property, his liberty, and even his life. His resource therefore was to address solicitation and remonstrance to Athens.

SECT.  
V.

Æsch. de  
cor. p. 431.  
Demosth.  
de cor.

Though the Macedonian interest was advancing rapidly in the island, and Philip had gone so far as to send his general Parmenio to assist in the regulation of its affairs, yet the party of Chares, as appears from both Demosthenes and Æschines, were backward in public measures for supporting the interest of Athens. The reason of this political phenomenon is however to be gathered from Demosthenes. Callias and Taurosthenes became afterward his confidential friends, and associates in the most important political business. Whether the connexion was already in any degree formed, or how far circumstances were prepared or negotiation begun for it, does not appear, but the orator shows ground enough for the refusal of his party to interfere in favor of Plutarchus. As formerly in Rhodes, so now in Eubœa, the many were adverse to the Athenian democratical leaders: in Eretria they banished those

Demosth.  
Phil. 3.  
p. 125.

p. 126.



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

whom Demosthenes calls their best friends, the orators who pretended most zeal in the democratical cause;<sup>26</sup> and it seems probable that the only opening which the Athenian democratical party saw for recovering their influence in Eubœa, was by forming connexion with Callias and Taurosthenes. The other party in Athens would, on that very account, be the more earnest to support Plutarchus. An earnestness arose however among the Athenians, not unlike that formerly excited by Timotheus, for maintaining the republic's interest in the island. Not only for the navy, but for the army also, personal service was extensively offered; and now first, it is said, within memory or tradition, the expense of equipping ships of war was voluntarily undertaken by individuals. This arose from a general disposition of the higher ranks to the measure; and all the circumstances together indicate that on this occasion the aristocratical leaders carried the popular favor. Demosthenes alone, of the democratical orators, ventured to speak; and he, as he has himself confessed, was ill heard and roughly treated. The command of the armament, rapidly raised, was committed, not to Chares or any of his faction, but to Phocion, their stern opponent.

Meanwhile Callias and Taurosthenes had so gained favor to their project for a union of all the towns of the island under one liberal system of independent government that, except in Eretria, their party everywhere prevailed. They did not however rest their cause entirely upon the attachment of their

<sup>26</sup> Demosthenes's hypocritical phrases on the occasion cannot be misunderstood: *Οἱ ταλαίπωροι καὶ δυσυχεῖς Ἐρετριεῖς τελευτῶντες ἐπέισθησαν τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας ἐκβαλεῖν*. Philip. 3. p. 125.

fellow-islanders. They engaged a considerable body of mercenaries, which had been in the Phocian service, and was dismissed probably on account of the near failure of resources from the Delphian treasury. But they continued always to profess the purpose of maintaining peace and friendship with Athens. Such was the involution of party interests, some avowed, some concealed, that when Phocion arrived with the Athenian armament at Eretria he seems hardly to have known what enemy he had to contend with. But, advancing into the country, and encamping near the town of Tamynæ in a deep valley, the heights about him were occupied by hostile troops in such force that he found himself in effect besieged, and in extreme danger. An express was hastened to Athens with information of the circumstances; and the result again marks the favor of the higher ranks of citizens to the cause of Phocion: all the remaining cavalry of the republic immediately embarked. Not however without a severe action the distressed army was relieved, and a victory of some splendor gained. The orator Æschines, serving in the cavalry, so distinguished himself that he was selected by the general to carry report of the victory to the council and people; and for his meritorious service was rewarded, by a decree of the general assembly, with the honor of a crown. What however the consequence of the victory was, beyond the deliverance of the besieged army, does not appear. We find Demosthenes afterward imputing hostility

Æsch. de  
cor. p. 481.

[B. C. 350. \*  
Cl.]

Demosth.  
Phil. 2.

[\* B. C. 350. 'Expedition of Phocion into Eubœa, and battle of Tamynæ. . . . This expedition was a little before the cause πρὸς Βοιωτὸν περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος, and at the time of the *Lenœan Dionysia*. Demosth. in Βατοί, p. 999. 'ed. Reisk. . . . as the cause πρὸς Βοιωτὸν was κατὰ Θέσσαλον ἢ Ἀπολλόδαρον ἄρχοντα, (Dionys. Dinarch. p. 656.) these were the *Dionysia* of the archon 'Thessalus, or Anthesterion of B. C. 350.' Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* pp. 132-4.]

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

and treachery toward Athens to Plutarchus, for whose support Phocion was sent; and, on the contrary, Æschines attributing the whole opposition against the Athenian interest in Eubœa to the measures of Callias and Taurosthenes. But it is remarkable that, much as we find Demosthenes complaining of Macedonian interference, and even Macedonian troops, in Eubœa, no mention is made of either on this occasion: when the party of Phocion directed measures, it appears the hostility of Macedonia instantly ceased. But the scrupulousness of that virtuous statesman seems to have denied effectual use of the advantages placed in his hands by his victory, and by the zealous attachment of his triumphant party. Whatever was the immediate arrangement, which seems indeed to have been but incomplete, sufficient opening was left for future intrigues of Callias and Taurosthenes.

B. C. 351.  
Ol. 107. 2.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 40.

[See p. 371.] About the time when these things, unnoticed by the historian, must have happened, a matter occurred, of extraordinary appearance in his account, for which we find no assistance from the orators. The Thebans, wearied and exhausted by the protraction of the Sacred war, found final success in it with their own means hopeless. Distressed thus, they sent an embassy to Ochus king of Persia, with the sole purpose, according to the historian, of begging money. What claim to favor they had acquired since, only two years ago, their general Pammenes, in the service of a rebel satrap, Artabazus, had defeated the king's armies, is not said. Perhaps those actually ruling in Thebes disowned Pammenes. But it appears from the sequel that the court of Persia desired, at this time, to cultivate a good understanding generally with the Grecian republics. The recovery of Egypt



had been, for half a century, its anxious purpose unsuccessfully pursued; Artabazus maintained still his rebellion in Bithynia; and Phenicia, forming close connexion with Egypt, had recently shown itself in revolt. All these things together pressing, the Persian court was driven to that policy, which had been so successfully used by the leaders of revolt against it, employing mercenary Grecian troops. It was probably intelligence of such a purpose that encouraged the mission from the Theban government to Susa. Their ambassadors obtained, according to the historian, three hundred talents, about sixty thousand pounds, which were however not probably given for nothing. Agents were sent soon after to all the principal republics. Athens and Lacedæmon, professing a desire to hold friendship with the king, stated the necessity of their own affairs in excuse for not parting with any of their native military force; but the Thebans sent their general Lacrates, with a thousand heavy-armed. Argos furnished three thousand, under a general specially desired by the Persian court, Nicostratus; whose fame, which led to the distinction, probably had been acquired, not in Peloponnesus, but in previous service in the command of mercenaries among the warring powers of Asia.

But, whatever assistance the Thebans obtained for their treasure from the liberality or the necessities of the Persian court, no considerable exertion followed in the war against Phocis. Predatory incursion only and small skirmishes are mentioned among the operations of the year, and no important result.

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

*Affairs of Greece during the third period of the Sacred war, when Athens and Macedonia became principal parties.*

## SECTION I.

*Chronology of the times. Naval successes of Macedonia against Athens: opening for negotiation alarming to the war-party at Athens: Philip's popularity alarming: measures of the war-party: Olynthus gained from the Macedonian to the Athenian alliance: embassy of Æschines to Peloponnesus: Philippics of Demosthenes.*

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

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THE imperfection of ancient chronology makes continual difficulty for the investigator of ancient history. For supplying the deficiencies, and correcting the errors of Diodorus and the Arundel marbles, which alone offer any extent of chronological clue, it behoves him to seek assistance wherever it may be found; and, for the times with which we are now engaged, a very valuable subsidiary remains in the remarks of Dionysius of Halicarnassus upon the orations of Demosthenes. It is therefore very satisfactory to find these confirming Diodorus, so far as to show that his chronology does not probably err for these times more than for those for which we have opportunity to compare it with the higher authorities of Thucydides and Xenophon. The beginning of the Olympian year, about midsummer, long after the

beginning of the common season for the action of Grecian armies, would be likely often to make confusion of two military seasons for writers who did not, with the accuracy of Thucydides, divide the year into summer and winter, the season of military action, and the season of military rest; especially for compilers like Diodorus, unversed in either political or military business, and writing not till some centuries after the times in question. For perfect exactness his chronology cannot claim credit; but as a general guide it will require attention, and even respect.

After the battle of the Pagasæan bay and its immediate consequences, the abdication of the tagus Lycophron, the settlement of all Thessaly in the Macedonian interest, the march of the combined Macedonian and Thessalian forces to Thermopylæ, and contest declined with the Athenian army there, the annals of Diodorus exhibit a remarkable void in Grecian history. Of the republics for two years nothing is mentioned but the embassy of Thebes to Persia, and the faint prosecution of the Sacred war, already noticed. Of Macedonian affairs not a syllable appears. Nevertheless it may be gathered from the orators that in that interval occurred the contest of parties in Rhodes, and the war in Eubœa.

B. C. 352.  
OL 107.1,2.

For the business of the Eubœan war, as we have seen, or, at least, for the conduct of military operations, the party of Phocion prevailed in Athens. But they acquired no lasting lead in the general assembly. Through the abilities and the diligence of the opposing orators, and the means they found to attach the lower people to their system of war and trouble, all approaches to peace with Macedonia were checked, though Philip showed himself always ready and even forward to meet them. Meanwhile Macedonia, and



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

the allies of Macedonia, not liable to injury by land from the power of Athens, were suffering continually in their maritime commerce. Not Athenian fleets only, or cruisers regularly commissioned by the Athenian government, but many little piratical republics, paying the Athenian commanders for licence, annoyed the Grecian seas.

To obviate these evils Philip directed his attention to the establishment of a marine. The recovery of the sea-ports of Macedonia to his kingdom, the possession of the peculiar advantages of the Amphipolitan territory, and, perhaps more than both these, the close connexion formed with Thessaly, and the consequent command of the means of its commercial towns Pagasæ and Magnesia, gave him altogether considerable means. His ensuing successes, though without decisive contest or splendid victory, appear to have astonished, while they not a little troubled his enemies. The islands of Imbrus and Lemnus were invaded and plundered; and, what made more impression than any other loss, some Athenian citizens were made prisoners. Nearer then to Athens, the port of Geræstus in Eubœa was forced, and a fleet of merchant-ships, richly laden, was carried off. But, what would still more perhaps affect the public mind, the coast of Attica itself was insulted, and the sacred ship *Paralus* was taken from the harbour of Marathon. It seems probable that the naval force of Olynthus assisted toward these successes; though in remaining mention of them all is attributed to Macedonia.

But beyond the naval successes, or any other advantage, the growing popularity of the king of Macedonia among the Grecian republics disturbed the war-party. The state of Greece, always uneasy and

threatening for men who, with or without ambition, desired domestic security, was now uncommonly alarming. For the smaller states, always, the best safety had arisen from a balance of power between the larger; so that equally the democratical, under Athens or Thebes, and the oligarchal, under Lacedæmon, were most at ease, when the democratical interest and the oligarchal were most nearly balanced throughout the nation; because then the imperial states had the stronger and more obvious inducement to give protection and avoid oppression. But now, and Demosthenes himself furnishes the picture, Thebes could hardly support herself in a contest perfidiously undertaken and ill conducted; and Lacedæmon, long ago depressed, had been lately checked in an effort to rise, while Athens, having repaired in large degree her great loss of valuable dominion in the Confederate war and the war with Macedonia by recent conquest in Thrace, and maintaining still her empire of the sea, was in spirit and in circumstances the most aspiring among the republics, almost alone able to undertake protection and to require submission.<sup>1</sup>

Sober men everywhere trembled at the view of an imperial democracy. The dominion of a multitude, even led by a Pericles, was an object of anxious fear: led by a Chares, it was an object of decided horror. In looking around the cheerless prospect then, the rising power of Macedonia, as a resource, if supposed offering but a choice of evils, could not fail to attract consideration.

SECT.  
I.

Demosth.  
Olynth. 3.  
p. 36.

Isocr.  
Areop.

A remark occurring in Sicilian history presents itself again here, that it may prove less disadvantageous to a great character, than on first view might be expected, to remain transmitted to posterity only

<sup>1</sup> Περὶ τῶν πρωτείων ἀντιτάξασθαι. Isocr. Areop.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Demosth.  
Philipp. I.  
p. 41. 42.  
de cor.  
p. 245.  
de legat.  
p. 424. 426.

by enemies. Of whatever has dropped from Demosthenes to Philip's advantage no question can be entertained; but whatever ill remains reported by others whose authority is not of itself high, unconfirmed by the ingenuity and earnest diligence of the great contemporary orator in seeking and spreading evil report, will be at least liable to just suspicion. The superior talents then, the indefatigable activity, and the personal courage of the king of Macedonia, are clearly and repeatedly attested by Demosthenes: even his liberality and generosity are largely shown; and his popularity throughout Greece, occurring for necessary mention, could hardly by words be more strongly painted than by the consummate speaker, using his utmost art to decry and bear it down. To obviate this popularity, and to substitute for it suspicion, fear, and, if possible, hatred, in Athens especially, but over Greece as far as might be, was a primary object of the war-party; and the task was assigned principally to the extraordinary abilities of Demosthenes. Hence those speeches, through whose celebrity their title of Philippic became at Rome, and thence through modern Europe, a common term for orations abounding with acrimonious invective.<sup>2</sup> Nor

<sup>2</sup> If the earlier date, the first year of the hundred and seventh Olympiad, were assigned to the first Philippic on less high authority than that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the third of the same Olympiad, or perhaps the spring, concluding the second year, might rather seem to have been the season of its delivery. Indeed it has been observed that facts are mentioned in it which appear to have been posterior to its assigned date; whence it has been supposed not one, but two orations of different dates. But for my unwillingness, on any occasion, to controvert high authority, I should be inclined to propose a compromise, reckoning it a single oration, of the date already mentioned, toward the end of the second or beginning of the third year of the hundred and seventh Olympiad; thus placing it between the date of



was the task light, nor was it little that Demosthenes did for his party. Foiled successively in the Confederate war, in the war of Amphipolis, in the war of Thessaly, and overborne, for a time, on occasion of the disturbances in Eubœa by the party with which Phocion acted, they must have sunk but for the singular talents which he brought to their support. Democracy itself, as we have lately observed him complaining, had at this time a falling cause. Advantages however remained, of which talents like those of Demosthenes might avail themselves. In every Grecian state was a relic or a germ of a democratical party, which might be excited to vigorous growth, or effort to grow, by any prospect of that boundless field afforded by democracy for ambition, excluding no individual from any extravagance of hope. Through the same animating power, activity, boldness, and perseverance are common virtues of democratical parties. These it was the business of Demosthenes to excite to energy everywhere. But the favorable opportunity occurred at Olynthus, whither also the late naval successes of Macedonia would contribute to direct the view.

We have seen the revived Olynthian confederacy brought, by the combined arms of Athens and Macedonia, to the brink of ruin, and saved only through the treachery and injustice of the Athenian government, alienating its own beneficial ally. In the short period since the connexion ensuing between Olynthus and Macedonia, the Olynthians had so prospered again that their military force is said to have been greater than when formerly it balanced for a time the united arms of Macedonia and Lacedæmon. The

Demosth.  
de legat.

Dionysius, and the later date, which some eminent modern critics would assign to the latter part of the speech.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

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Demosth.  
Olynth. 3.  
p. 30. & in  
Aristocr.  
p. 656.

citizens capable of bearing arms, according to Demosthenes, exceeded ten thousand; the cavalry amounted to one thousand; and the fleet was of fifty triremes. But, political prosperity having commonly the evil tendency to produce and sharpen contest for power, those, who could not be first in Olynthus connected with Macedonia, were ready to break with Macedonia, at any risk to their country, for the chance of attaining the lead in it through connexion with any other power. Whether intrigue began from Olynthus or from Athens, it is evident that communication was held between a party among the Olynthians and the war-party in Athens, and that, between them, a plan was concerted for producing a revolution in Olynthus. Peace was the plea of the Olynthian opposition. Considered by itself, without a view to circumstances and consequences, it was a plea that would of course weigh with a maritime and commercial people engaged in war with those whose fleets commanded the sea. The Athenian government, it would be observed, and repeated proof might be appealed to, would not make any peace with Macedonia: all approach to it was denied by the decree forbidding communication by heralds. But there was no such repugnancy to peace with Olynthus; and the Olynthian confederacy was not so bound to Macedonia that it should preclude itself for ever from a good so much to be desired. It might indeed be remembered that, in the last preceding communication of the Olynthian government with the Athenian, the Olynthian ministers, sent to treat of peace, had met with only insult. Now however the tone of the insulting party in Athens was altered; they were ready not only to meet but to invite friendly communication from Olynthus. So matters were managed that a majority was obtained in the Olyn-

thian assembly for entering into engagements with Athens contrary to engagements with Macedonia; and a peace, accommodating the interests of the two republics exclusively, or rather of the leading party in each, was concluded.

SECT.  
I.

B. C. 350.\*  
Ol. 107. 3.

Meanwhile the king of Macedonia, after settling the affairs of Thessaly advantageously, through the means offered by the victory over the Phocian army, had been called to new exertion by the motions of the restless barbarians, whose trade was war, by whom his kingdom was nearly surrounded. In arms and in negotiation he had been engaged with Illyrians, Thracians, Scythians, almost all the various hordes who occupied the country from the Adriatic sea to the Euxine, and from the Ægean to the Danube. Of any particulars of the achievements, either of his valor or his policy, no information remains from contemporary, and none of any value from later writers. The result only is so far attested, that he extended both dominion and influence, his authority and his popularity, gloriously for himself, and beneficially for his people. Especially he gave new security to the Macedonian frontier, which had been hitherto subject, like our Scottish and Welsh borders of old, to ceaseless war.<sup>3</sup>

Demosth.  
Philipp. 1.  
p. 41. 42.  
Olynth. 1.  
p. 12.  
Strab. l. 7.  
p. 307.  
Justin.

<sup>3</sup> Historians and biographers have spoken only of military expeditions, which some indeed have extended rather romantically; but the adverse orator shows there were advantages, apparently in not less proportion, procured for Macedonia in another way. It is of Thrace and the northern continent he is speaking, where he says, Πάντα κατέσραπτε καὶ ἔχει, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἐλὼν τις ἔχοι πολέμον νόμῳ, τὰ δὲ σύμμαχα καὶ φίλα ποιησάμενος. With provident ingenuity then he endeavours to obviate the impression this might make on the Athenian many in favor of Philip or of peace: Καὶ γὰρ συμμαχεῖν καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν

[\* See note 7. on s. 2. of this chapter.]



CHAP.  
XXXIX.Demosth.  
Philip. 3.  
p. 113.Demosth.  
Olynth. 1.  
p. 10. 11. &  
Philipp. 3.  
p. 113.Demosth.  
Olynth.  
1. & 2. init.Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 656.

Philip was yet in Thrace when information reached him of the prevalence acquired by the Athenian party in Olynthus, and the threatened defection of that state from the Macedonian alliance. Immediately he directed his earnest endeavours to have complaints explained and grievances removed, if any really existed, and to restore the shaken connexion between the two governments, without which peace would be impossible. 'This therefore,' says Demosthenes, it 'was the business of Athens to prevent;' and the managers of that business succeeded. Hardly thirty years ago Olynthus having nearly overwhelmed the Macedonian kingdom, and afterward maintained a contest against Lacedæmon, then at the height of her power, assisted by all the remaining strength of Macedonia, the hope might not unreadily be entertained among the Olynthians, that, strong in themselves now as then, with the advantage of support from Athens, they might assuredly withstand, and perhaps overbear Macedonia alone. One step gained by the Athenian party led to another, and from peace with Athens the progress was rapid to war with Macedonia.

The exultation of the Athenian war-party, on the arrival of intelligence of this result of their measures, appears to have been great. Demosthenes, speaking of it to the assembled people, told them it was the more gratifying, and of higher promise, as it was purely an Olynthian measure, not promoted by any interference from Athens. But another speech of the same orator remains in evidence that a party in Olynthus was previously pledged to the war-party in Athens for promoting a breach with Macedonia, and that expectation was already entertained of complete success

τούτοις ἐθέλουσιν ἅπαντες, οὓς ἂν ὀρώσι παρεσκευασμένους, καὶ πρᾶττειν ἐθέλοντας ἃ χρεή. Philipp. 1. p. 41. 42.

SECT.  
I.

to the intrigue. The real character and complexion of the measure are indeed largely shown among his extant orations. It was by carrying this measure in the general assembly of Olynthus that the party there, connected with the war-party of Athens, obtained possession of the administration. No cause of complaint against the Macedonian government gave ground for it. On the contrary it was a direct breach of faith with the Macedonian government, attempted to be justified only on the pretence of expediency. The interest of the Olynthian people, it was contended, so required it as to overbear all other considerations. Macedonia, the orator says, was so advanced in power that she might choose how far she would respect her engagements, and therefore the Olynthians did well to begin with breaking theirs. But even this argument, if his assertion to the Athenian people should pass for his opinion, he has in another speech overthrown: 'The power of Olynthus,' he says, 'might balance that of Macedonia, and Philip feared the Olynthians not less than they feared him.'<sup>4</sup>

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 656.Demosth.  
Olynth. 3.

But though, in the assembly of the Olynthian people, the Athenian party carried their measure for concurrence with Athens in war against Macedonia, yet most of the other cities of the confederacy were averse to it. Nor, in Olynthus itself, does the majority seem to have been such that decrees of banishment or any strong coercion could be ventured against opponents. They obtained however complete

<sup>4</sup> A story told by Justin, of the rebellion of three natural brothers of Philip, and their connexion with Olynthus, unmentioned by other ancient writers, and evidently unknown to Demosthenes, seems, like many other stories of that author, hardly requiring even this notice in a note.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Demosth.  
Olynth. &  
Philip.  
var. in loc.

Ch. 26. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Demosth. de  
legat. p. 425.

p. 344.

possession of the administration; and the stroke was great for the war-party at Athens: it gave them new credit with the Athenian many; new ground on which to found proposals of warlike measures; and they proceeded most diligently to use it: 'Now was the favorable moment,' they said, 'to engage all Greece in a league against the threatening ambition of the Macedonian king.' The utmost ingenuity was exerted to excite, among the Athenian people especially, but generally over Greece, apprehension of evils awaiting them from the falsest and cruellest of tyrants, if they neglected the existing opportunity, and to raise hope of incalculable advantage, if they exerted themselves to use it. Of the falsehood which might be ventured, in assertion to the Athenian many, to support such arguments, Demosthenes has left a curious example. Hardly anything in Grecian history is better authenticated than the fate of Olynthus in its contest with Lacedæmon, the complete dissolution of the confederacy of which it had been the head, and its own complete subjection under the Lacedæmonian empire. Demosthenes nevertheless, within thirty years of the event, did not fear to aver to the Athenian multitude that, in that contest, the Olynthians were completely successful, that they lost no fortress, (meaning apparently to have it believed that they lost neither territory nor command,) and that at last they made peace on their own terms. The Athenians, stimulated thus at once by hopes and fears, gave themselves now to the war-party; and ministers were sent throughout Greece, wherever it was supposed a favorable disposition might be found or excited.

The embassy to Peloponnesus was committed to Æschines. It was a great point to gain the demo-



cratical Arcadians. The apprehended obstacle was their alliance with Thebes; against which however it might be hoped that the liberal friendliness, shown by Athens among the late disturbances in Peloponnesus, at the risk of alienating Lacedæmon, its ally, would be considerably availing. The Arcadian general council, entitled the ten thousand or the numberless, was assembled at Megalopolis. Æschines, admitted to audience, inveighed strongly against the king of Macedonia as aiming at the tyranny of Greece, and did not scruple, with the usual arrogance of ministers of the imperial republics, and the common illiberality of democratical orators, to impute corruption to those who should not support the propositions he recommended. But his persuasion and his menaces, as we find in his own confession, were ineffectual. The Arcadians persevered in their alliance with Thebes; nor had any of the Athenian ministers, sent to other states on the same business, any better success.<sup>5</sup>

SECT.  
I.

Æsch. de  
legat.  
Demosth.  
de legat.

It was meanwhile committed to Demosthenes to excite the people at home; and his abilities shone with new splendor in the orations remaining to us, distinguished, among the Philippics, by the title of Olynthiac. In these orations he engaged in a very bold attempt which before his connexion with Chares he had opposed; namely, to persuade the many to concede, for the purpose of war, that part of the public revenue, really the greatest part, which, with the title of theoric, was appropriated to the expenses of theatrical entertainments, or distributions that might enable the poorest to find leisure for such entertainments. Much art was necessary to bring such

<sup>5</sup> A note on the subject of this embassy is inserted at the end of the section.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

a proposition before the people, so as to elude the strangely extravagant law, which denounced death against any who should move for the diversion of any part of the theoric revenue to any other purpose than that to which it stood by law appropriated. But in such art, among other qualifications of a republican orator, Demosthenes excelled. Here however the question may occur, how it was that, while the party of the profligate Chares, courtiers of the multitude, were those to put forward such a measure, the party of the stern and virtuous Phocion were its opposers. For solution of this apparent prodigy assistance is furnished by the orator himself. Money, at any rate, was necessary to the purposes of the war-party. But, to those earnest for peace abroad and quiet at home, it was rather desirable that, while the professors of war and trouble could lead measures, they should want the means of war and trouble. These then, on the other hand, could they have money to maintain armaments, would raise tribute. With this they might gratify the people, and have credit for the gratification: whereas the credit of gratification from the theoric money had gone all to the spendthrift orators who had put forward the decrees for its appropriation, and thus deprived their successors of means for acquiring popularity.

Another thing remarkable occurs in those orations. If the spirit of domination, the purpose of governing Greece, of making neighbouring states tributary, should in prudence have been anywhere concealed among the great orator's speeches, in the Olynthiacs apparently it should especially have been so; yet it is prominent even there. Insult to the Macedonians, prince and people, might be expected from a democratical orator before a democratical audience. 'The

‘kings who formerly held Macedonia,’ he said to the Athenian multitude, ‘obeyed our ancestors, as was he-  
 ‘coming from a barbarian to Greeks.’ But he has not scrupled to hold out to the Olynthians themselves, Greeks unquestioned, from enemies recently become allies of Athens, what they were to expect: ‘You,’ he says to the Athenian people, ‘were formerly lords of  
 ‘Olynthus with the country and cities around it.’ Apparently the able orator and politician reckoned that the advantage of the instigation to the Athenian many would overbalance any inconvenience of disgust and offence to the Olynthians, who had placed themselves in circumstances so to want the support which Athens alone could give.

Demosth.  
 Olynth.  
 p. 35.

p. 18.

Note †, referred to this place from p. 385.—The French translator Auger, in a note to Demosthenes’s oration on the embassy, has given an account of the mission of Æschines to Arcadia, and especially of his success, thus: ‘Le peuple d’Athenes nomma des députés pour soulever la Grece contre Philippe. Æschine, entr’autres, partit en Arcadie. Il assembla dix mille Arcadiens, et leur fit promettre de porter les armes contre le roi de Macédoine.’ Where the learned translator found this promise reported I know not. Demosthenes says nothing of it, and the declaration of Æschines himself is explicit, that he had no success.

The assembling of the ten thousand Arcadians to make the promise however (for the reason mentioned in a former note, the reputation of the writer) may deserve some remark. Demosthenes, speaking of the mission of Æschines to Arcadia, has these words:—τοὺς καλοὺς ἐκείνους καὶ μακροὺς λόγους, οὓς ἐν τοῖς ΜΥΡΙΑΙΣ, ἐν Μεγάλῃ πόλει,—ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἔφη (ὁ Αἰσχίνης) δεδημηγορηκέναι, p. 344., which Auger has translated thus:—‘les longs et beaux discours qu’il disoit avoir débités pour vous à Megalopolis, dans une assemblée nombreuse.’ What is here, in the text of his translation, *une assemblée nombreuse*, is what is rendered, in his note before mentioned, given for explanation of historical circumstances requisite for understanding the oration, the *dix mille Arcadiens*, who were made to promise to



CHAP. carry arms against the king of Macedonia. A writer more  
 XXXIX. attentive to historical matter than Auger, if not intent upon the  
 political institutions of the Grecian republics, when reading  
 Xenophon's Hellenics, might possibly have failed in recollection  
 of what he would find there, that *οἱ μύριοι* was the title of the  
 sovereign assembly of the Arcadian democracy, whose seat of  
 government was Megalopolis. [See vol. v. p. 118.] But one,  
 translating, and giving explanation in notes, like Auger, who  
 could hardly be without recollection of many analogous titles  
 occurring in Grecian history, the ten, the eleven, the thirty, the  
 four-hundred, the five-hundred, and others, should apparently  
 have gathered admonition from them to look about him a little  
 for the import of *οἱ μύριοι*.

This however is far from being so important as some other  
 errors of the same learned translator and commentator, resulting  
 apparently from rash carelessness. In Æschines's oration on the  
 embassy is a catalogue of principal events in Athenian history,  
 from the battle of Salamis to the orator's time. On this Auger  
 says, 'Je voulois donner un recit abregé des faits principaux,  
 ' depuis la bataille de Salamine, jusqu' après la destruction de la  
 ' tyrannie des Trente ; mais, en consultant l'histoire de ce temps  
 ' là, j'ai vu si peu de conformité entre ce que rapportent  
 ' les historiens, et ce que dit l'orateur, que j'ai renoncé à  
 ' mon projet. Je n'ai pas entrepris de les concilier, ce qui  
 ' seroit peutêtre impossible, et ce qui est d'ailleurs étranger à  
 ' mon ouvrage.' The learned critic often speaks of *l'histoire*,  
 as if that single word was a specific description of something  
 with which all his readers should be acquainted ; but I must  
 own myself generally at a loss to know what he means by it. In  
 the letter of Philip to the Athenians, preserved with the oration  
 of Demosthenes entitled ' On the letter,' mention is made of the  
 conquest of Amphipolis from the Persians by Alexander son of  
 Amyntas king of Macedonia after the battle of Platæa. Auger,  
 in his remarks on that letter, says very boldly to this ; ' Philippe  
 ' avance un fait qui n'a point de vraisemblance. Aucun hi-  
 ' storien ne parle de victoire remportée sur les Perses par cet  
 ' ancien Alexandre.—Il paroît qu'il profite de l'éloignement  
 ' des temps pour avancer un fait des plus douteux, pour ne pas  
 ' dire des plus faux.' Now it is remarkable enough that mention  
 of that fact remains from Demosthenes in two several orations,  
 that against Aristocrates and that entitled *περὶ συντάξεως*, with  
 these differences indeed from the account of the prince, to whom  
 Auger has so boldly attributed falsehood, that the orator gives

the principal merit to Perdicas, son of Alexander, and does not mention the place or places where the Persians were defeated, whereas Philip ascribes the command of the Macedonian forces to Alexander himself, and adds, that the territory of Amphipolis then fell under that prince's power; which is also in every view probable, though the name of Amphipolis was not yet in use. It is farther observable that translations of both these orations are found in Auger's publication, with passages relating the victory over the Persians fully and fairly rendered.

Auger indeed, with all his disposition to adventurous assertion, seems no pretender to learning that he had not. He makes light of the authority of Polybius, confessing that he never read Polybius. If he ever read Herodotus, Thucydides, or Xenophon, with any attention, he would there, I am confident, find no deficiency of conformity with the summary of Æschines. I think he would have difficulty to find any in Diodorus. What then may have been the historians that deterred him from his projected abridgment of Grecian history, I must own myself at a loss to guess.

It has been a favorite fashion, among French historical writers, to paint the characters of eminent men without referring the reader to their actions. Opportunity is thus ready for saying smart things with little trouble. Whether the portrait resembles the prototype will be discovered only by those who will undertake laborious investigation. In this easy line Auger has shown himself ambitious of the reputation of fine writing. Among other characters, dispersed among his observations on the orators, he has given that of Archidamus son of Agesilaus in his summary of the oration of Demosthenes for the Megalopolitans thus: 'Archidame, roi de Sparte, étoit d'un caractère sombre, fourbe, 'intrigant, et brouillon.' The best authorities I am aware of to refer to for that prince's character are Xenophon, Isocrates, and Diodorus; who concur, the two former in strong indication, the latter in express assertion, that it was completely the reverse of what the learned translator has asserted.

Nevertheless, while I warn against the errors, I desire to do justice to the merits of Auger. His translation, in general, as far as my experience of it goes, has deserved its reputation: even in remark he often shows candor: and, where knowledge already acquired has qualified him, he often shows judgment. But he has been too careless, very much too careless, of historical investigation, and not less over bold in hazarding remark.

## SECTION II.

*Olynthian war : Macedonian Olympic festival : apology for the conduct of Chares : Macedonian bribes.*

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Demosth.de  
leg. p. 426.

The eloquence of Demosthenes and the influence of Chares, the blazoned importance of the acquisition of Olynthus to the Athenian alliance, and the promise of great advantages to ensue, riches and glory to those of higher rank, and incalculable indulgences to those of the lowest, appear to have produced an extraordinary zeal among the Athenian people for the prosecution of war against Macedonia. A force was decreed such as never since the fatal Sicilian expedition had been sent on foreign service. Demosthenes states the army at fourteen thousand men, of whom four thousand were to be Athenian citizens. The amount of the naval force is not specified ; but there seems to have been no limit proposed upon the utmost that the state could furnish and the service require. Some squadrons were already on foreign stations ; one of thirty triremes, under the orders of Chares, lay in the ports of Athens. The equipment of many more was put forward, and to Chares was committed the command in chief by sea and land.

Philoch. ap.  
Dion. Hal.  
in ep. ad  
Amm.  
B. C. 349.  
Ol. 107. 4.  
[See  
p. 394.]

Such promise of vigorous exertion by Athens appears to have led the Olynthians to hope that they should make the war, on their part, entirely offensive : invasion of the Macedonian provinces before Philip could be duly prepared to oppose it would, they trusted, secure their territory against the evils of becoming the seat of hostilities. The promptitude of Chares to sail with his ready squadron went to confirm that hope. But they were greatly disappointed, on his arrival, to find that the troops he



brought were only middle-armed mercenaries, in number two thousand; a force well enough suited to his usual purpose of plunder, but not to meet the Macedonian phalanx for the protection of the Olynthian territory. In just apprehension of the consequences they sent remonstrance to Athens. Promises of native Athenian troops, heavy-armed and cavalry, were repeated. Charidemus meanwhile with eighteen triremes and four thousand men joined Chares, but, excepting the small yet valuable force of a hundred and fifty horse, they were still only middle and light-armed foot.

The army thus collected however was ample for the kind of war which Chares desired to wage; and if it was the purpose, through predatory expeditions, to provide pay or plunder which might make foreign service palatable to the four thousand citizens who voted for it, the plan seems to have been well concerted. The king of Macedonia was not prepared for this new war. His country was open on the side of the Olynthian territory; and Chares overran and plundered the bordering province of Bottiæa with little or no opposition. It was late in the season before the Macedonian forces could be collected at a point whence operations might be advantageously begun. Chares was already withdrawn. Philip then entered the Olynthian territory. He advanced into the peninsula of Sithonia, where many of the towns, though of the Olynthian confederacy, were more disposed to the Macedonian alliance than the Athenian. As he proceeded through the country their ready allegiance was accepted. The fortress of Zeira, resisting, was taken by storm.

Diod. l. 16.

Chares meanwhile, with a fleet that commanded the sea, and a light land force, could choose his point

Philoch. ut  
ant. & Theo-  
pomp. ap.  
Athen. i. 12.  
p. 534.

of attack, and make his retreat sure. In the fruitful peninsula of Pallene, the richest territory of the Olynthian confederacy, the disposition prevailed, hardly less than in Sithonia, to prefer the Macedonian alliance. Not unskilfully then pursuing his plan, he landed where about eight hundred men in arms only could be collected to oppose him, and yet were rash enough, for the protection of their property, to stand an action. Overbearing them with superior force, killing some, putting the rest to flight, he erected his trophy in assertion of victory. Contributions were then raised or booty taken in considerable amount; and a large distribution to the armament made all highly satisfied with the success of the campaign.

Chares returning to Athens, the people were assembled, as usual, to hear the general's report. He delivered an account of an expedition of uninterrupted success, and of a glorious battle, in which the troops had shown the greatest valor. Confirming testimony did not fail from those who had served and profited under him. But to make his interest with the many sure, he gave a feast to the whole people. The expense is said to have been sixty talents, about twelve thousand pounds sterling; not furnished from his private purse, or from the profits of his command, or from the Athenian treasury, but from the Delphian treasury; extorted from the Phocians, to whom the favor of men powerful among the sovereign many of Athens was at this time very important. But, if neither the cost of the feast, nor the manner of supplying it, have been exactly known to the contemporary author, from whom we have the account, yet he was in a situation to know what was reported on best authority; and all is consistent with

the most authoritative remaining accounts, indeed all remaining, of the conduct and character of Chares.<sup>6</sup>

SECT.  
II.

The armament was gratified, and the Athenian people cajoled, but the Olynthians remained very uneasy. The wintry season would afford a temporary relief, but the war had been hitherto not prosperous. A part of the enemy's country indeed had been plundered. Far however from succeeding in their hope of confining hostilities to the enemy's territory, far even from compelling the refractory members of their confederacy to join them in the Athenian alliance, many of those, before wavering, had been confirmed in the Macedonian cause by the ready protection of the Macedonian arms; and, with the return of spring, stronger exertion must be expected from the known activity and vigor of Philip. In much anxiety therefore they sent a third remonstrance and petition to Athens, urging the early supply of the better kind of auxiliary force which had been promised, and deprecating that neglect and tardiness through which those faithful allies of Athens, the Methonæans, had been ruined.

Philoch. ut  
ant.

The war-party would not be wanting in disposition to support the Olynthians against Macedonia; but so to support them that, at the conclusion of the war, they should remain strong enough to refuse tribute and obedience to Athens, would have been against

<sup>6</sup> The word of Theopompus alone is not very high authority. But the account of Philochorus has evidently been selected by Dionysius as that which he esteemed the most authentic and exact in his time extant; and, though the extract preserved from Philochorus by Dionysius does not give the particulars stated in the extract from Theopompus by Athenæus, yet the two harmonize.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

B. C. 348. \*  
OL. 108. 1.

their principles of policy, which their great orator has clearly and repeatedly indicated. Nevertheless, as the approaching exertion of Macedonia would probably far overmatch the unassisted strength of Olynthus, divided as it was within itself, the eloquence of Demosthenes and the influence of Chares were exerted to excite the Athenian people to energy. So they succeeded that two thousand heavy-armed, and three hundred horse, all Athenian citizens, or passing for such, embarked to re-enforce the army before employed, and Chares remained commander-in-chief.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile Philip had brought together on the Olynthian border an army that Chares, with perhaps

<sup>7</sup> This expedition is referred by Diodorus to the same archonship of Athens as that before reported; but probably the winter passed between them, the new archons entering on office about midsummer. [\* Mr. Clinton thus briefly and clearly states the transactions in this archonship between the Olynthians and Athenians: 'In the year of Callimachus three embassies were sent from Olynthus to Athens: upon the first embassy the Athenians sent a force under *Chares* composed of mercenaries: then, after *ὀλίγα τὰ μετὰξὺ γενόμενα*, the people of Chalcidice, being pressed by the war, and sending an embassy to Athens, *Charidemus* is ordered there; and, in conjunction with the Olynthians, ravages Pallene and Bottiæa. Again, another embassy being sent for new succours, the Athenians send another force, composed of citizens: τῶν πολιτῶν ὀπλίτας δισχιλίους καὶ ἑπτεῖς τριακοσίους.—στρατηγὸν δὲ Χάρητα τοῦ στόλου παντός. Philochor. ap. Dionys. p. 735.—Diodorus xvi. 52. ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Καλλιμάχου—Φίλιππος ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ τὰς Χαλκιδικὰς πόλεις. 'The Olynthian war therefore began after midsummer B. C. 349., and the transactions detailed by Philochorus and Diodorus happened partly in the latter part of B. C. 349. and partly in the beginning of B. C. 348. The first expedition, under Chares, seems to have been concluded in *Boedromion*: [Octob. B. C. 349.] Ulpian. ad Demosth. p. 26, 42. ed. Par. φασὶν, ὅτε ἔπεμψε τὴν λεῖαν ὁ Χάρης, βοηδρόμια ἦν.' Fasti Hellen. pp. 134-6.]

SECT.  
II.

no more than reasonable prudence, avoided to meet. A knowledge of the inclination toward the Macedonian connexion and aversion to the Athenian, which we find Demosthenes himself avowing to have prevailed, among all ranks in the towns of the Olynthian confederacy, appears to have decided the king of Macedonia's course, which was again directed into Sithonia. Mecyberna, within a few miles of Olynthus, opened its gates to him, and Torone, at the farther end of the peninsula, declared for his cause. Two principal places so situated being gained, the whole came easily under his power.

Demosth. de  
legat. p. 426.Diod. l. 16.  
c. 53.

The Olynthians then, apprehending not only farther defection of their confederate towns, but the usual destruction of Grecian warfare to their own property, even to the walls of Olynthus, unless they took the field in its defence, resolved to risk a battle. Some re-enforcement of Athenian troops, perhaps all the heavy-armed and horse, had joined them; but Chares persevered in his usual employment with his fleet and large force of light troops. Nor indeed might this be wholly unnecessary toward the subsistence of all. Nevertheless a single defeat did not deter the Olynthians and their Athenian associates: they ventured upon a second battle; but, being again defeated, their walls became, of severe necessity, their refuge. The remaining towns of their confederacy then so hastened to make terms with the conqueror that, in the complaining phrase of Demosthenes, he was at a loss whither to give his first attention.<sup>8</sup>

The situation of those who held the lead in Olynthus, always dangerous from the strength of the adverse party among their fellow-citizens, became,

<sup>8</sup> Οὐδ' εἶχεν ὁ τι πρῶτον λάβει. Demosth. de legat. p. 426.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.Demosth.  
Philip. 3.  
p. 113.

through this rapid defection of the confederate towns, together with the successes of the foreign enemy, precarious in extreme. Philip, master of nearly their whole territory, approached the city with the purpose of laying siege to it, and encamped at the distance of five miles. Ruin now so nearly threatening, they sent to him, expressing their desire to enter into treaty. He gave for answer, 'that it was ' too late: he had before abundantly and repeatedly ' expressed his earnestness to treat; but now it was ' become too evident that there was but one alternative; they must quit Olynthus, or he Macedonia.'

Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 426.

According to Demosthenes, the whole force voted by the Athenian people for the Olynthian war, four thousand citizens and ten thousand hired troops, was now actually employed on that service. The Olynthians therefore, though venturing no more in the field, resolved to defend their walls. What proportion of the Athenian army was in the garrison we do not learn. The force however that might have sufficed to make the siege tedious or its issue doubtful, had there been unanimity among the Olynthians, did not suffice to restrain the disaffected, but possibly contributed to increase and sharpen the disaffection. Five hundred Olynthian horse, perhaps nearly the whole of the effective cavalry of the state, went off in a body with their arms, and surrendered themselves to the king of Macedonia.<sup>9</sup> So far was the

Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Πεντακοσίους ἰππέας, προδοθέντας ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἡγεμόνων, ἔλαβεν αὐτοῖς ὅπλοις ὁ Φίλιππος, ὅσους οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος. Demosth. de legat. p. 426. That the interpretation of this, given in the text, is the truth, what follows in the text, let out by the same orator in another oration, clearly proves. The complex story which Leland, in his life of Philip, has wound out of this short passage of Demosthenes is a curious



SECT.  
II.

Athenian party, with all the assistance of the Athenian troops in the garrison, from being able to take measures for preventing farther desertion of the same kind, that Appollonides, who, for his zeal in the Athenian cause, had received the honor of the freedom of Athens, and for the same zeal had been raised to the chief command of the very cavalry that had deserted without him, was obliged to seek his own safety by flight from Olynthus. Euthycrates and Lasthenes, men zealous in the Macedonian cause, were then raised by the popular vote to the chief command in military, and chief direction in civil affairs; apparently for the very purpose of surrendering the place to the king of Macedonia. It was trusted that they would obtain terms more favorable for the numerous citizens always well disposed to the Macedonian connexion, or little forward against it, than their predecessors were either able to obtain, or desirous that those citizens should receive.

Demosth.  
Or. in Near.  
p. 1376.

The surrender of the place quickly following, the king of Macedonia proceeded immediately to the measure which the interest of his kingdom, not less than his own interest, imperiously required, the abolition of a republic on its coast, balancing between dependency upon Macedonia for protection against the claimed dominion of Athens, and subjection to Athens, which would involve extreme hazard for the independency of Macedonia. Support wholly fails,

B. C. 347.  
Cl. I

instance, whether of indulgence to his own ingenuity, or deference to his more ingenious French guide, having never met with Olivier's work, I cannot tell. Leland appears to have been a man of learning; and, where he would exercise his own judgment, he has sometimes shown judgment; but his deference to his French predecessor is extravagant. The name of Olivier, so frequently quoted by him as authority with Thucydides, Xenophon, and Demosthenes, is even ridiculous.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 53.

among the orators of the day, for the report of the annalist of three centuries after, that he plundered the town and sold the inhabitants for slaves. But if there were some condemnation to slavery, or confiscation of property, of persons who had made themselves obnoxious by treachery or violence toward the order of things existing before the connexion with Athens, the contemporary orators may have omitted notice of it because it was so familiar among the Athenians, who would certainly have done as much or more against a town surrendered to their arms under similar circumstances. We find indeed Demosthenes endeavouring to persuade the Athenian many that the very persons, who, in the phrase of the party, betrayed the city to the king of Macedonia, were those whom he particularly ill treated; nor is this said of Olynthus only, but Amphipolis also and other places. That some of those who had once served him well may afterward have grossly abused his confidence and merited his resentment, is certainly possible, though no account of it remains. But to represent a prince as the deepest politician of his own or any other age, gaining more by intrigue and bribery than any other ever gained, and yet commonly ill using his agents, is an extravagance which Demosthenes has evidently feared to offer in direct terms even to the Athenian multitude. With consummate art he has indeed so thrown it out that, whether his words were taken for more or less, he could not be convicted of any positive falsehood; and whatever were his success at the time, with posterity it has been great; following writers have made the most of it.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Possibly the story told by Diodorus may have been merely a licentious paraphrase of an expression of Demosthenes in his second Philippic, *προδοθέντες ὑπ' ἀλλήλων (οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι) καὶ πρᾶ-*

The acquisition of Olynthus, with all the towns of its confederacy and their territories, by which all the coast from Thessaly to Athos was restored or added to the Macedonian kingdom, long nearly excluded from the sea by numerous republican settlements, was thought an advantage, for prince and people, important enough to deserve peculiar celebration. Philip revived on the occasion, and celebrated with increased splendor, the Olympian festival, instituted or restored by his great predecessor Archelaus.<sup>11</sup> Theatrical performances seem to have been eminent among the entertainments, and for these he collected the most eminent actors and artists throughout Greece. His hospitality was magnificent; and amid this his singular talent for conversation and behaviour, dignified at the same time and engaging, greatly extended his popularity.

SECT.  
II.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 55.

Ch. 34. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Demosth. de  
leg. p. 401.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 55.

Meanwhile, at Athens, it was the pressing business of Chares and his party to reconcile the people, if possible, to so disappointing and distressing a result of measures from which so much advantage had been promised. Chares was, in usual course, to report to the assembled people the circumstances of his command; and, with the assistance of friends, to represent them so that he might obtain the requisite vote

θέντες. The orator has meant here to maintain no more than that the Olynthians sold one another; that is, betrayed the public cause for private interest. But if any of his hearers or readers might choose to take it that the Olynthians were sold to actual slavery by Philip, he would not probably have objected, provided he were not himself to answer for the falsehood.

<sup>11</sup> Diodorus has not expressly referred the festival now celebrated to the institution of Archelaus, but he calls it the Olympian festival, equally as that afterward celebrated by Alexander, which both he and Arrian (Diod. l. 17. c. 16. Arrian. l. 1. c. 11.) refer expressly to Archelaus. This festival has been noticed by Ulpian, Dio Chrysostom, and Philostratus, as observed by Wesseling in his note on the passage in Diodorus.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 447.Aristot.  
Rhet. I. 3.  
c. 10.

of Euthyne, acquittal from blame, or, in our lawphrase, his quietus. His friends however could not venture to contend that there was no misconduct. Demosthenes, in general terms, imputed the inefficiency of the great force under his command to nameless inferiors. Under such a commander-in-chief probably there would be misconduct among inferiors. Numerous and perhaps powerful families, thus interested in having those obnoxious to the imputation remain unnamed, would of course be interested in obviating such prosecution of the commander-in-chief as that to which so many of his betters, in various ages of the republic, had been victims. Possibly it was to this that another general, Cephisodotus, adverted, when, as Aristotle reports, he said: 'Chares and his friends begin with putting the people in a state of suffocation, and then desire their votes.'

The warmest partisans of Chares indeed must have found cause for much dissatisfaction with his conduct. But they appear to have seen all remaining hope of success for their ambition depending upon his support; and perhaps no small danger for their fortunes, and even their persons, involved with his fall. Their exertions for him therefore were neither faint, nor ill-imagined, nor ineffectual. To divert the public mind from the conduct of their own officers they sedulously directed it to that of the Olynthians, concerning which fiction might be better ventured. Endeavouring to conceal that a large part of the Olynthian people was always adverse to the Athenian connexion, they imputed mismanagement of the Olynthian affairs, and at length the surrender of the city, entirely to the treachery of the chiefs, and the effect of Macedonian bribes.<sup>12</sup> And such was the

<sup>12</sup> Where the same object was not in view Demosthenes has acknowledged that, in Olynthus and throughout the confede-

fascination of their eloquence, but eminently that of Demosthenes, which even in the dead letter has remained, not only the admiration of all posterity, but the persuasive of a large proportion, that Macedonian gold has become a kind of classical phrase for successful bribery. For, after the establishment of the Roman empire, when literature shone with the brightest midday lustre, while the sun of freedom sunk to lasting night, and discussion and animadversion on existing political interests were denied to the whole civilized world, men of letters, when they desired to interest the feelings of the prostrate nations in the political state of things, resorted to materials furnished by Greece; and the poets especially used the poetical licence for dressing these in a way to suit the purpose before them. If then bribery was the subject, gold was to be the material. But Demosthenes, though we find him sometimes venturing far, did not hope for success in such imposition, even upon the Athenian multitude. It was enough known that Macedonia, though greatly raised in power, and rapidly thriving in circumstances, was yet a poor country; and to talk of Macedonian gold as all-powerful would have been considered as irony. Necessarily speaking of things as they were in his day, his enumeration of bribes, to which the loss of Olynthus was to be attributed, can hardly fail now to excite wonder: cows, horses, sheep, timber! ‘Lasthenes,’ he says, ‘repaired his house with timber given from Macedonia; Euthycrates had a large herd of cattle for which he never paid anybody; another got sheep, another horses.’<sup>13</sup>

racy, the body, even of the lower people, were suspicious of the Athenians, and inclined to confide in the Macedonians: Οἱ πολλοὶ τούτους πιστοτέρους ἡγήσατο. De legat. p. 425.

<sup>13</sup> Δασθένης μὲν ἤρεψε τὴν οἰκίαν τοῖς ἐκ Μακεδονίας δοθεῖσι

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

It cannot be doubted but that, if it was an object for Philip to purchase good-will anywhere, it was singularly so at Olynthus, and there evidently he did think it an object. His cession of the city of Anthemus, when he first formed alliance with Olynthus, was in some sort a bribe to the whole Olynthian people, a mode of purchasing their good-will: but it

ξύλοις, Εὐθυκράτης δὲ βοῦς ἔτρεφε πολλὰς, τιμὴν οὐδενὶ δοῦς, ἕτερος δὲ τις ἦκεν ἔχων πρόβατα, ἄλλος δὲ τις ἵππους. Demosth. de legat. p. 426.

O that such bulky bribes as all might see,  
Still, as of old, encumber'd villany!  
Could France or Rome divert our brave designs  
With all their brandies or with all their wines?  
A statesman's slumber how this speech would spoil!  
Sir, Spain has sent a thousand jars of oil;  
Huge bales of British cloth blockade the door;  
A hundred oxen at your levee roar.

Pope's Moral Essays, Ep. 3.

It has been said that the poet and the romance-writer are, in one point, restricted within narrower bounds than the historian: he may relate any truth, however prodigious, but they must confine themselves to probability. Our moral bard might seem to have had this rule and Demosthenes's account of Macedonian bribes together in view; and so, timber appearing too extravagant for poetry in modern times, he has substituted oil and cloth. But then the romance-writer and the poet have a great advantage on the other side; for they may relate anything which, according to the ideas of their age, may pass for probable, putting truth wholly out of the question. Hence then it is that we have Horace's

- - - - - Diffidit urbium  
Portas vir Macedo, et subruit æmulos  
Reges muneribus. L. 3. Od. 16. v. 13.

And Juvenal's

- - - - - callidus emtor Olynthi. Sat. 12. v. 47.

It is remarkable that all Dacier's learning could lead him to no older authority for his poet's assertion, of a kind to satisfy him, than Valerius Maximus. He drops then down to Plutarch, Justin, Orosius. Probably he did not, with his fellow-countryman Rollin, think the speeches of the advocate evidence quite conclusive in the cause.



differed from proper bribery; it was not a clandestine transaction, but open and avowed; nor was it disgraceful on either side; on the contrary it was creditable to both. So it is possible that Lasthenes, Euthykrates, and other Olynthians may have received favors openly from Philip, and the very favors stated by Demosthenes. The Olynthian territory being probably cleared, like the country on the coast of North America, grants of timber from the Macedonian forests, nearest to Olynthus, may have been made to more than one person. But if bribery, in the stricter sense, was the common weapon of the Macedonian court, and a weapon that could be certainly effectual for any great purpose, apparently it should have been so to prevent the revolution in Olynthus; nor, had it been applied in the amount and with the skill and unscrupulousness indicated by later writers, does it appear what, but higher bribery, more skilfully or unscrupulously managed on the other side, should effectually have counterwrought it. Credit may then perhaps reasonably be given to Demosthenes for the bribery practised at Olynthus, as far as his statement of facts goes: we may allow that Lasthenes had a present of timber, and Eurysthenes of cows, and that some other persons, too obscure to be named, or, for the value of the present, or whatever other reason, not suiting the orator's purpose to name, received sheep and horses. We may go farther; for all accounts indicate that Philip's liberality was universal, his generosity bordering upon extravagance; that he desired to found both his power and his fame upon his philanthropy and his talent for conciliating the minds of men. Taking this under the description of bribery, indeed his whole course was a system of bribery. Among those so corrupt

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

as Demosthenes himself has described the people of the Grecian republics universally, that bribery would be occasionally practised on all sides may perhaps reasonably enough be supposed; but no remaining authority will warrant the modern historian in imputing the fall of Olynthus to dishonorable conduct of Philip, or of his partisans.

### SECTION III.

*New measures of the Athenian war-party: revolution in Phocis: licentiousness of Chares in military command: uneasiness of the public mind at Athens: disposition of the war-party to treat for peace: mission of the player Aristodemus to Macedonia: counter-revolution in Phocis: coalition of parties at Athens: embassy of Ten from Athens to Macedonia.*

The annihilation of such a state as Olynthus with its confederacy on the Macedonian coast, and the annexation of its cultivated peninsulas and commercial towns to the Macedonian kingdom, under a wise prince and a free and beneficent constitution, made a great change in the relative weight of that kingdom, and in the balance of power among the states around the Ægean sea. The circumstances were of deep concern for all Greece; but the immediate blow was only to the war-party at Athens, and for them it was great and alarming. Not only the valued and boasted opportunity acquired by the alliance of Olynthus for offensive, perhaps destructive, purposes against Macedonia, was undone, but opportunity was greatly increased for Macedonia to attack all the Athenian dependencies in Thrace. The miserable pageant therefore of a successor to the once great monarchs of that country, Kersobleptes, holding his

curtailed dominion in a kind of vassalage under the Athenian people, and compelled to join them in the war against Macedonia, trembled for the small share of sovereignty remaining to him. The Athenian colonists in the Chersonese, though promised effectual support, nevertheless saw the situation of things around them with much anxiety. What were the circumstances of that most interesting appendage of the ancient dominion of Athens, Eubœa, remains hardly at all indicated, farther than that its troubles, if ever composed through the expedition of Phocion, had broken out afresh. But when the party of Chares recovered a decisive preponderance in Athens, those adverse to it in Eubœa would of course endeavour again to obtain the patronage of Macedonia; for which the disposition was such that the Athenian interest was again overthrown. Philip however, it is evident, did not propose to use these advantages against Athens, if in Athens might be found a disposition to peace with him. On the contrary, not only he did not interfere to prevent the party friendly to him in the Eubœan cities from coming to an accommodation with Athens, but he authorized their deputies, going to Athens to negotiate for themselves, to declare his readiness also to make peace with the Athenian people. The Eubœan ministers executed their commission; but the war-party in Athens, still prevailing, were not yet so disposed that any treaty resulted.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 196.

Shortly after however a private interest produced what had been, on public considerations, or the pretence of them, denied. Phrynon, an Athenian of eminence, having been made prisoner by a Macedonian cruizer, had purchased his dismissal. Returning to Athens, he complained that, against the common



Ol. 103. law of the Greeks, he had been taken during the Olympian armistice. Were the insulting language of the war-party orators, and especially Demosthenes, calling the Macedonians and Philip himself barbarians, warranted by the practice or avowed tenets of the Athenian government, the Athenians could have apparently little right to claim from them any respect for the Olympian armistice. The savage decree, forbidding the entrance of a herald from Macedonia upon the Athenian territory, remained in force; yet such was the confidence of Phrynon in the liberality of the Macedonian government, that he desired to go himself to Pella to claim repayment of his ransom. But leave from his jealous sovereign, the people, must be solicited; and, to put forward with more authority and effect his private business, he desired to be vested with a public character. The people granted his request; but democratical jealousy rarely trusting a single minister to a foreign government, Ctesiphon, a friend of Demosthenes, was joined in the commission with him. Whether the party began to apprehend difficulties insuperable in their project of building their greatness on opposition to Macedonia, and already entertained the opposite project of supplanting the party of Phocion and Isocrates in favor with the Macedonian court, or whether their purpose was merely speculation and the acquisition of information for ground of farther measures, in any case to have a minister in whom they confided go to Macedonia, would be desirable for them. The embassy however was instructed to inquire concerning the king of Macedonia's disposition toward peace. On their return, Ctesiphon, reporting the transactions to the council and people, said that Philip declared it had been against his inclination that he had gone to war,

SECT.  
III.

and that he was ready immediately to treat of peace; and the ambassador strengthened this assurance by speaking largely of the king's liberal disposition and manners.<sup>14</sup> Great satisfaction being manifested by the people, Philocrates, a man eminent and zealous in the peace-party, seized the opportunity for proposing a decree to rescind that which forbade the admission of heralds from Macedonia; and it was carried without a dissentient voice. What were the considerations which induced the war-party, almost immediately after, so to exert themselves for the prevention of all treaty that not a step was taken in consequence of the opening, so studiously procured, and without opposition voted, is nowhere said, but apparently may be gathered from the circumstances quickly following.

Æsch. de  
legat.p.198.

Peace with Macedonia, however necessary for the republic, however necessary for the war-party themselves, would bring ruin to their power, unless they might be the peace-makers, and afterward hold such consideration with the Macedonian government that its communication with the sovereign, the people, for the mutual concerns of the two states, should pass through them. But Philip was steady in his preference of the party of Phocion and Isocrates, and therefore the war-party persevered in obstructing all accommodation with him. Among the complicated politics of Greece then, their keen sight discovered opportunity, little discernible to the common eye. In Phocis, through the overbearing weight of the

<sup>14</sup> It has been a question among the critics whether Phrynon and Ctesiphon were commissioned together, or Ctesiphon alone was the ambassador. For the history it is very little important; but it appears to me that the combined phrases *πεισθέντες δ' ἡμεῖς* and *προσείλεσθ' αὐτῷ* clearly indicate that they were joined in the commission.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 800.

standing army, of which the autocrator generals had now so long held the command, an effectual change had been wrought in the civil constitution of the country; whence those great officers have been sometimes qualified with the title of tyrant. When the change took place is not indicated, farther than as Onomarchus is found raising the mercenary force to an amount unknown either before or after him, and engaging in projects of ambition, far beyond the strength, and not very evidently adapted to promote the interest, of the Phocian people. The present youthful autocrator, Phalæcus, equal perhaps in courage, and perhaps in talents, wanted the authority of years and the advantage of experience which had enabled his father and uncles to hold their arduous situation so advantageously. Hence, rather than from any misconduct of which information has reached us, a party was enabled to rear its head against him. That party then in Athens, the party of Chares, which had held intimate connexion, and been deeply engaged in politics with his father Onomarchus, gave encouragement and support now to the party adverse to the son. Apparently he declined engaging in their views to the extent they required: possibly he had connexion with their adversaries, and preferred that connexion: he had certainly connexion with Lacedæmon, which would tend to render him less dependent than they desired upon themselves. If then they could raise his opponents to the supreme power in Phocis, that country being unable to maintain itself without foreign connexions, those men, so raised, must afterward be dependent upon them for means to hold their power. Of particulars of the revolution we have no information; but Phalæcus was deposed, the supreme authority in Phocis was committed to a triumvirate, and the new



government immediately sent an embassy to Athens. The party of Chares and Demosthenes received the ambassadors favorably, and introduced them to the general assembly to declare the object of their mission; which was to obtain the approbation of the Athenian people for a transfer to the new Phocian government of the friendship and alliance which had subsisted with that recently overthrown. The people were accustomed to hear, and very ready to believe, that, in political morality, the profitable was always becoming. A bribe therefore was ready: it was proposed that three Phocian towns, Nicæa, Thronium, and Alponus, small and of little value otherwise, but highly important for their critical situation, commanding the way from the pass of Thermopylæ into the country southward, should receive Athenian garrisons. This was of great moment for the purposes of the war-party leaders, but little inviting for the many; as revenue to arise from this new dominion could not be pretended. Motives for desire therefore being deficient, another passion was resorted to. Greece was represented in danger of subjugation from the arms of Macedonia, if Athens did not prevent. The result shows that arguments were ably adapted to the temper of those on whom it was proposed to work. The offer of the new Phocian government was accepted; and such was the zeal excited that fifty triremes were directed by a decree to be immediately manned, and all citizens under thirty to be ready in arms to march or embark, at the command of Proxenus, who was appointed general for the occasion. Some of the more intemperate then went so far as to

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 301.

p. 198.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

and the penalty was set at a hundred talents, near twenty thousand pounds. It appears however to have been judged by the more discreet not to have been a season for such violent party-measures. Demosthenes himself undertook the defence of Philocrates; and the prosecutor, not obtaining a fifth of the voices of the court, became liable himself to the penalty decreed against frivolous and vexatious accusation. The account however rather implies that this was not insisted upon by Philocrates and his friends, so that, in fact, the matter was compromised; and some reason for this moderation of the war-party seems to appear in what followed.

Æsch. de  
leg. p 251.

The general-autocrator, Chares, was absent, with the fleet and mercenary army, supposed on the Thracian station; where it was particularly expected of him to protect the valuable colony of the Chersonese. But deputies arrived from that colony, charged to express the extreme uneasiness of the settlers at the defenceless state in which they were left, when it was understood a Macedonian army was approaching, and the great armament under Chares, on which they had depended for protection, not only had not been seen, but could not be heard of. The terror, less perhaps of subjection to Macedonia than of the vengeance of the late proprietors of their lands and houses, for which the approach of a Macedonian army might give encouragement, had been such that some of them had already embarked, to seek, with the loss of their landed estates, some safety for their persons and portable property.

These circumstances excited indignation which the friends of Chares had difficulty to meet. The people assembled; and while, with much anger demonstrated, no specific proposition found any ex-

tensive concurrence, one of the intimates of Chares, Cephisophon, moved that a small squadron under the command of Antiochus, kept in the harbour of Piræus purposely for emergencies, should go in quest of the autocrator and his fleet, and bring an account of them. This was adopted as the fittest measure in the moment, and the public effervescence was thus suspended.

It appears extraordinary, in the deficiency of our information, that men so able, so daring, so indefatigable, and so unscrupulous as those who now principally directed the political business of Athens, should have judged it expedient to support, in so high a situation, one whose glaring misconduct was so continually thwarting their purposes. But Chares, with all his vices and extravagances, was evidently not without considerable talents, peculiarly adapted to hold that paramount influence which, according to all accounts, he did long hold, among such a military, and such a populace as the Athenian; whence he was necessary to those whom the goodwill of the army and the multitude was necessary. But in addition to this we have the concurring testimonies of the two great rival orators, Demosthenes and Æschines, to other considerations. Contributions were collected by the officers of the fleet, regularly assessed on the islanders, not with public authority or for public purposes; amounting, according to Æschines, to sixty talents, near twelve thousand pounds yearly; and the trade of all Greece was subjected to plunder, and the persons of Grecian navigators to violence, from those officers. There were those even who undertook to prove that, in the course of his various commands, Chares raised, in various ways, no less than fifteen hundred talents,

SECT.  
III.

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Demosth.  
de Cherson.  
Æsch. de  
leg. p. 250.



CHAP.  
XXIX.

near three hundred thousand pounds, not accounted for in the maintenance of the armament, but distributed among his favorite officers and supporting orators. Where or how Chares was employed when Antiochus was sent to seek him we have no information beyond what may be implied in these reports of the two great orators.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 251.

But circumstances were in too many points critical and threatening for the public mind to rest in the calm produced, for the moment, by the decree of Cephisophon. Æschines marks the trouble and indecision of the time by observing that the extraordinary assemblies convened were more numerous than the ordinary, required for the whole business of the commonwealth. Suddenly in the midst of this agitation a surprising disposition appeared among those hitherto most violent against Macedonia to relax in their opposition, and admit accommodation. Readily as this was met by the other party, difficulties occurred about the manner and means of opening a negotiation. The savage decree indeed forbidding all communication by heralds had been repealed: but the king of Macedonia's overtures, made through the Eubœan ministers, had been answered only with invective by the leading orators in the assembly, and with neglect by the administration; and the following mission of Phrynon and Ctesiphon had produced nothing. A direct proposal of peace therefore was avoided: but it was resolved to use opportunity, accidentally offering, for learning the disposition of the Macedonian court. Among many Athenians, made prisoners at Olynthus, were two of eminence, Everatus and Stratocles. It was proposed to negotiate specially for their ransom: but for this the authority of the sovereign people must be ob-

tained. Philocrates, the mover of the repeal of the decree forbidding communication with Macedonia, now moved a decree to authorize a mission for negotiating the ransom of the prisoners. Against all common expectation Demosthenes exerted his eloquence in support of the motion, which thus was readily successful.

The person chosen for the delicate office of sounding the king of Macedonia was a player, named Aristodemus. His profession, even in Athens, amid the singular passion there for the entertainment it afforded, is indicated by Demosthenes to have been esteemed degrading. Aristodemus however was recommended, not simply by his talents, though above the common, but by having, through his talents, recommended himself to the notice and favor of the king of Macedonia, when exercising his profession formerly at Pella. He was not long absent on his mission; but his report to the council, which should have been made immediately on his return, was irregularly delayed. Meanwhile Stratocles, liberally dismissed without ransom, coming home, reported publicly that the king of Macedonia had freely assured him of his desire of peace, and that he was ready even to confirm peace by alliance. The council then, in some anger, sent for their loitering minister; who, after a lame apology for his delay, made his report of Philip's professions, perfectly coinciding with what had been related by Stratocles. He was afterward, according to the usual form, introduced by the council to the assembly of the people, to whom he gave the same account. Some ill humour was manifested there also at the irregular delay of information for which the public mind had been so anxious; yet Demosthenes did not fear to move that the honor of a crown, to

SECT.  
III.

Demosth.  
de cor.  
p. 288.  
& al.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 201.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

be presented by the people, should reward the able and successful execution of the important mission; and it was accordingly decreed to Aristodemus.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 303.

The disposition of the Macedonian king toward an accommodation being thus authenticated, a day was appointed for an assembly to take the matter into consideration. On that very day dispatches arrived from the general Proxenus, or not till that day were acknowledged, informing the council that ‘the Phocians refused to deliver the places of which he was sent to take possession; that Phalæcus and his party, again predominant in Phocis, had imprisoned the ambassadors of the new government of that country, who had conducted the treaty at Athens, and so resented the conduct of the Athenian government that they had gone to the extremity of denying hospitality to the heralds, sent from Athens according to ancient custom to proclaim the season of the Eleusinian mysteries, and even refused the truce, offered to all on that solemn occasion.’

The cause of the new disposition of the party of Chares to peace was now explained. They had not been without information that the new government of Phocis would probably be unable to support itself; and yet they would not, while a chance of success remained, forego the advantages hoped for from the measures they had taken. The ill-excused delay of Aristodemus in reporting to the council, the zeal shown in his favor by Demosthenes, who was a member of the council, the critical arrival of the dispatches from Proxenus, the general of their choice, combined with the unremitted vehemence of their former opposition to Macedonia, and the suddenness of the change, indicated enough that the party were



temporizing; nor could it be doubted but, had the Phocian plot been finally successful, they would have opposed, not less than formerly, all proposal of peace. But when the failure of all advantage expected from their measures was complete, and moreover the great and threatening disadvantages accrued to Athens, that Phocis, from a steady and zealous ally, was become an incensed enemy, accommodation, if yet possible, with Macedonia seems to have been the only resource for either the party or the republic.<sup>15</sup>

Ordinary men might have been overwhelmed by the failure of a plot of such scandalous perfidy, involving such disaster and danger to the commonwealth. But the party of Chares, men certainly of no ordinary talents, were also fortunate in that their principal opponents were remarkable for moderation, as they for boldness in politics. To forward their anxious purpose of peace the friends of Phocion and Isocrates did not refuse a degree of coalition with the party of Chares; and treaty with Macedonia became the object of all.

Æsch. de  
leg. ut ant.  
& de cor.  
p. 450

Some degree of concert was evidently already established between the leaders of the contending parties when, on the motion of Philocrates, a decree was made for sending an embassy of ten to Macedonia. The commission comprised persons of both parties, and appears to have been altogether respectably filled. Six of the names have already occurred

<sup>15</sup> The caution and shifts of Demosthenes afterward to avoid argument on such important transactions, so connected with his main argument, especially in the orations on the embassy and on the crown, strongly corroborate all that has been asserted by Æschines. A passage in the oration of Demosthenes on the embassy is particularly to the purpose. Demosth. de legat. p. 362.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.Æsch. de  
legat. p. 202.

p. 204.

for notice, Ctesiphon, Philocrates, Phrynon, Aristodemus, Æschines, Demosthenes; the three former eminent by birth and fortune, the others by talents. To these were added Cimon, head of the illustrious house of Miltiades, with Iatrocles, Nausicles, and Dercyllus, who had held high situations. But a difficulty arose with regard to Aristodemus: he was engaged, after the manner of theatrical management in modern Europe, under a penalty to perform at public festivals in different cities. Such however was the estimation of the man, notwithstanding the disrepute of his profession, that Demosthenes did not scruple to be the mover of a decree for a mission to the several states to which he had bound himself, to solicit, in the name of the Athenian people, a release from his engagements. An eleventh ambassador was added, Aglaocreon of Tenedos, for all the subject-allies of Athens whose interests were to be implicated in the proposed negotiation; not chosen by themselves, but appointed by the imperial people.

## SECTION IV.

*Progress of the embassy to Pella: audience: return and report to the council and people. Policy of the war-party: condition of Synedrian or subject-allies. Embassy of Three from Macedonia to Athens. Decree for peace and alliance with Macedonia. Treatment of the king of Thrace. Departure of the Macedonian ministers from Athens.*

B. C. 347.  
OL. 108. 2.  
[B. C. 346.  
Cl. Cf.  
p. 433.]

The circumstances of the embassy being decreed, a herald was sent into Macedonia for a passport, for which however the ambassadors did not wait to begin their journey. In Thessaly a Macedonian army was blockading Halus; whose people, whether more

SECT.  
IV.Demosth.  
de legat.Æsch. de  
leg. p. 207.  
Isocr. Or.  
ad Phil.

through attachment to the party of the late tyrants, or incitement from Athens, or mere enmity to the Pharsalians who asserted some claim of dominion over them, had rebelled against the common government of the country. Such however was the confidence of the Athenian ambassadors in the liberality and honor of the Macedonian government that they did not scruple to pass through the Macedonian camp. Respected, as they had promised themselves, there, they proceeded to Larissa, a city zealous in the Macedonian alliance, where they met their herald, bearing the requisite authority with which they proceeded to Pella.

Immediate deputies of a multitude, they appear to have received no precise instructions: under terror of their despotic and wayward sovereign they were to be careful to promote, at every opportunity, the interest of the Athenian people. Among matters however which they seem to have considered as most particularly expected of them, was to use their endeavours for obtaining the cession of Amphipolis. To offer any advantage for Macedonia in return appears to have been out of question; only, as a supposed private gratification for the prince, they might engage for the restoration of Leosthenes, an illustrious Athenian exile, esteemed among the most eloquent men of the age, who had been kindly entertained at the Macedonian court. Altogether they were expected to demand so much and to concede so little that Cimon declared, among his colleagues, ‘he feared Philip would have the advantage of them in fair reasoning.’<sup>16</sup>

Negotiation was yet managed in the manner of

<sup>16</sup> — φοβέιτο μὴ δικαιολογούμενος περιγένοιτο ἡμῶν ὁ Φίλιππος.  
Æsch. de legat. p. 205.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

ancient times, much by conference, little in writing. Introduced to audience, the ambassadors all spoke in turn, the elder beginning. Demosthenes, as youngest, spoke last. He was apparently most depended upon by the war-party for watching its separate interests and maintaining its importance. But, whether through consciousness of the illiberality of his invectives in the Athenian assemblies against the prince he was addressing, or apprehension of his deficiency in a situation so new to him, or both together, with perhaps other feelings, his nerves failing, his voice and memory faltered. Philip, with ready politeness, endeavoured to encourage him; but, after two or three vain attempts, in which through his confusion he dropped some very awkward expressions, he concluded abruptly.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 222.  
225. 226.

The ambassadors were then conducted into an adjoining apartment. After no long delay they were again introduced into the chamber of audience. They were seated, and the king addressing them replied severally to the arguments used by each, with a perspicuity and elegance which forced admiration from all. Stating strongly his sentiments of his own and his people's rights, he expressed, in terms the most obliging to the embassy, a disposition the most friendly toward the Athenian commonwealth. They were then invited to sup with him. Hilarity prevailed; and they found themselves compelled to acknowledge Philip's talent for conviviality equally as for business.

p. 227.

After a day or two proposals for a treaty were delivered to them in writing, in the form of a letter to the Athenian people. In this communication the king expressed his desire that the peace, which it was hoped would follow between Macedonia and Athens,

Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 354.

might be assured by an alliance. In farther conference then with the ambassadors he frankly told them his purpose immediately to join his army in Thrace, where he was at war with some Thracian princes and some Grecian towns; but he gave them his word that, as long as might be necessary for deliberation in the Athenian assembly concerning the peace and alliance proposed, nothing hostile should be attempted against the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese. The business of the mission thus ended, and the ambassadors returned to Athens.

Immediately on their arrival, in regular course they reported their proceedings, and delivered the king of Macedonia's written proposals to the council of Fivehundred. Demosthenes, who was a member of that council, spoke very favorably of his colleagues generally, and moved that, according to custom, when the conduct of an embassy was approved, they should be honored for their able and faithful services with a public supper in the prytaneum; and, as the business of peace was so successfully begun, that they should wear on the occasion crowns of the sacred olive. The council approved, and the honor was paid.

In course they were then to be introduced by the council to make their report to the assembled people. Demosthenes, as youngest of the embassy, again spoke last, but he spoke with a tone considerably altered. 'All that his colleagues had been relating,' he said, 'was little to the purpose. Let the decree of the people, directing the embassy, be read.' It was read accordingly. 'Let the king of Macedonia's letter, which we have delivered, be read.' That also was recited. 'Now,' he said, 'it is for the people to decide what is to be done.' He paused,

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

and a murmuring conversation arose among the people. 'I then,' he resumed, 'will propose a decree: 'Let it be directed, 'that the herald expected from 'Philip be received; and that the ambassadors to 'follow him be received: that, within two days 'after the arrival of the ambassadors, the prytanes 'assemble the people, to consult on peace with 'Macedonia; and that we, your ambassadors, if 'we are thought worthy, receive the approbation 'of this assembly, and be treated in the prytaneum 'to-morrow.' His motions were approved, and his decree passed.

The inflexible Phocion and his friends were not politicians to contend, in a government like the Athenian, with the time-serving party of Chares. These, compelled, after all their struggles against it, to allow and even press for peace, and successful, through the co-operation of those before their opponents, in putting the matter thus far in train, thought things sufficiently ripe now for separating themselves from their new associates, and making the administration of the republic again exclusively their own. They would begin with even making the business of the negotiation with Macedonia exclusively their own. To effect this they would go beyond what the strict principles of their opponents would permit, in demonstration of zeal for peace and of consideration for the king of Macedonia; trusting, for their verbal justification, in the declared will of the sovereign many, that peace with Macedonia should be negotiated, and, for their real security, in maintaining, through their policy, their command of a majority of votes.

Ministers had been dispatched to all the allies of the Athenian people, inviting a general congress at



Athens. The purpose stated was, to consult on the terms of a general peace, which might provide for the interests of all, or on means for making common war with Macedonia, if it should be found necessary for the defence of their common liberties. The peace-party could not readily conceive that this measure, in which all seem at the time to have concurred, would prove ungrateful to the war-party, who had admitted the necessity or expediency of negotiation. But, to their surprise, Demosthenes was the orator to assert the inconvenience of it: the discussion of so many various interests, he contended, would interfere with the desired conclusion of peace and alliance with Macedonia. He proposed therefore a decree for taking the alliance into consideration on the same early day which was already, on his motion, appointed for the debate on peace; and, for farther security against the delay that discussion might produce, his decree required that the votes should be taken on the following day, when no speaking should be allowed. The party of Phocion remonstrated in vain, that it would be highly insulting as well as injurious to their allies not to allow them to participate in the negotiation, having been formally invited by Athenian ministers, who were not yet even themselves returned from their mission. The people however had caught the impatience, without knowing the motives of those whose lead they had been accustomed to follow, and the decree proposed by Demosthenes was carried.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 237.  
& 240. &  
de cor.  
p. 454. &  
460.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 243.

This measure had precisely the effect apparently proposed. Phocion and his friends, the original earnest promoters of peace, were thrown into a situation in which they found themselves under neces-

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Ch. 35. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

sity of holding the language and conduct of opposition; and Chares and his friends were become the peacemakers, with the voice of the people supporting them. But the insult was gross to all the foreign connexions of the republic. The Lacedæmonians, and other independent allies, if any others were independent, could not but revolt at it. The Synedrians, resident deputies of the subject-states, in great uneasiness, met to take the matter into consideration. The result of their debate was a decree or resolution, to be offered to the Athenian people, in their first assembly appointed to consider of peace and alliance with Macedonia. It has been preserved by Æschines, and is indeed an interesting memorial; marking strongly the servile condition of the Synedrians, who imply in it a sense of injury which they dared not express, and apologize even for the implication by declaring, in a solemn act, the most unreserved resignation of themselves and their constituents to the will of the Athenians, as the sovereign people. It runs thus: ‘ Since the Athenian people are taking into consideration a treaty of peace with Philip, though the ministers are not returned whom they sent through Greece to exhort the cities concerning the liberty of the Greeks, it is resolved by the allies that, when the ministers return, and have made their report to the Athenians and their allies, and two assemblies appointed by the prytanes according to the laws shall have been held, in which the Athenians may declare their will about the peace, whatever the Athenian people may decree shall be binding, as a measure taken in common with the allies.’

The expected Macedonian herald soon arrived, and shortly after the ambassadors, Parmenio, Anti-

pater, and Eurylochus, men eminent then in their own country, and afterward over the civilized world.<sup>17</sup>

SECT.  
IV.

It was observed, not without surprise, that Demosthenes was singularly forward in civility toward them.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 282.

He entertained them in his house,<sup>18</sup> and we have his own boast that he entertained them splendidly. He was forward to be the mover of a decree of the people, which apparently passed as matter of course unopposed, assigning them places of honor at the theatrical and other exhibitions of the Dionysian festival, or feast of Bacchus, of which it was then season. Wherever they appeared in public, but the especially in the theatres, where most eyes might be upon them, defying all the invidious observations of the wondering crowd, he was ostentatiously officious in his attention.

Demosth. de  
legat. p. 414.

It was not probably the purpose of Chares and Demosthenes to injure or offend the Synedrian allies, or not to extend to them all the advantages of the treaty; but it was evidently now their great object to make the alliance of Macedonia exclusively their own, shutting out from it, as much as possible, Lacedæmon and all other independent Grecian states. It appears also to have been their anxious desire to obviate all discussion of the late business in Phocis. Without regard therefore to speeches of the adverse orators, or decrees of the Synedrians, the assemblies were held according to the decree of Demosthenes; and peace and alliance with Macedonia, which had been years contended for by the party of Phocion and

<sup>17</sup> Parmenio and Antipater are very respectfully mentioned by Demosthenes in his oration on the embassy, p. 362.

<sup>18</sup> Ἐξέτισσε. This has been generally interpreted to mean that he lodged them. I apprehend it does not necessarily mean so much.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Isocrates, was in two days concluded by those hitherto bitter opponents of every thing tending to such a measure. The allies of both parties were comprised; but those to be considered as entitled to the benefit of the treaty were named; and among the allies of Athens neither Phocis was mentioned nor Lacedæmon.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 259.

Another omission, less important among the general interests of Greece, was noticed at the time as more extraordinary: the unfortunate king of Thrace, Kersobleptes, though not only an ally, but in the situation nearly of a Synedrian or vassal of Athens, was unnamed in the treaty, and of course excluded from its advantages. Within a day or two a minister arrived from him, Critobulus, a Greek of Lampsacus, dispatched purposely to attend the negotiation. Astonished to find all settled, Critobulus claimed nevertheless that his prince's name (ill omitted, he contended, as he was unquestionably an ally of the Athenian people) should be inserted in the treaty, and that himself, being duly authorized, should take the prescribed oath before the Macedonian ambassadors. This demand was urged in the assembly of the people, when Demosthenes, in his turn, as a member of the council of Fivehundred, was one of the presidents. The petition of the unfortunate prince found favor with the many, and Aleximachus moved that Critobulus should be admitted to take the oaths for him. But Demosthenes, rising from the seat of presidency, declared 'that he would not  
' put the motion for any such decree, as it would be  
' a violation of the treaty already sanctioned by the  
' people. If the requisition of the Thracian prince  
' was to be taken into consideration, it could now be  
' properly done only on a day to be named for the

‘purpose.’ Indeed regularity of proceeding, and a just respect both for the power they had been treating with, and for the consistency and faith of their own conduct, seem clearly to have required what Demosthenes insisted on. But he, who so often successfully excited, could not always stem, the popular passion: his own doctrine, the too common doctrine of popular orators, that all considerations should give way to popular utility, and even to the popular will, would tend to blind the many to the reasonableness of his zeal for order; his own frequent lessons of disregard for foreign powers would weigh against his arguments now for respect to them. The many were vociferous for the question. The presidents, far from able to enforce order in such an assembly once disposed to tumult, could not command respect for themselves. They were called upon by name to ascend the bema, and thence declare their reasons for refusing to put the question which the popular voice required. At length they yielded to the tumultuous manifestation of the sovereign will, and the decree passed.

The king of Macedonia however had already provided against any trouble which might be apprehended by his new friends in Athens from the contradiction in which the government was thus involved. Joining his army in Thrace as he had told the Athenian embassy when at Pella was his intention, he marched immediately against Kersobleptes. That weak prince withdrew into the peninsula of Athos, and being followed thither was soon compelled to accede to the king of Macedonia’s terms, and deliver his son as a hostage for observance of them. The few remaining little Grecian cities westward of the Chersonese, of which Doriscus, a

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

place of some note formerly in the Persian wars, appears to have been the most important, were then no difficult or tedious conquest for the Macedonian arms. The object of the expedition, as far as may be gathered from writers not having in view to give a regular account of it, was principally to obviate piracy. What were the measures ensuing we have no information; but, from what was common among the Greeks, it seems not improbable that the population of some conquered towns was removed; which may have afforded foundation for the assertion of Demosthenes, afterward to the Athenian people, that Philip cruelly destroyed thirty-two towns in Thrace. Chares commanded an armament which should have protected the allies of Athens in those parts. Of what he did no account remains, farther than that he sent home intelligence of the Thracian prince's submission to the king of Macedonia. This having taken place before the conclusion of the peace between Macedonia and Athens, all farther question about his admission as a party to the treaty was of course obviated.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 259.

p. 282.

Æsch. de  
cor.  
Plut. vit.  
Demosth.

When, the business of the mission being completed, the Macedonian ambassadors were to return home, the assiduity of Demosthenes in civility toward them was, if possible, increased. He took upon himself to hire carriages for their departure, he attended them on horseback in their way through Attica, and paid his last compliments to them not till they reached the Bœotian border.



## SECTION V.

*Judicial inquiry into dilapidation of the Delphian treasury. Continuation of war between Phocis and Thebes. Distress of Thebes, and solicitation for support from Macedonia: alarm of Phocis and Lacedæmon: alarm of the war-party in Athens.*

The Grecian republics, now again without an external enemy, were left to their own always abounding grounds of discord. Among these the question, who should hold command in Delphi, stood yet foremost; and though the means of exertion of the Thebans and Phocians, between whom the contest began, were nearly exhausted, yet the Sacred war still held a very threatening aspect for the nation.

In the short interval between the deposition of the young autocrator-general, Phalæcus, and his restoration, a judicial inquiry had been instituted by the Phocian government concerning the dilapidation of the Delphian treasury, of which Diodorus has given a report, bearing appearance of being founded on authentic documents. The great objects of the new government in such an inquiry would of course be to justify the recent revolution; and not only to their own people but to all Greece, so as to obtain not only excuse, as widely as might be, but favor and support. Much then it would behove them to avoid offence to all, but especially to those who led the councils of Athens; formerly holding close alliance with the government of the autocrator-generals, and now the main stay of that which had risen by its fall. Accordingly the tribunal to which the inquiry was referred avoided to impute implication in the guilt to any foreign state. They moreover completely acquitted the memory of Philomelus, declaring that his

SECT.  
V.

B. C. 347.  
Ol. 108. 2.  
[Cf. pp. 416.  
433].

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 56.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

administration was found pure. This would amount to acknowledgment that the principles, on which Lacedæmon and Athens had originally concurred with the Phocians to secure the Delphian temple and treasury against the appropriation of them by the Thebans, were also pure. They stated the sacrilegious robbery to have been begun under Onomarchus and continued under his successors; till Phalæcus, (whom, being at direct variance with Athens, they were by no interest bound to respect,) unable to discover any more valuables to satisfy the demands of his followers in arms, allowed them even to break up the pavement of the sacred place, under a notion, excited by two lines of Homer, that, from very ancient times, it had been a practice to deposit treasure there.<sup>19</sup> Philon, accused of being the principal agent in the sacrilegious business, was put to the torture; and, amid his sufferings, having acknowledged himself guilty (at least so his torturers said) and indicated others, was delivered over to an ignominious death. Many then for being concerned in it, or perhaps more really for attachment to the party of the autocrat-general, were also sent to the executioner, and many more found safety only in flight.

The narrative of Diodorus is sometimes not least valuable when contradicting itself, because it so indicates that he reported faithfully from writers of different parties. After having stated the judgment on the sacrilege, as if he supposed it perfectly just, he has proceeded nevertheless to assert what involves some invalidation of its justice. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, he says, did partake in the sacri-

<sup>19</sup> Οὐδ' ὅσα λάϊνος οὐδὲς ἀφῆτορος ἐντὸς ἐέργει  
Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος Πυθοῖ ἐνι πετρῆεσσι.

Hom. Il. l. 9. v. 404.

legious plunder, 'inasmuch as they received pay for ' more troops than they actually furnished for the ' Sacred war.' But, in looking to analogous circumstances mentioned in Grecian history, it appears not easy to decide what amount of criminality should be imputed to any taking and using of the treasure, called sacred, for important public purposes. So long ago as the revolt of the Asian Greeks against Darius, a man of high estimation among them, Hecataeus of Miletus, recommended the employment of the treasure deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia in the temple of Apollo at Branchidæ, the great bank of that side of the Ægean sea, in measures for public defence. His proposal was overruled; but the purpose is not marked by the historian with any reprobation, otherwise than as the measure was not thought fit for immediate adoption by those to whom it was proposed. In the preparation for the Peloponnesian war, Pericles reckoned the golden ornaments of the statue of Minerva, the most venerated in Athens, a resource placed there with a direct view to use in public need; being so formed that they could be readily removed and restored. And indeed, in the licentiousness of democracy, amid the frequent clamors of the many for distributions of public property, it may have been often a useful measure of policy to consecrate the precious metals, with the view to preserve them for public purposes. It is to be observed then that there was at Delphi an Athenian, a Corinthian, a Lacedæmonian treasury, or separate apartment in the treasury; and so for all the principal republics which had treasure there. The question then occurs: What right, in what circumstances, for what purposes, and with what formalities, had the several republics to draw treasure from their several treasuries? But that it was understood some such

Ch. 7. s. 2.  
of this Hist.  
Herod. l. 5.  
c. 36.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

right existed seems fully indicated in the expression of Diodorus, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had partaken in the sacrilege, inasmuch as, not that they had received money for the pay of troops employed in supporting the Phocians, but that they had received beyond the proper pay of those actually employed;<sup>20</sup> so that the guilt was incurred, not by opposing in arms the Amphictyons and others, pretended avengers of sacrilege, but for failing of due exertion against them. The same right then which the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might have for pay for troops employed in the Sacred war, the Phocians themselves might have; drawing treasure only belonging to the republics of their alliance, from which they might have regular authority. Possibly so far Philomelus might have received support from the Delphian treasury, and yet have been justly entitled to the honorable acquittal which his memory received; and this may have made the real distinction between his conduct and that of his successors. Perhaps Onomarchus began in the same creditable course; but, after engaging with the party of Chares at Athens in ambitious projects, of which the conquest of Thessaly was to be the leading step, neither the treasure of Cræsus nor the treasure of the Thebans and their allies was likely to be spared. But the Thebans and their allies, who insisted that the cause of the Phocians was impious in its origin, were only consistent when they insisted that all concurrence in it was impious; and so of course they would involve Philomelus in one charge of sacrilege with those who, after him, went to extremities which he had carefully avoided.

Diodorus reckons the whole treasure at Delphi,

<sup>20</sup> Μετέσχον τῆς αἱρέσεως Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οἱ συμμαχήσαντες τοῖς Φωκεῦσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐκπεμπομένων στρατιωτῶν τοὺς μισθοὺς λαβόντες. Diod. l. 16. c. 57.

when the war broke out, not less than two millions sterling; of which that deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia was much the largest part. We find it afterward satisfactorily indicated by him that though, when Phalæcus and his principal associates found it necessary to retire from Delphi, they might probably search every recess before untried, even to the soil under the sacred pavement, for more treasure, yet it was far from being through absolute want; for they carried away in their military chest no inconsiderable store, with which they were enabled to keep a powerful force still about them. This is what the new government of Phocis and their Athenian friends had certainly not intended to allow. They were disappointed by it, and the defeat of their project, on the success of which they seem to have intended to found far more extensive projects, quickly followed.

Without funds the new government of Phocis was weak, and little able to prosecute the war against Thebes. Of this the Thebans proposed to take advantage; but neither their councils nor their arms were ably directed. Apparently their first object should have been to recover those towns of Bœotia itself which had withdrawn themselves from the Theban alliance, or, in the phrase of the imperial republics, had rebelled against the Theban people. But the first measure of their arms was to invade Phocis for plunder. This was successfully executed, and, the Phocians under their new leaders venturing a battle near Hyampolis, were defeated. Thus the weakness of the government, and the want of union among themselves, and the need of a mercenary army such as that attached to Phalæcus, becoming manifest, that restoration of the general-autocrator, which occasion has occurred already to notice, quickly followed.

B. C. 347.  
Ol. 108. 2.  
[Cf. pp. 416,  
433.]

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 56.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

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The Thebans, then too late, proceeding against the revolted towns, were unable to do more than ravage the country, and, in withdrawing with the plunder, suffered a defeat.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 58.

The Phocians then, strong with their restored mercenary force, and possessing advantageous opportunities through their alliance with the revolted Bœotians, proceeded to retaliate by carrying ravage extensively over the lands of the Theban alliance. Some actions were undertaken in defence of them, but the Phocians were victorious. The cavalry of the Grecian republics, as formerly observed, was generally composed of persons wealthy enough each to maintain a horse and serve with it at his own expense, attended by at least one slave afoot. Its business on home-service was especially to watch the motions of an invading enemy, and protect the lands against ravagers and plunderers. Thebes, with its command of Bœotia, was stronger in cavalry than any other Grecian state, southward of Thermopylæ. Nevertheless the Phocians, coming to action with the Theban cavalry near Hedylium, obtained a victory, which is mentioned by the contemporary orator as of much importance, both in itself and for the impression it made in Thebes, and extensively over Greece.

Demosth.  
de legat.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 59.

Approaching winter gave the Thebans that relief which was common in Grecian warfare. But their treasury was exhausted. The pressure from the Bœotian towns connected with Phocis was severe; farther revolt was apprehended, and in Thebes itself much discontent was brooding. Remaining hope for those who held the administration rested on the support of allies interested in their cause. The Thessalians were principal; but so was Thessaly now connected with Macedonia that, to obtain their as-



sistance, negotiation would probably best be directed to the court of Pella. Thither accordingly a Theban embassy was sent.

SECT.  
V.

B. C. 346.  
OL. 108.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .

Meanwhile at Athens, whether the established practice of former times, or only the proud and jealous temper of the democracy of the day required, though the treaty of peace and alliance with Macedonia had been sworn to before the Macedonian ambassadors by Athenian commissioners appointed by a decree of the people, yet it was held that the ratification was incomplete till commissioners from the Athenian people had received an oath to the observance of the treaty from the king of Macedonia in person. An embassy of five therefore was appointed, Eubulus, Cephisophon, Democrates, Cleon, and Æschines; and to administer the oath seems to have been the only original object.

[B. C. 346.  
CL.]

But information of the mission from Thebes to Pella excited interest deeply and extensively through Greece. The Phocians were first to show alarm. Always unequal alone to the maintenance of their own independency, they had recently lost the support of Athens. The Athenians indeed were divided, as the Phocians themselves were divided. The party of Phocion, friendly to the general-autocrator of the Phocians and his friends, were not so to the party which had deposed him, and against which he had again risen. But the powerful party of Chares, disposed to favor that party, could not be on good terms with Phalæcus and his supporters; and, in negotiation with Macedonia, how far both parties concurring

[\* Mr. Clinton places in this year the first embassy *περί εἰρήνης*, (see above, p. 416.) the second *ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρκους*, a third deputation 23 Scirophorion, and the occupation of Phocis by Philip a few days after. *Fasti Hellen.* pp. 138-140. See also the remarks on the duration and close of the Sacred war in s. 8. of this chapter.]

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

does not very clearly appear, the Athenians had abandoned the cause of Phocis. Lacedæmon therefore remained the only power to which, in the existing crisis, the Phocian government could look for any effectual assistance.

But the state of things was threatening for Lacedæmon itself. Should the Thebans obtain the support of Macedonia for the overthrow of Phocis, its support might follow for the overthrow of Lacedæmon, the supporter of Phocis, implicated in the same imputed crimes, condemned under the same judgment, and devoted under the same curses. On the other hand, should assistance from Macedonia be denied to Thebes, and, what appeared not impossible, should an accommodation follow between the Thebans and Phocians, extensive as was the hostile disposition in Peloponnesus toward Lacedæmon, another Theban invasion might be expected there. The sense, which the Lacedæmonian government had of the crisis, is marked in the exertion which followed. While an embassy was sent to the Macedonian court, a body of a thousand Lacedæmonians, under the orders of the king, Archidamus, marched to Phocis. A thousand Lacedæmonians, if attended by the ancient proportion of inferior troops, would be no inconsiderable force among Grecian armies. Since the fatal battle of Leuctra, neither a Lacedæmonian king, nor such a Lacedæmonian force, had been seen beyond the isthmus. Phalæcus with an army of Phocians and mercenaries, said to amount together to eight thousand, occupied the important posts near Thermopylæ, which his Phocian adversaries had proposed to surrender to the Athenians.<sup>21</sup> At the same time negotiation, such

Isocr. Or.  
ad Philip.  
p. 340.

Æsch.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 59.

Demosth.  
de legat.  
Diod. ut  
sup.

<sup>21</sup> The expression of Demosthenes is, that 'the Phocians held 'the pass;' clearly marking that Phalæcus commanded the

as opportunity might be obtained for, was attempted by the Phocian government both with Macedonia and Thebes.

SECT.  
V.

Isocr. ut  
ant.

In this state of things, the turn that negotiation might take at Pella, important for all, was not least so for the Athenian people. But the favor of the Macedonian court was important severally to both the parties at Athens; to the party of Chares especially, for whom peace and alliance with Macedonia would operate as a political overthrow, unless they could hold that favor eminently, if not even exclusively. In the new crisis, therefore, they were unsatisfied with the composition of the appointed embassy; and they appear to have been, not unreasonably, jealous especially of Æschines; who, having concurred in the coalition formed with Phocion's party for the important public purpose of making peace, would not afterward, for any separate interest of his former party, abandon his new connexion. It appears however to have been judged inexpedient to risk alarm, either among the Athenian people, or in foreign states, by avowing any political object in adding to the number of the embassy, or to its instructions. But a resource was open: precedents were numerous of granting to eminent men, soliciting it from the sovereign many, a public commission for the professed purpose of putting forward a private business; whence benefit might accrue, perhaps some-

Phocians as their constitutional general, and that he was not reduced to be the mere leader of a band of mercenaries. When Æschines, in his defence of himself afterward, called Phalæcus tyrant of the Phocians, or included him with others of their leading men under the title of tyrants in the plural, he seems to have done it only in deference to the prejudices of the multitude, whom in his then circumstances it behoved him to soothe and court. De legat. p. 300. 301. and 303.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 274.

p. 272.

times to the commonwealth, but oftener only to a party; the private business serving as a veil, under which a political purpose might be prosecuted, either for public benefit or party advantage. The release of many Athenian citizens, prisoners of war in Macedonia, waited yet for the ratification of the treaty of peace, which was the object of the embassy. It was well known that Philip had never taken ransom for any Athenian prisoners of war; and, among the informed, no doubt was entertained but that all Athenian citizens, now prisoners in Macedonia, would be freely dismissed as soon as the ratification was completed. Nevertheless Demosthenes did not fear to make the pretence of the patriotic and charitable purpose of ransoming, at his own expense, some Athenian prisoners, the ground of a request to the people, that he might be added to the number of the embassy then on its way to Macedonia. He was accordingly appointed, apparently with four others; for we find the number of this, as of the former embassy, was finally eleven; ten representatives of the Athenian people, and one of all their allies.

## SECTION VI.

*Congress of Grecian embassies at the Macedonian court. Proceedings of the Athenian embassy. Report to the council and people.*

p. 276.

The Macedonian court now became the focus of negotiation for the Grecian republics. The Athenian embassy arriving found the Theban already there, waiting for the king, who was not yet returned from Thrace. The Lacedæmonian came soon after;

and before Philip's arrival others, in the expression of *Æschines*, from almost all Greece. *Æsch. de leg. p. 262.*

In this numerous assemblage of missions from so many republics of one nation, all had different interests to prosecute. They had indeed mostly together in view to put an end to the Sacred war, and provide better security for the temple and treasury of Delphi. But even to this there were exceptions; for we find Demosthenes afterward not scrupling to declare, that the interest of Athens required interminable war in Greece, and especially the continuation of the Sacred war; that the permanency of such a contest among the Grecian republics was highly desirable for the Athenian people. But even where the missions agreed about the object, they differed widely concerning the means of attaining it, and the consequences to be desired. Thebes, Athens, and Lacedæmon, though unable to command, as sometimes formerly, remained yet leading republics, under which the others, with more or less submission or attachment, arranged themselves. The Thebans, to provide for the future security of Delphi, and future peace of the Greek nation, insisted upon the full restoration of the authority of the Amphictyons, and the full execution of the utmost vengeance of the Amphictyonic law against the sacrilegious Phocians. On the contrary, the Lacedæmonians looked to such a result of the contest as big with ruin to their state and to Grecian independency. The Athenians, differing from both, yet differed hardly less among themselves.

The Athenian embassy was compounded from the adverse parties of the republic. Specially commissioned only for the ceremony of receiving the king's oath to the treaty already concluded, it was however required in general terms to act, as opportunity might

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 276.

occur, in every way for the benefit of the commonwealth. The field thus before it was large and abounding with objects; among which each member, according to his views of public, or party, or private interest, somewhat indeed at his peril, might select his object. Even forms for their proceedings were little settled, either by regulation, or precedent. Demosthenes had early shown a disposition to disagree with his colleagues; but his first material difference was about a matter of form. He objected to the rule, which seems to have been general at Athens, in common with most or all of the republican governments, giving precedence according to age, and which had been followed by the former embassy. Why his colleagues would concede such a point to him, and why Æschines would omit to state their inducement, seems not easily imaginable; unless what might be more reasonable in itself than creditable in any declaration of it, a dread of the use to which an orator, powerful among the despotic many, might turn the clause in their instructions, commanding them to act, in all things, as the good of the people might require.<sup>22</sup> We shall hereafter see Demosthenes, without alleging any breach of instructions, without specifying fact of any kind, stating, in general terms only, impediment to him in the prosecution, or rather only purpose, of public service as ground for capital crimination.

Demosth.  
de leg.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 280.

Audience was given to the Athenian in presence of all the other embassies, and Demosthenes, according to his own requisition, spoke first. He began with avowing a difference from his colleagues in political opinions; and he proceeded then to endeavour

<sup>22</sup> Πράττειν δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις καὶ ἄλλ' ὅτι ἂν δύνωνται ἀγαθόν.  
Æsch. de legat. p. 276.



to show that it was not because he was ill-disposed toward the prince he was addressing, but very much the contrary. He related his services to the Macedonian interest in the Athenian assemblies; he mentioned his defence of Philocrates, when criminated for moving the repeal of the decree forbidding the admission of heralds from Macedonia; he specified the decrees moved by himself for facilitating and promoting the negotiation for peace and alliance with Macedonia, and he did not scruple to detail his attention to the Macedonian ambassadors, at Athens, and to mention the aspersions he had suffered in consequence. Aware then of the recollection, that could not fail among all who heard him, of the long course and extreme violence of his contrary conduct, he hazarded an attempt to extenuate the grossness of his frequent invectives, adding much flattery, and strong professions of attachment to Philip. In this it is said, probably with truth, though the account, coming from his adversary, is likely to be highly charged, that he succeeded very ill. In an unusual situation, to which also his temper and habits were adverse, his extensive genius failed him. The awkwardness of his mixture of apology and flattery, the absurdity even of some of his compliments, and the embarrassed and uncouth manner in which he delivered them, considered together with his fame as an orator, were so striking that (whether Philip himself smiled is not said) the bystanders could not refrain from laughing aloud.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> This was a transaction not in the dark, but so public that, had not the rival orator's report of it been largely founded on truth, the shame must have recoiled on him, with great injury to his cause, which evidently was not so injured. He has gone so far as to report some of the phrases which excited laughter, appealing to others who had been present for the exactness of his account.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Æschines following began his speech to the king with a reply to that part of the speech of Demosthenes which was directed against his colleagues. 'He had not been sent,' Æschines said, 'nor had his colleagues, he apprehended, been sent, to apologise in Macedonia for their conduct in Athens, but they had been chosen to transact the business of the republic at the Macedonian court for their supposed fitness for the office, proved on former occasions.' He proceeded then to what Demosthenes apparently had avoided, to plead the cause of the Phocians, in consonance with the sentiments maintained by the Lacedæmonians, and in opposition to the Thebans. 'The first principle,' he said, 'of the Amphictyonic institution was beneficence: its object was not the destruction of men, still less the destruction of whole communities, but, on the contrary, the prevention of such destruction. The Amphictyonic law expressly declared that on no account should any Amphictyonic community be overthrown, or town destroyed; it forbade the implication of the innocent in punishment with the guilty; and to the benefit of this law the Bœotian townships, which had quitted the Theban for the Phocian alliance, were entitled equally with the Phocians themselves.'

Where sentiments and interests differed so widely, as at this time among the hostile republics, and were maintained with so much heat, and, beside the differences between republic and republic, there was such contention of parties within each, with so much uncertainty which might next day preponderate, arrangement adapted to general satisfaction or general good would be, the former clearly impossible, the other of great difficulty. Among the allies of Macedonia the Thessalians, whether for antiquity of

SECT.  
VI.

connexion, steadiness of attachment, services rendered to his family, or power through wealth, strength, and situation to render farther services, had certainly the first claim to Philip's consideration. But the mildness of the measures against the adherents of the late tyrants had left in Pheræ a party strong enough, and bold enough, to deny the contingent of troops of that city for a purpose for which a preponderant portion of the Thessalian people was perhaps more than moderately earnest, the war against Phocis. At the same time the town of Halus, which when Æschines and Demosthenes first passed in embassy to Macedonia was blockaded by a Macedonian army, persevered yet in its contumacy, and especially in its hostile disposition toward the people of Pharsalus, who were among the oldest and most zealous of the Thessalians in the Macedonian interest. This civil war, in a country whose alliance was so important to Macedonia, forcibly required Philip's attention. What he did then seems to have been what could be done most respectful to the embassies and the states they represented, and most consonant to the best principles of confederacy among the Grecian republics; he desired the assistance of their mediation to compose the differences between the Halians and Pharsalians; and for this purpose he proposed that the congress should move to Pheræ. He would then accompany them so far in their direct way home: all the embassies would be nearer the principal objects of negotiation, as well as nearer their constituents. No objection appearing to have been alleged, or indeed to have existed, Pheræ became the seat of the congress, and of the Macedonian king. <sup>24</sup>

Demosth.de  
legat.p.441.

p. 352.

<sup>24</sup> We find Demosthenes, in a speech of many years after, venturing to tell his sovereign, the Athenian many, that the



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

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What were the adverse claims of Halus and Pharsalus does not appear, but the mediation of the congress was unsuccessful. Halus persevered in opposition to the common government of Thessaly, and the army under Parmenio continued the blockade. Decision on this subject was necessary toward the conclusion of business with perhaps all, but particularly the Athenian embassy. Previously to the ratification of the treaty of peace and alliance between Athens and Macedonia by the king's oath, it was to be determined what states were to be included as allies of the contracting parties. It was agreed that Halus should be excluded. A decree of the Athenian people, at the instigation apparently of the war-party, hostile to the autocrator-general and his party, had already declared Phocis no longer the ally of Athens. Philip concurred with the party of Pho-

king of Macedonia bribed the embassies to stay with him till his preparations for the expedition against Phocis were completed, adding this curious reason, 'Lest,' he says, 'your ambassadors 'returning, and reporting his measures, you might have embarked, and, occupying the strait of Thermopylæ, stopped his 'passage.' De cor. p. 236. Hardly, in modern times, could such an impudent imposition be attempted upon the many of London in Common-hall, or of Westminster in Palace-yard, or of the most uninformed part of England in county-meeting. Everywhere there would be those able to inform the more ignorant that nothing could so effectually check the hostile preparation of a power, desiring that its preparation should remain a secret, as the presence of the embassies from powers interested to oppose the purpose of the preparation. But, should it even be found difficult to penetrate the mass of ignorance with such information, yet the observation could not fail to be ready, and of easy conception for all understandings: 'Were not you, Demosthenes, one of the embassy? And did you take the bribe? 'Or, if you did not, what prevented you from sending home 'information of proceedings adverse to the interest of your 'country?'

SECT.  
VI.

cion in desiring to provide protection for that unfortunate people, and their Bœotian friends. At the violence of the Thebans against both he did not scruple to express dissatisfaction strongly, but he judged it expedient to temporize with the prejudices of the Thessalians. The Athenian ministers of Phocion's party therefore rested on assurance from him that he would do his best in favor of both Phocians and Bœotians; while, in conformity with the decree of the Athenian people, the Phocians not only were omitted in the catalogue of allies of Athens, but expressly declared excluded from participation in any benefit of the treaty between Athens and Macedonia.<sup>25</sup> The claims of the contracting parties in Thrace were next discussed and settled. The dominion of the Chersonese was confirmed to the Athenian people, with just exception of the brave Cardians, who were numbered among the allies of Macedonia. Over the rest of Thrace Athens asserted no claim of either dominion or alliance, leaving it thus open to the arms or the mercy of Philip. Matters being so agreed upon, Philip took the oaths, and the Athenian embassy returned home.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 504.

The omission of Isocrates, among his proposals for reforming the Athenian constitution, to speak with any respect of the council of Fivehundred, while he was urging the restoration of power to the almost abolished council of Areopagus, indicates no favorable opinion of the former. Indeed we find the appointment of the members by lot out of all the citizens considered, even among the ancients, as an absurd

<sup>25</sup> The decree declared the Phocians ἔκσπονδοι. That this term implied exclusion from alliance and all benefit of the treaty concluded with Macedonia, there can be no doubt. What more it may have implied may be difficult to determine.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Æsch. de  
legat.

Demosth.  
de legat.

mode of constituting a body to direct executive government. But this election by lot seems to have been very commonly eluded; so that some men of superior education and qualification always obtained seats. Demosthenes, according to the assertion made in his presence to the Athenian people by Æschines, became a member 'not according to law, but through bribery.' If one man such as Demosthenes succeeded in so obtaining a seat, it might best suit the purposes of his party if his colleagues were of the lowest of the people. Of what description however, or what various descriptions of men, the council was actually constituted, we have no precise information, when Demosthenes, as a member of it, was to report the proceedings of the embassy. In doing this, he spoke very unfavorably of his colleagues; and the council, whether persuaded by his speech, or before prepared, put a singular slight upon the embassy: the customary decree, which had never failed before on any such occasion within memory, for honoring it with a public supper in the Prytaneum, was omitted.

Ibid.

In the assembly of the people then, to which the proceedings of the embassy were in course next to be reported, Demosthenes also took the lead in speaking. He now affected to be the advocate of the Phocians, and bewail their unhappy lot:<sup>26</sup> the king of Macedonia, whom he had been grossly courting, he now again grossly reviled; and, as disposed to

<sup>26</sup> We find him acknowledging that the interest of the Phocians was totally unprovided for in the treaty with Macedonia, and this he justifies so far as to avow that he imputed no ill even to Æschines on that account: *σιωπᾶν καὶ ἔῤῃ εἰκὸς ᾗν*; 'it was very well to be silent about it and let it alone.'

Demosth. de legat. p. 354.



friendship with Macedonia, he reviled all his colleagues. But the Athenian many were not yet duly prepared for this change. A large proportion had been indulging in prospect of those advantages from peace and alliance with Macedonia which the orator himself had been before teaching them to look for; and accordingly, as we find himself confessing, he was heard with marked disapprobation.

Æschines following obtained favorable attention while he defended the embassy and the peace concluded by it. With regard to the Phocians, he said, 'it was notorious the king of Macedonia could not admit any stipulations for them in the treaty, without breaking with his old allies the Thesalians and Thebans. But he had given ample assurance that he would exert himself to avert, or soften the severities proposed by their inveterate enemies, which no other could avert, or soften. That the treaty concluded with Macedonia was otherwise advantageous, could not be doubted; especially for the affairs of Eubœa, where the Athenian people were in danger of losing every thing, had the war continued. Nevertheless it would depend upon themselves to draw the full benefits which were laid open to them. If the disposition became general to revile, with the orator who had preceded, the power with which they had just concluded peace and alliance, any very cordial friendship ought not to be expected in return.'<sup>27</sup>

Demosth.  
de legat.

<sup>27</sup> We have an account of the speech of Æschines only from his bitter adversary. That the text above is a fair representation of the tenor of his argument seems clearly enough to be

## SECTION VII.

*New measures of the war-party in Athens hostile to Macedonia.  
Oration of Isocrates to Philip.*

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 356.

Æschin.  
de legat.  
p. 276. &  
300.

Demosth. de  
leg. p. 357.  
Æsch. de  
leg. p. 304.

Isocr. cp. ad  
Philip. 1.  
p. 418.  
Æsch. de  
leg. p. 305.

After the ratification of the peace with Macedonia a decree had been passed, on the motion of Philocrates, declaring that, ‘if the Phocians did not ‘duly surrender the temple of Delphi to the Amphictyons, the Athenian people would join in arms ‘against them, and against all who should support ‘them in their contumacy.’ Phocion’s party yet held the principal direction of the government when the king of Macedonia, who had been preparing for the Phocian war openly and avowedly before all the Grecian embassies in Thessaly, addressed the Athenian people in the usual manner, by a letter in his own name, by which he invited them as allies, and as Amphictyonic people, to join his other allies, and the whole Amphictyonic confederacy, in a just community in arms and in council, for ending an evil so extensively destructive as that war had been, and still extensively threatening. The party of Phocion, in conformity with the decree already made, were anxious to concur in this measure for the common good of Greece; and they reckoned the opportunity not only particularly advantageous for asserting the dignity of the republic, and advancing its importance among the Grecian states, but also, if to soften the

gathered from Demosthenes, exerting his powers to give everything the most invidious appearance; and it receives strong confirmation from the first epistle of Isocrates to Philip, and the tract entitled his oration to Philip, which show that such was the approved tenor of argument among Phocion’s party.

threatened lot of the Phocians and their Bœotian allies was desirable, that Athens could in no other way nor at any other time interfere so efficaciously. A powerful party in Thebes, arrogantly demanding support for the pretension of the Theban people to sovereignty over all the other people of Bœotia, and vehemently pressing for vengeance against the Phocians, had already notoriously disgusted Philip; and the disposition prevailing among the Thessalians to concur with the Thebans distressed him. The vote in the Amphictyonic assembly of a state hostile to Thebes, and the contingent of such a state in the Amphictyonic army, were particularly desirable for him. In such circumstances therefore the sentiments of the government of such a state must command respect.

But this was a measure which, in promoting at the same time the power of Athens and the good of Greece, would have tended to fix the superiority of the party of Phocion and Isocrates, and therefore was to be opposed by the party of Demosthenes and Chares. Nor did they want for arguments which might weigh with the many. ‘Where was the advantage,’ they said, ‘of peace with Macedonia, if it was to involve the republic in a new war? They did not approve the peace; but, peace being made, the people should rest in peace. What benefit was to result, either to the republic or individuals, from the service of Athenian citizens in the Amphictyonic army? Would it be more profitable than service under the orders of the people in Thrace, or in Asia? Was it certainly safe for Athenian troops to join overbearing numbers of Thessalians and Macedonians? Might they not be overpowered and detained as hostages, till conditions, disad-

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 305.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

‘vantageous to the republic, were obtained for their ‘release?’ Aversion to military service thus encouraged, and suspicion excited, produced a delay of answer, and Philip sent a second letter. But meanwhile the party of war and trouble, now for the moment advocates for peace and quiet, had gained farther hold on the popular mind; the party of Phocion, successful in stopping mischievous exertion, were unable to procure beneficial exertion, and the king of Macedonia’s requisition was finally answered with a denial.

Demosth. de  
leg. p. 379.

de legat.  
p. 357.

Thus was gained a necessary previous step toward the execution of a project for leading the republic immediately again into war with Macedonia, and beginning with a blow which, if not at once even decisive, would place the party in circumstances of great advantage for farther measures. They had observed that, through the ordinary waste of Grecian warfare, the country, to a wide extent southward of the strait of Thermopylæ, the seat of long hostilities, could afford little for an army coming into it. Whether the deficient interest, or the not uncommon extreme of scruple of the party of Phocion had prevented the recal of Proxenus, he remained, with a fleet of fifty triremes, in the neighbourhood of the strait. The nautic multitude was of course always ill pleased with peace, and ready for war; and of the officers, a large proportion, under influence of the same interests, were always disposed to the views of the war-party. If then the Lacedæmonians and Phocians could be kept firm and united, and the Athenians could be brought to co-operate with them, Philip’s supplies by sea being intercepted, if he ventured southward of the strait, he might be ruined without the hazard of a battle.

The great obstacle to this scheme of profound policy seems to have been what the war-party had made for themselves, by so alienating the autocrator-general of Phocis, and his party, that they would hold no communication with them. Hence seems to have arisen a proposal, that Nicæa, Thronium, and Alponus, critical posts for commanding the pass, which the late new government of Phocis had promised, and the restored government refused, to surrender to Athens, should be committed to the custody of the Lacedæmonians. Archidamus gave into this project, so far as to declare himself ready to undertake the garrisoning of the three towns. But the Phocians, who had found large cause for mistrusting the Athenians, began to mistrust the Lacedæmonians when they found them connected in policy with the Athenians, and chose rather to depend upon the king of Macedonia's disposition to favor them. Refusing therefore to surrender the places, yet desirous of avoiding offence to the Lacedæmonians, they excused themselves, saying: 'They feared Sparta had too much occasion to look to her own dangers.'<sup>28</sup>

This transaction could not be secret. The disposition of the war-party to produce a new breach

<sup>28</sup> Τὰ τῆς Σπάρτης δεινὰ δεδιέναι, καὶ μὴ παρ' αὐτοῖς. Æsch. de legat. p. 302. All the critics seem to have seen difficulty, and to have supposed omission or corruption, in this passage, except Taylor, whose explanation is by a paraphrase only, and to me, I must own, not satisfactory. Reiske translates δεινὰ *fraudes*, and Auger *mauvaise foi*. Why they have chosen that uncommon sense of the word seems not obvious. If authority be desired for application of it in its ordinary sense, Isocrates furnishes abundance where, in his oration to Philip, he describes the troubles of Sparta and the dangers continually surrounding her. Considering it then as referring to them, Wolf's correction of the passage, according to the manuscript Cod. Reg. 3., καὶ μὴ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς, makes the whole of easy construction.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

with Macedonia had been amply manifested: the peace of Athens and of Greece, and especially the welfare of the party of Phocion in Athens and of that large part of the Grecian people concurring in political sentiments with them, were in danger. In these critical circumstances Isocrates published his much admired oration to Philip; which, under the form indicated by the title, is really an appeal from himself and his party to the Athenian people, and to the whole Greek nation.<sup>29</sup> The war-party, when they found their power falling through the failure of their measures against Macedonia, it appears, would have allowed Philip the supreme situation in Greece, that command of armies and presidency of councils, for which Athens, Lacedæmon, and Thebes had been so long contending, provided they might hold the lead in Athens. This imputation of Æschines seems virtually admitted by Demosthenes, through his failure to meet it. How far they might have had in view to betray him afterward cannot be known. But no sooner had they ascertained that, though interfering no way in the interior of the republic, yet for all the common concerns of Athens and Macedonia, and all the common politics of Greece which interested both governments, he would still give his confidence to the party of Phocion, and would not be allured by any promises or any flattery, or driven by any alarms, to favor their opponents, then the orators of the war-

<sup>29</sup> The oration to Philip marks its own date, after the conclusion of peace between Athens and Macedonia, and before the conclusion of the Sacred war. Between these two points then it farther marks its time, after symptoms of a disposition toward a new breach with Macedonia had been manifested by a party in Athens, and while the Lacedæmonians were apprehensive of an accommodation between the Thebans and Phocians; thus fixing almost its moment.



party, disappointed in their measures and vexed at their own work, applied their utmost diligence to make him, and the peace themselves had negotiated with him, suspicious and odious in Athens, and to disturb, as extensively as might be, those arrangements and that plan of policy through which Phocion and Isocrates had hoped to provide tranquillity for Greece. In this they had now so succeeded that Isocrates, evidently in concurrence with his party, but with his party in a degree of despair, resorted to the bold and hazardous expedient of proposing to Philip to assume authority by which the disturbers of the general tranquillity might be repressed, and to persuade the Grecian people to approve the measure.

Isocrates was in the habit of epistolary correspondence with Philip; and, of his extant epistles to that prince, the first carries indication of having been written for the public eye, to try the popular mind upon the subject of the oration intended to follow. He could use, it appears, more freedom toward the prince than he thought prudent to venture toward his own sovereign, the Athenian people; and, in the very outset of his oration he has not scrupled to impute a faulty ambition to Philip in the beginning of the war; apparently alluding to his extensive and rapid conquests, made while the Athenians were implicated with their revolted allies, and reckoning them more than moderate reprisal for the injurious aggression at Pydna. Faults however he allows there were on both sides. To prevent the war then, he says, had been his anxious desire: from the moment it began he had been earnest to have peace restored; and now peace was made he was most anxious to provide that it should be lasting. But, for this, ob-

Isocr. Or.  
ad Phil.  
p. 308.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

serving how eager, after short repose, some among the Athenian people already were for new hostilities, he feared nothing could be effectual but what he had recommended many years ago, to unite the whole nation in war against Asia. Hence he has taken occasion to address the king of Macedonia as the only person capable of holding the lead in so great a business. Already the ally of Athens, he says, Philip should bring all the Grecian states to concord with one another and alliance with himself, and then lead the armies of all against the barbarians.

Representing the king of Macedonia then in a way to recommend him to the confidence of the republics, and to obviate the ill opinions which the war-party were so diligent in impressing, he proceeds, after some ingenious turns adapted to his purpose of winning attention and obviating irritation and jealousy, to give a picture of Greece itself. ‘Without neglecting any of those great interests,’ he says to Philip, ‘in managing which you have been already so successful, your endeavours should be directed to bring Argos, Lacedæmon, Thebes, and Athens to concord. That being effected, for the rest no difficulty will remain; because all are habituated, in any danger, to look to one of these for support; so that, bringing only those four states to harmony, you will deliver all the others from many evils.’ Adverting then to the origin of the Macedonian royal family from Argos, to its reputed common descent with the Lacedæmonian kings from Hercules, to the particular veneration for that deity at Thebes, and to the traditions of the support given by the Athenians to his posterity, as arguments for a friendly disposition in Philip to all the four states, he proceeds to notice objections to his proposal: ‘I know,’ he says, ‘it is

SECT.  
VII.

‘reckoned by some a vain idea that I am offering;  
 ‘for they will not believe it possible to bring the  
 ‘Argives to concord with the Lacedæmonians, nor  
 ‘these with the Thebans: in short, they maintain  
 ‘that no republic, long habituated to the ambition of  
 ‘commanding others, will rest in equality. And  
 ‘while either Athens or Lacedæmon held their former  
 ‘power I am well aware that the objection would be  
 ‘complete: for the predominating state would have  
 ‘the disposition, with the means, to prevent the de-  
 ‘sired concord. But now I know it is otherwise. Isocr. Or.  
ad Phil.  
p. 332.  
 ‘The principal states are disabled by wars, not unlike  
 ‘individuals long contending in single combat: their  
 ‘fury, while their strength holds, resists all attempts  
 ‘to part them; yet at length wounds and weariness  
 ‘effect it, without other mediators.

‘Let us observe then first the Lacedæmonians,  
 ‘who, not long ago, commanded Greece by land and  
 ‘sea. Such is now the alteration that the Pelopon-  
 ‘nesians, formerly all ready at their command to  
 ‘march anywhere, have been seen mostly joining the  
 ‘Thebans to invade their territory. Nor have the  
 ‘evils of the change ceased with that invasion. They  
 ‘are still troubled with the adverse disposition of  
 ‘their own people of the country towns, the Pericæ-  
 ‘cians. At the same time all the other Pelopon-  
 ‘nesians mistrust them; most of the Greeks dislike  
 ‘them; and even from their own slaves they are  
 ‘daily and nightly suffering depredations, so that  
 ‘there is no relief for them from the necessity  
 ‘of watching in arms. But, what now presses  
 ‘beyond anything, they are apprehensive of an ac-  
 ‘commodation between the Thebans and Phocians;  
 ‘whence might follow a new invasion of their coun-  
 ‘try, more destructive than what they have already



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

‘ suffered. In such circumstances how can they  
‘ but gladly see a person ready, with power and with  
‘ all qualifications, to undertake the mediation which  
‘ may end the existing hostilities?

‘ The Argives are in circumstances partly similar,  
‘ and partly worse. From their first possession of  
‘ their present country they have had, like the Lacedæmonians, continual wars with neighbouring states.  
‘ But the contests of the Lacedæmonians have been  
‘ generally with weaker powers, those of the Argives  
‘ with stronger; whence it is habitual with them to  
‘ expect yearly the destruction of their harvest. And,  
‘ in every intermission of the evils of foreign war, civil  
‘ strife has never failed among them; so violent, that  
‘ in Argos has been seen more exultation in the massacre of the best of the citizens than elsewhere  
‘ commonly in the slaughter of enemies.

‘ To come then to the Thebans; they, by a splendid  
‘ victory, acquired great reputation and high fortune;  
‘ yet, by an intemperate use of their advantages, they  
‘ have brought themselves to the situation now of a  
‘ people defeated in war, and worn by calamity. Instantly as they had obtained a superiority over their  
‘ enemies, they began to excite troubles in Peloponnesus; they proposed to conquer Thessaly; they threatened Megara; they deprived Attica of Oropus and its  
‘ territory, wasted Eubœa, and sent triremes to Byzantium: as if they were taken with the extravagant  
‘ ambition to command by sea as well as by land.  
‘ At length they made war on Phocis; expecting  
‘ quickly to subdue its towns, to hold the country  
‘ under their dominion, and to become masters of the  
‘ Delphian treasury. In all these hopes they have  
‘ been disappointed. They have killed a few Phocian  
‘ mercenaries, fitter to die than live; and they have

Isocr. Or.  
ad Phil.  
p. 342.

p. 344.

‘lost many of the best of their own citizens. Pro-  
 ‘posing to bring all the Greeks under their dominion,  
 ‘they are now reduced to hope in you for their own  
 ‘safety.’

SECT.  
 VII.

Thus far the able painter incurred no hazard in representing the truth. But a business remained of extreme difficulty and delicacy, to pourtray his own country; to exhibit the odious features in its constitution and politics, so that they might be acknowledged, and excite attention, without exciting a dangerous irritation. He has therefore begun with feigning to consider notice of Athens as needless, because, he says, Athens had been wise enough already, and before any other state, to make peace. Taking a wide circuit then through matters apparently little to the purpose, unless as they might conciliate by amusing, and so prepare patient attention among the many, he has proceeded at length, but with remarkable precaution, to describe the party of Chares without naming it: ‘I have omitted one matter,’ he says, ‘not forgetting it, but hesitating to open upon it; which yet I think ought to be done: for I reckon it will be advantageous to you to hear of it, and becoming me to proceed, in treating the subject before me with all my wonted freedom.’

Isocr. Or.  
 ad Phil.  
 p. 354.

This apology, addressed to the prince, has evidently had for its purpose to draw the minds of the irritable multitude to an idea that his resentment at what was to follow might be expected, when only theirs was really apprehended. Isocrates proceeds then: ‘I know there are men who, envying your great fortune, practised in exciting trouble in their several republics, and reckoning the common peace of others war against themselves, speak ill of you. These men, passing by all other things to comment on your

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

‘ power, represent it as raised, and now growing, not  
 ‘ for the benefit, but for the subjection of Greece;  
 ‘ which they say has long been your secret purpose.  
 ‘ You have promised to support the Messenians if you  
 ‘ succeed in settling the affairs of Phocis; but your  
 ‘ object, they contend, is to reduce Peloponnesus under  
 ‘ your dominion. The Thessalians, Thebans, and all  
 ‘ the states of the Amphictyonic confederacy are fully  
 ‘ prepared to follow you in any measures, and the  
 ‘ Argives, Messenians, Megalopolitans, and many  
 ‘ others, are ready to place themselves under your  
 ‘ orders for the conquest of Lacedæmon. This then  
 ‘ being effected, the rest of Greece, they observe,  
 ‘ will remain too weak for resistance.’ That this  
 formidable picture was a true one seems unquestion-  
 able: the fate of Greece was in Philip’s hands, and  
 all depended upon his disposition to use his power  
 well or ill.<sup>30</sup> Avoiding therefore any direct examination  
 of it, the orator proceeds to tell the many of what  
 kind of men they should beware: all bold pretenders  
 to knowledge of the secret counsels of other powers;  
 all those, from highest to lowest, who were greedy  
 of the profits of war and trouble; and not less those  
 who, as we find Demosthenes continually, claimed  
 the merit of a solicitude for the public good beyond  
 what the public felt for itself. In regard to Philip’s  
 purposes then at last he adds: ‘ What is reasonably  
 ‘ to be apprehended from one power is not always  
 ‘ reasonably to be apprehended from another, in  
 ‘ different circumstances. Were the king of Asia to  
 ‘ prepare war against Greece, the purpose might even  
 ‘ do him honor: but for one of the progeny of Her-  
 ‘ cules, the benefactor of all Greece, to do so, cannot

Isocr. Or.  
ad Phil.  
p. 356.

p. 358.

<sup>30</sup> Thus Æschines has observed of this crisis: ‘ Ἡ μὲν Τύχη καὶ  
 Φίλιππος ἦσαν τῶν ἔργων κύριοι. De legat. p. 288.



‘be equally for his interest, and, instead of honor, SECT.  
‘would involve him in the deepest infamy.’ VII.

He proceeds then to the bold proposal for Philip to take upon himself to be the peacemaker of Greece, and its commander in war against the barbarians. The manner of introducing this proposal has been admirably studied for obviating surprise and indignation among the many, for softening adverse and engaging favorable prejudices. ‘Possibly,’ says the orator, still addressing Philip, ‘you may reckon it ‘beneath you to regard the slanders and absurdities ‘that are vented about you; satisfied with your own ‘consciousness of integrity. But you ought not to ‘despise the opinion of the many, nor reckon it ‘a little matter to hold universal esteem. You may ‘indeed reckon that you have attained a fair and ‘great reputation, becoming yourself and your fore- ‘fathers, and the deeds of both, if you bring all the ‘Greeks to be so affected toward you as we see the Isocr. Or. ad Phil. p. 360. ‘Lacedæmonians toward their kings, and those in ‘immediate familiarity with you toward yourself. ‘Nor will this be difficult, if you will show yourself ‘the common friend of all, and no longer distinguish ‘some cities with favor, and others with the reverse; ‘and if moreover you will prosecute measures for ‘gaining the confidence of the Greeks by being formidable to the barbarians.’

Hence he passes to animadvert upon the reasonableness of hope for success in war against Persia; founded on former successes of the Grecian arms, and the actually distracted state of the Persian empire: adding the remarkable assertion that, for troops, there could be no difficulty to have them in any p. 370. number; because such was the state of Greece that a greater, and better army, might be more easily raised

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

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of exiles from the several republics than of those in actual enjoyment of the rights of citizens.

Hence again, under pretence of example and admonition to the prince, he passes to what might reconcile those among the Greeks, yet prejudiced against a Macedonian leader, and obviate the aversion and fear of those bred, whether in democratical or oligarchal principles, to look with horror upon royalty. ‘Three ‘great examples to the point,’ he says, ‘are before ‘you: your father, your great ancestor, the founder ‘of the Macedonian monarchy, and your greater ‘ancestor, the god Hercules, founder of your race. ‘If the two former could, and the latter would speak, ‘they would surely advise as I do. Your father was ‘the friend of all those states whose friendship I ‘recommend to you. The founder of the Mace- ‘donian monarchy sought command, not as many ‘have done, by sedition, massacre, and tumult in ‘their own cities: with a more liberal spirit, leaving ‘Greece, he acquired a kingdom in Macedonia; ‘knowing that the Greeks were unaccustomed to ‘bear monarchy, while other nations could not be ‘satisfied under any other form of government. As ‘thus in principles and practice, so in the successful ‘result, he differed widely from others. They, when ‘they have sought empire, not only have perished ‘mostly themselves, but their race has been extir- ‘pated; whereas he, after a fortunate life, has trans- ‘mitted his honors to a late posterity.’ Much following about Hercules, adapted, no doubt, to the Greeks of the time, cannot be equally felt by the modern reader. From the traditionary deeds of that hero the orator takes occasion again to dwell on the consideration of war with Persia, on the allurements of which, for the very large unsettled part of the

Isocr. Or.  
ad Phil.  
p. 378.

Greek nation, and the party of war and trouble everywhere, he appears much to have relied. He concludes then thus: ‘The sum of what I advise is  
 ‘this: That you act beneficially toward the Greeks;  
 ‘that you reign constitutionally over the Macedo-  
 ‘nians; that you extend your command as widely as  
 ‘may be over the barbarians. And thus you will  
 ‘earn the gratitude of all; of the Greeks, for the  
 ‘good you will do them; of the Macedonians, if you  
 ‘will preside over them constitutionally and not tyrannically; and of all others, as far as you relieve them  
 ‘from barbaric despotism, and place them under the  
 ‘mildness of a Grecian administration. Others must  
 ‘have their opinions of what the times want, and will  
 ‘judge for themselves how far what is here written  
 ‘may be adapted to them; but I am fully confident  
 ‘that no one will give you better advice, nor more  
 ‘accommodated to the existing state of things.’

SECT.  
VIII.Isocr. Or.  
ad Phil.  
p. 410.

## SECTION VIII.

*Effect of the oration of Isocrates. Measures of the king of Macedonia. Measures of the Phocians. Negotiation of all parties with Macedonia. End of the Sacred war. Judgment on the Phocians committed to the Amphictyons. Credit acquired by the king of Macedonia.*

The appeal of Isocrates, addressed to the reason of his fellow-countrymen, was weak against the measures of his opponents, who engaged them by their passions. The temperance of style, in public speaking and writing, and the uniform moderation in political contest, of the party of Phocion, gave occasion for the saying, attributed to Philip, that ‘Isocrates contended with a foil against Demosthenes with a sword.’ Nevertheless the sober remonstrance, in



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

the oration to Philip, seems not to have been wholly wasted, even in Athens; and where, over the greater part of Greece, neither similar passions, nor equal powers of eloquence opposed, it appears to have had still more efficacy. The disposition among the republics to co-operate with the king of Macedonia toward the establishment of peace throughout the country, and to place themselves under his lead for the purpose, was very extensive, and yet was put forward with nothing of the usual republican violence. His own conduct marked the completest respect for the venerable orator's admonition, and yet exhortation urging him to the undertaking seems not to have been unwanted. So little solicitous, as it is indicated by Demosthenes himself, was Philip to take the lead in settling the troublesome and invidious business of the Sacred war, that he invited the Lacedæmonian government to assume it, offering to leave the arrangement wholly to them. Why this was declined, both Macedonian and Lacedæmonian history failing, we are uninformed.<sup>31</sup> But Philip still delayed moving, while the siege of Halus continuing might afford him excuse to his impatient allies. That town at length surrendered upon terms; what we are not informed; but it is evinced by the very invective of Demosthenes that nothing of ordinary republican cruelty followed. The

Demosth. de  
leg. p. 365.

<sup>31</sup> Λακεδαιμονίους μετεπέμπετο, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐκείνοις ὑποσχόμενος πράξειν. Demosth. de legat. p. 365. The orator proceeds to say that Philip deceived the Lacedæmonians, but he has totally avoided to say how; for which it is difficult to assign a reason, but that he was unable. On the contrary, what he and his rival together have made known, rather indicates that the snare or ambush, ἔνεδρα, of which he speaks, as deciding the final measure of Archidamus, was his own work, or that of his party, in the business of the Phocian garrisons.

population was removed. It appears to have been rumored that, pretending to take the place for the Pharsalians, he would garrison it with his own troops for a check upon the Pharsalians; but he gave it up to them with a strict adherence to promise, or a liberality beyond promise, which still increased his popularity. The whole military force of Thessaly then, according to Diodorus, putting itself under his orders, he marched to Thermopylæ.

SECT.  
VIII.

Diod. 1. 16.

Thus the Sacred war was at length brought to a crisis, when the treasury of Delphi, originally the great object, was no longer worth contention. Still however various and great concerns remained; the possession of the temple itself with its oracle and sacred precinct, the place of meeting of the Amphietyonic council, and the seat of the Pythian games. With the decision of this possession would be determined the fate of the Phocian people and the dominion of the Phocian territory; and, what was the sum of all, the supremacy among the states of Greece could scarcely fail to be theirs who should finally prevail in this great contest. But while the enemies of Phocis had obtained the advantage of the Macedonian alliance, the powerful confederacy which had so long enabled her to withstand, and often nearly overbear her opponents, was distracted and almost dissolved, through mutual mistrust produced by the measures of the war-party at Athens. Phalæcus and his partisans could have no confidence in the Athenian government while there was reason to apprehend that the party of Demosthenes and Chares might obtain a superiority in the general assembly. They were also become jealous of Archidamus and Lacedæmon, apparently in consequence of new connexion, formed or apprehended, between the Athe-

nian war-party and the Lacedæmonian government.<sup>32</sup>

Æsch. de  
legat. p. 307.  
Isocr. Or.  
ad Phil.

The Theban forces joined the army under Philip. Meanwhile more than three-fourths of Peloponnesus was ready, on any encouragement from him, to fall upon Laconia itself. In this state of things resistance to the confederacy of which Philip was the head could hardly, with any reasonable hope of success, be attempted.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 308.

Nevertheless, even in this state of things, Philip did not cease to show a desire to bring the Grecian republics to conciliation, rather than proceed to the violences for which his allies were urgent. Of this disposition Phalæcus hastened to avail himself. It was not to be hoped that, under any arrangement which the actual circumstances would allow, he and his principal partisans could continue to live in Phocis. They were therefore glad to stipulate for leave to emigrate in safety, carrying with them their portable effects. On these conditions the critical posts of Nicæa, Thronium, and Alponus were surrendered to the king of Macedonia, and Phalæcus marched toward Peloponnesus. Greece was now open to the king of Macedonia and the Thessalians. The most vehement alarm immediately seized the inhabitants of those Bœotian towns which had engaged in the Phocian cause. They feared, not Macedonian sovereignty, but Theban vengeance. Hastening therefore to address supplication to Philip, they prayed that they, like the adherents of Phalæcus, might have permission, abandoning their houses and lands, to seek safety for their lives by flight. Nor was the aspect of things much less unfavorable for

Æsch. ut  
ant.

<sup>32</sup> This is indicated by Demosthenes in what he reports of the proposal for surrendering the Phocian garrisons, and also by Æschines.



the Phocians of the party adverse to Phalæcus : those who had fled on his restoration could not hope to return ; and if any had remained, they could little hope longer to remain in safety, obnoxious as they were to the Thebans for their connexion with Athens.

It is indeed indicated by Demosthenes that the principal Phocians very generally emigrated. Philip, interesting himself for all these, so differed with the Thebans and Thessalians, who were vehement for vengeance against them, that a coolness became apparent. Nevertheless he succeeded in procuring personal safety for all. The remaining Phocians, the larger part of the lower classes, participated in the common horror of subjection to the power of the Thessalians and the Thebans, but they declared their readiness to surrender themselves to the king of Macedonia. This was allowed them, and in his name exclusively possession was taken of all their towns. For what passed between Archidamus and Philip after the proposal to submit the Phocian business to the arbitration of Lacedæmon account fails. Demosthenes indeed says that Philip deceived the Lacedæmonians, but without adding the least intimation how ; and had there been any thing in any transaction really uncreditable to Philip, he would not have omitted mention of the facts, which should have supported the imputation. Nor is it likely that, had there been anything very uncreditable to Archidamus, notice of it would have wholly failed ; unless either public negotiation or private intrigue from Athens were implicated. Complete arrangement between the two kings indeed seems not to have been effected ; or not such as to obviate future misunderstanding. Archidamus however, clearly unable to interfere farther with any effect, withdrew, and was unmolested

SECT.  
VII.

Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 360. &  
366.

Æsch. de  
legat.

p. 303. 304.  
Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 360.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 59.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

in his march homeward. Phalæcus and his principal followers found a temporary refuge in Peloponnesus. The mercenary force under him divided. A part, following his fortune, engaged in new adventure where, among the widely spread settlements of the Greeks, in Crete, it is said, and in Italy, a demand for such troops occurred. Some had found service among the troubles of Eubœa. All quitted the former scene of action, and thus, after so many bloody struggles, during more than ten years, the Sacred war quietly ended.<sup>33</sup>

Diod. l. 16.  
Æsch. de  
cor. p. 481.

[B.C. 346.\*  
Cl.]

<sup>33</sup> Demosthenes, in his oration on the embassy, spoken within two years after the end of the Phocian war, says expressly that Philip took no Phocian town by siege or assault, but that all were surrendered to him by capitulation; Μηδεμίαν τῶν πόλεων τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι ἀλῶναι πολιορκίᾳ, μηδ' ἐκ προσβολῆς κατὰ κράτος· ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ σπείσασθαι πάντας.—Demosth. de legat. p. 360. In another part of the same oration, speaking of the demolition of the walls of the Phocian towns, he attributes that work expressly to the Thebans: τὰ τῶν Φωκέων τείχη κατεσκάπτετο· Θηβαῖοι δ' ἦσαν οἱ κατασκάπτοντες, p. 445. What then are we to think when we find the same orator, in a speech of twenty years after, and with another purpose in view, producing from among the records of the republic a letter purporting to have been sent by Philip to the Athenian people, immediately after the surrender of Phocis, in these terms: 'The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the Athenian council and people greeting: Know that we have passed Thermopylæ, and subdued Phocis: that we have placed garrisons in the towns that voluntarily submitted, and that, having taken by force those that resisted, we have destroyed them, and reduced the people to slavery.' Demosth. de cor. p. 238. 239. Did he, in the former speech, hazard falsehoods concerning public and notorious facts then recent, speaking then also in accusation, so that his adversary,

[\* B. C. 346. '... the Phocian war ended, ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Ἀρχίου, Diod. xvi. 59. at the time of the *Pythia*: Demosth. p. 380. ed. Reisk. After a duration of ten years: Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 45. 24. ed. Steph. τὸν δεκαετῆ πόλεμον.' In Ctes. p. 74, 37. δεκαετὴς γεγινώς. Diod. xvi. 59. διαμείνας ἔτη δέκα. Diodorus has three variations in speaking of this war: 1st. xvi. 14. ἐπὶ Ἀγαθοκλέους [B. C. 357.] ἐγένετο ὁ πόλεμος οὗτος ἔτη ἑνδεκα.—2nd. xvi. 23. ἐπὶ

SECT.  
VIII.

By these events the fate of Greece was placed very much in the king of Macedonia's power. But, through all the invective of the adverse orator, it is evident that he proceeded to use the power with a moderation unexampled among the republics, and with a consideration for the general constitution of the country, and for the several constitutions of all its various states, as if he would teach every one how to respect itself, and all how to support the independency and dignity of the nation. He came attended with a very small body of Macedonian troops: the Thes-  
 salians were in considerable force about him: the whole strength of Boeotia was at hand. It was expected, and demanded of him by his allies, that the Amphictyonic law should be carried into execution against the prostrate people: and it appears much implied by the orators that, if he would have assumed judgment to himself, little exception would have been

Demosth.  
Philip. 2.  
p. 69. &  
Philip. 3.  
p. 123.  
Demosth.  
de legat.

in his reply, which is extant, might have brought forward the recorded letter, had it existed, and which, had it existed, must then have been generally in memory? or was the letter, or the part of it above quoted, one of those forgeries or falsifications of public records, said to have been not unknown at Athens, which the orator might venture in the latter speech, when he was himself speaking in reply, and perhaps could not be answered till after the decision of the cause? or how otherwise is the contradiction to be accounted for?

<sup>6</sup> Καλλιστράτου [B. C. 355.] ὁ πόλεμος συνέστη καὶ διέμεινεν ἐτη ἑννέα.—3rd  
<sup>6</sup> ἐπὶ Ἀρχίου. (xvi. 59.) where he reckons it *ten* years. These variations are  
<sup>6</sup> consistent with the termination of the war. There were eleven years from  
<sup>6</sup> Agathocles to Archias, and nine from Callistratus to Archias. But the year  
<sup>6</sup> of Agathocles was the true date for the seizure of the temple, because three  
<sup>6</sup> historians all agree in the year of that archon. [See Mr. Clinton's remarks on  
<sup>6</sup> the date of the seizure of Delphi cited above, p. 266.] And, as the war ended  
<sup>6</sup> in the very first month of Archias, the actual duration was ten years, as all  
<sup>6</sup> authorities make it to be. Pausanias x. 3, 1. was led into an opposite error,  
<sup>6</sup> and placed the end of the war one year too high: δεκάτῳ δὲ ὕστερον ἔτει μετὰ  
<sup>6</sup> τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ κατάληψιν ἐπέθηκεν ὁ Φίλιππος πέρασ τῷ πολέμῳ, Θεοφίλου μὲν  
<sup>6</sup> Ἀθηναίων ἀρχοντος, ὀγδόῃ δὲ ἰλυμπιάδος καὶ ἑκατοστῆς ἔτει πρώτῳ.' Clinton,  
 Fasti Hellen. p. 140.]



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

taken; unless that the Thebans and Thessalians would have been dissatisfied with mild sentences. According to that constitution which all Greece had for centuries acknowledged in theory, though very little admitted in practice, the judgment should rest with the Amphictyons. But, apparently with a just consideration for equity as well as a liberal deference to those states which had professed resistance to the decrees of the Amphictyons on the ground that they acted under control, Philip invited a congress of deputies from all the states of Greece.<sup>34</sup>

Æsch. de  
legat. p. 271.  
Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 378. 379.

At Athens this appears to have been at the time generally acceptable, and the former ambassadors were mostly reappointed by the people. Æschines and Demosthenes were of the number; but Æschines obtaining excuse for sickness testified by the oath of his physician before the council of Fivehundred, Demosthenes refused the office.<sup>35</sup> For Æschines, his brother was substituted.

Ch. 39. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

As the breach widened between the parties of Phocion and Chares, the secession of Æschines from the latter, and addiction to the former, became decided and avowed. Being the most powerful speaker

<sup>34</sup> Diodorus, (l. 16. c. 59.) with his too ordinary deficiency, says that Philip consulted with the Bœotians and Thessalians. It is obvious that he could not avoid consulting with the Bœotians and Thessalians. But the assertion of Æschines, that ambassadors or deputies were invited from the republics generally, is corroborated by the account of Demosthenes, who says the Athenian people named ambassadors for the occasion: 'Ἀπεπέλλετ' αὖθις αὖ τὸ τρίτον τοὺς πρέσβεις ὡς τὸν Φίλιππον, — ἐχειροτονήσατε καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ ἐμέ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πλείους τοὺς αὐτούς. Demosth. de legat. p. 378.

<sup>35</sup> The expression of Demosthenes, in giving his account of this refusal, is ἐξωμοσάμην, literally, 'I swore off.' On what ground he swore off is not indicated by either orator.

of his new party, he stood of course in the most direct opposition to the leading orator of the other party, Demosthenes; and hence the violence of political enmity between them, to which, of all the celebrated orations transmitted from antiquity, we owe four the most celebrated, and, with them, the fullest and best information of the transactions, and especially of the politics of the times. Æschines's change of party furnished opportunity for invective, which Demosthenes did not fail to use. With the licentiousness of democratical oratory he continually imputed it to bribes from the Macedonian court. Æschines, less addicted to foul language, yet sometimes retorted with it in a way that the licentiousness of democracy only would allow. 'Demosthenes,' he says, 'mind and body, and every limb, was continually up at auction.' These mutual imputations, of the utmost familiarity in the political oratory of their day, prove nothing, and have no tendency to prove anything. Æschines might have his views to private advantage in quitting, as Demosthenes in adhering to the profligate party he was engaged with. But the secret ways of corruption are rarely open to the historian; nor is it necessary here to go beyond obvious and tangible matter for ground for the conduct of either orator. Envy at the superiority acquired by a younger, in the favor of Chares, in the favor of the multitude, and in consequent weight and importance, may have affected the mind of Æschines. But more creditable motives are also obvious; a foresight of the evils which the projects of Chares and Demosthenes, if unsuccessful, would bring upon Athens, and, if prosperous, upon all the rest of Greece; a dislike to continue in political society with those, however eminent for talents, who had already been

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

disgraced by disappointment in numerous uncreditable projects; a preference of the ready friendship of such men as Isocrates, Phocion, and Niceratus, and those with whom Isocrates and Phocion and Niceratus held friendship. On the other hand, what would lead Demosthenes to decline the office, to which the popular voice had appointed him, was the fear of leaving the assemblies, in a critical moment, to the unbalanced eloquence of Æschines, supporting the wisdom and approved integrity of Niceratus, Isocrates, and Phocion.

Æsch. de  
cor. p. 515.  
& 517.

The business referred to the congress which met at Thermopylæ<sup>36</sup> was of extreme complication and difficulty. The first object presenting itself was judgment on the Phocians; and this abounded with embarrassment. The Thebans, Thessalians, and some others, it was well known, were disposed to press severity; on the other hand, that large part of Greece, which had more or less supported or approved the opposition to Thebes and the Amphictyons, would feel involved, in censure at least, by any sentence against them. The restoration of the credit of the Delphian treasury then was what all would desire; but on the important question how it should be managed there would be much doubt and little agreement. Indemnification, for the states interested in the treasure which had been wasted, was also called for; but how

<sup>36</sup> That the meeting was at Thermoplæ is marked by Æschines in his oration on the crown, p. 515. & 517. ed. Reiske. On what ground Auger has given 'Delphes,' for Πύλαι, I cannot pretend to guess, nor how he could suppose Eubœa in the way from Delphi to Athens. From Thermopylæ the voyage by the Eubœan coast to the Attic was perhaps, at any time, the most commodious way of making the journey; and when Bœotia was hostile, and the season of the Pylæan or other truce did not give security, it would be almost the only way.



this should be provided would not be readily agreed.<sup>37</sup> The views of true Grecian patriots indeed would go still much farther; to provide for the future peace and union of Greece, without which the independency of each republic, and of all, must be utterly precarious. And here adverse prejudices, conflicting interests, difficulties of all kinds, presented themselves. But the matters on which early decision was most imperiously required were judgment on the Phocians, and arrangement of the business of the Delphian treasury. Perhaps it was no more than necessary, for the purpose of coming to any conclusion, and making any progress, that, after short deliberation, the congress resolved to refer these to the Amphictyons.

Regularity of proceeding, and respect for the ancient constitution of the nation, could hardly any other way be so well consulted as in committing the judgment to that formerly venerated national court of judicature. But to make it an impartial court, and to procure any general confidence in it, more than usual balance against the old preponderance of Thessalian votes, and the recent acquisition of Theban influence, was necessary. Nor was this unprovided for. The ministers returned to their several homes, to report past, and obtain instructions for future proceedings. At Athens no objection seems to have been made to the resolution of the congress: but now here was the sanction of the sovereign assembly obtained. The same embassy was reappointed, as an embassy to the Amphictyons.<sup>38</sup> The means of

Æsch. de  
legat.

<sup>37</sup> That these were objects is shown by Demosthenes, de legat. p. 347.

<sup>38</sup> Æschines calls both the missions, appointed to consider of judgment on the Phocians, embassies to the Amphictyons. The former of them is called by Demosthenes an embassy to Philip.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.Æsch. de  
cor.

the Amphictyonic body to enforce their decrees depended upon the support which the republics represented were able and willing to give. It was in the practice of the Amphictyons, in critical emergencies, to call all Greeks, at the time at Delphi on whatever authorized business, to assist with their advice; making them thus, in epitome, a kind of general assembly of the nation. But a congress of embassies would have more regular authority; it would be as a second house of national assembly; and would far more either control or add weight to the decrees of an assembly so partially constituted as that of the Amphictyons.

The contending orators, each giving an account of this interesting meeting, do not furnish the clear and full information which might be expected.<sup>39</sup> Whether in the council, or rather in the congress, or perhaps between the council and the embassies composing the congress, questions, it appears, were warmly debated.

<sup>39</sup> Demosthenes, ingeniously throwing out hints to his adversary's disadvantage, where he could venture nothing in plain terms that might not be in plain terms contradicted, describes things in half-sentences; and Æschines, always fearing to excite jealousy that his conduct had been directed by a disposition adverse to democratical despotism, (to which, in common with Phocion and Isocrates, and all the best men of Athens, he certainly was adverse,) often avoids to give any account, where much might be expected. It is remarkable, in the orations on the embassy and on the crown, that there is more eulogy of Philip from Demosthenes, his virulent enemy, than from Æschines, his friend. In his oration on the crown especially Æschines seems to have feared that every syllable, which might be construed into justification of Philip, would operate toward his own ruin; and even the panegyric that he has hazarded in his oration on the embassy, when he was supported by Phocion and all the principal men of his party, is not given as from himself, but put into the mouths of others. To such a degree was that true, which Isocrates ventured to declare, that democracy did not allow freedom of speech.

According to Æschines, some of the Amphictyons, from some of the smaller republics, were very rude, uneducated men. The animosity even of the Thebans against the Phocians was exceeded by the barbarous fanaticism of the rough highlanders of Cæta; who contended that, to appease the anger of the gods against the Greek nation, nothing of the full punishment, directed by the Amphictyonic law for sacrilege, should be remitted; the whole Phocian people, they insisted, should be destroyed by precipitation from the cliffs of the sacred mountain. Against such extreme intemperance however the measures already taken would in a great degree provide. The most obnoxious of the Phocians were already out of easy reach; some, as we have seen, with Phalæcus in Peloponnesus, some in other parts. But in the council and among the embassies the more liberal appear to have been a clear majority. The decree finally given, as it remains reported by Diodorus, seemingly neither unfairly nor very defectively, in these times may appear severe, yet, placed by the side of republican judgments, will show rather moderation, humanity, and clemency. It began regularly with laying a foundation for what was to follow, by declaring all the Amphictyonic rights of the Phocians forfeited. It directed then that the three principal cities of Phocis be dismantled, and all the other towns destroyed; that the people live in villages, not less than a furlong one from the other, and none consisting of more than fifty houses; that they surrender all heavy armour and all horses, and possess none till the debt to the god be paid; for the liquidation of which a yearly rent of sixty talents, nearly twelve thousand pounds sterling, was assessed on the Phocian lands.

Æsch. de  
leg. p. 310.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 60.

With as little severity thus as, considering the



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

state of Greece; it seems easy to imagine possible, all the principal objects of the congress, those which most interested the Greek nation, were provided for. The most eminent of the Phocians, as we are informed by Demosthenes, including probably most of the principal landowners, had already emigrated. Exile, that frequent lot of Grecian freemen, was evidently for them unavoidable. Their country was in course to be held subordinate, and deprived of means to renew the former violences against the temple and treasury, and the dangers ensuing to the conquerors. For them therefore, unarmed, to live in their country, surrounded by Thebans, Locrians, and Cœtæans with arms in their hands, could be little desirable. The deprivation of heavy armour and horses for those allowed to retain possession of the lands was then no more than an ordinary precaution among the republics against a defeated party even of their own fellow-citizens. To move the inhabitants of one town to another, we have seen also a common measure of policy; and to move the Phocians, mostly of the lower ranks only, from towns to villages, would probably be less felt as a severity than the previous forced migration of the principal Arcadian landowners to a city, which the boasted vindicator of Grecian freedom Epaminondas is said to have commanded, and which the Athenian republic, claiming to be the great patroness of democracy, afterward supported. For the remaining population then to pay the rent required, holding lands not before their own, was a mode of restoring the credit of the Delphian treasury, and doing justice to those who had suffered from the contest for it, apparently as little exceptionable as any which the circumstances of the times would have admitted. This remaining popu-

lation must then necessarily live so far in dependency as it was without means to defend itself against foreign invasion. But then all the neighbouring states had an interest in defending it, while their jealousies would prevent any one from commanding it; so that the Phocian people, in their villages, possessed perhaps a better independency than the Bœotian towns under Theban rule, or the aristocratical Arcadians under their democratical sovereigns.

It remained still to dispose of the right of double vote in the Amphictyonic assembly, which had been held by the Phocian people. Among those then whose cause the king of Macedonia had assisted, among the large part of the Greek nation which reckoned that by him the national religion had been vindicated, the political as well as the religious constitution maintained, the rights of the great national council asserted, and themselves preserved from subjugation, it could appear no immoderate compliment to give that right to a prince, the acknowledged descendant of Hercules, who had done so much for them. It was accordingly decreed that the forfeited double vote of the Phocians should belong to the king of Macedonia and his posterity.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 60. & 64.  
Justin.

As soon as judgment was declared against the Phocians, Dercyllus, one of the Athenian embassy, a friend of Chares, hastened home, leaving the rest of the embassy to deliberate on measures farther to be taken for establishing the tranquillity of Greece.

Demosth.  
de legat.  
p. 359.  
& 378.  
Æsch. de  
legat.

It happened that he arrived when an assembly of the people was, in regular course, held in Piræus, on the business of the naval arsenals. Alarm was infused among the multitude, as if the combined forces of Macedonia, Thessaly, and Thebes were on full march against Athens. The panic was such that a decree,

About 17  
August.

Demosth.  
de pace,  
p. 62. &  
Philip. 2.  
p. 69.  
& de cor.  
p. 238.

proposed to the sovereign crowd, was instantly voted, commanding all free inhabitants of Attica, without delay, to move their families from the country into one of the fortified towns, Athens, Piræus, Eleusis, Phyle, Aphidna, Rhamnus, or Sunium: it directed farther, that all those places be put into the best state for defence; and, the more to impress the popular mind, it was proposed, and the decree directed, that the sacrifice to Hercules, according to the established ceremonial for the beginning of a war, be performed in the city.

These measures may appear, on first view, democratical extravagances, unfit even for any serious party purposes. But the explanation remains from Demosthenes himself, in his account of the measures of his party which have been already related: the negotiation for placing the towns commanding the pass of Thermopylæ in the hands of the Lacedæmonians, and the plan for starving the Amphictyonic army by stopping its supplies. How far, and how timely, Philip may have had information of the extent of this hostile purpose, and of the preparation for its execution, we are not informed; but intelligence of transactions so public as those which followed the return of Dercyllus would of course quickly reach him. It produced a communication from him, in the usual form of a letter, to the Athenian people, testifying his surprise at their proceedings, and complaining of them as measures indicating the purpose of hostility, the most unprovoked and unjustifiable.<sup>40</sup> What answer was given to this letter is nowhere

Demosth.  
de cor.  
p. 239.

<sup>40</sup> This is the letter mentioned in note 33. of this section. In the latter part of it, stating the complaint, there is no appearance of falsification, similar to that which Demosthenes himself has given reason to suppose in the former part.



found; but circumstances enough indicate that it was such as the party of Chares, and not the party of Phocion, would suggest. Confidence between the Macedonian and Athenian governments must of course cease; and the Athenian embassy to the Amphietyons, (whether at Thermopylæ still, or rather removed to Delphi,) if before authorized, as Æschines indicates, to concur with Philip in lenient measures toward Phocis and the Bœotian allies of Phocis, and to support propositions of that tendency against the violence of the Thebans and Thessalians, would now be utterly uncertain what to expect from their own government; sure only that, if the party of Chares finally prevailed, they should be criminated for any concurrence in Macedonian counsels.

Nevertheless the congress, as the historian assures Diod. l. 16. us, proceeded in the line recommended by Isocrates, taking into consideration what was wanting for the general benefit of Greece, (toward which an extension of pacification would be a principal matter,) and passing decrees for the purpose. But Athenian support failing, (not perhaps what the Athenian embassy might be disposed to give, but what it could undertake that the government it represented would render effectual) necessity followed for yielding much to the Thebans and Thessalians. Philip could not, without certain rupture with Thebes and injury to his interest in Thessaly, procure the restoration of Plataea and Thespiæ, the towns from of old connected with Athens; nor could he obviate the exile of the Orchomenians, and other Bœotians, who had taken part with the Phocians. It was even said, so small was Demosth. the Macedonian force for attending him, compared with the Theban and Thessalian, and so violent a powerful party in Thebes, that even his person might

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

not have been safe, had he farther urged favor for those unfortunate people. On his part no violence was used or threatened. Bloodshed, even what law might have warranted, was completely obviated. Returning to his kingdom, he left the decrees which had been constitutionally passed to be constitutionally executed, under the direction of the Amphictyons. What then his own generosity could do to make amends to the unfortunate outcasts it is acknowledged was done. As many as would take refuge in his kingdom were kindly relieved, and provided with settlements. Nor did the invective of the Athenian orators avail over the greater part of Greece. On the contrary, wherever the Athenian war-party interest did not predominate, its purposes were observed with aversion and apprehension, and its invective rather excited opposition in panegyric of Philip, even to extravagance. To this the testimony of Demosthenes himself is so strong and so direct that it may perhaps outweigh all others. Even at Thebes, he says, the voice of those at the time prevailed, who joined the Thessalians, extolling Philip as their friend, benefactor, and preserver; and, throughout Greece, the people rejoiced in the peace, for which they readily acknowledged themselves indebted to him.<sup>41</sup> Thus warranted, the historian's large yet

Demosth.  
de cor.  
p. 238.

<sup>41</sup> The foul words with which the orator has studiously stained his eulogy sufficiently show that he meant no flattery: Οἱ μὲν κατὰ πτυσοὶ Θετταλοὶ καὶ ἀναίσθητοι Θηβαῖοι φίλον, εὐεργέτην, σωτῆρα τὸν Φίλιππον ἡγοῦντο· πάντ' ἐκεῖνος ἦν αὐτοῖς. Οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ "Ἕλληνες, ὁμοίως ὑμῖν πεφενაკισμένοι καὶ διημαρτηκότες ὧν ἡλπισαν, ἦγον εἰρήνην ἄσμενοι. Demosth. de cor. p. 240. The sense in which Demosthenes commonly uses the term φενακίζω seems most nearly to be represented in English by the cant phrase 'to hum.'

sober praise will command credit. ‘Philip,’ says Diod. l. 16. c. 60. Diodorus, ‘having concurred with the Amphictyons  
 ‘in their decrees for the common welfare of Greece,  
 ‘having provided means for carrying them into exe-  
 ‘cution, and having conciliated good will on all  
 ‘sides by his humanity and affability, returned into  
 ‘his kingdom, bearing with him the glory of piety  
 ‘added to that of military talents and bravery, and  
 ‘in possession of a popularity that gave him great  
 ‘advantage for future extension of his power.’

END OF VOL. VI.



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